Europe

Greece and Russia: Back to the Truman Doctrine?

Published

3 years ago

February 5, 2020

Britain’s well-known keenness to keep Russia, and then the Soviet Union, and now again just Russia, away from the Eastern Mediterranean is a well-established fact of foreign policy. Since the end of the last world war, the same policy has returned, albeit in the new colours of America, with the UK in attendance. This article traces some key events in the continuing atavistic story and then attempts to prognosticate, concluding that, whatever the public relations spin on events, little has altered since the assassination of Greece’s first pro-Russian leader, Count Kapodistrias, other than cosmetically. In short, the same things return, but with different colours.

English Greece

In 1841, the British Minister to Greece, Sir Edmund Lyons, said: ‘A truly independent Greece is an absurdity. Greece can either be English or Russian, and since she cannot be Russian, it is necessary that she be English.’ His words show that the Cold War began long before the so-called Truman Doctrine. In fact, one can pre-date the beginning of a Cold War mentality to 1791, when the English Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, lambasted Russia for wishing to dismember Anatolia. This was only some twenty-two years after Catherine the Great’s attempt to free Greece via the Orlov brothers. At any rate, when Greece’s first leader, the pro-Russian Kapodistrias (a former Russian foreign minister), was assassinated in 1831, Britain breathed a sigh of relief. Thenceforth, Greece was a mere geopolitical tool of the world’s largest empire. The Crimean War demonstrates par excellence Britain’s insistence on keeping Russia away from Greece, just as does Britain’s possession of Cyprus in 1878, whereby Britain undertook to support the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Fast-forward to 1944 when, despite Churchill’s’ ‘percentages agreement’ with Stalin, whereby Greece would be ten per cent Russian and ninety English, Britain was still highly suspicious of its ‘ally’ Russia, even though the Foreign Office had admitted that Britain, not the Soviet Union, was responsible for the strength of the Communists in Greece (and Yugoslavia). 1947 is a key year, since this is when Britain literally handed Greece to the US, thus extricating itself from her embarrassing rôle in having aided and abetted the Greek civil war. Britain thus brought America into the Balkans, thereby replacing the dead Austro-Hungarian Empire as its pro-Ottoman and then pro-Turkish friend.

American Greece

Greece now appears to be again becoming one of the American military and commercial empire’s most compliant partners. Let us again go backwards: Trumanesque Greece was firmly part of the US and NATO Cold War strategy, with the Left Wing being reviled by the anti-communist deep state which, when threatened by liberalisation, engineered the military coup of 1967. This brought in a particularly pro-American government. Despite the US-condoned invasion of Cyprus, which led to the fall of the Junta, Greece’s leaving NATO’s integrated military structure for a few years, Andreas Papandreou’s short-lived push for more independence in foreign policy, and former recent Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis’ attempts to move closer to Moscow (e.g. the abortive Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline), Greece is now again moving very much into the US/NATO camp. This was epitomised by the recent signing of the ‘EastMed Act’, which improves US military cooperation with Greece and establishes areas of cooperation such as energy security in the region, according to Jim Risch, chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The US is particularly happy with the agreement between Greece, Cyprus and Israel on gas exploration since it will reduce European dependence on Russian gas. The US is even happier with Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ public support for the assassination of Iran’s top general, Soleimani, which contrasts with France and Germany’s muted response. It is no exaggeration to state that Greece is in many respects emulating the foreign policy of the military dictatorship of 1967–1974.

Another factor in all this is the Greek-American one. There are estimated to be 1,400,000 Americans of Greek heritage, all with relatives in Greece, and all descended from immigrants. As with many immigrants, particularly those who have had to leave their country for economic reasons, many are beholden to their host country’s policies, but particularly in the case of policy vis-à-vis Russia. They are spearheaded by the American Hellenic Institute, and lobby constantly to try and persuade the US to be firmer with Turkey on the Cyprus question. Yet they are by and large also anti-communist, and therefore anti-Russian, as if the Cold War is uppermost in their minds, with their apparent inability to differentiate between Communism and modern Russia.

