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Parliamentary elections in Iran and how they affect domestic and global policies

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On February 21 the Islamic Republic of Iran held parliamentary elections to the country’s Majlis, a unicameral parliament known as Majlis of Islamic Council. Simultaneously, it held midterm elections of seven members of the Assembly of Experts.

Before analyzing the election outcome, it would be appropriate to say a few words about the peculiarities of the legislative power in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The specifics of legislative power in Islamic Republic of Iran

The longest section of the Iranian Constitution – Chapter VI – is devoted to the legislative branch of government, represented by the Majlis. In accordance with this chapter, the total number of parliamentary deputies is 290, of them 285 are elected by a general vote, one deputy is elected by the Zoroastrian and Jewish communities, two deputies are elected from the Armenian community and one representative is elected by the Assyrians and Christians.

Elections are held once every four years.

Under the current Constitution the parliament – Majlis – is authorized to initiate legislation in all spheres of human activity, to exercise control of the activities of top government officials (the president, ministers), including the appointment of ministers and hearings on their performance. Majlis has the right to carry out inquiries in any areas of public activity and is empowered to announce the impeachment of the president, demand that the president be removed from office, express a vote of no confidence in the government or some of its ministers. (The final decision rests with the Supreme Leader).

Parliamentary activity cannot run counter to the official state religion or the Constitution. Responsibility for ensuring that Majlis does not breach the Islamic principles or violate the Constitution lies with the Supervisory Board, or the Council for Monitoring the Observance of the Constitution.

This supra-parliamentary organ, the Supervisory Board, consists of 12 members, 6 of which (representatives of the Islamic clergy) are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the other 6 (lawyers) are appointed by the Majlis.

The main function of the Supervisory Board is to make sure that the bills, laws and activities of officials comply with the Constitution. The Council approves Majlis decisions on candidates for key posts, including the president, deputies of the Majlis, members of Islamic councils and government ministers. It has the right to return any bill for finalization by the Majlis or veto any parliamentary decision, as well as to make amendments to the Constitution.

The Supervisory Board is empowered to monitor the elections of members of the Council of Experts (the main function of which is to elect the Supreme Leader), the president of the republic, the Majlis, as well as referendums and other forms of expression of public opinion. The SB has the right to reject candidates for the presidency, for the Majlis or the Council of Experts, as well as to abolish laws that run counter to the Constitution and Islamic principles.

The history of Iran knows instances of acute differences between the Supervisory Board and the Majlis which de facto blocked the adoption of major laws and forced the government to work in a legislative vacuum. In order to avoid such deadlocks, the Expediency Council was set up in 1988 to consider the appropriateness of the decisions taken and make the final decision in the event of disagreement between the Majlis and the SB. In later years, the powers of this Council were expanded to embrace supervision of the activities of the executive, legislative and judicial branches, the armed forcesetc.

Throughout the entire history of the IRI the Majlis has been the center of debates and the scene of open (or closed) political battles. Opposition representatives use the Majlis to voice their discontent with the policies of president or the government.

The role of the Iranian parliament becomes clear from the fact that in the past 40 years there wasn’t a government proposed by the newly elected president and fully and unanimously approved by the Majlis at first go. Under pressure from the Majlis the presidents had to replace ministers or have them as acting ones.

Of course, the Iranian Majlis does not play a major role in political decision-making. Important decisions are usually the result of informal negotiations within the political and clerical elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the presence of the Supreme Leader, in his office, or in the High Council of National Security.

Nevertheless, the Iranian parliament creates the appropriate decision-making atmosphere and lays the foundation of political activity in the country. The Majlis is able to assist the activities of the government or, conversely, impede or even obstruct the implementation of executive agenda.

The specifics of political landscape in IRI

The specific feature of the Iranian political landscape since the second half of the 1980s has been the formation of three ideological trends in Islamic political discourse which reflected the presence of differences within the establishment on a number of issues. These ideological trends, which can be identified as liberal-reformist, pragmatic and radically conservative, after surviving numerous transformations and changing some of their positions, still determine the development of political processes in Iran. Each of these wings have their own flanks, their own factions of the moderate, the centrists and the radicals, who are  “waging battles” as well but within the framework of a single system of political values. Fairly often, representatives of these factions change their political coloring and join the ranks of their former opponents. For this reason, analysts signal the presence of only two political affiliations: the liberal – reformists and the radical conservatives. In all likelihood, this interpretation of the political scene in Iran makes sense, the more so since the presence, as said above, of moderate factions, the centrists and the radicals in these groups makes the political landscape in the country more complicated and at the same time more colorful.

