Connect with us
nord stream nord stream

Energy

International Security Implications of the US-Russia Contention Over the Nord Stream 2

Published

on

The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has been a subject of heated debates all along the construction cycle. The pros and cons are abundantly exposed in the public domain and have been at the centre of technical and political discussions for several years. The project comes amid a wide range of comments and statements on the high political level, involving leaders of Germany, Russia, the United States and the European Union. The polemic around the Nord Stream 2 takes place in a particular context marked by the growing tensions between Russia and the West and recurrent security incidents in the East of Ukraine and the Crimea area. Those factors add further to a tendency to overemphasize political and security dimensions of the Nord Stream 2. Consequently, the project has been associated with far-reaching strategic implications. Referring to the opinions expressed by politicians and experts on both sides of the Atlantic, Western media have represented the pipeline construction as infringing on the NATO interests in the region and frustrating the unity of the European nations. The pipeline has also been presented as laying the ground for Russian military offensive into its European neighbourhood. This has created quite an exceptional environment for a project which was designed merely as an extension of the already existing pipeline route (Nord Stream 1). Indeed, the project could hardly be viewed in ‘normal circumstances’ as a very new element in, or a substantial change, to the European energy and security landscape.

Making an extra argument in favour or against the project will not be the objective of this article. What it will, however, try to explore is to what extent the contention around the Nord Stream 2 may interfere with existing security balances in Europe and how far it can impact strategic security relations in a triangle formed by Russia, the EU and the USA.

On the one hand, the developments around the Nord Stream 2 are quite similar to those which accompanied earlier projects of hydrocarbon transit from Russia to Europe, starting from the Nord Stream 1 and back to the Cold War times. This can be noticed by looking at the international reaction to the project. Indeed, many arguments currently advanced against the Nord Stream 2 have already emerged at the order of the day on several occasions. The narrative is commonly constructed along the lines of Europe’s energy vulnerability and its dependence on external energy supplies, from the Cold War era “red oil” threat to later Soviet and now Russian gas dependency. Ten years ago, the opponents of the first Nord Stream pipeline put on the table almost the same points of criticism. They considered the project as an attempt to bypass traditional transit countries, exert political and military influence on them, gain strategic dominance over Europe.

The diplomatic and political manoeuvres around the Nord Stream 2 are also not entirely new. Back in 1962 (a time when oil and not gas was the main product in energy trade relations between the USSR and Europe) NATO countries introduced a US-proposed embargo on oil pipes and connected technology for the Soviet Union. This strategy was enacted as an attempt to delay the construction of the pipeline named Druzhba (the Russian for ʻfriendshipʼ) intended to bring the country’s oil to Europe. Further embargo on pipeline technologies was implemented in the early 1980s by Ronald Reaganʼs government. The measure was supposed to prevent the construction of the Soviet export gas pipeline Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod, in which several European companies and banks had a stake. For these past events, various features of the European and transatlantic policy were quite similar to the present times. The division of Europe into supporters and detractors of the pipelines from Russia, US and NATO attempts to block Russian energy deals with the European companies, and the national governments’ subjection in international affairs to the energy majors’ strategies, do not sound like anything new. Thus the actual contention over the Nord Stream 2 is inscribed into the longer-term turbulent history of the Russian hydrocarbon transit projects in Europe.

On the other hand, today’s context is different, and there are mainly two new elements which account for the change. First is that the world has entered a new historical period, security-wise far less structured, predictable and manageable than the Cold War times and even the post-Cold War era. Dramatically reduced level of trust between the USA and Russia, coupled with the harsh rhetoric of their leaders and continuous mutual accusations raise the conflictual potential in the bilateral relations. US-China competition over trade and economic leadership adds to further international complexity. The growing number of actual and potential military conflicts, including hybrid ones, brings about a higher risk of escalation with unpredictable consequences. Serious concerns hover over disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with its significant components fallen apart or remaining in limbo. While the demise of the time-proved mechanisms aimed at conflict prevention may be traced back to 2002, when Washington’s withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABN Treaty), the recent developments, mainly the US decision to pull out from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Russia’s suspension shortly after of its own compliance with the pact, have put the finishing touch to the arms control and disarmament agenda of the whole post-Cold War era.

