Trump’s visit: A trap to push India into`sphere of influence’

US president Trump received an over-ebullient welcome in India. An,  ostensibly,  private trust Donald Trump Nagarik Abhinandan Samiti (Donald-Trump Welcome Committee) organised Trump’s welcome in  Gujarat at cost of Rs. 120 crore.

India has for long been a champion of `non-aligned movement’. It is now hankering after politico-strategic alignments for short-term gains. In so doing, it is unmindful of the pitfall that it is falling into US `sphere of influence’ (SOI).

The SOI are international formations of an `influencer’ and one or more `influenced’ countries. Such a nexus should be ideational, economic and, at least ostensibly, non-coercive. For instance, Monroe doctrine postulated much of central and South America, and Japan in the US SOI (now Australia, Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam also included). China’s SOI includes North Korea. Kautliya also propounded a similar concept of mandala (inter-reltionships or circles), akin to the SOI.

Susanna Hast, in her book Spheres of Influence thinks though SOI are unacceptable from international norms, they serve as a “device” for limiting the danger of armed conflict between superpowers’. I, for one, believe that the SOI’s have pushed the post-cold-war world closer to a confrontation.

The stakeholders today are not weakling countries.  Through the SOI, the USA is trying to forestall China’s rise as a rival power by year 2027. China is weary of its encirclement by US network of allies like Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. China’s strategy is to prevent US forces from effectively operating near over China or East or South China Sea.

Disputed islands: Senkaku group of five disputed islands is at the heart of Sino-Japanese sovereignty dispute. Three of the component islands (Uotsurishima, Kita-Kojima and MinamiKojima) were privately owned by Kurihara family. Japan bought them for 2.05 billion yen ($26 million). After a few years of stasis, punctuated by domestic protests, Beijing began escalating its intrusions into sea around the islands.

Natuna islands of Indonesia are another Apple of Discord. Chinese coast guard vessels have been escorting dozens of their fishing boats into the exclusive economic zone around the Natunas. Natuna represents the southern edge of the South China Sea dispute between China and a number of Southeast Asian nations.

Indonesia deployed warships, submarines and fighters until the intruding vessels pulled back.

Malaysia, has filed new maritime territorial claims with the United Nations immediately triggering a response from Beijing. Indonesia invoked the UN Law of the Seas as part of a concerted use of lawfare to hem in China.

To enhance its maritime movement, China has established its first foreign military base in the East African nation of Djibouti, another in Mombasa, and a third, debatably, at Vanuatu.

Irritants: Even if India falls firmly into the USA’s SOI, some problems will remain intractable. These include installation of six nuclear plants by Westinghouse, now bankrupt, in India. Trump’s son in law has shady involvement in the deal.

Trade issues: India is now the eighth-largest trade partner of USA.  The number of Indian students in the US and the number of US companies active in India have both grown. For most US-based tech giants, India is now one of their top three customer bases. Indian companies are investing heavily in the US.

Yet, the US has declared India ineligible for the generalised system of preferences, a market access vista. Besides, there are differences over e-commerce, data localisation and digital payments.

Domestic opposition: Pramila Jayapal, Indian-American Congresswoman from Washington state, has criticised India’s violation of minorities’ right to religious freedom, its Kashmir policy and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, and the National Register of Citizens. Presidential frontrunner Bernie Sanders demnded, “Instead of selling $3 billion in weapons to enrich Raytheon, Boeing and Lockheed, the U.S. should be partnering with India to fight climate change.”

Sino-Indian relations in flux: USA wants to take advantage of low-ebb Sino-Indian relations.  The last coffin in the relations is India’s cartographic aggression of amending maps to show Chinese territories as Indian. India has several boundary disputes with China.

McMahon Line: Upon independence, British legacy was a boundary dispute with China in the east in the form of McMahon Line “by treaty, custom or both’, exacerbated by India’s claim of disputed Kashmir state’s accession on October 26, 1947 (historian Alastair Lamb doubts authenticity of the `instrument of accession’).

India’s prime minister pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru was adamant that  `India’s boundaries with China were clear and not a matter off further argument’(Notes, Memoranda and Agreement Signed between the Government of India and China, White Paper II, 1957 (new Delhi, Ministry of external Affairs, government of India, 1959), p. 49, 52-57). China shrugged off India’s point of view.

Border incursions: Both countries accused each other of border violations. India alleged People’s Liberation Army often trespassed Hoti, Damzen, Shipki Pass, Lapthal and Sangcha Malla by 1954. To create a nation-wide furor, Nehru told Indian parliament on August 25, 1959 that a Chinese detachment encroached into Indian Territory of Longiu in the Subansiri frontier Division at a place south of Migyitunand opened fire. Inlate1950s,

The 1962 War

Nehru and Zhou En Lai met in New Delhi from April 19 to 25 1960 to defuse the situation. But, it was in vain. The boundary dispute led to October 1962 War. In the short war, China occupied Aksai Chin, an uninhabited area of Ladakh in disputed Kashmir state, close to Azad Kashmir area. After occupying Aksai Chin, China built its Highway219 to connect with its eastern province of Xinjiang.

Why Sino-Indian bonhomie ended: The 1962 War was upshot of Indi’s Forward Policy, propounded by Indian’s General BM Kaul, and reluctantly followed by Nehru. According to this policy, India provocatively deployed troops and established b order outposts along India-China boundary. To justify deployment, India alleged China had built seven roads inside the Indian territory of Ladakh, several roads being close to India’s border in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, six in Sikkim and Bhutan borders, and eight in the North East Frontier Agency. It was further alleged that China had established seven new posts in Ladakh, 14 in the Central Sector of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, 12  across Sikkim and Chumb Valley, and three across NEFA.