The Greek government seems to naïvely think that by making Greece a US military strongpoint, as it has just done, it will gain US support, to help Greece to combat Turkish claims on some Greek islands. This is naïve, and the US Embassy has written: ‘We recognize Greece’s border with Turkey, but not all the territorial waters implications which Greece asserts. We have not taken a position on sovereignty over Imia/Kardak, in part because of the lack of an agreed maritime boundary….. We recognize the six-mile territorial sea claim and a claim to the superjacent air space. We do not recognize Greece’s claim to territorial air space seaward of the outer limit of its territorial sea.”

Greece can expect no help from the US if Turkey does manage to grab a Greek island. Indeed, whatever the rhetoric, Turkey is more important to US and NATO interests than Greece. As the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote in 1975, reflecting US policy then and now, “We must also recognise that in the final analysis Turkey must be regarded as more important to Western strategic interests than Greece and that, if risks must be run, they should be risks of further straining Greek rather than Turkish relations with the West.” This is still true, whatever the public relations socio-political engineering. Greece also seems to have forgotten that the US facilitated and condoned the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. More worrying, Iran has already threatened retaliation if the US uses any base in Greece to attack it. In diplomacy, detail and precision are more important than pseudo-bonhomie and vague words. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, Greece’s behaviour puts Russia in a strong position. Before elaborating on this, let us first look at ‘Russian Greece’.

Russian Greece

As we have seen, the assassination of Greece’s first leader was the first blow to Greece-Russia relations, ushering in a period of instability and foreign, mainly French and British, interference. Yet the modern Greek state would not even have come about as it did, were it not for Russia: the Anglo-Russian Protocol of April 4, 1826, stated that Britain would mediate to make Greece an autonomous vassal of the Ottoman Empire, but that if this proved impossible, the two powers could intervene jointly or separately. Russia intervened, and Britain was forced to adopt an ‘if you can’t beat’em, join ‘em’ approach. Thus, the British-Russian-French fleet sunk the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet at Navarino, followed by Russia’s defeating the Ottomans in a quick war. Greece was thus able to gain its – albeit qualified — independence, as a protectorate of the ‘Powers’. Thereafter, Britain’s gunboat ‘diplomacy’ ensured that Greece was unable to support Russia officially in the Crimean War: Britain simply blockaded Piraeus. But during the Russian Revolution, Greece made a major strategic mistake by fighting the Bolsheviks, to Britain’s glee, thus helping Moscow justify supporting Mustafa Kemal. Although Greece and the Soviet Union were technically on the same side (i.e. the Greek government in exile) following the German invasion of Russia, the result of the Greek civil war and the Truman Doctrine put paid to any possibility of warm relations between Athens and Moscow. Stalin’s internal exiling of around 50,000 Soviet Greeks eastwards should be seen in this context, particular the groups exiled in the late Forties. Thereafter, the banning of the Greek Communist Party in Greece and the military Junta of 1967 to 1974 put paid to serious relations between Athens and Moscow. Thereafter, any serious attempts to improve relations have been thwarted in one way or another. Perhaps understandably, Moscow has considerable difficulty in trusting Greek governments, given Greece’s NATO-friendly energy policy, such as the US-sponsored Greece — Cyprus — Israel triangle, and now the military agreement with the US.

Therefore, whatever the natural, historical atavistic affinity between the Greek and Russian peoples — viz., inter alia, the Cyrillic alphabet, Orthodox Christianity, the Treaty of Küçük Kainardji (whereby Russia won the right to protect Christians in the Ottoman Empire), a commercial treaty granting Greek ships the protection of the Russian flag, the establishment of a military academy for Greeks in Russia, the Greek Battalion of Balaclava (part of the Russian Imperial Army), and the pro-Russian Kapodistrias, strategic reality has to date proved stronger than nostalgia, emotion and atavistic affinity.