In such a context, armed conflicts are likely to break out or grow in intensity along one of many existing fault lines. The cross-border energy projects also turn into dividing factors within the current confrontational conjuncture. Consequently, North Stream 2 has got the potential to impact the European geopolitical scene profoundly.

The second new element pertains to the US domestic hydrocarbons production and the way it strains the competition for the European gas market sharply. Only about a decade ago, the United States was supposed to become the largest importer of liquefied gas. However, the shale revolution brought about a sharp increase in domestic gas production. Paradoxically, the infrastructure previously designed to import LNG to the USA was used later on to export gas. That contributed to a significant reduction in the cost of American LNG projects compared to similar endeavours in other countries (Qatar, Australia and Russia). By 2020, the production capacity of the six existing US LNG plants reached about 78 million tons, and the United States is now quite able to outrun Qatar in production volumes (this is apart from being currently the world’s leading exporter of refined oil products).

Meanwhile, domestic gas production in the European countries accounts today for less than 50 per cent of domestic consumption. The demand for imported gas is growing. Over the past six years, gas supplies from external sources have increased by an average of almost 4 per cent annually. In 2018, European countries imported 326 Bcm of gas, 4.8 per cent more than in 2017. In the first half of 2019, the total net gas imports in the EU amounted to 210 Bcm, which was 19 per cent more than in the first half of 2018, amid increasing consumption (+4.5 per cent) and decreasing domestic production (-7.6 per cent), pointing to further increase of gas import dependency in the EU. Russia remained the top pipeline gas supplier of the EU, covering the major part (almost 45 per cent) of total extra-EU gas imports.

The approximate market share volume in Europe for the US gas producers may potentially elevate up to 60 – 80 billion cubic meters, but only if supplies from Russia are effectively restricted. Because of the hurdles which the US LNG may face on the European market due to the growing competition with the cheaper pipeline gas from Russia, its export may find itself limited only to the markets of the Asia-Pacific Region and Latin America with only a marginal proportion going to Europe. That explains the rationale behind some non-market restrictive measures, or sanctions, which serve as an instrument to sideline the competitor and politically facilitate American LNG flows toward Europe. President Trump and high officials of his administration expressed on various occasions their opinions on the North Stream 2 project, which oscillated from lukewarm to overtly adverse. The US ambassadors in Berlin and the Hague overtly pressured local governments and private companies to reconsider their support for or involvement with the pipeline. In June 2019, the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Protecting European Energy Security Act, a bill which would impose sanctions on anyone who sells, leases, or provides pipe-laying vessels used in the construction of a Russian-origin energy pipeline that makes landfall in Germany or Turkey. A month later, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced the bill that would impose sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 as an effort to “protect European energy security and Ukraine’s stability”.

Finally, on December 20, 2019, the US President signed a sanctions package on the Nord Stream 2 and another offshore pipeline designed by Moscow, Turkish Stream (also called TurkStream). As an immediate effect, the Swiss-Dutch company AllSeas in charge of laying the pipes in both projects announced its withdrawal from the Nord Stream 2, causing presumably a one-year delay to its completion.

The surplus shale oil and gas production in the US has impacted the governmental approach toward diplomacy. Ever since the 1970s, Washington had criticized the use of energy as a political instrument; however, once the self-sufficiency was achieved, energy sanctions have become the tool of choice for American foreign policy. This new role of the US — that of the ‘energy hegemon’ — will likely have several effects on the transatlantic relations and international security.

