India became independent on August 15, 194 while China on April 1, 1950. Sino-Indian relations have since witnessed ups and downs from bonhomie, hindi-chinee bhai bhai (Indian-Chinese brotherhood) to being at daggers drawn. The last coffin in the relations is India’s cartographic aggression of amending maps to show Chinese territories as Indian.
Genesis of boundary dispute
McMahon Line: Upon independence, British legacy was a boundary dispute with China in the east in the form of McMahon Line “by treaty, custom or both’, exacerbated by India’s claim of disputed Kashmir state’s accession on October 26, 1947 (historian Alastair Lamb doubts authenticity of the `instrument of accession’).
India’s prime minister pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru was adamant that `India’s boundaries with China were clear and not a matter off further argument’(Notes, Memoranda and Agreement Signed between the Government of India and China, White Paper II, 1957 (new Delhi, Ministry of external Affairs, government of India, 1959), p. 49, 52-57). China shrugged off India’s point of view.
Border incursions
Both countries accused each other of border violations. India alleged People’s Liberation Army often trespassed Hoti, Damzen, Shipki Pass, Lapthal and Sangcha Malla by 1954. To create a nation-wide furor, Nehru told Indian parliament on August 25, 1959 that a Chinese detachment encroached into Indian Territory of Longiu in the Subansiri frontier Division at a place south of Migyitunand opened fire. Inlate1950s,
The 1962 War
Nehru and Zhou En Lai met in New Delhi from April 19 to 25 1960 to defuse the situation. But, it was in vain. The boundary dispute led to October 1962 War. In the short war, China occupied Aksai Chin, an uninhabited area of Ladakh in disputed Kashmir state, close to Azad Kashi area. After occupying Aksai Chin, China built its Highway219 to connect to its eastern province of Xinjiang.
Why Sino-Indian bonhomie ended
The 1962 War was upshot of Indi’s Forward Policy, propounded by Indian’s General BM Kaul, and reluctantly followed by Nehru. According to this policy, India provocatively deployed troops and established b order outposts along India-China boundary. To justify deployment, India alleged China had built seven roads inside the Indian territory of Ladakh, several roads being close to India’s border in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, six in Sikkim and Bhutan borders, and eight in the North East Frontier Agency. It was further alleged that China had established seven new posts in Ladakh, 14 in the Central Sector of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, 12 across Sikkim and Chumb Valley, and three across NEFA.
Contours of Disputed border
Sino-Indian boundary is divided into three sectors, eastern western and the middle. The border dispute relates only to the western and eastern sectors. Western sector covers 4000 kilometers. Half of this boundary separates disputed Kashmir from China’s north-western province, province Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. In the undefined northern part of the frontier, India claims an area equivalent in size to Switzerland under China is actually part of Indian Territory of Ladakh. Besides, Indian claims a Chinese controlled territory that was debatably ceded to China by Pakistan in the northern sector. Furthermore, Shakasgam Valley was claimed by India but later happened to be shown as Chinese territory in China Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963.
China’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh
China claims an Indian controlled area three times bigger, including most of Arunachal Pradesh. China never ratified McMahon Line.
Since inclusion of Tibet in China, Arunachal Pradesh is a buffer between Tibet an India’s north-eastern region. Arunachal Pradesh used to be defined by India as North Eastern Frontier Agency during 1980 to 1954. It was converted into a state in 1955.
The McMahon Line was drawn in 1914 under Simla Accord initiated by plenipotentiaries of the British India, Tibet, and pre-Communist China. The People’s Republic of China never ratified the agreement as it regarded Tibet as inalienable part of Chinese territory.
Twang Region
China disputes Indian claim that Tawang region is a part of Indian Territory, showed as such in McMahon Line. China says Taiwan had historically been a part of Tibet. By corollary it is a part of China.
The Sino-Indian dispute began from Taiwan region. In view of India’s hardline position, China began to claim whole state of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory.