For three decades, representatives of opposing factions alternately led the executive and legislative branches and tried to put their ideas into practice. At times, their rivalry escalated so much that it turned into a grave conflict which deteriorated to involve wider sections of the society but never to an extent when it could pose a threat to the stability of the regime. At the most critical times, the intervention of the Supreme Leader balanced the situation. It should be mentioned that the fierce political struggle between representatives of the opposing doctrines has been waged exclusively within the bounds of the Islamic regime, for its preservation, strengthening and prosperity (and, of course, for power). The differences can only be found in the tactics.

The Iranian Nuclear Program (INP) has become a major factor in the country’s foreign and domestic policy since the exposure of its secret aspects in 2003. The INP triggered the anti-Iranian resolutions of the UN Security Council in 2006-2010, as well as the introduction of international and unilateral sanctions against Iran, which led to a profound economic crisis of 2012-2015.

On the other hand, the INP led reformist liberals who insisted on “nuclear talks” into Iran’s power structures. In 2013, a liberal (by Iranian standards), Hassan Rouhani, assumed the presidency, formed a government of his supporters, brilliantly held talks with permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany and the European Union, in 2015 concluded a most important nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) , which led to the lifting of anti-Iranian sanctions. The spectacular victory of Rouhani became the  foundation of his policy, opening broad prospects for the development of Iran, for its participation in international cooperation.

However, the radical groups opposed to Hassan Rouhani, first of all, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), used their presence in the Majlis, as well as the Institute of Islamic Councils, primarily the Supervisory Board, to thwart Rouhani’s attempts to carry out at least limited reforms. Meanwhile, corruption and poor management (including of financial and economic processes) “ate away” at the opportunities provided by the JCPOA.

In these no-easy circumstances US President Trump dealt a blow against the JCPOA, removing the United States from the agreement and announcing sanctions against Iran. The blow came as devastating for the Iranian economy, striking at the standard of living of the Iranians, at the liberal reformatory wing of the Iranian political establishment, against the fundamental principles of foreign and domestic policy of President Rouhani.

The radicals saw their chance! The radical-conservative opposition, taking advantage of the moment, accused the president of inability to handle the situation and the entire country and launched preparations for assuming control of power.

Majlis Elections 2020   

Elections to the Iranian parliament have become the most important political event of  the year 2020. The radicals and conservatives went to the polls well-prepared.

First, let’s consider a few figures. Of the nearly 83 million Iranians, 57.9 million are eligible to vote. 54,611 polling stations were opened in 208 constituencies.

Of the more than 16 thousand bids for participation in the elections as candidates for parliamentary deputies (including from 782 women), 7148 were approved for 290 seats in the Majlis. The Supervisory Board disqualified 60% of the applicants, which marked the highest dropout rate since the 1979 Revolution. The overwhelming majority of the dropouts were representatives of the liberal reformists and moderate centrists. Among them were 90 members of the current Majlis.

As a result, many supporters of the reformists and of the moderate decided to boycott the elections. And not only them. Many Iranians could no longer trust the regime, the president, the government, and the Majlis, which had failed to do anything to improve the worsening conditions of ordinary citizens. It is necessary to add that this time the turnout was influenced by the coronavirus epidemic from Chinese Wuhan which seriously affected Iran. Some voters, especially those  politically inactive, might have refrained from going into the polls for fear of catching infection.

Indeed, the February 21 turnout turned out to be a record low in the entire history of the Majlis elections after the Revolution in Iran – 42.57% of the total number of registered voters (24.6 million people). The average for the previous 10 parliamentary elections was about 60%, while the minimum stood at 51%.

According to the election results, conservative radicals who call themselves “principalists”, that is, defenders of the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the legacy of the founder of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, won a crushing victory. According to estimates, they got 223 of the 290 seats possible. In the previous Majlis, there were about 120 representatives of the radical-conservative political wing.