First of all, overusing sanctions in the energy domain would affect the supply security of the EU countries and necessitate some innovative safeguards against further deterioration. A situation when almost all non-US sponsored energy supply projects in Europe may face fierce American opposition on political grounds is constraining for actual and potential investors into hydrocarbon transit business. As long as the US economic interests find their way in Europe under the guise of political considerations, the stakes of the European companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 (or other energy projects with Russia or Iran) will remain at risk. That kind of setting may result in a broader awareness within the EU about the diverging political priorities of Washington. It is also possible to expect the elaboration of some specific measures aiming to mitigate the effects of the US sanctions on what Europeans see as their legitimate business and security interests. It should be noted, that the big question is whether the EU will have enough of united political will and capacity to take a course of action that goes against the attitude of its central political and commercial partner, the US. However, the ongoing discussions in Europe about the de-dollarisation of the energy products trading, as well as some attempts made by France, Germany and the United Kingdom to set up a special purpose financial vehicle (INSTEX) to facilitate trade with Iran, are some early examples of a search for greater autonomy.

Secondly, fierce US lobbying against the Nord Stream 2 stokes tension to an already complex and sometimes explosive European security landscape. The US and some Eastern European countries used to strengthen the arguments against the project by stressing its linkage with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It purportedly followed therefrom that the raison d’être of the North Stream 2 was to slowly strangle Russian neighbour’s economic and political capabilities, particularly by causing Ukraine to lose around 2 billion euro annually in gas transit fees when the new pipeline becomes operational.

However, by the end of 2019 Moscow and Kyiv reached a new five-year agreement on Russian gas transit through Ukrainian territory. Ukraine got the supply volumes it wanted: 65 billion cubic meters in the first year, and 40 billion the next year. In the absence of the Nord Stream 2, delayed by the US sanctions, Gazprom might have to supply some 75 Bcm through Ukraine in 2020.

Nevertheless, the critics of the project are already extending the strategic implications of the pipeline to the Baltic area. The standard argument here is that the pipe would give Russians a pretext to patrol the entire Baltic sea, as well as provide infrastructure for information transmission and for tracking the movement of naval vessels. From that reasoning follows that adequate countermeasures need to be designed and implemented by NATO in order to prevent a “blow” against security in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, the whole area is getting locked in a highly conflictual conjuncture aggravated by already existing regional security challenges, such as the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the ongoing military buildup on the NATO’s Eastern flank.

Thirdly, the recurrent difficulties in involving Europeans into sustainable and smooth economic partnership in the gas sector, as well as the American sanctions which could eventually apply to any additional lines to the Russia-sponsored pipelines in Europe, incentivize Russia to reconsider the geometry of its energy export routes. The deliveries of Siberian gas to China in the amount exceeding 1 trillion cubic meters in 30 years began via a new trunkline — ‘the Power of Siberia’, with the annual capacity of 38 Bcm . The reorientation of substantial gas volumes toward the East is a sign that the former Cold War allies seem to be on the way of upgrading their relationships while trying to fend off escalating pressure from the West. Washington clearly designates Russia and China as US strategic rivals, and this precipitates both countries to cooperate on a broader range of issues, like energy and related infrastructure, international security and domestic governance. With all the limitations which an alliance between Moscow and Beijing may face, this it is likely to become a consequential factor of the strategic landscape in Eurasia and beyond.

Fourthly, the growing US pressure both on Russia and on Europe to stanch the Nord Stream 2 construction causes discords within the EU and is likely to rebound badly for the European political unity already put to the test by many economic and security issues. The controversial reputation of Donald Trump’s international policymaking could pose a problem to those EU member states that follow American president in warning against the project. On the contrary, those who support the Nord Stream 2 or stay neutrally favourable toward it, are likely to be in a more advantageous position by representing their attitude as resistance to external pressure and uncompromising defence of national and European interests. The German’s pattern of political conduct fits well into this framework. Berlin supports the pipeline construction (regarded primarily as a business project) and defends it as a contribution to national economic development and secure energy supply for Europe. In a way, Germany has revealed the limits of pressure that President Trump is prone to exercise on the US allies and adversaries alike. What is happening proves that applying coercion, or just evoking it publicly, can bring about the opposite effect. That holds true for the Nord Stream 2 which has got broad public support within German society, and is now championed both by major ruling political parties in the current CDU/SPD coalition as well as three parties of the opposition: the far right AfD, the liberal FDP, and the extreme left, die Linke. The same holds in other cases as well. For instance, another President Trump’s favourite subject of anger concerning Germany is its defence spending. However, pushing Berlin into increasing it up to 2 per cent of its GDP makes it extremely difficult to do so. On the one hand, existing polling data proves that Germans oppose defence spending above the 1.5 per cent of GDP, already promised by Angela Merkel by 2024. On the other hand, hardly any politician in Germany wants to be seen succumbing to Trump’s overt forcing. Although there is no direct link between the German involvement with the Nord Stream 2 construction and its vision of the defense spending obligations, the underlying factor on both accounts is compelling American demand for clear-cut solutions to the issues, which turn out to be much more nuanced from the German standpoint.