The Turkish Factor

On top of this, from a purely strategic viewpoint, Turkey is more important to Russia than Greece, one of the most obvious reasons being the fact that the Bosphorus Straits are on Turkish territory, and that Russia values its rights of passage. As Russia has seen Greece being used increasingly by the US as a tool to frustrate various Russian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, so Russia has been skilfully playing on Turkish sensitivities to build up its influence. The sale of the S-400 system to Turkey, to Washington’s rage, is a prime example. Moscow has understood that unlike Greece, it can influence events, and chip away at US and NATO interests via Turkey: Realpolitik and soft power par excellence.

The Cyprus Complication

No consideration of Greece-Russia relations can be complete without some reference to Cyprus. The days of Archbishop Makarios’ balanced relations with Moscow are dead and gone. Although Russia has taken various initiatives, such as proposing an international conference on Cyprus, NATO and the EU have resisted this. Russian proposals to rid the island of foreign armed forces are anathema to the US and Britain, who would then have to give the British ‘Sovereign Base Areas’ to Cyprus, thus weakening NATO’s de facto base linking the Eastern Mediterranean to the Middle East. For NATO, Turkish interests take precedence over Cypriot and Greek ones. When Moscow tested the waters by selling its S-300 system to Cyprus in 1997, the resulting Turkish threats and EU and US pressure on Cyprus not to activate the system in Cyprus, saw it transferred to Crete. Again, Turkish interests took precedence. Russia does, of course, have its red line: when a resolution on the Annan unification plan was discussed in 2004, Russia vetoed it, since the plan as a whole was essentially NATO- (and Turkey-) friendly.

Russian foreign policy is not as a rule aggressive, such as the US’s and Turkey’s. In the case of its relations with Greece, Moscow is happy to watch Greek-Turkish tensions causing problems for NATO, and influence Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East to suit its own aims of stability. In this respect, Greece is on the sidelines, now considered to be a mere tool of US policy. In contrast, Turkey has shown a measure of independence vis-à-vis the US, which Greece would not dare to countenance. This is perhaps sensing that were Turkey to snatch a Greek island, the US would simply issue a critical statement against Turkey, and do all it could to prevent a war between NATO ‘allies’ Greece and Turkey, just as occurred with the Cyprus crisis in 1974. It wishes to keep its base at Incirlik.

To Conclude

Then becomes now, albeit with different colours. Just as with Britain during her heyday, Greece’s relations with Russia today are predicated on the US’s keeping Russia at bay in the Eastern Mediterranean, and therefore from having positive and close relations with Greece, Russia’s natural ally in the Nineteenth Century. It would take a Greek statesman of the calibre of Kapodistrias, de Gaulle or Putin to even begin to re-establish the balance. Common religious and historical ties are not enough.

From our partner RIAC

Related Topics:Geopolitics Greece History Russia USA

Up Next

The Politics of Difference: Italy’s Nationalist Turn and the Struggle between “New” and “Old” Italians

Don't Miss

Municipal elections in Paris: Will the city of light be up to the challenge of environmental issues?

William Mallinson

Professor of Political Ideas and Institutions, Università degli Studi Guglielmo Marconi

Comments

Europe

New offensive on Republika Srpska is coming

Published

3 days ago

June 6, 2023

Slavisha Batko Milacic

U.S. Air Force photo by Clay Cupit

If there is a country in Europe that is in constant crisis, it is Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is precisely why most analysts call Bosnia and Herzegovina an impossible state. It is important to note that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complex country made up of two parts: the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (where the absolute majority are Bosniaks and Croats).

Recently, two US Air Force “B-1B” bombers made a low flight over Bosnia and Herzegovina, flying over several cities. After the overflight of American bombers, the US embassy in Sarajevo announced that bomber overflight is a sign of the US’s permanent commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multi-ethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

– We are celebrating the lasting bond between the USA and BiH. The flight demonstrates our commitment to building strong bilateral relations and is proof of our common values and goals. Through cooperation and understanding, we are building a path to a future of peace, security and prosperity in the region – announced General James Hecker, member of the US Air Force and commander of American air bases in Europe, air forces in Africa and the NATO Joint Air Command.