The myth of McMahon Line
Indian leader’s pugnacious statements about dual-front war have once again brought the McMahon Line into limelight. In its boundary dispute with China, India stresses sacrosanctity of the so-called McMahon Line. Let us look at this mythical Line. As in the Western Sector, the boundary between India and Tibet in the Eastern Sector from Bhutan to Burma also was not delimited. However, in 1873, the British drew an administrative line short of the Tibetan foothills, called the inner line. This line was not an international boundary. The British then drew another line, the’ Outer Line’. This line encompassed the external territorial frontier along the foothills, where they rose abruptly from plains for the steep climb to Tibetan plateau.
The British did not extend their authority to Assam Himalaya (North Eastern Frontier Agency), though they considered it strategically important. The McMahon Line followed the crest of Himalayas. But, it did not create a real water-shed boundary line. Circumscribing several rivers, including Brahmaputra (Tsangpo), the line moved along the edge of the Tibetan Plateau, getting broken along ridges, before entering the Brahmaputra Valley. Following signing of the Lhasa Convention as a result of Young Husband Mission in 1904, China realised precariousness of her suzerainty in Tibet. The British also felt that, after occupation of Lhasa by Manchu government in 1910, Chinese incursions into the tribal areas would pose threat to Assam (India). Lord Minto, the then Viceroy of India, therefore, proposed that the so-called Outer Line be extended to include all tribal areas except Tawang Tract. His, successor Lord Hardinge too favoured a strategic boundary between China plus Tibet and the tribal territory. While the British were brooding over various strategies, the Chinese took the initiative to establish themselves at Tsangpo Valley and headwaters of several rivers flowing into Assam.
The clever Englishman then noticed that confrontation with China would not serve her strategic interests. It would, be better to accept Tibet as a buffer state between China and colonial India. To achieve this objective, the Englishman organised a tripartite conference ‘of delegates from Tibet, China and British at Simla in 1913 under the Chairmanship of Henry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. The aim of the conference was to draw ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ Zones in Tibet and deter the Chinese from administering the outer Tibet. Since, the Chinese delegate did not agree to this’ proposal, the conference broke down. In April 1914, McMahon somehow managed to get the draft treaty initialled by the Chinese delegate Ivan Chen. Later, McMahon and the Tibetan representative signed a joint declaration to the effect that the redrafted convention would be binding on both their governments. Maxwell in his book India’s China War further brings out that the map accompanying the draft convention showed the proposed division of Tibet into ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ Zones. The frontier of Tibet was marked in red colour and the proposed boundary between the two Tibetan Zones in blue colour. But the red line, which for greater part of its length showed the boundary between Tibet and China, curved round its southern extension to show what would have been boundary between India and Tibet.
In that sector it followed the alignment on which McMahon had agreed with the Tibetans. The proceedings of the agreement were made public in 1935 and the Survey of India began to mark the lines on their maps. After the Second World War, the McMahon Line got revived. Posts happened to be established in the two regions through routes, Walong and Dirang Dzong, which connected India with Tibet. Though India does not have a cogent case on the boundary issue, let us elucidate India’s point of view vis-à-vis China’s. India believes: (a) in the Eastern Sector, the McMahon Line is respected by China in the actual observance even though name of this line is anathema to the Chinese as a “hangover from the era of colonialism”. The two countries have divergent perceptions about two vital places.
These are Thag La (Chodong) and Migyuton (Long ju). ThagLa lies towards east of Bhutan and adjoins it. Long ju lies on another border route to the east of it. (b) In the Central Sector, that is, the alignment west of Nepal and reaching the Ladakh area of the IRK, the disputes concern the alignment of postures at Bara Roti (Wu Je). Here both sides have agreed before 1962 to respect the status quo and not to maintain any military presence. (c) It is in Ladakh, that the two sides have a major difference over the alignment. The main points of the Chinese view are: (a) there were only four points of dispute on the line of actual control. Regarding area in Ladakh under dispute, China had declared in 1963 that she would vacate the area in which India had set up 43 military posts prior-to the War of 1962. However, the border adjoining Baltistan and the Dardic States being under Pakistan’s control, India should first settle the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. (b) The Aksai Chin road is vital to China, because it links Western Tibet to Sinkiang. This road was built by the Chinese from Shigatse in Tibet to Yechen in Sinkiang covers a distance of 2,000 miles at a height varying from 11,000 ft to 16,000 ft through Aksai Chin. In Aksai Chin the road passes through Shabidulla (once the outpost of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) and ends at Kokyar where Sinkiang begins (Even though the journey is difficult and arduous, the Chinese use it in preference to the Keriya route which passes East of Aksai Chin and also links Rhutog in western Tibet to Khotan in Sinkiang.