The overemphasized political and military dimensions of the Nord Stream 2 increase pressure on the strategic relationship between Russia and the West. The anti-Russian rhetoric fans the continuous contention around the project in the American and European mass media. The moment when it happens is all the more inopportune, taking into account the deteriorated security environment in Europe which moves closer to the untrammeled arms race with the demise of the INF Treaty and the uncertainty about the future of the New START — one of the last pillars of the arms control regime. International energy supply projects have become — nolens volens — closely intertwined with political and security developments, be it escalation between the US and Iran at the Strait of Hormuz — a vital shipping route linking Middle East oil producers to global markets — or the simmering conflict in the East of Ukraine, in the vicinity of a transit corridor for Russian gas exported to Europe. Being a constant element of the strategic picture, energy is more and more regarded as a dividing factor which serves the interests of one party to the detriment of the other. The application of this conflictual paradigm to the Nord Stream 2 gives rise to yet another fault line amidst already strained European political and security environment.

Paradoxically, with the Nord Stream 2 contention, the very concept of energy resources supply and sharing acquires a confrontational connotation in Europe. Whereas, the same idea was underlying regional integration back in the mid-20th century. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established by the Paris agreement in 1951 was intended to neutralize competition between European nations over natural resources and prevent further war with Germany. The visionary idea behind the transnational community implied that amidst dramatic lack of trust toward a particular country the best way to avoid conflict and to restore confidence was to involve the distrusted state into a large-scale energy project. Unfortunately, subsequent historical developments on the European continent resulted in a situation where the idea of promoting extended energy partnership as a pledge of lasting peace seems no longer attractive. The Nord Stream 2 case demonstrates quite clearly the lack of collective will on behalf of the European Union to engage on a long-term basis with its Eastern neighbour in the gas sector. Keeping in mind the limitations of any historical analogies, back than the ECSC represented a political option in dealing with a nation which was suspected of seeking regional domination. In the modern days, rather than making out of the Nord Stream 2 another squandered opportunity for building a more sustainable relationship with Russia, the West, and primarily the EU as a close neighbour, could have looked at the pipeline beyond its primary function of one-way gas supply. The connecting gas artery might also serve to send something back from Europe toward Russia, albeit in a virtual sense, like a better understanding of European priorities and concerns, trust, and a vision of a shared future. The project could have also been viewed as a safeguard against presupposed Russian military invasion into the countries of the EU Eastern periphery. The possible damage to the pipeline which would provide significant and much-needed export revenues for the national economy is a convincing disincentive for Moscow to mount some dubious warfare operation in its neighbourhood. However, this perspective was not able to make its way through alarmist rhetoric which depicted the Nord Stream 2 as a part of Russia’s sinister designs. The same reasoning certainly reinforces the aggressive image of Russia and gives additional sense to NATO’s raison d’être. At the same time, it leaves Moscow disenchanted with the European partners, locks the country out in a reactive posture and makes look for strategic alliances elsewhere.