The B-1B aircraft is a long-range heavy bomber that can carry the largest conventional load of guided and unguided missiles of any aircraft in aviation.

It is stated that these aircraft are able to quickly drop huge amounts of precision and non-precision weapons against any enemy, anywhere in the world, at any time.

However, no sovereign authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Presidency and the Council of Ministers – has made a decision on the overflight of American bombers over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specifically, it was done without the consent of the legitimate representatives of the Serbs in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this act, official Washington violated the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The question arises, why are US bombers now flying over Bosnia and Herzegovina and who are they sending a message to? But the answer to that question is simple. The only ones who were bombed by American bombers in the Balkans were the Serbs. Also, only the Serbs protested against the overflight of the American bombers, because they have bitter memories of the American weapons that were used to kill Serbian soldiers and civilians in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Also, due to frequent crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political leader of the Serbs in that country, Milorad Dodik, often talks about a referendum for the independence of the Republika Srpska. And while no one disputes this right with Scotland, as well to other countries in Europe in the past years(like Montenegro), Republika Srpska is threatened with war. Not only from Bosnian radical politicians, but also from American diplomats. To make matters worse, at the same time official Washington created and recognized an independent Kosovo through war. Even today, the main protector and financier of independent Kosovo is US.

It is the hypocrisy of official Washington towards Kosovo that creates additional anger in Republika Srpska. Because, we must not forget, Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced the Holocaust at the hands of Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) during the Second World War. Precisely the genocide that the Serbs experienced in the Second World War is the reason why the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the breakup of Yugoslavia clearly said that they do not want an independent Bosnia in which those who mercilessly killed them during the Second World War will have the main say. But that they want to live with their mother country Serbia.

The Serbs from Bosnia expected that, just as the Jews got their own state, they too would have the opportunity to decide where they would live. Unfortunately, part of the international community had other plans. The artificial state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was forcibly created, and since the Croats do not want Bosnia in addition to the Serbs, a de facto colonial administration was appointed in Bosnia. It is reflected in the character of the Office of the High Representative. Namely, in the nineties, when US was the only superpower in the world, Washington lobbied to introduce the position of High Representative in Bosnia. He was given dictatorial powers, so the democratic will of the people in Bosnia is valid only if the High Representative agrees with it. Plus, the High Representative could remove politicians, fire them from their jobs, in short, make life hell for anyone who opposes him. Due to all of the above, and bearing in mind that the position of the High Representative was expected to last for a short time, rebellions by local Serbs and Croats, as well as part of the international community, soon occurred. Many respected Western organizations that deal with the protection of human rights have been pointing out for years that the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be abolished, because it contradicts democracy and has the characteristics of a dictatorship.

However, the current High Representative, Christian Schmidt was illegitimately elected to that position because he was not appointed to that position by the United Nations Security Council. That is why the Republika Srpska has clearly said that it does not recognize Mr. Christian Schmidt as the High Representative. However, US diplomats in Bosnia don’t accept that decision of Republika Srpska, which is why a new crisis is being created in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the Republika Srpska, in accordance with international law, refuses to implement the undemocratic decisions of the High Representative, part of the international community led by Washington plans to implement a new law that obliges everyone to comply with the decisions of the High Representative. And that is exactly why the American bombers flew over Bosnia and Herzegovina, to send a message to the Republika Srpska that it must listen, otherwise they can be punished as they were in the 1990s.

Another big problem is the issue of state property in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the war and created today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, all property belongs to the entities, except for property that is decisively stated to be state property.

Even if international law is on the side of Republika Srpska, on this issue as well, the US ambassador in Bosnia and Herzegovina, contrary to diplomatic practice, announced his position in the form of an order.

Speaking about the claims from the Republika Srpska that there is no state property and that it belongs to the entities, Murphy stated that this is completely wrong.

– It is a legal fiction. No matter how many times the Republika Srpska authorities claim the opposite, it does not change the fundamental facts, said Murphy and added that the issue of property is resolved at the state level and that the state must say what property it needs, such as prospective military property.

– If there is property that is not needed, you do not have to keep it and the state can transfer it to another owner: municipality, canton, and even entity.

