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Ukraine: Geopolitical View of the Interested International Actors

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The geopolitical position of Ukraine at the current stage of development of international order is complicated and somewhat challenging. The country is in the zone of interest of the USA and the Russian Federation, as well as Europe. This makes it a point of contention between powerful international actors.

The first question is — why it is so difficult to find a shared vision for the solution of the conflict? In the discourse of all the sides of the conflict, we see intent on finding and realising a solution. The main problem is the lack of trust between all parties, lack of trust between Russia and western countries. Trust between the Ukrainian and western elite is higher, but also contains some elements of alertness. Trust was destroyed from all the sides, both Russian and western. The situation is complicated by misunderstandings regarding intentions and proposals.

When we are in the situation of crisis — it means a lack of trust between the parties of the conflict. The question is how we can rebuild trust and further negotiations. The discourse in official media and official government statements show the intention to continue the dialogue, but at the same time, we see that the dialogue is quite difficult.

What is it trust? — It is a opportunity to predict the behavior of the trusted partner [1]. The previous behaviour of the partners is not a good base for trust in the situation of the current Ukrainian crisis. Even during peaceful times, each agreement passed through a long and complicated process of negotiations. For example, regular gas crisis’s between Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, common values present an opportunity to rebuild trust. How can Russia, Ukraine and western partners understand that they have shared values? — the negotiation platforms, on the base of international institutions, such as Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. In this article, I aim to look at the global structure and the roots of the Ukrainian conflict, in the context of historical, socio-cultural and political aspects.

The typology of international actors and the structure of their interests

The Ukrainian case shows different examples of strategies and frames [2] of external politics, used by different types of international actors toward the other state. I will name three types of actors that exist (not taking into account international organizations, global terrorist networks, criminal networks, etc.). In this article, I will discuss the goals and strategies of the Nation-State, Quasi Empire, and Nationalizing State. Each of these actors has certain peculiarities in creating international politics and agenda. All of them are engaged in the Ukrainian situation.

National State

The Nation-State model is most common in the world. It is a phenomenon of the modern period and is considered to be the only variant of state. The borders of a Nation-State are strictly defined and protected by the political regime of the country. State unity is based on a common nation (state language, citizenship). The Nation-State “looks inside” itself and tend to protect the borders and the inside unity of the country [3].

Quasi-Empire Project

Then quasi-Empire elements on the post-soviet space (after the collapse of USSR) the Russian Federation still have not constructed the national state in the classical view. Or the same elements of the quasi-empire project we can observe in the behaviour of the USA. Nowadays, we cannot speak about empires in the full sense of the word, but some elements can still be found. Some previous empires are on the transition way towards Nation-State, but the empire legacy still has its’ impact [4].

The borders of the nation empire are not finally defined and political elites look at the opportunity to enlarge the territory or to influence somehow on the other states and communities. Before the Ukrainian crisis, such ideas were rather marginal, but the political crisis in Ukraine moved the issue into the official discourse.

This approach is typical for quasi-empire and unacceptable by the Nation-States. — Here is the first point of misunderstanding and lack of trust. Why do empire nations believe they have the right to other states? — Because it still does not have a common understanding of its nation. Usually, it is a multinational and multi-confessional state and needs institutions different from those of the Nation-State.

Nationalizing State [5]

The territories, which were under the empires usually, become nationalizing states. Nationalizing state is a kind of transition situation (but it can be so for a rather long period). Such states emerge after the collapse of big empires or other countries. The nationalizing state usually moves towards the Nation-State: so the task is to create a nation and to define the borders.

The nation is also in the process of creation, but usually, it is created on ethnic base. The same situation is in Ukraine now; the current political elites tend to support the idea of the Ukrainian nation (Ukrainian language, certain historical myths), at the same time most of the people who live in the East and South of the country are automatically excluded from this nation criteria. The nationalizing states usually became the sphere of interest of quasi-empires.

Society without a State

After 2014 we also can see the marginal area of Donbasss, on which some unique social and political processes are developing, described by James Scott [6]. These societies try to escape hierarchy of any kind. Based on cultural flexibility, pragmatism and self-reliance of autonomous communities. Once this kind of society is formed — it will be a difficult task to reintegrate it back to a Nation-State.

Why is it important to know the type of actor when we speak about external politics and conflicts? The case is that the behaviour and expectations of a Nation-State will radically different from the ones of a quasi-Empire. The main aim of a Nation-State is to protect the borders, which were defined and legitimized. Quasi-Empire aims to have potential territorial or cultural growth. That is why the idea of soft power was created in the USA and is so prevalent in the Russian Federation now — these states would like to influence the territories much outside their borders. In this case, the external politics of nationalizing states are reactive — they can only react on the impulses from quasi-empires, and struggle for their national identity and diffused borders. Donbasss is in a unique situation as it is not much needed in Europe or Russia. It is more likely that we can find institutes created to avoid any form of state and obedience.

That is why Europe blames Russia for annexing new territories; at the same time, it is seen in Russia as the historically logical process of state-building. And Russia blames the EU and the USA for the violation of regional security. Both of them blame each other for making Ukraine dependent.

The Ukrainian National Identity and Europeanization

Ukraine first embraced the European path during the 2004 revolution. Institutionally, this path implies the country’s aspiration to join the EU and NATO. Recent amendments to the Ukrainian constitution legitimize this drive.

The European identity is historically a superstructure above the national identity. Ukraine’s main problem is its aim not to follow the traditional procedure and therefore try to skip the phase of forming its own national identity in its desire to join the European family.

Essentially, Ukraine is replacing the notion of Ukrainism with that of Europeanism. Democratic institutions are paramount for European countries as they are the integrating base of the rule of law that makes up the Union. However, Ukraine does not give value to the institutions’ content and operation, but to their own existence.