The coalition of reformers and moderates managed to get only 20 seats. In the previous parliament, about 140 deputies represented their interests. Thus, their result worsened seven times.

Another 36 deputies are independent candidates, that is, they do not belong to either of the two camps. The fate of 11 more seats will become clear in the second round, which will be held on April 17. One representative of the reformers and one woman have a good chance to win, so the number of women in the new Majlis may increase to 17.

In Tehran, a coalition of conservatives and hard-liners led by the former mayor of the Iranian capital, Mohammad Bagher Halibaf , won all 30 seats granted to the city. Halibaf received 1.2 million votes. In the opinion of many political analysts,  he may become Speaker of the new Majlis.

The “principalists” won a victory, not least because of the low turnout. This victory raises the issue of the legitimacy of the future parliament. Observers indicate: of  the 24.6 million people who turned out 77% voted for the conservatives, that is, 19 million of the 57.9 million eligible to vote, which is one third. Such low support for hard-liners is fraught with serious consequences in the future. And, what is important is that reform supporters are clearly keeping a low profile.

A survey conducted by ISPA (Iranian Student Interview Agency) a few days before the election revealed that in Tehran, for example, the number of students who intended to boycott the election was double the number of those who were planning to go to the polls – 44% against 21 %.

So, conservative radicals took upper hand in the struggle for the Majlis. What’s next?

Possible scenarios for developments in and around Iran

The 11th Iranian Majlis will get down to work in May. Presumably, in the first months of its activity the “parliament of the hard liners” will not make any drastic political moves, especially in the international scene.

Top on the agenda will be domestic policies – preparations for the presidential election in May 2021. President Hassan Rouhani and his government, the only state body controlled by reformers, will be number one enemy for the radicals. Of course, impeachment of the president and resignation of the government would be a perfect option for deputies of the Majlis. But the Supreme Leader, in the current circumstances, is unlikely to allow such a political explosion with unpredictable consequences.

Most likely, the newly elected deputies will start a “cold war” against the president and his team in order to blemish the activities of the reformers and deprive them of any chance of vying for the presidency and stop any of Rouhani’s supporters from entering the new government, which will be formed by the new president in 2021 (after serving for two terms, Rouhani cannot run again).

Prior to the presidential elections the new Majlis is likely to completely block the activities of the president and his government and will change the country’s political agenda not in favor of moderate forces.

Undoubtedly, anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-Western propaganda will intensify. Measures will be tightened inside the country to prevent the penetration of Western ideology and culture. There will be a fierce fight against violators of Islamic principles and carriers of alien ideas.

As for foreign policy, the JCPOA will remain key. Two scenarios are possible in this respect.

The first, under which Iran is unlikely to perform any political somersaults, covers the period until the May presidential elections in Iran. This period also embraces the presidential elections in the USA in November 2020. Under this scenario, te “principalists” – anti-Westerners will still seek ways to address the issue of sanctions and the JCPOA as a whole, possibly through dialogue (with Europe and even with the USA ). After all, by and large, Tehran has no alternative but negotiations given that the economic and foreign policy position of Iran is becoming increasingly complicated. Not to mention the oil embargo, in 2019, not only trade with Europe collapsed by 74%. Hopes for finding an alternative in the East also crumbled: the long tentacles of American sanctions significantly cut down the volume of trade with China (-34%) and India (-79%).

In addition, Britain, France and Germany have launched a dispute resolution mechanism under the JCPOA, which could lead to the resumption of  international sanctions against Iran.

On the election day 21.02.2020, FATF after several warnings blacklisted Iran after President Rouhani failed to convince his opponents to ratify the Palermo Convention  and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Under the second scenario, the situation around the IRI may infuriate the radicals causing them to resort to extreme measures. Amid the intensifying differences with the West it could mean a withdrawal (possibly gradual) from the JCPOA, from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with lessening control over the INP from the IAEA.

Simultaneously, Tehran is likely to step up efforts to restore its nuclear infrastructure with a view to creating the conditions for the production of nuclear weapons.

This, as one might say, is the saddest option for the country. Presumably, neither Israel nor the United States will put up with Iran’s deliberate moves in the nuclear field with the prospect of an atomic bomb. They will surely try to get rid of such a threat by force. And this, of course, means a war.