The question arises, where does a foreign ambassador have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and to determine what has been resolved and what has not?! However, all of the above indicates that a new serious offensive is heading towards Republika Srpska.

Political neutralization of Milorad Dodik

Republika Srpska, bearing in mind that international law is on its side (Dayton Peace Agreement), must not accept to have her property taken away, under no circumstances. Also, the Office of the High Representative is a relic of the past and is not in accordance with international law, so Republika Srpska is doing the right thing by not recognizing the newly appointed High Representative. This policy of the President of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has shown that even small entities/states, if they have strong leaders like Mr. Dodik, can lead an independent and beneficial policy for their people.

However, precisely because of the patriotic policy of Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik, part of the international community is trying to remove him from power. First of all through accusations of corruption and on top of that with colored revolutions. Despite speculation that NATO soldiers could arrest Mr. Dodik, this is not realistic. But what is realistic is that the State Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina issues an arrest warrant and that NATO special units assist in the execution of that act.

There is already intelligence that such plans are being prepared. Due to all of the above, the President of Republika Srpska and the Government of Republika Srpska must approach this issue seriously. First of all, through increasing the number of members of the special police units of the Republika Srpska in Banja Luka and through the mobilization of the people of the Republika Srpska. It is necessary to make it clear to part of the international community that if the political persecution and arrest of Milorad Dodik were to take place, the people of the Republika Srpska would rise to the defense of their democratically elected president through mass protests and demands for the independence of the Republika Srpska. Only these two factors can stop the political neutralization plan for Milorad Dodik, which is already formulated in Sarajevo.

Europe

Sweden’s NATO Predicament and the Nations whose Destinies Connected

Published

6 days ago

June 3, 2023

Sedat Laçiner

Image credit: NATO

Exploring the Historical Bonds of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey

The Swedish monarch, Charles XII, exuded pride and arrogance as he led his formidable army towards Moscow, still in his twenties. He believed his forces to be invincible, drawing comparisons between himself and his soldiers to the legendary Leonidas and his valiant 300 Spartans. Several factors contributed to the young king’s unwavering confidence on the path to Moscow.

A mere few years prior, in 1700, a powerful coalition comprising Denmark-Norway, Saxony-Poland-Lithuania, and Russia had launched a coordinated assault on the Swedish protectorate of Holstein-Gottorp, as well as the provinces of Livonia and Ingria. Undeterred by the overwhelming presence of enemy armies, Charles XII triumphed in successive sieges, vanquishing his adversaries one by one. Following the Battle of Narva, even the formidable Tsar Peter the Great of Russia sought terms of agreement, but Charles XII disregarded these pleas. By the time they arrived at the gates of Moscow, the Swedish army had emerged victorious against foes two or even three times their own size, bolstering the commander’s sense of invincibility, akin to the great conquerors of the past like Leonidas or Alexander the Great. However, the seemingly indomitable Charles XII committed the same error as dreamy conquerors such as Napoleon and Hitler before him: underestimating the challenges posed by the vast Russian steppes. The army of Charles XII suffered a devastating defeat, compelling the young monarch to seek refuge in Ottoman territories, accompanied by a mere thousand men.

The Swedish king and his men remained guests in the Ottoman Empire, which is today Ukrainian territory, for more than 5 years. The Ottomans treated Charles like a king and cherished him, and he and his Polish and Ukrainian entourage were generously borne. Turkish Sultan Ahmed III was aware of the importance of Sweden for Ottoman security. The King, who could not return to his country, hoped to defeat Russia through an alliance with Poland and Ottoman Turks. The presence of the Swedish King in the Ottoman Empire also strained Turkish-Russian relations and eventually brought them to the brink of war. The most important reason for the Ottoman-Russian Prut War (1710-11) was the Turks’ refusal to surrender Charles XII to the Russians.