As for Ukraine, the very idea of Eurointegration resulted in an escalation and subsequent loss of part of the country’s territorial integrity in 2014. Historically, European institutions have only been partially effective in heterogeneous societies with contrasting socio-cultural backgrounds. For the population of eastern Ukraine, Soviet values have proven to be even more important than they are for Russian citizens. In his research on national construction in post-Soviet territories, Vladimir Lapkin determines the post-Soviet secession phenomenon, in a process backed not only by a classic nationalist impulse but also by the nostalgia of the Soviet past. Lapkin asserts: “These ‘special separatists’, unlike ‘classical separatists’ who attempt to oppose their ethnonational project to the dominating ethnic nation (or its simulacrum), promoted ideas that were absolutely impossible within the political prevailing of the imperial universality of the 1990s and 2000s. In the absence of a better example, an ‘idealised USSR’ or a ‘revived Russian state’ is often appealed.” [7]

Consequently, Ukraine’s European path towards the EU and NATO easily turns into a semiotic myth because it embraces the idea of a universal solution for many problems Ukraine faces today, including those concerning the economy, social sphere, territorial integrity, and government’s legitimacy. The underlying idea towards European integration and the subsequent introduction of European institutions may actually create the potential and necessary motivation for action. Perhaps, the myth existence regarding the future integration with the EU and NATO may bring about prosperity, nonetheless completely negates any initiative or attempt to actually achieve anything.

None of the presidential frontrunners deny that the drive towards Europe could be difficult or even fatal. The approach of Ukraine needing to become part of the EU and NATO due to Russian aggression is a temporary one. It only aims to secure the current regime legitimacy and will be no longer useful once Russia has begun restoring its relations with the West afterwards the enduring crisis. That is when Ukraine will once again be faced with the great problem of rebuilding its sovereignty statehood.

Russian vision of the Conflict

The global perception of the crisis in Russia is based on the post-soviet legacy. It is closely related to the process of creating a Russian identity, defining the borders and strengthening positions as a global actor.

The interest towards the situation in Ukraine is high among Russians. Therefore, the Russian population is keenly following the Ukrainian elections, given the close economic and other personal ties (likelihood of having family between the two countries). Analysis conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center explored popular opinions within Russia regarding the Ukrainian elections, and the results were quite interesting. “The Russian populations’ awareness of the upcoming Ukrainian presidential elections is rather high: 79% of Russians have heard of the election campaign including 18% who are following the campaign closely”. At the same time, fears of possible manipulations are widespread among Russians, with 68% of those polled believing that the election results will be falsified by the Ukrainian authorities and thus won’t be representative of the will of the people. More than one and every ten respondents (12%) believes that while there might be certain violations, but they will not influence the overall results. Altogether, the elections do not inspire much credibility in Russian society, doubting even about their legitimacy.

If we consider general attitudes towards Ukraine in Russian society, the radical positions have not changed much. On the one hand, one of them is that Ukraine is an example of fair and transparent elections. On the other — Ukraine is a “historical fault”.

On Russia’s side, Crimea is not an issue for discussion anymore, after Russia feels it has settled questions concerning security in the Black Sea and, more broadly, security for the Russian speaking community in the region. That is why now Russia’s main goal is to move towards a peaceful resolution of the current conflict with Ukraine, excluding the Crimea issue from the future negotiation process. Based on my research and observations, I believe Russian interests in Ukraine can be summarized in three key points:

First, Russia is highly interested in the implementation of the Minsk agreements and reintegration of Donbasss in Ukraine. In this respect, the Russian Federation is concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population in addition to their safety, and this issue will rank high on Russia’s agenda.

Secondly, Russia aims at rebuilding its economic ties with Ukraine, since Moscow is still Kiev’s largest trade partner: according to World Bank data, in 2017 Ukrainian export to Russia was 3 943 217.84 $ (9.08%), by comparison — Poland is the second (6.28%) and import — 7 196 562.10 (14.56%), China is the third (11.41%).

Third, despite the conflict, labour migration from Ukraine to Russia remains a reality. Russia is interested in qualified workers and students coming to study. Ukraine remains the main country of origin of migrants to Russia, even if the number has decreased (137,700 in 2018 as opposed to 150,100 in 2017) and there is a trend of more Ukrainian citizens to leave Russia.

I would like to attract your attention to one citation from Russian President speech to the Federal Assembly in 2014:

“It was an event of special significance for the country and the people, because Crimea is where our people live, and the peninsula is a place of strategic importance for Russia as the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation and a centralised Russian state. It was in Crimea, in the ancient city of Chersonesus or Korsun, as ancient Russian chroniclers called it, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptised before bringing Christianity to Rus”.

He speaks about strategic importance, development of the Russian nation, and a centralized Russian state. And all of these things are now connected to Crimea. Each country has to have a historical heartland. For the Russian Empire, it should be the Kievskaya Rus, which is now situated in Ukraine. In fact, Russia and Ukraine struggle for the same territories to be their heartland. This citation shows us a new ideological reality in Russia.

Accordingly, Crimea became the centre of civilization for Russian identity. It is a new ideological reality of internal Russian politics, which should be considered as crucial in policymaking decisions. In this sense, we can argue that putting the Crimean issue in the negotiation agenda will lead to a more radical Russian position.

Russian and Ukrainian Struggle for History

In the current situation, we find not only the negotiation of an attempted settlement to the East Ukraine armed conflict, a new stage of information and ideological confrontation also seems to be developing a rivalry between Russia and Ukraine over the interpretation of their past. In fact, the fabric of the history of the Kievan Rus looks very much like a blanket, with each country trying to pull all of it to their side.

What we have seen so far has been sluggish but definitely intensified by the media struggle, textbooks, movies and other cultural areas for the exclusive right to interpret the same historical facts. Why can’t these two states share a common history, and why is it so important to possess a unique past?

In his address to the Federal Assembly (December 2014), President Vladimir Putin mentioned Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev in the Crimean context, which was perceived by a large part of the society as a legitimation of the peninsula´s affiliation through the myth of restoration, the historical truth and the preservation of continuity in traditions, culture and statehood. To this end, Moscow will erect a memorial to Vladimir on Vorobyovy Hills to honour the 1000th anniversary of his death. In his turn, Ukrainian President Poroshenko released an executive order to commemorate Grand Prince Vladimir as the “founder of medieval state Rus-Ukraine,” while the Russian State Duma responded by accusing Kiev of attempting to privatize the memory of Russia’s Baptizer.

Having made history as the ruler who baptized Rus and bolstered its statehood (the key features attributed to him by history textbooks), Grand Prince Vladimir has recently emerged as a substantial stumbling obstacle of Russian and Ukrainian politicians’ mutual comprehension.

In Russia, the deep-rooted historical legitimacy and continuity of historical epochs have not practically undergone any revisions, with all projects to interpret and describe history (Sergey Solovyov, Vassily Klyuchevsky, Sergey Uvarov’s triad of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality) working to build a single, non-contradictory historical model of development. With some slight variations, this scheme was taught both in the Soviet period and following the disintegration of the USSR. Nobody questions the Kievan Rus as the source of statehood and the Moscow Princedom and later the Russian Empire as its successor.