Finally, the US-Russia contention over the Nord Stream 2 is likely to take a toll on the transatlantic solidarity. The trends going in that direction are gaining strength driven by the specifics of the current American foreign policy. It would be premature to argue that the European elites are ready to break ranks with Washington. However, on several issues, such as the nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA), Middle East policy, the role of NATO or relations with China they show increased independence and greater consideration of their national interests. The way things will develop for the Nord Stream 2 will be partly determined by the unfoldment of the debates over the greater European strategic autonomy from the US. However, even if the outcome of these debates tilts the balance in favour of the Nord Stream 2, it is difficult to predict for how long that could last. The European position regarding the project has indeed proved to be a complicated, precarious symbiosis between internal strategic concerns, imposed security frameworks and economic motivations.

From our partner RIAC

[1] As Roberto Cantoni notes, those were not the only USA-proposed blockades aimed at hindering Soviet industrial projects: “…In 1946, a penicillin plant program launched by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to build up the capacity of the pharmaceutical industry in Eastern and Southern Europe was significantly delayed by an American embargo on extractor technologies. The State Department refused to grant export licenses for the necessary equipment to pass the Iron Curtain. Other products including radioisotopes and computer equipment were also embargoed to stifle Soviet technological progress”.

[2] Among the primary factors driving gas demand growth in Europe are the decline in domestic production, reduction in nuclear generation, and the decreased role of coal in the energy sector. Within the EU, the gradual capping on the extraction from the major Dutch Groningen gas field resulted in the production downturn of a magnitude similar to the increase of Russian gas imports (both roughly 40 Bcm).

Continue Reading
Comments

Energy

Russian Energy Week: Is the world ready to give up hydrocarbons?

Published

on

In an official message to mark the opening of the Russian Energy Week international forum on 13-15 October in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed that there are numerous issues on the agenda related to current trends in the global energy market, including improvements to industry infrastructure and the introduction of modern digital technologies into its operation.

“The efficiency of energy production and consumption is the most important factor in the growth of national economies and has a significant impact on people’s quality of life. Many countries have already adopted policies to accelerate the development of clean energy technologies,” he wrote in the message to guest and participants.

“The forum business programme is therefore set to look in detail at the possibility of developing green energy based on renewable sources and the transition to new, more environmentally friendly fuels. I am confident that the events of the Russian Energy Week will allow you to learn more about the achievements of the country’s fuel and energy sector, and that your initiatives will be put into practice,” Putin said.

Leaders of foreign states have also sent greetings to the participants and guests. For instance, President of the Republic of Angola João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, Prime Minister of Vietnam Pham Minh Chinh, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Armed Forces Mohamed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, and Vice Premier of the State Council of China Han Zheng.

In their greetings, it generally noted the importance of the topics to be discussed at the forum as well as the need to build an international dialogue and consolidate efforts to achieve the sustainable development goals, including as regards climate change.

The programme covers a wide range of issues of transformation and development in the global energy market. In the context of energy transition, the issues of energy development are inextricably linked with the introduction of new technologies, and the transformation aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. Climate protection is a task that cannot be solved by one country; it is a global goal, which can be achieved through building dialogue and cooperation between countries.

The participants in the discussion will answer the question: Is the world ready to give up hydrocarbons? In addition, during the panel session, the participants will discuss whether oil, gas and coal are really losing ground in the global energy sector; whether the infrastructure will have time to readjust for new energy sources; how long will there be enough hydrocarbons from the field projects that are being implemented; and whether an energy transition using fossil fuels is possible.

The international climate agenda is forcing many countries to reform their carbon-based energy systems. For Russia, which holds a leading position in the global hydrocarbon markets, the transition to development with low greenhouse gas emissions presents a serious challenge, but at the same time it opens up new opportunities for economic growth based on renewable energy, hydrogen technologies, advanced processing of raw materials and implementing green projects.

The Climate Agenda included sessions dedicated to the operation of the Russian fuel and energy sector in the context of energy transition, the impact of the European green pivot on the cooperation between Russia and Europe, as well as the session titled ‘The Future of Coal in a World Shaped by the Climate Agenda: The End, or a New Beginning?’