Nations whose Destinies Connected

If one were to ask residents of Istanbul about the location of Sweden or Poland today, they might draw a blank. In the minds of modern Turks, these countries no longer hold strong alliances or close ties. Similar sentiments can be found on the streets of Stockholm or Warsaw. Relations between Turkey, Sweden, and Poland have weakened and even become uncertain since the days of the Ottoman Empire. However, during the Ottoman era, particularly in the 16th-18th centuries, the sultans in Istanbul viewed Sweden and Poland as crucial counterbalances against Russia in Eastern Europe, and they prioritized these relationships.

For the Ottomans, it was advantageous that Russia was engaged in a conflict with Sweden in the north, as it alleviated pressure on the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman wars with Russia also presented an opportunity for the Swedish Kingdom to launch attacks against Russia. In line with Ottoman foreign policy, the corridor spanning from the Ottoman Empire to the Baltic Sea, encompassing Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, and the Kingdom of Sweden, was considered a unified entity and treated as such. Presently, the prevailing method of interpreting maps primarily revolves around an east-west orientation, neglecting the various other facets of geography. Restricting the analysis of Russia’s perception of Eastern Europe solely to the East-West dimension would be highly deceptive. When examining the map from the vantage points of influential decision makers or political scientists situated in Istanbul or Stockholm, it is crucial for them to perceive a comprehensive geographical corridor extending harmoniously from Sweden to Anatolia. This broader perspective is essential in formulating appropriate policies aligned with the geographical realities at hand. While it can be acknowledged that Ottoman efforts were insufficient, their approach to map interpretation holds validity, and a comparable perspective remains relevant in contemporary times.

Growing Russia Shrinking Nations

The Russian threat necessitated cooperation and coordination among Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia’s objective had been to expand its reach to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, which inevitably led to westward and southward offensives by Russian armies. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine draws its origins from these historical objectives as well: Russia seeks to establish a lasting and greater presence in the Black Sea region and gain access to war seas.

Over the centuries, Moscow (Russia), a relatively insignificant principality in the 15th century, rapidly expanded at the expense of three states: the Ottomans, the Kingdom of Sweden, and Poland. As Russia grew stronger, these three states gradually declined. By the end of the 18th century, Poland lost its independence and disintegrated, while the Swedish Empire diminished to the status of an ordinary state. Although the Ottoman Empire persisted until the 20th century, numerous Russian attacks eventually contributed to its collapse.

History Repeats

History, known for its repetition, serves as the best teacher of world politics. Hence, learning from the past is a paramount virtue for adept statesmen. Following the Ukrainian War, “old history” resurfaced in Eastern Europe, prompting regional states to seek reliable havens in anticipation of a potential Russian assault. Even Finland and Sweden, traditionally regarded as the world’s most pacifist states, found themselves lining up for NATO membership during the Cold War years. Countries under the NATO security umbrella, such as Poland and Turkey, experienced some degree of reassurance.

NATO members, particularly the United States, warmly embraced the applications of Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. However, Ankara surprisingly vetoed both applications, citing national interest. The Turkish government argued that these two states harbored anti-Turkey sentiments and terrorist groups within their borders. At least, these were the explicit reasons given. Finland managed to persuade Turkey within a year and became the fastest member state after applying to NATO. However, Turkey’s veto on Sweden’s membership still remains in effect. Sweden even made constitutional amendments in an effort to sway Turkey. While Sweden’s desire to join NATO can be understood from various perspectives, Turkey’s expectations from Sweden, as well as the key NATO member, the United States, appear more intricate.

The timing of Sweden’s accession as the 32nd NATO member remains uncertain, but statesmen should draw lessons from history. The realities faced by Poland, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire still hold relevance in today’s international relations. Setting aside current crises, the relationships between Poland, Sweden, and Turkey fall short of their potential. These countries must strive for closer and more coordinated cooperation to maintain peace and stability in Eastern Europe while safeguarding their vital and existential interests. Furthermore, this cooperation should not solely be based on hostility towards any specific state, but rather on deterring hostilities altogether. (*)

NOTES:

———————

(*) For Turkish-Polish relations also see: Laçiner, Sedat, et al., Turkish-Polish Relations: Past, Present and Future, (Ankara: ÇOMÜ Press, 2015).