However, the political decision to annex Crimea had been perceived ambiguously both in Russia and abroad and hence has required additional legitimization. The new mythologem is intended to smoothly integrate the current political reality into the existing legitimization model and provide it with additional fixtures.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, the legitimization of its statehood is a much more complicated affair. The executive order of the former president, Poroshenko, to honour Grand Prince Vladimir was meant as a reminder that this relevant period is an inherent part of Ukraine’s history. Within the current quagmire of problems over the legitimacy of borders, Ukrainian national identity and diminishing political support, this order was designed to preserve available structures and the legitimacy model. Because of this, the political effect appears quite questionable.

Compared to Russia, historical legitimization is a much more complicated endeavour for Ukraine. En route to statehood, Ukraine felt the impact of the powerful state and ideological machines of the neighbouring Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. And it was Mikhail Grushevsky who launched the construction of the model for a unique Ukrainian history when Nation-States emerged after the breakup of these empires. His project primarily reflected the decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was briefly implemented during the revolutionary reforms in the Russian Empire. The scheme was revived in 2004 by the instigators of the Orange Revolution and the former president, Pyotr Poroshenko.

In 1898, Mr Grushevsky released the first volume of History of Ukraine-Rus that contained a compilation of facts intended to substantiate the historical independence of the Ukrainian people by tracing an alternative succession of historical stages. He rejected the unity of eastern Slavs, drawing a line between the Ukrainian-Russian people and Great Russians. Before Mr Grushevsky, Ukrainian history had one way or another been integrated into the history of Russia and Poland, the neighbour powers which controlled Ukrainian territories. Accordingly, his innovation suggested an alternative model of historical development and a new succession in the continuity of state entities seen as the forerunners of modern Ukraine.

Mr Grushevsky discarded the Muscovite version of history, insisting that although the Kievan Rus transferred some forms of the socio-political order to the Great Russia lands, there was no full-fledged continuity between the Kievan Rus and Moscow Princedom. The Tatar invasion undermined the socio-political basis of the Kievan Rus. East of the Dnieper River, these traditions were practically ruined, with only some of them preserved on the right-hand side and advanced in the Galitsk-Volyn Princedom and later under the rule of Lithuania and Poland. The history’ version developed by Moscow was also unfit for legitimizing Ukrainian statehood because the emergence of the Ukrainians as a separate people was dated to the 14th-15th centuries, thus something absolutely unsuitable for Mr Grushevsky as the ideologue of the Ukrainian statehood.

As before, the key issue still lies in establishing the successor of the Kievan Rus. Prior to the appearance of Mr Grushevsky’s interpretation, the succession of the Kievan Rus and Tsarist Russia had been universally recognized (see V.M. Solovyov, V.O. Klyuchevsky). The incorporation of the Kievan Rus period into the historical roots of a state proceeds from the establishment of a certain state entity through a certain ethnic groups. Proponents of the unity of the three eastern Slavic peoples agree that the Kievan Rus was set up by the Slavs, who later gave rise to the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. In his History of Ukraine-Rus, Mr Grushevsky not only substantiated the autochthony of the Ukrainian ethnos’ origin but also firmly insisted that the Kievan Rus belonged to the tradition of the Ukrainian statehood.

This concept smoothly resonates again in the current official Ukrainian debate because it provides grounds for the logical construction of national identity. Ukrainians assert that Moscow was built on its own, borrowing practically nothing from the Kievan Rus under immense Tatar influence.

Although this is ancient history, the two historical paradigms are popular in modern politics, with the described myths being only a fracture of the entire mythology arsenal employed in the debate. The history of the Great Patriotic War actually plays the same role, the most cited issues being the dichotomy of the Soviet troops and collaborationists on occupied Ukraine territory, the odious Stepan Bandera, Golodomor, etc. The interpretation of concrete events and the formation of myths (as semiotic systems) helps to assign friends and foes and additionally validate political decisions.

Conclusion

Although Russian and Ukrainian leaders use the same historical facts surrounding the Kievan Rus, their motivation differs. While Russia wants to add additional legitimacy to its political decision over the voluntary entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Ukraine is trying to restore the shattering legitimacy of its state borders and the national identity of its population.

The use of historical facts is a long applied instrument for fueling an entire political context, usually with quite material consequences. In fact, turning the status of Crimea into the historical centre of Russian statehood may create a stumbling block during zero-sum international negotiations. If the partners opt for a more constructive approach to handle other issues, Crimea should be off the agenda. Ukrainian legitimacy appears more threatening. Independent for over 20 years, Kiev has failed to generate a state-wide identity and is now trying to revitalize older models, which have regrettably demonstrated their ineffectiveness after Maidan 2004. The country will face the irreparable loss of its legitimate borders and government, as well as the identity of its population.

In a situation like this, Russia and the West appear to have coinciding interests in handling the issue of Ukraine’s legitimacy because neither would like to see a Somalia-style failed state at their borders. This move should be affirmative, shedding the extremes a la “Ukraine is not a state,” etc. since this is a field for determined efforts to establish a constructive myth for a state on the verge of a breakdown.

Speaking on the possible steps towards the successful Nation-State for Ukraine:

First, Ukrainian politicians need to come up with a uniform set of values and legitimacy that would be relevant to most of the country’s population. We could hypothetically suggest the idea of the country’s independent economic development. With its favourable geography, Ukraine may well become an economic hub, a target for effective investment, and a growth point for innovative projects. For this to happen, however, the country first needs to shed its dependence on any single strong external actor, be it Russia, Europe, the U.S., or, in the longer term, China. It would be fairly possible to create effective, law-governed economic institutions without joining the EU and NATO.

Second, Ukraine needs to mould its youth in a way that would facilitate negotiating practices and an ability to achieve a compromise. No matter how skilful the Western European advisors may be, Ukraine will have a hard time introducing democratic institutions unless society revises its long-standing habits. Introducing brand new institutions is always a complicated process that involves breaking established behavioural patterns. This is primarily the mission of educational establishments. The mere drive towards Europe is not going to unite the nation in any significant way.

Ukraine should also stop picturing Russia, or any other country, as its nemesis because this only works as a short-term solution. Seeking out external enemies is only good as an interim method of legitimising a government and securing public unity. The method has a number of disadvantages. First, consolidating against an external enemy requires a particular exertion of forces; no system is capable of holding out for long under stress. Second, the external enemy’s environment may change radically. Third, a country that is defending itself expends much of its strength on defence, not on development.