Sessions of the ‘New Scenarios for the Economy and the Market’ track are dedicated to the global challenges and opportunities of the electric power industry; the impact of ESG on the Russian fuel and energy sector; the potential for the renewable energy sources; and other issues of the future of energy.

The Russian Energy Agency under the Ministry of Energy brings together experts from key international analytical organizations to discuss the future of world energy during the session titled International Energy Organization Dialogue: Predicting the Development of Energy and Global Markets.

The Human Resource Potential of the Fuel and Energy Sector, participating experts will discuss the prospects for developing the professional qualification system, and a session titled Bringing the Woman’s Dimension to the Fuel and Energy Sector. Optimizing regulation in the energy sector and organizing the certification and exchange of carbon credits in Russia are the basis of the Regulatory Advances in Energy. 

Anton Kobyakov, Advisor to the Russian President and Executive Secretary of the Russian Energy Week 2021 Organizing Committee, said “the level of various formats of international participation testifies to the importance of the agenda and Russia’s significant role in the global energy sector. We are a reliable strategic partner that advocates for building international cooperation based on the principles of transparency and openness. With the period of major changes in the industry, it is particularly important to engage in a dialogue and work together to achieve both national and global goals.”

The forum, organized by the Roscongress Foundation, the Russian Ministry of Energy, and the Moscow Government, brought together many local and foreign energy and energy-related enterprises. The speakers attending included  Exxon Mobil Corporation Chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO Darren Woods, Daimler AG and Mercedes-Benz AG Chairman of the Board Ola Kallenius, BP CEO Bernard Looney, and TotalEnergies Chairman and CEO Patrick Pouyanné.

Continue Reading

Energy

World Energy Outlook 2021 shows a new energy economy is emerging

Published

on

A new energy economy is emerging around the world as solar, wind, electric vehicles and other low-carbon technologies flourish. But as the pivotal moment of COP26 approaches, the IEA’s new World Energy Outlook makes it clear that this clean energy progress is still far too slow to put global emissions into sustained decline towards net zero, highlighting the need for an unmistakeable signal of ambition and action from governments in Glasgow.

At a time when policy makers are contending with the impacts of both climate change and volatile energy markets, the World Energy Outlook 2021 (WEO-2021) is designed as a handbook for the COP26 Climate Change Conference in Glasgow, which offers a critical opportunity to accelerate climate action and the clean energy transition. The new analysis – which the IEA is making available for free online – delivers stark warnings about the direction in which today’s policy settings are taking the world. But it also provides clear-headed analysis of how to move in a well-managed way towards a pathway that would have a good chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C and avoiding the worst effects of climate change.

The WEO-2021, the IEA’s annual flagship publication, shows that even as deployments of solar and wind go from strength to strength, the world’s consumption of coal is growing strongly this year, pushing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions towards their second largest annual increase in history.

“The world’s hugely encouraging clean energy momentum is running up against the stubborn incumbency of fossil fuels in our energy systems,” said Fatih Birol, the IEA Executive Director. “Governments need to resolve this at COP26 by giving a clear and unmistakeable signal that they are committed to rapidly scaling up the clean and resilient technologies of the future. The social and economic benefits of accelerating clean energy transitions are huge, and the costs of inaction are immense.”

The WEO-2021 spells out clearly what is at stake: what the pledges to reduce emissions made by governments so far mean for the energy sector and the climate. And it sets out what needs to be done to move beyond these announced pledges towards a trajectory that would reach net zero emissions globally by mid-century – the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario from the landmark IEA report published in May, which is consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C.

As well as the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, the WEO-2021 explores two other scenarios to gain insights into how the global energy sector may develop over the next three decades – and what the implications would be. The Stated Policies Scenario represents a path based on the energy and climate measures governments have actually put in place to date, as well as specific policy initiatives that are under development. In this scenario, almost all of the net growth in energy demand through 2050 is met by low emissions sources, but that leaves annual emissions still around today’s levels. As a result, global average temperatures are still rising when they hit 2.6 °C above pre-industrial levels in 2100.