Europe

Sino-European Relations Souring as Russia-Ukrainian War Intensifies

Published

1 week ago

May 30, 2023

Dr.Renata Thiébaut

From left to right: Charles MICHEL (President of the European Council), Xi JINPING (President of the People's Republic of China) Copyright: European Union

Since the establishment of Sino–European relations in 1975, there have been significant changes toward building a China-driven agenda in the past 15 months. These changes are intrinsically related to China’s rise, which diverted the EU-American international protagonism.

While there is no common ground among EU members on how to counterbalance the dependence on trading with the second-largest economy in the world, the G7 Summit imparted to the collective endeavors of the largest economies to ‘de-risk’ from China. The EUA, Canada, the UK, and Japan have joined the club.

The Russo-Ukrainian War Context

In March 2019, the European Union adopted a two-folded stance on its relationship with China, defining it as competition cooperation. This dualism underlines the need to understand how to play politics the Chinese way. Since then, the EU has sought to adopt a more assertive tactic, and the ‘systemic rival’ approach has thus prevailed. Besides, the recent Russia-Ukrainian war has contributed much to this decision. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently stated, “How China continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward.”

China’s close ties with Russia have been around for a while. Their connections in the global arena intensified to counterbalance the American world leadership. Sino-Russian relations were built through symmetric ideological concepts, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is still rooted in the Marxism-Lenist ideology.

China’s foreign affairs are based on non-interventionism principles, but its alignment with Putin has been questioned instead as support to the current war that possibly includes military intelligence and economic aid to Russia. China’s abstention from voting on the resolution that condemned Russia’s latest actions in Ukraine in October 2002 and the recent visit of Xi Jinping to Moscow days after the international criminal court issued an arrest warrant for President Putin contributed to the EU to build the narrative that China does support Russia’s point of view and justifications to the war.

The EU strongly condemned Xi’s trip, voicing worries about China’s role in the war and power balance in its relations with Russia, which now favors China. In late March, Von der Leyen delivered a speech on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre, stating, “President Xi is maintaining his ‘no-limits friendship’ with Putin.”

As Xi voiced “peace talks” and “responsible dialogue” over the war, a joint statement with his Russian counterpart raised the flag of a possible siding with Russia. The joint statement contained criticisms of sanctions and the contributions of NATO in expanding the conflict.

China’s possible role in a peaceful negotiation is unlike the one adopted to break a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which ended decades of elusive diplomatic relations. The reason is simple: its close ties with Russia.

The Economic Context

In the G7 summit in Hiroshima last week, the largest global economies voiced ‘de-risking’ China against possible economic coercion in various areas involving trade, technologies and intellectual property, and supply chain.

Apart from the Sino-American trade war and the reliance on trading in China – the EU recorded a trade deficit of more than 365 billion euros with China in 2022 – at least two other concerns have debuted on the discussion agenda: the country’s rare earth metals control and responsibility in cyberspace.

To counterbalance China’s new status quo on the global stage, the G7 announced the launch of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment. The total of $600 billion in financing for quality infrastructure is a clear threat to the Belt and Road initiative, but it is unlike that it will pose any danger to China-led investment activities.

The Taiwan Context

The expansion of Chinese influence in the South China Sea has also become a prominent topic at the G7 summit. The G7 Foreign Ministers released a joint statement against China’s latest military activities near Taiwan, condemning economic coercion and urging peaceful talks.

Taiwan is perhaps China’s most irrevocable negotiation topic in foreign relations as the “One China” policy emphasizes the recognition of the island as an integral part of its territory instead of a separate sovereign state. This policy is the central pillar of bilateral diplomatic relations with China.

The complex dynamics shaping countries’ perceptions and interactions with China have shifted Europe’s future standpoint, leaning towards a more assertive approach. As Europe redefines its relationship with China, the balance between reciprocity and market access, and strategic cooperation in climate change will shape the continent’s strategy moving forward. In any event, Europe’s future relations on China promises to be more stick, less carrot.