Russia is a significant international actor for Ukraine, and Kyiv will need to come up with some new kind of format for relations with Moscow sooner or later. This will happen after the frozen conflict has ceased to suit the key decision-making political actors. Prior to the inevitable talks, both parties will have to establish a negotiating position. It would be wise to start the talks with the less painful issues, but searching for such issues poses a special intellectual problem for conflict mediators. It is fairly possible that one of these steps will involve establishing a dialogue along the lines of Track II expert diplomacy.

A possible conflict solution for Donbass — giving Crimea back — will entail a significant transactional cost and a very high price for Russian elites. It is impossible in the current political situation, as we see the new nation and state legitimacy model. The connection of Donbass and Crimea issues will lead to more confrontation. If we put the Crimean issue outside the agenda, we can look at the following possible variants for the regulation of the conflict.

-Donbass as separate state — the variant of Transnistria.

-Donbass as part of Ukraine. Possible only on the basis of wide autonomy. At the same time, there is needed a process of economic reconstruction, without ethnic or language issues.

-Donbass as the part of Russia, the less possible one.

The second variant is considered to be the most peaceful for the international community. Nonetheless, we still have the army of Donetsk and Lugansk which are interested in their own profit. So for Russia and Europe, it will be very important to change the official discourse and start to see not the enemies, but rather strategic partners.

First published in “Geopolitical Challenges of European Security in the South Caucasus and Ukraine 19th Workshop of the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group, 16/2019 Vienna, October, 2019”. From our partner RIAC

[1] Uslaner, Eric: The Moral Foundation of Trust. Cambridge University Press 2002.

[2] Uslaner Goffman, Ervin: Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience. Harvard University Press 1974.

[3] Uslaner For Nation-State see: Habermas, Yurgen: The European Nation-State And The Pressures Of Globalization. In: New Left Review. 235/1999.

[4] Uslaner Kaspe, Svyatoslav: Imperii I Modernizatsiya. Obshaya Model I Rossiyskaya Specifika. Moskva, 2001.

[5] Uslaner Brubaker, Rogers: National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe. In: Daedalus. 124/1995, pp. 107-132

[6] Uslaner Scott, James C.: The Art of Not Being Governed. An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. Yale University Press 2009.

[7] Uslaner Lapkin, Vladimir: Problems of Nation Building in Multi-ethnic Post-Soviet Societies: Ukrainian Case in Comparative Perspective. In: Polis. 4/2016, pp. 54–64.

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Eastern Europe

Ukraine Doesn’t Matter

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“Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!,” said former President Porfirio Diaz about Mexico’s uncomfortable relationship with its much stronger neighbor, the United States of America (US). Following Mexico’s defeat in the Mexican-American War (1846 – 1848), Mexico ceded 1.37 million sq. Km (529,000 sq. miles), over half of its entire territory, to the US in exchange for $18 million. Earlier in 1845, Mexico lost 1.01 million sq. Km (390,000 sq. miles) when the US annexed Texas. Sharing a fence with a bully certainly has its price.

Just as Mexico suffered at the hands of the US 173 year ago, Ukraine has, since 2014, been bullied by Russia. Like the US did to Mexico, Russia too has been dismembering Ukraine, and still wants more of Ukrainian territory.

The on-going Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the first time the two Slavic neighbors have clashed. The two countries’ history have been intertwined as far back as 879 CE when the Kievan (Kyivan) Rus’ federation was founded, with Kiev (now officially, Kyiv) as its capital for all but three of its 361 years of existence before it fell to the Mongols in 1240.

Following the collapse of the Mongol Empire, some former Kievan Rus’ lands were later united with Poland. In 1648 Hetman (military leader) Bohdan Khmelnytsky led a Cossack rebellion against Catholic Poland, leading to the creation of the Hetmanate. In 1654 the Hetmanate signed the Treaty of Pereiaslav for the Orthodox Russian Tsar to protect them from Poland, but in 1764, Catherine II abolished the Hetmanate, ending Ukrainian autonomy.

Following the overthrow of the Russian monarchy in 1917, the Russian Provisional Government granted Ukraine autonomy. The Bolsheviks, who won the Russian Civil War, refused to recognize Ukrainian sovereignty, but appeased Ukrainians by creating the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, later called the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, a founding member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union in 1922, and the United Nations (UN) in 1945.

Ukrainians suffered immensely from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s collectivization policies which killed an estimated 10.8 million people in the 1932-1933 Great Famine (sometimes called the Holodomor [“to kill by starvation”]) which some term a Genocide.

Ironically, Russian Tsars, and the Soviet Union handed over a lot of territory to Ukraine. In September 1939, Stalin annexed 201,015 sq. Km (77,612 sq. miles) of Eastern Poland, and incorporated them into the Lithuanian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). At the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945, the Allies allowed the Soviets to retain the annexed Polish lands, in exchange for part of East Germany.

In 1944, the Soviet Red Army captured and occupied parts of Carpathian Ruthenia (of the then Czechoslovak Republic) which were ceded to the Soviet Union in June 1945 and became part of the Ukraine SSR in January 1946. In 1954, the Soviet Union controversially transferred Crimea to the Ukraine SSR, to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, and appease Ukrainians.

Following the abortive coup in August 1991 against President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Ukraine SSR declared independence. In December 1991, Ukrainians voted for independence from the USSR, and Ukraine, Russia and Belarus signed the Belavezha Accords, which ended the Soviet Union, and the US recognized Ukraine. The USSR was formally dissolved on December 21, 1991, following the signing of the Alma-Ata Protocol which also transferred the USSR’s membership of the UN and its Security Council to the Russian Federation.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian, Russian and US presidents signed a statement in January 1994, reaffirming Ukraine’s commitment to transferring its strategic nuclear warheads to Russia and, with US assistance, dismantling strategic nuclear weapons launchers in its territory. Furthermore, Ukraine was to be provided “security assurances” following its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In February 1994, Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO), Partnership for Peace, and following its accession to the NPT, signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in December, 1994, along with Russia, the UK, and the US. All of them committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and promised not to threaten, or use force against it. In 1997, NATO deepened its relationship with Ukraine by establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and Russia signed a Treaty on Friendship with Ukraine, which recognized their existing borders, and mutual commitment not to invade, or declare war on each other.