Incidentally, the second scenario could take effect after the presidential elections in the USA and Iran, that is, upon completion of the first soft scenario. Though, before that, much can change in the world, in the Middle East and in Iran, where the “silent majority” may still manifest themselves and begin to act against the radicals.

However, whatever the scenario – soft or hard, Iran will likely be moving more and more away from progressive social and economic reforms at home. Led by the radicals, Tehran will expand the “hybrid war” against its regional and world opponents, and will toughen its foreign policy, which will become an explosive factor.

Hopefully, the pragmatic politicians, who are quite a few among the radical conservative bloc, will prevent the events from following the military scenario.

In general, we can state for sure that today in Iran we are witnessing the strengthening of the conservative wing of the Iranian establishment as a result of the influence of numerous internal and external factors, not least the aggressive and ill-considered policy of US President Donald Trump on  the withdrawal from the JCPOA and introduction of austerity sanctions against Tehran !

From our partner International Affairs

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Middle East

Iranians Will Boycott Iran Election Farce

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Iran and elections have not been two synonymous terms. A regime whose constitution is based on absolute rule of someone who is considered to be God’s representative on earth, highest religious authority, morality guide, absolute ruler, and in one word Big Brother (or Vali Faqih), would hardly qualify for a democracy or a place where free or fair elections are held. But when you are God’s rep on earth you are free to invent your own meanings for words such as democracy, elections, justice, and human rights. It comes with the title. And everyone knows the fallacy of “presidential elections” in Iran. Most of all, the Iranian public know it as they have come to call for an almost unanimous boycott of the sham elections.

The boycott movement in Iran is widespread, encompassing almost all social and political strata of Iranian society, even some factions of the regime who have now decided it is time to jump ship. Most notably, remnants of what was euphemistically called the Reformist camp in Iran, have now decided to stay away from the phony polls. Even “hardline” former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad realizes the extent of the regime’s woes and has promised that he will not be voting after being duly disqualified again from participating by supreme leader’s Guardian Council.

So after 42 years of launching a reformist-hardliner charade to play on the West’s naivety, Khamenei’s regime is now forced to present its one and true face to the world: Ebrahim Raisi, son of the Khomeinist ideology, prosecutor, interrogator, torturer, death commission judge, perpetrator of the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, chief inquisitionist, and favorite of Ali Khamenei.

What is historic and different about this presidential “election” in Iran is precisely what is not different about it. It took the world 42 years to cajole Iran’s medieval regime to step into modernity, change its behavior, embrace universal human rights and democratic governance, and treat its people and its neighbors with respect. What is shocking is that this whole process is now back at square one with Ebrahim Raisi, a proven mass murderer who boasts of his murder spree in 1988, potentially being appointed as president.

With Iran’s regime pushing the envelope in launching proxy wars on the United States in Iraq, on Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and on Israel in Gaza and Lebanon, and with a horrendous human rights record that is increasingly getting worse domestically, what is the international community, especially the West, going to do? What is Norway’s role in dealing with this crisis and simmering crises to come out of this situation?

Europe has for decades based its foreign policy on international cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the promotion of human rights and democratic principles. The International community must take the lead in bringing Ebrahim Raisi to an international court to account for the massacre he so boastfully participated in 1988 and all his other crimes he has committed to this day.

There are many Iranian refugees who have escaped the hell that the mullahs have created in their beautiful homeland and who yearn to one day remake Iran in the image of a democratic country that honors human rights. These members of the millions-strong Iranian Diaspora overwhelmingly support the boycott of the sham election in Iran, and support ordinary Iranians who today post on social media platforms videos of the Mothers of Aban (mothers of protesters killed by regime security forces during the November 2019 uprising) saying, “Our vote is for this regime’s overthrow.” Finally, after 42 years, the forbidden word of overthrow is ubiquitous on Iranian streets with slogans adorning walls calling for a new era and the fall of this regime.

Europe should stand with the Iranian Resistance and people to call for democracy and human rights in Iran and it should lead calls for accountability for all regime leaders, including Ebrahim Raisi, and an end to a culture of impunity for Iran’s criminal rulers.