The Aksai Chin road, together with the highway from Kashgar to the Khunjerab Pass and onwards into Pakistan, forms part of the lines of communication in the two remote non-Han autonomous republics, namely Tibet and Sinkiang). (c) Part of India’s border with the Sinkiang autonomous region is under Pakistan’s control since 1947. So, again, India should first settle the dispute with Pakistan first (As per Pakistan’s and Azad Kashmir’s governments’ agreement, the Northern Areas are under administrative control of Pakistan. (Facsimile of the agreement is given in Yousaf Saraf‘s Kashmiris Fight for Freedom). The Northern Areas include Gilgit, Hunza, and Baltistan, except the frontier from Siachen Glacier in the West to the Karakoram Pass and Aksai Chin. (The areas are of importance to upper Ladakh as the two rivers, the Shyok and Mibra have their origin here in Rumo and Siachin Glaciers respectively. The two rivers join and then fall into the Indus River and serve the water needs of the whole area of Ladakh North of Indus.) (d) The provisional agreement between China and Pakistan in respect of the area west of Siachin Glacier in March 1963 gives the area of Shaksgam, which abuts on the Siachin to China. Some areas of Tapndumbash, Pamir and Raksam have been given by China to Pakistan.) (e) The 1963 agreement between Pak and China covers the border right up to the Karakoram Pass. These areas will need tripartite negotiations when political conditions become favourable. Conspicuously, China’s position regarding McMahon is tenable under international law. As for India, it maintains a variable position.
India’s equivocal China policy
The hallmark of India’s foreign policy towards her neighbours is equivocation. India’s China policy is ostensibly based on Panchsheel principles that are mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference and peaceful existence. But, it is actually based on Chanakya’s mandala principle which states ‘all neighbouring countries are actual or potential enemies’.
The duality of India’s foreign policy is reflected in her relations with China. Atal Behari Vajpayee, then Indian prime minister, is extolled as `architect of India’s China policy’. During his visit (June 2003) to China, he admitted China’s suzerainty over Tibet. Even in a written statement before the Lok Sabha, he said, ‘On Tibet, I would like to assure this House that there is no change in our decades old policy. We have never doubted that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China”. But, in a subsequent press conference, he clarified that there was no cataclysmic change in the status quo and India’s views on disputes with China.
After the visit, the Indian delegation told newsmen that ‘the Chinese draft wanted India to use the word “inalienable” for both Tibet and Taiwan being part of its territory, but India did not go the whole hog with this phraseology. Frontline dated July 18, 2003 reported, ‘Indian officials were at pains to point out that they had used the term “People’s Republic of China”, and not China- the PRC being an entity that came into existence in 1949’.
“What was the status quo? Kiran Kumar Thaplyal and Shiva Nandan Misra in – Select Battles in Indian History: From Earliest Times to 2000 A.D, (Volume II, page 632), point out ‘India gave major concession to China by giving up military, communications, and postal rights. It also withdrew military detachments from Yatung and Gyantse. By this treaty (1954) India indirectly recognized Chinese sovereignty (as against suzerainty) over Tibet referring to the latter as Tibet region of China’.
India’s intrusions into the Chinese territory are a stark contradiction of her status quo concerning the Chinese territory adjoining her so-called state of ‘Arunachal Pradesh’. The after math of the India-China War, also, was acceptance of Chinese point of view by India.
The vicissitudes of India – China Relations (1950 – 1962) reflect that India unquestioningly accepted China’s control of Tibet. India’s policy on Tibet during the British rule was to secure Tibet as a buffer state between India and China (fear of red China and the then USSR).