Following presidential run-off elections marred by fraud and voter intimidation in November, 2004, nationwide protests called the Orange Revolution resulted in fresh elections in December, 2004. The pro-Europe candidate Viktor Yushchenko, defeated the pro-Russia candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, upsetting Russia, coming shortly after the 2003 Rose Revolution which overthrew the pro-Russia government in Georgia, Russia’s neighbor and former Soviet Republic.

President Vladimir Putin of Russia raised the alarm in February 2007 in his Munich Speech at the Munich Security Conference, warning about the dangers of a unipolar world and unilateralism. He also spoke against NATO’s expansion, which he said would not ensure security in Europe, and was a “serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”

Despite this, Ukraine requested in January 2008 to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), but President Putin opposed it, telling US President George W. Bush that Ukraine was not “a real nation-state.” NATO debated Ukraine’s request at its Bucharest Summit in April 2008, but because France opposed it, could only promise Ukraine that it would join later.

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was re-elected President of Ukraine, and promptly abandoned Ukraine’s plans to join NATO. Yanukovych was later accused of political witch-hunting when charges were filed against his pro-European opponent, delaying the finalization of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Although the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, overwhelmingly supported the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in February 2013, the Ukrainian government under Russian pressure, decided in November 2013 not to sign it, and sought to join the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union. Ukrainians immediately protested Yanukovych’s decision, and launched the Euromaidan protests or Maidan Uprising; later called the Revolution of Dignity.

The Euromaidan protestors also called for the resignation of President Yanukovych, and an end to government corruption. The government violently dispersed protesters and introduced harsh anti-protest laws. The protests, which started in Kyiv spread across the country, and climaxed in February 2014, with 130 people killed.

Although an agreement was reached between the opposition and President Yanukovych to form an interim unity government, Yanukovych and other government officials fled to Russia in February 2014. In a controversial vote Yanukovych called a coup, Parliament impeached him and installed an interim government.

Following the overthrow of Yanukovych, protests and counter-protests broke out in Crimea, with Russophile nationalists, pitted against pro-Ukraine Crimean Tatars. Unidentified Russian soldiers called Little Green Men entered Crimea on February 26, 2014, and organized a controversial referendum in which 97 percent of voters supported Crimea joining the Russian Federation.

In contravention of the UN Charter, the 1991 agreement among former Soviet Republics accepting their borders when the Soviet Union collapsed, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine, and 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on Friendship, Russia formally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol on March 21, 2014.

In early 2014, pro-Russian protests started in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts (Regions), which are predominantly Russian-speaking, and collectively form the Donbas area of southeastern Ukraine. The demonstrations quickly turned violent and armed Russia-backed separatists declared the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR).

Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in April 2014, and by August 2014, had considerably reduced the separatist-held territory. In response, Russia invaded the Donbas in late August 2014 with artillery, personnel, and what it called a “humanitarian convoy.”

As a result, the Ukrainian government lost much of the territory it had captured from separatists in its April 2014 counteroffensive. The Ukrainian government was thus forced to sign, in September 2014, a ceasefire agreement known as the Minsk Protocol with Russia, the DPR, and LPR. The agreement was however violated many times by both sides and collapsed by January 2015. A new ceasefire, called Minsk II, was agreed to in February 2015, although fighting quickly resumed.

At the Munich Security Conference in February 2017, the US Vice President Mike Pence said the US would hold Russia accountable in Ukraine, and demanded its adherence to the Minsk Agreements. In reply, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused NATO of sparking unprecedented tensions in Europe because of its expansion, and President Putin tightened the screws on Ukraine by recognizing official documents (birth certificates, identity documents, etc.) issued by pro-Russian authorities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In January 2018, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill to regain control over the separatist-led areas of Donbas and Luhansk, calling them “temporarily-occupied territories.” Russia condemned the bill, which came after the US announced its readiness to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, calling it “preparations for a new war,” and a violation of the Minsk Agreement.

In April 2018, Ukraine replaced its “Anti-Terrorist Operation” in the Donbas with a “Joint Forces Operation” signifying it was protecting Ukraine’s “territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence” and fighting the Russian military, not “separatist militants.” On the same day, the US confirmed the delivery of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine.

Although the Javelin missiles were to be kept away from the frontline, Russia had expressed its displeasure when the deal was announced in December 2017, claiming it would encourage “the resumption of large-scale bloodshed in Donbas.” Sure enough, all three ceasefires agreed to between June and December 2018 failed, with each side blaming the other for their collapse.

Another ceasefire was entered into in March 2019, although there was not much hope for its success. Against this background, Ukraine held its 2019 presidential elections without the participation of parts of Donbas occupied by Russia or pro-Russia separatist. Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelenskyy won the elections on an anti-establishment and anti-corruption platform and became President of Ukraine in May 2019. Zelenskyy also called for unity between Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers, and promised to end the conflict with Russia.

The exclusion of parts of Donbas from the presidential elections prompted the Russian government to consider easing the provision of Russian passports to residents of DPR and LPR, and toward that end, published three Decrees between April and July 2019, calling them humanitarian and practical measures which did not violate the Minks Agreements.

The  European Council considered this “passportisation” of the Donbas by Russia a contravention of the Minsk Agreements, and the EU Commission issued a guidance for member states to reject such passports. Nevertheless, naturalizations increased about 85 percent to 497,817, and the proportion of Ukrainian applicants for Russian passports almost doubled to 60 percent, between 2018 and 2019.

In October 20019, Russia, Ukraine, DPR, LPR, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed the “Steinmeier Formula” which envisaged free elections in the LPR and DPR, followed by their integration, with a special status, into Ukraine. Following the signing of the Steinmeier Formula, Ukraine and separatist withdrew their troops, and Russia exchanged prisoners with Ukraine. In addition, presidents Putin and Zelenskyy, French president Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel resumed the Normandy Format peace talks in December, 2019.

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic worsened living conditions in the conflict zone, and by March 2020, fighting escalated. The 29th ceasefire since the war started in 2014 came into in July 2020, and this largely held until November 2020.

2021 got off to a bad start, with 25 Ukrainian soldiers killed in the conflict zone, compared to 50 soldiers being killed in 2020. Tensions increased around early April after Russia moved thousands of military personnel as well as large quantities of arms and materiel into Crimea and its border with Ukraine. The UK and EU expressed their concern about Russia’s military buildup and promised their “unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

On their part, Russia said some of its troops were deployed to practice fighting enemy drones and that the military movements posed no threat to Ukraine. However, a Russian official added that an escalation of the conflict in Donbas would mean the “the beginning of the end of Ukraine.” Chancellor Merkel asked Putin to reduce the Russian troop buildup, while US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and his German counterpart emphasized the importance of supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s provocations.

