The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a new strategic theatre in the 21st century. In this geopolitical construct, India occupies a prime place and it has provided the country with a platform to project its power and influence beyond the traditional South Asian region. Besides, it facilitates India to move up in the ladder in the international power configuration. It was a natural extension of India’s Look-East policy launched in the early years of the post-Cold War era to integrate the Indian economy with the East Asian economic dynamism and lately it has been extended into the strategic domain as India’s strategic relationship with fellow democratic countries in the region grew stronger. India is now an original member of almost all regional security mechanisms of the region. This has been a major shift in the approach of regional countries because in the past India was excluded from the Asia-Pacific construct and was not considered a part of the region, politically and economically.
India embraced the Indo-Pacific construct despite it being an American initiative for widening its hub and spoke network beyond its traditional alliance system and bring India into the new security architecture under the US leadership. The US has enthusiastically supported the growth of India-Japan strategic cooperation, which formed the basis of the Indo-Pacific construct. It has resulted in India’s increasing strategic engagement with the Pacific littoral countries and enhancing India’s profile on security issues in the region. The formation of the quadrilateral security dialogue (quad) mechanism is the culmination of the idea that major powers take more responsibility to preserve peace and stability in the region.
A major reason for India’s interest in the Indo-Pacific construct has been the pre-eminent role that other countries have accorded to India in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). Such recognition by other major powers is a key indicator in judging India’s status in the larger international power configuration. At the same time, India believes that partnering with the US, especially in the Indo-Pacific construct would help it acquire advanced defense technology necessary to counter the challenges emanating from its
traditional rivals such as Pakistan and China. However, India’s enthusiasm in strengthening the quad and treating the Indo-Pacific framework as a beneficial geopolitical sphere is diminishing. Instead, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy now focuses on to the western part of the Indian Ocean.
There are three main reasons for this change of attitude: firstly, for India, the existing Indo-Pacific is complex and security driven. The fundamental objective of free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept is to preserve rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, but it is inextricably linked to alliances and containment strategies, which India has never been a party to. Secondly, for New Delhi, the existing Indo-Pacific construct is characterised by Sino-American rivalry for regional dominance. India does not want to be entangled in this competition. India doesn’t want to be seen as against China as the construct itself is being touted as anti-China mechanism by China. Officially, New Delhi doesn’t consider that China’s increasing naval activities in the Indian Ocean is to contain India’s maneuverability in its backyard. India’s newly appointed first Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat has downplayed the concern raised by the naval fraternity that China’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean region is not against India but to protect China’s legitimate interest in the region.
New Delhi engages with both countries-albeit in varying degrees-but expects the US to remain as the most powerful nation in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, New Delhi’ naval capability is not sufficiently enough to manage its security interests in both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. The existing multilateral mechanism under the leadership of ASEAN supported by the US preponderant power could well preserve the rules based order in the Indo-Pacific. And thirdly, strategically, the existing Indo-Pacific comprises eastern half of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific but India considers it inclusive and more wider extending from the Americas coast to the African coast – call it ‘extended Indo-Pacific’, which include Russia, eastern coast of the Pacific , West Asia, and African coastal states. This will bring India’s traditional defence partner Russia into the construct and also it could dispel China’s concerns.
India’s ‘look-west’ policy and enhanced cooperation with the EU
India looks to avoid a spill-over effect of the US-China rivalry in the western Pacific into the Indian Ocean or a direct competition between the India and China. At the same time, Chinese increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean region is a great concern for India. To prevent China getting strategic influence in the Indian Ocean, India is building a coalition of littoral countries as well as enhancing its cooperation with the European Union. Britain, France and Germany have already shown their interests by raising their profile in the Indo-Pacific, with freedom of navigation operations. Since EU have already made its presence in the western part of the Indian Ocean by participating in the anti-piracy operation and doesn’t have any hegemonic ambition, a strong naval cooperation between India and EU bodes well. Britain and France have legitimate stakeholder status in the Indian Ocean region and India’s defense partnership with both is also progressing well.
Since US commitment to providing guarantee for regional security is diminishing, instead, the Trump administration demands regional countries to take more responsibility both financially as well as militarily, an India-EU strategic partnership would be able to preserve the rules-based order in the India Ocean region. India has now become a reliable strategic partner for the US in the Indian Ocean region so much so that US allies are also inclined to partnering with India. For India’s part, it is ready to cooperate with all major powers that have a legitimate interest in the Indian Ocean region. Under its ‘look-west’ initiative India has recently strengthened relations with countries of the western Indian Ocean which include island countries, African coastal states and West Asia.
The geo-economic situation of the western Indian Ocean region demands a close cooperation between EU countries and India. India has promulgated security and growth for all in the region (SAGAR) as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) targeting the western part of the Indian Ocean rim and islands with a leadership undertone. As an alternative for the ‘debt trap’ which the BRI has turned into, India has taken infrastructure projects both bilaterally and with a third party in the island nations and littoral countries which include Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (ASGC) with Japan. As of 2018, Chinese companies have participated in the construction and operation of a total of 42 ports in 34 countries under the Silk Road scheme, and between 2016 and 2017Chinese firms announced around US$20 billion-worth of investment in nine overseas ports. India cannot match with China’s financial muscle power so it requires economic cooperation with EU.