The Announced Pledges Scenario maps out a path in which the net zero emissions pledges announced by governments so far are implemented in time and in full. In this scenario, demand for fossil fuels peaks by 2025, and global CO2 emissions fall by 40% by 2050. All sectors see a decline, with the electricity sector delivering by far the largest. The global average temperature rise in 2100 is held to around 2.1 °C.

For the first time in a WEO, oil demand goes into eventual decline in all the scenarios examined, although the timing and speed of the drop vary widely. If all today’s announced climate pledges are met, the world would still be consuming 75 million oil barrels per day by 2050 – down from around 100 million today – but that plummets to 25 million in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario. Natural gas demand increases in all scenarios over the next five years, but there are sharp divergences after this.

After decades of growth, the prospects for coal power go downhill in the Announced Pledges Scenario – a decline that could be accelerated further by China’s recent announcement of an end to its support for building coal plants abroad. That move may result in the cancellation of planned projects that would save some 20 billion tonnes in cumulative CO2 emissions through 2050 – an amount similar to the total emissions savings from the European Union reaching net zero by 2050.

The differences between the outcomes in the Announced Pledges Scenario and the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario are stark, highlighting the need for more ambitious commitments if the world is to reach net zero by mid-century.

“Today’s climate pledges would result in only 20% of the emissions reductions by 2030 that are necessary to put the world on a path towards net zero by 2050,” Dr Birol said. “Reaching that path requires investment in clean energy projects and infrastructure to more than triple over the next decade. Some 70% of that additional spending needs to happen in emerging and developing economies, where financing is scarce and capital remains up to seven times more expensive than in advanced economies.”

Insufficient investment is contributing to uncertainty over the future. Spending on oil and natural gas has been depressed by price collapses in 2014-15 and again in 2020. As a result, it is geared towards a world of stagnant or even falling demand. At the same time, spending on clean energy transitions is far below what would be required to meet future needs in a sustainable way.

“There is a looming risk of more turbulence for global energy markets,” Dr Birol said. “We are not investing enough to meet future energy needs, and the uncertainties are setting the stage for a volatile period ahead. The way to address this mismatch is clear – a major boost in clean energy investment, across all technologies and all markets. But this needs to happen quickly.”

The report stresses that the extra investment to reach net zero by 2050 is less burdensome than it might appear. More than 40% of the required emissions reductions would come from measures that pay for themselves, such as improving efficiency, limiting gas leakage, or installing wind or solar in places where they are now the most competitive electricity generation technologies.

These investments also create huge economic opportunities. Successfully pursuing net zero would create a market for wind turbines, solar panels, lithium-ion batteries, electrolysers and fuel cells of well over USD 1 trillion a year by 2050, comparable in size to the current oil market. Even in a much more electrified energy system, major opportunities remain for fuel suppliers to produce and deliver low-carbon gases. Just in the Announced Pledges Scenario, an additional 13 million workers would be employed in clean energy and related sectors by 2030, while that number doubles in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.

Continue Reading

Energy

Russian Energy Arrogance or American Cold War Psychology?

Published

on

Lately, there has been much garment-rending across Western media and governmental sources, all criticizing Russia’s so-called hostility toward the European Union on the issue of gas supplies this coming winter. The core essence of the criticism is the accusation that the Russian Federation is playing geopolitical games with the European Union, threatening it with a freeze-out this winter if it does not play ball on accepting the massive Nord Stream 2 pipeline deal. A cursory glance across many important media sources in the West reveals just how quickly the “analyses” seem eager to ratchet up the emotionality:

  • The Washington Examiner reported that “winter is coming” for Europe and Biden because of Putin.
  • The National Interest derisively called “giving Europe a pass” on ratifying Nord Stream 2 as an outright victory for Putin.
  • Politico blatantly asked “will Putin attack?” when discussing the issue of supplying gas to Europe.
  • The New York Times called Nord Stream 2 a “security threat” and that Biden must stop Putin from achieving this victory.
  • Newsweek reported how many governmental officials in Washington are outright lamenting this issue as a “present to Putin” and an example of the White House enabling Putin while undermining Europe.