Tensions increased in April 2021 when Ukraine flew its Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 military drones over Donbas for the first time. A week later, President Putin warned that any country which takes Russia’s good intentions for weakness or indifference, and crosses its red lines should know that Russia’s response will be “asymmetrical, swift and harsh.”

In early October 2021, eight members of the Russian mission to NATO were expelled because they were “undeclared Russian intelligence officers.” Russia accused NATO of duplicity, and in retaliation, closed its mission to NATO, which it declared was “not interested in equitable dialogue and joint work.”

On October 19, 2021, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in Kyiv that Russia was an “obstacle to a peaceful resolution” of the conflict in Ukraine. In clear reference to Russia, he added that “no third country” could veto NATO’s membership decisions. Secretary Austin also discussed with Ukrainian authorities the implementation of the US-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework which underlines US support for Ukraine’s right to decide its own foreign policy, its desire to join NATO, as reaffirmed in the June 2021 NATO Summit Communique.

Secretary Austin’s remarks in Kyiv were criticized for reflecting US policy makers’ failure to accept geopolitical realities in eastern Europe, and risking drawing the US and NATO into a war with Russia. Furthermore, his remarks were said to encourage Ukraine to take a hardline against Russia, instead of accommodating Russia’s interests.

A few days after Secretary Austin’s statement in Kyiv, Ukraine destroyed a separatist artillery gun manned by “Russian occupation forces” in the Donbas using, for the first time, a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone. Although Ukraine claimed that the drone did not cross the Contact Line, the 427-Km long frontline between the government and non-government-controlled areas in Donbas, the LPR said the drone attack was in violation of the Minsk Agreements. Germany’s Foreign Office expressed its concern about the drone strike, while a Russian government spokesman said the drone attack was destabilizing and would not help settle the conflict.

In a November 2021 speech, President Putin said that Russia’s Western partners were aggravating the situation in Ukraine by supplying the Ukrainian government with lethal weapons and conducting military exercises in the Black Sea and other regions close to Russia. In addition, Putin said, their partners ignored Russia’s warnings about its “red lines,” including NATO’s expansion eastward toward Russia.

In December 2021, President Putin said that Russia wants to negotiate agreements with the US and its allies to stop NATO from deploying weapons near Russian territory, and expanding eastwards. A few days later, Ukraine claimed that Russia was sending tanks and snipers to the conflict areas.

By mid-December, Russia published draft US-Russia and NATO-Russia agreements to guarantee it’s security, and defuse the tension in Ukraine. The US government said some parts of the proposals were “unacceptable” while others saw them as a ploy by Russia to justify an invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia had a massive buildup of over 100,000 troops along its border with Ukraine, in readiness for what many called another invasion of Ukraine.

Fighting escalated in February 2022, with the Ukrainian military reporting 60 incidents of weapons fire in one day, and about 135,000 Russian troops on the Russia-Ukraine border. On February 15, 2022, the Russian State Duma (lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) passed a non-binding resolution asking President Putin to recognize the DPR and LPR.

A few days later, the DPR and LPR leaders requested President Putin to recognize the independence of their republics and proposed signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation (including military cooperation) with Russia. Putin signed the State Duma resolution recognizing the republics, along with their treaties on “friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance” with Russia.

In his address to Russia following his recognition of the breakaway republics, President Putin said that Ukraine was created by Russia, and never was a genuine state. He also said that although many European allies of the US knew of the risks of admitting Ukraine into NATO, the US forced them to carry out its anti-Russia policy. Putin concluded by saying that those in power in Kyiv should immediately cease hostilities or their conscience will be burdened by bloodshed from the conflict.

On February 21, 2022, President Putin ordered more Russian troops into Donbas for a “peacekeeping mission,” which the US called an invasion. Putin raised the ante on February 24, 2022 when he announced the start of a “special military operation” in the Donbas. The much-anticipated full-scale invasion of Russia by Ukraine was on.

The global reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came thick and fast, with President Biden condemning it, but adding that US will not send its troops to Ukraine to fight Russian forces. The US also provided $4.6 billion in security assistance, and $914 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion began, and announced an additional $700 million in funding on June 1.

NATO Heads of State and Government condemned the Russian invasion, calling it “brutal,” “wholly unprovoked,” and “unjustified.” They also said that Russia had rejected the path of diplomacy and dialog offered by NATO and its Allies and violated international law. They vowed to continue supporting Ukraine and reaffirmed their support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For its part, the EU imposed restrictive measures on Russia to weaken its ability to finance its war on Ukraine. Thus, it imposed many sanctions against Russia starting in March 2014 following the referendum on Crimea’s accession to Russia. More rounds of sanctions followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and by early June 2022, the EU had sanctioned 1,175 Russian individuals (including President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov), 101 Russian entities, and imposed its sixth package of sanctions against Russia. In addition, the EU has extended every six months, economic sanctions it imposed on Russia in 2014, and covering the finance, energy, defense and other sectors.

On the diplomatic front, the EU cancelled the 2014 EU-Russia summit, and ended the privileged access of Russian diplomats, officials and business executives to the EU. The EU also provided humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine, including €355 million to help civilians affected by Russia’s invasion of the country.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Zelenskyy, who advocated for dialog with Russia, became a belligerent leader of Ukraine’s fierce resistance against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy has addressed Ukrainians nightly, rallying them to fight, using his oratory and communications skills. Zelenskyy has also, via video link, addressed Heads of State, parliaments, and conferences around the world pleading, with little success, for more support (especially military support) for Ukraine.

President Zelenskyy has pleaded numerous times for NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, and provide them more lethal weapons to fight Russia. Unfortunately for Ukraine, his appeals have fallen on deaf ears because NATO said it won’t risk a direct confrontation with Russia. Zelenskyy should have seen this coming, because he admitted in March 2022 that NATO had categorically told him that while they will maintain in public that NATO is open to Ukraine joining the organization, the reality was that it won’t.