Contours of Disputed border: Sino-Indian boundary is divided into three sectors, eastern western and the middle. The border dispute relates only to the western and eastern sectors. Western sector covers 4000 kilometers. Half of this boundary separates disputed Kashmir from China’s north-western province, province Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. In the undefined northern part of the frontier, India claims an area equivalent in size to Switzerland under China is actually part of Indian Territory of Ladakh. Besides, Indian claims a Chinese controlled territory that was debatably ceded to China by Pakistan in the northern sector. Furthermore, Shakasgam Valley was claimed by India but later happened to be shown as Chinese territory in China Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963.

China’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh: China claims an Indian controlled area three times bigger, including most of Arunachal Pradesh. China never ratified McMahon Line.

Since inclusion of Tibet in China, Arunachal Pradesh is a buffer between Tibet an India’s north-eastern region.

Twang Region: China disputes Indian claim that Tawang region is a part of Indian Territory, showed as such in McMahon Line. China says Taiwan had historically been a part of Tibet. By corollary it is a part of China.

The Sino-Indian dispute began from Taiwan region. In view of India’s hardline position, China began to claim whole state of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory.

India’s equivocal China policy: The hallmark of India’s foreign policy towards her neighbours is equivocation. India’s China policy is ostensibly based on Panchsheel principles that are mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference and peaceful existence. But, it is actually based on Chanakya’s mandala principle which states ‘all neighbouring countries are actual or potential enemies’.

The duality of India’s foreign policy is reflected in her relations with China. Atal Behari Vajpayee, then Indian prime minister, is extolled as `architect of India’s China policy’. During his visit (June 2003) to China, he admitted China’s suzerainty over Tibet. Even in a written statement before the Lok Sabha, he said, ‘On Tibet, I would like to assure this House that there is no change in our decades old policy. We have never doubted that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China”. But, in a subsequent press conference, he clarified that there was no cataclysmic change in the status quo and India’s views on disputes with China.

After the visit, the Indian delegation told newsmen that ‘the Chinese draft wanted India to use the word “inalienable” for both Tibet and Taiwan being part of its territory, but India did not go the whole hog with this phraseology. Frontline dated July 18, 2003 reported, ‘Indian officials were at pains to point out that they had used the term “People’s Republic of China”, and not China- the PRC being an entity that came into existence in 1949’.

“What was the status quo? Kiran Kumar Thaplyal and Shiva Nandan Misra in Select Battles in Indian History: From Earliest Times to 2000 A.D (Volume II, page 632), point out ‘India gave major concession to China by giving up military, communications, and postal rights. It also withdrew military detachments from Yatung and Gyantse. By this treaty (1954) India indirectly recognized Chinese sovereignty (as against suzerainty) over Tibet referring to the latter as Tibet region of China’.

India’s intrusions into the Chinese territory are a stark contradiction of her status quo concerning the Chinese territory adjoining her so-called state of ‘Arunachal Pradesh’. The after math of the India-China War, also, was acceptance of Chinese point of view by India.

The vicissitudes of India-China Relations (1950 – 1962) reflect that India unquestioningly accepted China’s control of Tibet. India’s policy on Tibet during the British rule was to secure Tibet as a buffer state between India and China (fear of red China and the then USSR).

Yet, to China’s chagrin, India spurred Tibetans to expe1 the Chinese mission from Lhasa in the middle of 1949. This event forced the Republic of China in January 1950 to claim Tibet as part of China. Induction of Chinese army into that region in October 1950 vapourised the Englishman-conceived buffer between India and China.

India made muffled protests and then, according to military historians, ‘meekly acquiesced’ to China’s forward policy. In November 1950, when EI Salvador requested that Tibetans plea be heard by the United Nation, the Indian delegate did not support it. United States and Britain could not exploit the issue as India, China’s immediate neighbour, did not vote for Salvadorian proposal.

In March 1959, Dalai Lama fled to India, and was given asylum along with his followers. The New China News Agency accused India of ‘expansionist aims in Tibet’. Indian border post of Assam Rifles at Longju was evicted by the Chinese by force. In the Western Sector, the Indian government decided to set up posts north east of Leh.

India sent patrols to Lanak Pass. One of these patrols of about seventy men encountered the Chinese at Kongka Pass. On 20 October the Chinese and Indian patrols clashed. The flight of the Dalai Lama into India in 1960 and clashes between rival patrols led to a border war between India and China in 1962.

Inference: Duplicity in India’s foreign policy is the greatest obstruction to peaceful resolution of her disputes with her neighbours. She never tangibly objected to Chinese control of Tibet or construction of communication links in the area. Never invoked intervention by UNO on this matter. Yet, she sheltered Dalai Lama, and sent patrols into Chinese territory, leading to India-China War. India considers Kashmir issue to be a bilateral dispute. Yet she does not like to sit eye-ball-to-eyeball with Pakistan on dialogue table. She boasts of friendly relations with Bangladesh. But, simultaneously accuses the latter of providing sanctuaries to Indian ‘terrorists’ and ‘insurgents’ in BD territory. About Bhutan, the Indian strategic analysts say, if India does not annex it, China will.

Inference: India is wooing the USA to win her blinker-eyed support on Kashmir issue and repression of religious minorities.

Amjed Jaaved
Amjed Jaaved
Mr. Amjed Jaaved has been contributing free-lance for over five decades. His contributions stand published in the leading dailies at home and abroad (Nepal. Bangladesh, et. al.). He is author of seven e-books including Terrorism, Jihad, Nukes and other Issues in Focus (ISBN: 9781301505944). He holds degrees in economics, business administration, and law.