The face-saving exit of the US from its protracted fatigued involvement in the Afghan theatre, which cost the country $3 trillion and blood of 2400 soldiers, was refurbished as the US Taliban peace deal signed on 29th February in Doha. Congenitally inept to turn the tide of war in its favor through military might, a typical US resorted to diplomatic overtures in the form of peace talks granting concrete major concessions to those Taliban leaders, who are placed on the US’s and UN’s terror list. Under the deal, the US will reduce its military footprint of 14,000 troops to 8,300 within 135 days followed by the complete withdrawal of all the US and foreign troops within the next 14 months. The US has further bolstered the Taliban’s standing by agreeing to release 5000 political prisoners by 10th march, the first day of intra- Afghan talks, and promised to delist Taliban from the US and UN sanctions list that entail travel bans, assets freeze, and arms embargo.
In return, the US hopes that the Taliban abides by an unenforceable promise of not harboring terror outfits like ISIS and Al Qaeda that threaten the security of the US and its allies and start negotiating with the Afghan political leaders to reach a national accord for the future governing system. To naively believe that the Taliban will cut its umbilical connections with Al Qaeda will be a major strategic mis calculus, considering that the Taliban gambled on their tenuous hold on power for protecting Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden only to face the wrath of US invasion in 2001. Any anticipated vagaries in the equation of Al Qaeda -Taliban ties are elusive as the Sirajuddin led Haqqani network shares deep bonhomie with Al Qaeda and its leader Ayman al Zawahiri has shared bayat or allegiance to Taliban’s leader Habitullah Akhunzada. The two may well augment their joint military operations against their common enemy, the Islamic State of Khorasan, as the group has staged a deadly comeback in Kabul attacking a gathering of politicians and local populace commemorating the killing of an ethnic Hazara leader. Apart from that, the US outsourced its counter-terrorism operations to that Taliban who never proved any discernible evidence of officially drifting away from Al Qaeda. In the event of raining attacks from the US and coalition forces, these ties will further strengthen at the crest. Further Taliban’s leadership due to its decentralized governing structures, factionalism has limited capacity to control battlefield actions as their commanders hail from diverse geographical and tribal constituencies.
The US – Taliban agreement has overwhelming use of the prefix of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan not recognized by the United States and Taliban” in a bid to not legitimize the Taliban. But this acted counterproductive, as the US might have officially conceded to Taliban’s authority or its role in the future political matrix of Afghanistan where it has asked Taliban to perform the government’s obligations of not issuing travel documents or providing refuge to those who endanger the security of the US and its allies. When just mainstreaming Taliban’s deputy leader Sirajuddin Haqqani was not enough, by offering him the editorial space in the venerable New York times, to whitewash Taliban’s barbaric self-righteous history of inflicting pain on the Afghans titled with the article “What we the Taliban want”, US without the concurrence of Afghan government, its principal ally, promised Taliban that their 5,000 fighters will walk free before the start of inta Afghan dialogue.
President Ghani, well cognizant, about how the release of these Taliban leaders might boost the Taliban’s fighting morale and military capabilities, refused to release them keeping in mind the harsh battlefield imbalance skewed in the favour of the Taliban. Perhaps in the wake of the political stalemate where his principal rival Abudllah Abdullah has discredited his victory in the principal elections thus enervating the prospect of the cohesive political front in negotiating with Taliban, he thought that prisoner card could have given the government a miniscule leverage when they negotiate political settlement with Taliban. Right after the signing of deal with the US , Taliban showed its true colors and issued directives to avoid hostilities against the US and foreign forces but to resume attacks on Afghan security forces which was met by a retaliatory response in the form of US airstrikes on Taliban.
As the US begins its withdrawal, Taliban will ramp up its operational tempo and pressure targeting the Afghan forces and even civilians which ironically wont be considered as the breach of the deal considering that Afghan lives are of less value and they will left on their own as the emphasis in the deal has only been given to the security of US and its allies. The risks of miscalculations run high for the Taliban as their strategy to increase skirmishes on the battlefield to retain the balance of power on ground can elevate the risk of reckless escalations, imperiling the lives of US forces. Such an event increases the probability that the US security establishment in the pursuit of their own security guarantees might think of leaving behind a residual intelligence and security presence which might well play out in the favour of Afghan government.