The war in Ukraine seems to have no end in sight because both President Biden, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at the June 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain that NATO will continue to provide Ukraine with weapons as long as necessary. Furthermore, the US has been absent from efforts to bring peace to Ukraine – if not outrightly opposed to them. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also accused the US and its NATO allies of pouring oil on the fire in Ukraine by arming it, and increasing the risk of nuclear war.

For its part, the US said that one of its goals in the war in Ukraine was to “see Russia weakened” so it won’t be able to conduct similar invasions in the future. Although President Biden asked his officials to tone down their position, Russians will remember former President Gorbachev’s advice that the only Russia the US loves is a weak Russia.

Ukraine clearly is a proxy in the US and NATO war on Russia. What matters therefore, is not peace and security for Ukrainians, but the desire of the US (9,181 Km or 5,705 miles from Ukraine) and NATO to bring Russia to her knees. As such, a negotiated peace between Ukraine and Russia is far off, and this pathetic, needless war which has killed thousands and made millions refugees will drag on. Poor Ukraine, so far away from the United States, and so close to Russia!

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Eastern Europe

Ukraine: Amnesty International revealed the unpleasant truth

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image source: war.ukraine.ua photo: Vadim Ghirda

Ukrainian forces have threatened civilians by setting up bases and operating weapons systems in populated areas, including schools and hospitals, as they battled the Russian intervention that began in February, Amnesty International said in a statement.

“Such a tactic violates international humanitarian law and endangers civilians, as it turns civilian objects into military targets. The Russian strikes that followed in populated areas killed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure,” the statement said.

– Amnesty International has documented a pattern of Ukrainian forces putting civilians at risk and violating the laws of war when conducting operations in populated areas – said Agnes Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International.

He pointed out that the defensive position does not free the Ukrainian army from respecting international humanitarian law.

The organization’s researchers spent several weeks from April to July investigating Russian attacks in Kharkiv, Donbass and the Mykolaiv region.

The organization inspected the attacked sites, interviewed survivors, eyewitnesses, relatives of the victims of the attack, and carried out remote detection and analysis of weapons. During those investigations, evidence was found that Ukrainian forces were firing from heavily populated areas and were themselves inside civilian buildings in 19 towns and villages in these regions. The organization analyzed satellite images to further confirm some of these incidents – it is emphasized.

According to Amnesty International, most of the residential areas where the soldiers were located were kilometers away from the front.

– Viable alternatives were available that would not endanger civilians, such as military bases or densely wooded areas nearby, or other structures further away from residential areas. In the cases it has documented, Amnesty International is not aware that the Ukrainian military, located in civilian structures in residential areas, asked or helped civilians to evacuate, which is a failure to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians. announcement.

Directed shooting from populated areas

Amnesty says survivors and eyewitnesses of Russian attacks in Donbass, Kharkiv and the Mykolaiv region told researchers that the Ukrainian military was conducting operations near their homes at the time of the attacks, exposing the areas to counterfire from Russian forces. Amnesty International researchers have witnessed such behavior in numerous locations.

International humanitarian law requires all parties to a conflict to avoid locating, to the greatest extent possible, military targets within or near densely populated areas. Other obligations to protect civilians from the effects of attacks include removing civilians from the vicinity of military targets and providing effective warning of attacks that may affect the civilian population.

– The army was stationed in the house next to ours and my son often brought food to the soldiers. I begged him several times to stay away, because I feared for his safety. That afternoon, when the attack happened, my son was in our yard and I was in the house. He died on the spot. His body was mutilated. Our house was partially destroyed – said the mother of a man (50), who was killed in a rocket attack on June 10 in a village south of Nikolaev.

Amnesty International found military equipment and uniforms in the house next to hers.

Nikola, who lives in the block in Lisichansk in Donbass, which the Russians regularly targeted and killed at least one person, said that it is not clear to him “why our army fires from the cities and not from the fields”.

Another resident said that “there is definitely military activity in the neighborhood.”

– We hear “outgoing” and then “incoming” fire” – he said.

Amnesty International teams saw soldiers using residential buildings located 20 meters from the entrance to the underground shelter, which was used by residents and where an elderly man was killed.

In one Donbas town on May 6, Russian forces used cluster munitions over a neighborhood of mostly one- or two-story houses where Ukrainian forces were manning artillery. Shrapnel damaged the walls of the house where Ana (70) lives with her son and 95-year-old mother.

In early July, a farm worker was injured when Russian forces attacked an agricultural warehouse in the Nikolayev area. Hours after the attack, Amnesty International researchers witnessed the presence of Ukrainian military personnel and vehicles in the grain storage area, and witnesses confirmed that the military was using the warehouse, which is located across from a farm where civilians live and work.

As researchers surveyed damage to residential and public buildings in Kharkiv and villages in the Donbass and east of Mykolaiv, they heard gunfire from nearby Ukrainian military positions.

In Bakhmut, several residents said the Ukrainian military was using a building barely 20 meters across the street from the high-rise. On May 18, a Russian rocket hit the front of the building, partially destroying five apartments and damaging nearby buildings.

Military bases in hospitals

Amnesty International researchers witnessed Ukrainian forces using hospitals as de facto military bases in five locations. In the two cities, dozens of soldiers rested and ate in hospitals. In another town, soldiers fired from near a hospital.

A Russian airstrike on April 28 injured two workers at a medical laboratory in the suburbs of Kharkiv after Ukrainian forces set up a base in the compound.Using hospitals for military purposes is a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

Military bases in schools

The Ukrainian army routinely set up bases in schools in the cities and villages of the Donbass and in the Mykolaiv region. Schools have been temporarily closed to students since the beginning of the conflict, but in most cases the buildings were located near civilian settlements.

In 22 of the 29 schools visited, researchers either found soldiers using the premises or found evidence of current or previous military activity – including the presence of military equipment, ammunition, military ration packs and military vehicles.

Russian forces attacked many schools used by Ukrainian forces. In at least three cities, after Russian bombing of schools, Ukrainian soldiers moved to other schools nearby, putting surrounding neighborhoods at risk of similar attacks.

In a city east of Odessa, Amnesty witnessed Ukrainian soldiers using civilian areas for accommodation and staging areas, including basing armored vehicles under trees in residential areas and using two schools located in densely populated residential areas.

Conclusion

Amnesty International’s report was not a surprise to me as an analyst. Since the beginning of the conflict, all of us who follow the behavior and tactics of the Ukrainian army have witnessed such tactics of the Ukrainian army, which are strictly prohibited by international law. Also, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned about the behavior of the Ukrainian army that threatens innocent civilians. However, the fact that the respected Amnesty International writes about it in its report represents a strategic turn. Bearing in mind that this is an extremely respected Western non-governmental organization, we can safely say that even in the West, the opinion is slowly growing that the criminal behavior of the Ukrainian army will no longer be tolerated.