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Powershift in Knesset: A Paradigm of Israel’s Political Instability

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The dynamics of the Middle East are changing faster than anyone ever expected. For instance, no sage mind ever expected Iran to undergo a series of talks with the US and European nations to negotiate sanctions and curb its nuclear potential. And certainly, no political pundit could have predicted a normalization of diplomacy between Israel and a handful of Arab countries. The shocker apparently doesn’t end there. The recent shift in Israeli politics is a historic turnaround; a peculiar outcome of the 11-day clash. To probe, early June, a pack of eight opposition parties reached a coalition agreement to establish Israel’s 36th government and oust Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. While the political impasse has partly subsided, neither the 12-year prime minister is feeble nor is the fragile opposition strong enough to uphold an equilibrium.

Mr. Netanyahu currently serves as the caretaker prime minister of Israel. While the charges of corruption inhibited his drive in the office, he was responsible to bring notable achievements for Israel in the global diplomatic missions. Mr. Netanyahu, since assuming office in 2009, has bagged several diplomatic victories; primarily in reference to the long-standing conflict with Palestine and by extension, the Arab world. He managed to persuade former US President Donald J. Trump to shift the American embassy from Tel Aviv to the contentious city of Jerusalem. Furthermore, he managed to strike off the Palestinian mission in Washington whilst gaining success in severing US from the nuclear agreement with Iran. To the right-wing political gurus, Mr. Netanyahu stood as a symbolic figure to project the aspirations of the entire rightest fraction.

However, the pegs turned when Mr. Netanyahu refused to leave the office while facing a corruption trial. What he deemed as a ‘Backdoor Coup Attempt’ was rather criticized by his own base as a ruse of denial. By denying the charges and desecrating the judges hearing his case, Mr. Netanyahu started to undercut the supremacy of law. While he still had enough support to float above water, he lost the whelming support of the rightest faction which resulted in the most unstable government and four inconclusive elections in the past two years.

While Mr. Netanyahu was given the baton earlier by President Reuven Rivlin, he failed to convince his bedfellow politicians to join the rightest agenda. Moreover, Mr. Netanyahu probably hoped to regain support by inciting a head-on collision with the Palestinians. The scheme backfired as along with the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the tremors overtook Israel’s own Arab-Jewish cities resulting in mass chaos. The burning of Mosques and local Synagogues was hardly the expectation. Thus, both the raucous sentiment pervading the streets of Israel as well as the unstable nature of the Netanyahu-government led the rightest parties to switch sides.

As Mr. Netanyahu failed to convince a coalition government, the task was handed to Mr. Yair Lapid, a centrist politician. While the ideologies conflicted in the coalition he tried to forge, his counterparts, much like him, preferred to sideline the disputes in favor of dethroning Netanyahu. Mr. Lapid joined hands with a pool of political ideologies, the odd one being the conservative Yamina party led by the veteran politician, Mr. Naftali Bennett. While Mr. Lapid has been a standard-bearer for secular Israelis, Mr. Bennett has been a stout nationalist, being the standard-bearer for the rightest strata. To add oil to the fire, the 8-party coalition also includes an Arab Islamist party, Raam. A major conflict of beliefs and motivations.

Although the coalition has agreed to focus on technocratic issues and compromise on the ideological facets, for the time being, both the rightest and the leftish parties would be under scrutiny to justify the actions of the coalition as a whole. Mr. Bennett would be enquired about his take on the annexation of occupied West Bank, an agenda vocalized by him during his alliance with Mr. Netanyahu. However, as much as he opposes the legitimacy of the Palestinian state, he would have to dim his narrative to avoid a fissure in the already fragile coalition. Similarly, while the first independent Arab group is likely to assume decision-making in the government for the first time, the mere idea of infuriating Mr. Bennett strikes off any hope of representation and voice of the Arabs in Israel.

Now Mr. Netanyahu faces a choice to defer the imminent vote of confidence in Knesset whilst actively persuading the rightest politicians to abandon the coalition camp. His drive has already picked momentum as he recently deemed the election as the ‘Biggest Fraud in the History of Israeli Politics’. Furthermore, he warned the conservatives of a forthcoming leftist regime, taking a hit on Naftali colluding with a wide array of leftist ideologies. The coalition is indeed fragile, yet survival of coalition would put an end to Netanyahu and his legacy while putting Naftali and then Lapid in the office. However, the irony of the situation is quite obvious – a move from one rightest to the other. A move from one unstable government to a lasting political instability in Israel.