There is mention in the agreement that the US will act as a facilitator of intra afghan dialogue but if the Taiban- Afgan dialogue doesn’t lead to fruition of any sort of political arrangement within these 14 months , it wouldn’t have any impact on the US ‘s plan of phased withdrawal. This bears stark resemblance to the 1973 Paris Peace agreement when the US repackaged its military defeat against the North Vietnam Communist bloc as a peace deal leaving South Vietnam in the lurch leading to the fall of Saigon in 1975. With Trump’s administration’s abandonment of the Afghan government and the Syrian Kurds, the US rightfully championed Kissinger’s controversial statement that America has no permanent friends or enemies but only interest. While this is true for nearly every state in the world where realpolitik is the hallmark of any foreign policy, the US just proves it more explicitly and unabashedly than anyone else.
The fact that US had a timeline for its exit in the deal and didn’t push for an adherence or a strict timeline for a country wide ceasefire, which lays the groundwork for any neat peace agreements especially while dealing with non state thugs like Taliban says alot about much the US really cares for stable and prosperous future of Afghanistan. Before any peace talks, political will, systematic exchange of information on arms buildup , troops movement, establishment of observation posts , peace keeping forces, and opening of diplomatic channels for negotiations and most important ceasefire monitoring mechanisms form the fulcrum of any confidence building measures. But in this scenario , a seven day reduction in violence pact was the only litmus test the Taliban had to pass through to negotiate for the departure of foreign forces.
We can draw parallels with that of the developments in Idlib where the Sochi partners of Russia and Turkey respectively announced ceasefire in Idlib, the last rebel held stronghold, just to break them initiating revealing how cheap the life of Syrians is in today’s debilitating security landscape.
It is also worth to raise questions as to why the Kabul declaration with the Islamic Republican of Afghanistan and the Doha agreement with Taliban didn’t evince any mention of the preservation of the democratic progressive gains made in the last 18 years after the Taliban’s ouster since 2001? The US has shown its back by not fulfilling the moral obligation of protecting the rights of minorities and women in Afghanistan. It didn’t seek any guarantees from Taliban’s to uphold the liberties of these segments of societies once they set foot into the political mainstream even after Taliban’s repetitive insistence that they will protect their rights and freedom as governed by the strict interpretation of Islam.
Though the US has exemplified that it will nullify the agreement if Taliban doesn’t adhere to its promises prescribed in the deal, these can be simply idle threats considering that Trump in the crucial election year has to tantalize his support base by fulfilling one of its core election promise of bringing back home the US troops from all “endless wars” in the Middle east.
The US jubilation will eclipse over the misery of Afghans when they are already disillusioned with the country’s communal discord, rampant corruption, which has led to the loss of confidence in the state institutions and where violence and bloodshed with each passing is becoming a norm, simultaneously making them numb.
The intra afghan talks will face major stumbling blocks as Taliban will have a better bargaining position and the onset of challanges of accommodating the political visions of strange bedfellows, one coveted by Taliban to run the state through the rigid islamic sharia law, and the second, a democratic, inclusive and nationalistic model of Islamic republic of Afghanistan . For that, Abdullah and Ghani must first settle the power dispute to have an upper hand in the talks. Other contentious, hard pressing issues include the framework of the current democratic Afghan constitution , which is an anathema to Taliban, representation of the minorities and the demobilization or reorganization of the Taliban’s forces into Afghan security apparatus.
The most tenacious Afghans stood indomitable driving out Soviets, British, and US out of the country, but might be at war with themselves, as the cultural and multi ethnic make of the country, which raged a bloody civil war might prove as a voodoo if the second phase of intra afghan dialogues fails to materialize the prospect of peace in Afghanistan.