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Eastern Europe

Both Zelensky and Poroshenko Acknowledged They Came to Power Illegally

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A coup is an illegal way to come to power, and both of Ukraine’s Presidents after the February 2014 overthrow of the democratically elected President Viktor Yanukovych acknowledged that the overthrow of him violated the law, and that the government which became installed after Yanukovych’s overthrow has no legitimacy whatsoever — that the “Maidan of dignity” and “democratic revolution” was actually a hoax.

On 22 June 2015, I headlined “Ukraine’s President Poroshenko Admits Overthrow Of Yanukovych Was A Coup” and I provided full online documentation both of his allegation and of its being entirely true. I even documented that on 26 February 2014 (the final day of the actual coup) he had informed the EU that this was the case, and that they were surprised to hear it but ignored it. The U.S. allegations that Yanukovych had been overthrown by a spontaneous and mass-supported revolution against him — and which were clearly a lie even as early as 4 February 2014 but a lie that was pumped ceaselessly in the ‘news’-media regardless of that evidence — those U.S. allegations were thoroughly documented, in a 12 March 2014 video-compilation that was posted to youtube, to be false, a hoax, and yet nonetheless, this fact continued to be ignored in U.S.-&-allied ‘news’-media, as-if truth had nothing whatsoever to do with news-reporting and analysis — as-if evidence doesn’t matter, regardless of how extensive and reliable and conclusive it is. As-if The West is floating on lies, and its public won’t ever much care about that fact. (That’s the assumption; and, if by “the public” is meant the nation’s press, then that assumption is unquestionably true, because the press don’t care about it, at all — they instead support it; they support this status-quo, of lies-based ‘history’.)

Then, on 11 February 2020, Ukraine’s own Interfax News Agency issued the following news-report (as auto-translated into English):

https://web.archive.org/web/20220801215625/https://interfax-com-ua.translate.goog/news/political/640586.html?_x_tr_sl=uk&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

https://archive.ph/GM55p

“Zelensky: the Maidan case is the most complicated in Ukraine”

11 February 2020

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, believes that the investigation and completion of the tragic events on Independence Square during the Revolution of Dignity is the most difficult matter [to discuss] in the country.

“Lost evidence, documents. There are no people, there are no witnesses. Some say that in general, in places after this tragedy, all these events have been removed by many. The most difficult case that we have in our country is the Maidan,” he said in an exclusive interview with “Interfax-Ukraine” agency.

Zelensky pointed out that “everyone is engaged in these matters”.

“I know for sure that they are working faster than it was a few years ago. When they will find customers, because it is more understandable with murderers, I cannot say. All forces are involved in these cases, and we are doing everything possible,” he said.

Actually, there were plenty of witnesses, and even some of the participants subsequently came forth to admit publicly that they had participated in the coup, but the ‘news’-media in U.S.&-and-allied countries weren’t interested (even if the public there might have been, if only they had known about it).

On 24 February 2020, Putin ordered an invasion of Ukraine so that the coup-installed regime in Ukraine and its U.S.-NATO-EU sponsors won’t be able to install U.S. nuclear missiles within 5-minute flying-distance from Moscow on Ukraine’s border with Russia.

This is the result of the ideology that now controls The West, called “neoliberalism” in domestic or intranational policymaking, and “neoconservatism” in international policymaking; and it is that every dollar is equal, and that every person isn’t only different from every other person but is unequal, that all rights should therefore depend upon how rich a person is — investors therefore should control the government: they have a right to use their wealth to hire whomever they must in order to deceive the voters, so that wealth will control the government, and the public won’t. A microcosmic documentary about this U.S.-epitomized-and-championed ideology, in action, showing how it actually works, is the film “DOWNFALL: The Case Against Boeing”. It’s about the most deadly passenger plane that was ever designed and built by any company anywhere, Boeing’s model 737 Max. It’s about the U.S. Government being controlled by the nation’s super-rich, who are overwhelmingly psychopaths; and, since they control the Government, the most psychopathic individuals keep getting richer and richer (‘better and better’) and never get life in prison or the death penalty, no matter how much they ought to. It’s about the worst people controlling the Government, while the elected Government officials are s‘elected’ by the super-rich and merely pretending to care about the public that they are supposed to be (and claim to be) representing (but know they actually don’t).

Ukraine’s Government is merely a client-state of our own. It is a subsidiary of America Incorporated. It’s like Boeing. It’s the way that Boeing is, and the way that its Government has been set up for Boeing (and all successful corporations) to be. But in international affairs, which is the realm of neoconservatism, power comes as much from weapons as it comes from deceiving voters. It’s about the system that empowers the most-evil individuals and that traps the public and encourages the public to fight against each other instead of against the few individuals (the successful investors) who profit from this system: the system that is called neoliberalism-neoconservatism, and that profits the predators, at the expense of the public. Mussolini called it “fascism,” and also called it “corporationism”, and he got that ideology from his teacher Vilfredo Pareto, who was its inventor. In it, the order both of rights and of power is: (1) investors; (2) executives; (3) consumers; (4) employees. (Anyone who isn’t in any of those 4 categories is considered to be worthless. The dollar rules; they don’t count, at all.)

The documentary’s creator remained, at the end, a confused, non-comprehending liberal, only slightly less of a neoliberal-neoconservative than she was before it. But at least she seems sincere. She is simply deceived by the liberal ‘news’-media that she is subjected to — still a believing Democrat, obviously against Republicans: her “us” (CNN, NYT, etc.) against “them” (FNC, WSJ, etc.). But the viewers of her documentary might see in her documentary what she does not  — something which goes beyond her narrow sphere of concern.

She is Rory Kennedy — a daughter of RFK, sister of RFK Jr., and niece of JFK.

Anyway: Ukraine, at least ever since February 2014, is being run in accord with the same ideology that guides Boeing Corporation. The U.S. Government calls this “the rules-based international order,” and those “rules” come from the U.S. Government, and NOT from the U.N. and its international laws. It’s the world in which the most-successful gangsters rule, not merely nationally, but internationally. That’s called “hegemony,” and the rulers of America like it just fine, because it’s theirs — they own it, and they want to keep it. They certainly don’t want it to end.

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