Yet, to China’s chagrin, India spurred Tibetans to expe1 the Chinese mission from Lhasa in the middle of 1949. This event forced the Republic of China in January 1950 to claim Tibet as part of China. Induction of Chinese army into that region in October 1950 vapourised the Englishman-conceived buffer between India and China.
India made muffled protests and then, according to military historians, ‘meekly acquiesced’ to China’s forward policy. In November 1950, when EI Salvador requested that Tibetans plea be heard by the United Nation, the Indian delegate did not support it. United States and Britain could not exploit the issue as India, China’s immediate neighbour, did not vote for Salvadorian proposal.
India acquiesced to construction of strategic roads, linking China with Tibet, during Nehru’s ‘Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai’ era. The Chinese had constructed two roads for taking heavy load across Tibet to areas close to the so-called McMahon line. Simultaneously they surveyed the entire Aksai Chin.
In 1956, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin area from hills near Yarkand to Gartok. Johnson line had earlier shown this area as part of Kashmir, but India made no protest. In 1950, the Chinese rushed supplies through this very route to Western Tibet.
In 1958, China claimed Aksai Chin” as part of China. Now, India woke up from Rip Von Winkle’s slumber and made a counter-claim to possession of Aksai Chin.
The Indian claim was untenable under principles of international law which favoured the party in prior occupation. India had no case as it had never surveyed the area or sent her patrols into that area. As such, India did not invoke jurisdiction of International Court of Justice.
However, as an afterthought to create corroborative evidence, India sent two Indian patrols to investigate the road in July 1958. One of the patrols sent in the Southern sector came back safe while the other patrol sent in the northern sector was captured by the Chinese.
When India protested to China, the Chinese retorted that they had captured the patrol as it had, in violation of the ‘Panchsheel’ principles, trespassed their territory. When India agitated the boundary issue, the Chinese replied that the boundary between the two countries had never been delimited. About the McMahon line, the Chinese maintained that the Simla convention was signed only by the British and the Tibetan representatives and the Chinese government had not ratified the treaty.
China never accepted the Indian point of view that ‘the McMahon line was legalised by Simla convention. As such, ‘the boundary claimed by India both in the Western and the Eastern Sectors was based on geography, tradition as well as specific international agreement between India and China’. India however stuck to her schizophrenic contention on the boundary line in the eastell1 sector and her claim ‘to territory between McMahon line and the foot-hills’. As for Aksai Chin, the Chinese maps published in 1958 showed this area as part of their territory.
In March 1959, Dalai Lama fled to India, and was given asylum along with his followers. The New China News Agency accused India of ‘expansionist aims in Tibet’. Indian border post of Assam Rifles at Longju was evicted by the Chinese by force. In the Western Sector, the Indian government decided to set up posts north east of Leh.
India sent patrols to Lanak Pass. One of these patrols of about seventy men encountered the Chinese at Kongka Pass. On 20 October the Chinese and Indian patrols clashed. The flight of the Dalai Lama into India in 1960 and clashes between rival patrols led to a border war between India and China in 1962.
Duplicity in India’s foreign policy is the greatest obstruction to peaceful resolution of her disputes with her neighbours. She never tangibly objected to Chinese control of Tibet or construction of communication links in the area. Never invoked intervention by UNO on this matter. Yet, she sheltered Dalai Lama, and sent patrols into Chinese territory, leading 0 India-China War. India considers Kashmir issue to be a bilateral dispute. Yet she does not like to sit eye-ball-to-eyeball with Pakistan on dialogue table. She boasts of friendly relations with Bangladesh. But, simultaneously accuses the latter of providing sanctuaries to Indian ‘terrorists’ and ‘insurgents’ in BD territory. About Bhutan, the Indian strategic analysts say, if India does not annex it, China will.
Inference: It is high time India said no to her whimsical behaviour. How long will India cling to the Barbie doll of animosity towards her neighbours? It is not Chanakya’s mandala principle, but reason, which India should follow.