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The Gaza War

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Destruction in Gaza following an Israeli strike in May 2021. UNOCHA/Mohammad Libed

On May 22, 2021, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei’s website, posted a congratulatory message from one of the Hamas group’s leaders, Ziad Nakhaleh. In his message, Ziad Nakhaleh addresses Khamenei and says, “Qasem Soleimani’s friends and brothers, especially Ismail Ghani (Iran’s IRGC commander) and his colleagues, led this battle and were present with us during our recent conflict with Israel. … We pray for the preservation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its brave soldiers.”

Since the regime’s establishment 42 years ago, Iran has been instrumental in inflicting war and chaos regionally. When Iran finds itself cornered and entangled with its internal problems or facing an impasse, a war or bloody conflict gets ignited by the regime to divert the Iranian people’s attention. This undeclared policy of the Iranian regime frees itself from the most pressing internal issues, even temporarily.

Today’s Iranian society is like a barrel of gunpowder ready to ignite. Last year, the Iranian parliament declared that more than 60 percent of Iranians live below the poverty line. According to the media close to the regime, close to 80% of the population below the poverty line this year. It is worth mentioning that Iran is one of the top 10 wealthiest countries globally, despite the challenges of the current sanctions.

This poverty is mainly the result of rampant institutionalized government corruption. According to Qalibaf, the current speaker of Iran’s parliament, only 4 percent of the population is prosperous, and the rest are poor and hungry. The two uprisings of 2017 and mid-November 2019 that surprised the regime were caused mainly by extreme poverty and high inflation. The regime survived the above widespread uprisings by opening direct fire at the innocent protestors, killing more than 1500 people. There is no longer any legitimacy for the regime domestically and internationally.

The explosive barrel of the Iranian discontent is about to burst at any given moment. To delay such social eruption, Khamenei banned the import of COVID-19 vaccines from the US, Britain, and France, hoping the people will be occupied with the virus and forget about their miserable living conditions.

On the other hand, the Iranian regime is in the midst of new negotiations with the western countries regarding its nuclear program. These negotiations may force the regime to abandon its nuclear plans that have cost billions of dollars, its terrorist activities in the region, and its ballistic missiles stockpile. This retreat will inevitably facilitate the growth and spread of the uprisings and social unrest across Iran.

The Deadlock of the Regime

The regime is facing an election that could ignite the barrel of gunpowder of the Iranian society. In 1988, when Khamenei wanted to announce Ahmadinejad as the winner of the presidential ballot boxes but faced opposition from former Prime Minister Mousavi. Widespread demonstrations were ignited. The same scenario is repeating itself in this year’s presidential election, where Khamenei intends to announce Raisi as the next president of Iran. There is a legitimate fear that demonstrations will ignite once again.

To avoid the happening of the same experience, Khamenei is forced to make an important decision. Like any other dictator, he pursues a policy of contraction during these challenging and crucial times, deciding to favor those loyal to him and his policies. Khamenei needs a uniform and decisive government to exert maximum repression on the Iranian people.

By disqualifying the former president (Ahmadinejad), the current vice president (Jahangiri), and most importantly, his current adviser and speaker of the two parliaments (Larijani), he has cut loose a large part of his regime. One way or another, Khamenei’s contraction policy is going to weaken his grip on power.

On the other hand, the Iranian regime must comply with the West’s demand for nuclear talks. In 2021, the political landscape is entirely different from 2015 in the balance of regional and global forces. The regime’s regional influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria has been severely weakened.

There is an explosive situation inside Iran. The resistance units spread throughout Iran after the 2019 uprising and have rapidly increased in recent months. They are spreading the message of separation of religion from the government, plus equality between men and women in a society where women do not have the right to be elected as president or a minister. The resistance units call themselves supporters of Maryam Rajavi, the Iranian regime’s sworn enemy. These units can direct a massive flood of people’s anger towards the Supreme Leader’s establishments with every spark and explosion.

Khamenei wanted to force the West to lift all sanctions and demonstrate a show of force within Iran and the region by initiating the Gaza war. The Gaza war was intended to divert the attention from Khamenei’s decisions on Iran’s presidential election. In this situation, the regime wanted to break its presidential deadlock by firing rockets through Hamas and carrying out a massacre in Israel and Palestine.

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