Very disconcerting language indeed, emblematic of the continued insistence in the West that it is de facto in a New Cold War with Russia. To all of this Putin has largely given a presumptive and decidedly dismissive geopolitical yawn. But underneath the typical cool bravado that Putin has always exhibited in the face of direct Western criticism, there must also be an obvious air of dissatisfaction and outright anger at what Russia sees as a consistent effort by Washington to portray it in the worst possible light.

First, Russia is quick to explain that recent soaring energy prices are not the result of some dastardly political scheme engineered inside the Kremlin, but instead connected to recovering energy demands as the world emerges from the COVID pandemic, particularly from Asia. To ignore this global economic fact in order to focus on a fabricated political design is the first hint to Russians that they are being held to a geopolitical double-standard that others do not face.

Second, powerful Washington opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, is based not so much on any flaw in the pipeline or doubt that it would ease the energy needs of Europe. Rather, it is recognition that the pipeline makes Russia stronger, as it will allow it to directly supply gas to Europe, as opposed to its current main pipelines that run through Ukraine first. As everyone knows, the Russia-Ukraine relationship continues to be incredibly tense and unfriendly. Thus, seeking a way to work around that problem while still supplying a valuable natural asset is, in economic-geopolitical-security terms, completely rational and logical for Russia. Therefore, Washington’s opposition is seen by Putin for what it truly is: strategizing against Russia growing stronger, more prosperous, and influential.

Third, Russia, if anything, is always aware of all perceived slights when it comes to its position on the global stage. Some might even say it has a tendency to “over-perceive” such slights historically. In this particular case, the slights are quite obvious when Russian analysts look at how the rest of the major players in the global economy are treated when they engage in similar strategy. The fluctuations in the oil market, overall decided by OPEC but heavily influenced individually by Saudi Arabia, have over the decades rarely been purely altruistic. When it has been apparent that Saudi Arabia is taking advantage of its leveraged position, maximizing its own individual benefits to the detriment of all the other players, rarely has the United States gone straight for the geopolitical jugular, questioning whether or not Saudi Arabia is preparing for war by another name or is intending to “starve” the West of its innate energy needs. The same can be said for China, with all of its various machinations over the past two decades in terms of the currency, labor, real estate, and manufacturing markets. While criticism has always existed against both of these countries, those same criticisms have also recognized that the respective Saudi and Chinese maneuvers are understandable from objective geopolitical, economic, and security perspectives. It is not surprising, therefore, that Russia is not just aware of these parallel realities but also notices how unfavorably it is treated in comparison for the same behavior. Especially given that these countries, while not exactly the best-of-friends with the United States, are still given so-called passes deemed “dangerous” if given to Russia.

Taken together, these facts are what always drive Russians crazy and push Putin into his “dismissive arrogance” posture that he often assumes when irritated by members of the Western media. Luckily for Russian specialists, this is one of the most entertaining aspects of Putin’s personality, as this arrogance is one of the few times that his true opinions and feelings are on display for reporters. But underneath the arrogance is arguably an endemic frustration forming the base of it all. What the Kremlin is most tired of is having to answer questions that clearly (though obliviously when it comes to the reporters asking) imply that Russia is in the wrong if it pursues policies that maximize its economic strength, increase its geopolitical prestige and leverage, and/or does not improve its relationship with the United States. Putin often remarks about how his decision-making is based solely on what is good for Russia and best for Russians. These comments are usually dismissed by the West as platitudes. But he means them. The problem is not that he takes such objectives seriously. The problem is that too many in the West fail to envision a reality where Russia does not accept being put into a tightly controlled box built on what the United States considers appropriate. And this latter point is not affirmation of a New Cold War with the West; it is confirmation that the West is still stuck in the psychology of the old one.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending