EU Trade Agreements are subjected to a three pronged review before the European Parliament (EP), Council and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which ordinarily would widen the net for any agreement that falls foul of human-rights ethos to be rescinded. This is not mere comity but a treaty obligation under Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty and the EU Policy. The EU has taken several initiatives that show its commitments. It has started the EU Cities Award for Fair and Ethical Trade to allow member-state consumers to undertake informed decisions, passed resolutions to halt EU imports of minerals that fund conflicts and forced labour, has advocated for torture-free trade related UN Convention and has recently been incorporating legally-binding labour and environment standards in all its agreements with a specific reference to Paris Agreement. However, since all three bodies at the EU pursue different goals, the conditionality clauses have not always been uniform.
Several of its agreements have been halted over contentious issues of human-rights, such as the EU FTAs with Malaysia, Thailand El Salvador. EU-Myanmar Negotiations on Bilateral Investment have halted after 5 rounds of negotiations because of the Rohingya refugee crisis. Negotiations for a renewed agreement with Russia have also been suspended by the European Council since March, 2014 (annexation of Crimea). EU has also started an official procedure which could lead to suspension of the EU Cambodia Preferential Trading Status because of violation of human rights and labour rights. It has attempted to modernise the first-generation FTAs (executed before 2005) to include more ‘rule and value based’ systems (Mexico, since April 2018) and consistently provided macro-financial assistance to countries like Jordan and Tunisia hosting Syrian refugees, to improve their balance of payments. However, there have been criticisms that in its attempts to forge economic deals with more industrialised states, it has been willing to compromise on the human-rights aspects. A few authors believe, that the EU’s diminishing importance as a commercial hub over emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil, might be reason.
The EU-India Free Trade Agreement (‘FTA’) negotiations that commenced around 2007, have been stalled since 2013 over several issues including India’s dismal record of its treatment of minorities and human-rights defenders, its position on Kashmir (and lately, the Citizenship Amendment Act) and environmental and labour standards such as its tolerance of bonded and child labour. Agreed, there have been a few agreements pursued (1994 Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development and the 2004 Strategic Partnership agreement), but they have been more in the nature of political statements than binding economic commitments.
There are also a few concerns emerging with an ‘EU-wide advocacy’ solution, for several reasons including: the marked increase in populist right-wing led governments (for instance, Hungary), rising grievances against the high standards propounded by courts such as the Abu Qatada judgement of the ECtHR which upheld that fair trial principles triumph even national interests, in the context of deportation of Abu Qatada to Jordan, recession trends and economic slowdowns (for example, in Greece) that have lowered the bloc’s bargaining power, EU’s inconsistency in its own internal affairs (for instance, no actions have been taken against Spain over its actions in Catalonia over similar issues of self-determination) and a perception amongst developing countries that human-rights is a Western concept (recently cited by India’s Home Minister, Amit Shah).
Adoption of an intersectional approach
Although the EU speaks collectively on these matters, it is not denied that larger member-states often prevail over the smaller ones at the EP, hence a supranational assessment may not be the best way forward. As of March 2019, 13 member states including Germany, Belgium and France, enjoyed a trade surplus with India, while 20 member states including Netherlands and Spain stood at a deficit. A greater asymmetry of positions could indicate which way the deal ultimately tilts. The latter group would seem to be more willing to hold India to higher standards.
An analysis of the goods traded would be the next step. The EU enjoys a higher export-import ratio over India in goods such as aircrafts and associated equipments for which finding alternate markets would be difficult. Whereas India’s trade in terms of food-products, including sea-food (running into 50,000 crores) have been facing losses over the US halting imports. After the US, the EU would have naturally been the next biggest market, but the inking of the EU-Vietnam FTA indicates that further losses could percolate from the EU.
For a while now, India has been continually adopting a protectionist stance. The government has been contemplating restrictions on imports of electronic goods since it believes that its signing of the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement that led to higher imports by reduction of import duties, hurt its domestic consumers. In April 2019, the EU had taken India to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on ICT Goods for imposing ‘unlawful duties’. It has also maintained this stance at the recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) over concerns about Chinese goods flooding the market. It seems less likely to compromise over the EU deal now. Apart from this, India has an alternative in the form of an FTA with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) led by its political ally Russia (other countries include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). Since the bloc lies at a distance, it would be unlikely to invest heavily and India need not be too worried about losses to its domestic players. Moreover, there is greater scope for exchange in technology (India has previously expressed its willingness to provide SEZs to Russia) and the bloc is as large as MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) with whom India has had trade pacts since 2009. While Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and Egypt are in the process of negotiating FTAs with EAEU. Vietnam has already entered into an FTA with the bloc and this could be setting a precedent. Finally, India could enter into deal without the added weight of incorporation of human-rights clauses and this makes it more likely to maintain its position on the EU FTA.
However, the EU still holds the bargaining chip because India’s current economic losses and decreasing levels of investment could deter concrete deals at this point.
Cedric Ryngaert, expert in international law, opined that EU’s obligations to ensure its trading partner’s compliance with human-rights standards in context of the Fronte Polisario judgement, were not merely extraterritorial but flowed from its territorial obligations to exercise due-diligence since the agreements were concluded within EU, although its effects were felt on a foreign territory. He argues that even though the EU Courts may not be able to prohibit the execution of agreements, they are still competent to examine whether there has been an ‘error of assessment’ on the part of the Council. There could be similar arguments regarding the application of the passive personality principle (although the principle itself has not gained much traction), since individuals from occupied territories are now residing or are nationals of EU member states, the bloc holds a duty towards them.
Purely academic concerns aside, to prevent backlash on the part of the EU Member States, strict standards of assessment could be confined to ‘serious’ violations as opposed to ‘ordinary violations’. The seriousness could be assessed for example, by identifying whether the category of human rights being violated is peremptory in nature or at least the minimum essential or core obligations. This finds support in the example that even the concept of exercise of universal jurisdiction is limited to certain serious violations and Article 42 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) that prohibits international organisations from recognizing as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of peremptory norms nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. Apart from self-determination and the freedom of religion, the core labour standards (on forced/compulsory labour, association and collective bargaining and child labour) are also part of customary international law.To see how strongly these principles are upheld, notice that even as a part of EU’s Public Procurement policies (See, 2014 Directives) which is supposed to comprise a significant proportion of its GDP (almost 14% of their GDP) and where member states are usually allowed discretion, one exception stood out: where the corporation or its operators have been convicted by a final judgement of child labour or trafficking (Art 57(1)(f) Dir 2014/24/EU).
EU agreements with other industrialised nations have not been completely smooth either. EU opted for consultations (17 December 2018) and follow-ups with South-Korea over non-ratification of four fundamental ILO Conventions and has also referred the matter for arbitration(2 July 2019). It has provided support to Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica) in implementing ILO reforms through their regional offices, adoption of due diligence business plans and formation of tripartite councils (for collective bargaining) while condemning the situation in Nicaragua. In Columbia, Peru and Ecuador, where there were issues over child labour, collective bargaining and association rights, illegal mining and fishing issues, it has set up ‘technical missions’ to identify and provide suggestions (labour networks have been set up, hazardous occupations lists revised in Colombia, financing of labour inspection by EU in these countries, commitments to the endangered species convention). It has provided assistance packages to Georgia and Ukraine subject to them undertaking concrete measures (Georgia has enacted laws on occupational safety and health, while maintaining that Ukraine must address governance issues such as through adoption of anti-money laundering laws).
There are existing bottlenecks in several other countries too, yet, there still exists an agreement.
The EU is generally not hesitant in enforcing the provisions, but believes in initially resorting to dialogues and bilateral talks, seeks reports from civil society, looks to the implementation of the provisions through follow-ups. Suspension or unilateral cessation of operation of the FTAs are a bit unusual. The human rights clauses are unique to the FTAs executed by the EU. These provisions are not standalone, and the whole reason why they exist in trade agreements is to incentivise the partner states to uphold their commitments.
EU has a large presence at the WTO. One of its agendas has been entering into agreements with WTO members and keeping them plurilateral, open for other WTO members to enter at a later stage. This would eventually lead to anchoring those agreements at the WTO Level itself, even if negotiated outside the organisation. India would stand at a loss if it were to leave the deal. India could also be a prominent partner when it comes to trade in services(as of 2014, the Trade in Services for EU stood at 728 Billion Euros and 60% of the EU investment abroad is related to services). It has also been negotiating the ambitious plurilateral agreement on services wherein it will engage in EU-financed exchanges, training and other capacity-building initiatives, negotiation of mobility related issues for professionals and conditions of entry and residence for nationals of non-member states. Instead of out rightly lobbying for stopping all negotiations over the FTA, showing that the EU has an upper-hand, and overselling the importance of the EU trade deal to India is what I believe will be the best way to ensure that India fulfills its human rights mandate. The Indian civil society to engage with trade confederations so as to push their business interests to facilitate trade deals considering their losses. Finally, EU at its end could be led by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights(the revised Draft for a binding treaty along these lines was formulated in July 2019) to control corporations entering into trade agreements or investing in countries with low human rights track records.
 The proposal to initiate a trade agreement with a non-member state arises from the European Commission (EC).DG Trade is one of the bodies that leads discussions before the EC. There is also the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) (a working group made up of the EU Member States that works alongside the EC). Both are known to adopt a liberal economic approach. However, EP can take the ultimate decision by choosing to not ratify agreements that have already been executed, although it cannot alter them. The EP is believed to espouse political values over commercial interests. To avert such a situation, the TPC has started deliberating with the EP’s Committee on International Trade. Finally, the European External Action Service (EEAS) is motivated to maintain a coherence in External Policies and is known to prefer values over interests. Legal commitments towards human-rights principles is enshrined also as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Development Cooperation, Common Commercial Policy, Area Freedom and Justice, the 2012 Strategic Framework and corresponding Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy and the Common Agreement on the use of Political Clauses, 2009. These policy documents, provide that human rights clauses should be included either as a part of the FTA itself, or a political document that precedes the execution of the FTA. The Commission in certain cases also draws up Impact Assessments (before negotiations) and Sustainability Assessments (during the negotiations) to understand the potential impact of trade liberalisation on the HRs situation in the territory and the State’s ability to fulfill their obligations. This has been understood recently, to be a part of the EU’s obligations under Article 21.
Bangladesh-Myanmar Economic Ties: Addressing the Next Generation Challenges
Bangladesh-Myanmar relations have developed through phases of cooperation and conflict. Conflict in this case is not meant in the sense of confrontation, but only in the sense of conflict of interests and resultant diplomatic face-offs. Myanmar is the only other neighbor that Bangladesh has on its border besides India. It is the potential gateway for an alternative land route opening towards China and South-East Asia other than the sea. Historically, these two countries have geographic and cultural linkages. These two bordering countries, located in separate geopolitical regions, have huge possibilities in developing their bilateral economic relations. At the initial phase of their statehood, both countries undertook numerous constructive initiatives to improve their relations. Nevertheless, different bilateral disputes and challenges troubled entire range of cooperation. Subsequent to these challenges, Bangladesh and Myanmar have started negotiation process on key dubious issues. The economic rationales over political tensions in Bangladesh-Myanmar relations prevail with new prospects and opportunities.
Bangladesh-Myanmar relations officially began from 13 January 1972, the date on which Myanmar, as the sixth state, recognized Bangladesh as a sovereign nation. They signed several agreements on trade and business such as general trade agreement in 1973. The two countries later initiated formal trade relations on 05 September 1995. To increase demand for Bangladeshi products in Myanmar, Bangladesh opened trade exhibitions from 1995 to 1996 in Yangon, former capital of Myanmar. However, that pleasant bilateral economic relations did not last for long, rather was soon interrupted mainly by Myanmar’s long term authoritarian rule and isolationist economic policy. In the twenty-first century, Bangladesh-Myanmar relations are expected to move towards greater economic cooperation facilitated by two significant factors. First, the victory of Myanmar’s pro-democratic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in 2011 has considerably brought new dimensions in the relations. Although this relation is now at stake since the state power has been taken over by military. Second, the peaceful settlement of Bangladesh-Myanmar maritime dispute in 2012 added new dimension in their economic relations.
Bangladesh and Myanmar don’t share a substantial volume of trade and neither is in the list of largest trading partners. Bangladesh’s total export and import with Myanmar is trifling compared to the total export and import and so do Myanmar’s. But gradually the trades between the countries are increasing and the trend is for the last 5 to 6 year is upward especially for Bangladesh; although Bangladesh is facing a negative trend in Balance of Payment. In 2018-2019 fiscal year, Bangladesh’s total export to Myanmar was $25.11 million which is more than double from that of the export in 2011-12. Bangladesh imported $90.91 million worth goods and services from Myanmar resulting in $65 Million deficit in Balance of Payment in 2018-2019 fiscal year. For the last six or seven years, Bangladesh’s Balance of Payment was continuously in deficit in case of trade with Myanmar. The outbreak of COVID-19, closure of border for eight months and recent coup in Myanmar have a negative impact on the trade between the countries.
Bangladesh mainly imports livestock, vegetable products including onion, prepared foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, plastics, raw hides and skin, leather, wood and articles of woods, footwear, textiles and artificial human hair from Myanmar. Recently, due to India’s ban on cattle export, Myanmar has emerged as a new exporter of live animals to Bangladesh especially during the Eid ul-Adha with a cheaper rate than India. On the hand, Bangladesh exports frozen foods, chemicals, leather, agro-products, jute products, knitwear, fish, timber and woven garments to Myanmar.
Unresolved Rohingya crisis, Myanmar’s highly unpredictable political landscape, lack of bilateral connectivity, shadow economy created from illegal activities, distrust created due to different insurgent groups, maritime boundary dispute, illegal drugs and arms smuggling in border areas, skeptic mindset of the people in both fronts and alleged cross border movement of insurgents are acting as stumbling block in bolstering economic relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Bangladesh-Myanmar relations are yet to blossom in full swing. The agreement signed by Sheikh Hasina in 2011 to establish a Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation is definitely a proactive step for enhancing trade. People to people contact can be increased for building mutual confidence and trust. Frequent visit by business, civil society, military and civil administration delegates may be organized for better understanding and communication. Both countries may explore economic potential and address common interest for enhancing economic co-operation. In order to augment trade, both countries may ease visa restrictions, deregulate currency restrictions and establish smooth channel of financial transactions. Coastal shipping (especially cargo vessels between Chittagong and Sittwe), air and road connectivity may be developed to inflate trade and tourism. Bangladesh and Myanmar may establish “Point of Contact” to facilitate first-hand information exchange for greater openness. Initiative may be taken to sign Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) within the ambit of which potential export items from both countries would be allowed to enter duty free. In recent year, Bangladesh was badly affected by many unilateral decisions of India such as onion crisis. Myanmar can serve as an alternative import source of crops and animals for Bangladesh to lessen dependence upon India.
Myanmar’s currency is highly devaluated for a long time due to its political turmoil and sanctions by the west. Myanmar can strengthen its currency value by escalating trade volume with Bangladesh. These two countries can fortify their local economy in boarder areas by establishing border haats. Cooperation between these two countries on “Blue Economy” may be source of strategic advantages mainly by exporting marine goods and service. Last but not the least, the peaceful settlement of maritime boundary disputes between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 2012 may be capitalized to add new dimension in their bilateral economic relations. Both nations can expand trade and investment by utilizing the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a Joint Business Council (JBC) between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) and the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI).
With the start of a new phase in Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, which has put the bilateral relations on an upswing, it is only natural that both sides should try to give a boost to bilateral trade. Bilateral trade is not challenge free but the issue is far easier to resolve than others. At the same time, closer economic ties could also help in resolving other bilateral disputes. For Myanmar, as it is facing currency devaluation and losing market, increased trade volume will make their economy vibrant. For Bangladesh, it is a good opportunity to use the momentum to minimize trade deficits and reduce dependency on any specific country.
The Monetary Policy of Pakistan: SBP Maintains the Policy Rate
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) announced its bi-monthly monetary policy yesterday, 27th July 2021. Pakistan’s Central bank retained the benchmark interest rate at 7% after reviewing the national economy in midst of a fourth wave of the coronavirus surging throughout the country. The policy rate is a huge factor that relents the growth and inflationary pressures in an economy. The rate was majorly retained due to the growing consumer and business confidence as the global economy rebounds from the coronavirus. The State Bank had slashed the interest rate by 625 basis points to 7% back in the March-June 2020 in the wake of the covid pandemic wreaking havoc on the struggling industries of Pakistan. In a poll conducted earlier, about 89% of the participants expected this outcome of the session. It was a leap of confidence from the last poll conducted in May when 73% of the participants expected the State Bank to hold the discount rate at this level.
The State Bank Governor, Dr. Raza Baqir, emphasized that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has resorted to holding the 7% discount rate to allow the economy to recover properly. He added that the central bank would not hike the interest rate until the demand shows noticeable growth and becomes sustainable. He echoed the sage economists by reminding them that the State Bank wants to relay a breather to Pakistan’s economy before pushing the brakes. The MPC further asserted that the Real Discount Rate (adjusted for inflation) currently stands at -3% which has significantly cushioned the economy and encouraged smaller industries to grow despite the throes of the pandemic.
Dr. Raza Baqir further went on to discuss the current account deficit staged last month. He added that the 11-month streak of the current account surplus was cut short largely due to the loan payments made in June. The MPC further explained that multiple factors including an impending expiration of the federal budget, concurrent payments due to lenders, and import of vaccines, weighed heavily down on the national exchequer. He further iterated that the State Bank expects a rise in exports along with a sustained recovery in the remittance flow till the end of 2021 to once again upend the current account into surplus. Dr. Raza Baqir assured that the current level of the current account deficit (standing at 3% of the GDP) is stable. The MPC reminded that majority of the developing countries stand with a current account deficit due to growth prospects and import dependency. The claims were backed as Dr. Raza Baqir voiced his optimism regarding the GDP growth extending from 3.9% to 5% by the end of FY21-22.
Regarding currency depreciation, Dr. Baqir added that the downfall is largely associated with the strengthening greenback in the global market coupled with high volatility in the oil market which disgruntled almost every oil-importing country, including Pakistan. He further remarked, however, that as the global economy is vying stability, the situation would brighten up in the forthcoming months. Mr. Baqir emphasized that the current account deficit stands at the lowest level in the last decade while the remittances have grown by 25% relative to yesteryear. Combined with proceeds from the recently floated Eurobonds and financial assistance from international lenders including the IMF and the World Bank, both the currency and the deficit would eventually recover as the global market corrects in the following months.
Lastly, the Governor State Bank addressed the rampant inflation in the economy. He stated that despite a hyperinflation scenario that clocked 8.9% inflation last month, the discount rates are deliberately kept below. Mr. Baqir added that the inflation rate was largely within the limits of 7-9% inflation gauged by the State Bank earlier this year. However, he further added that the State Bank is making efforts to curb the unrelenting inflation. He remarked that as the peak summer demand is closing with July, the one-way pressure on the rupee would subsequently plummet and would allow relief in prices.
The MPC has retained the discount rate at 7% for the fifth consecutive time. The policy shows that despite a rebound in growth and prosperity, the threat of the delta variant still looms. Karachi, Pakistan’s busiest metropolis and commercial hub, has recently witnessed a considerable surge in infections. The positivity ratio clocked 26% in Karachi as the national figure inched towards 7% positivity. The worrisome situation warrants the decision of the State Bank of Pakistan. Dr. Raza Baqir concluded the session by assuring that despite raging inflation, the State Bank would not resort to a rate hike until the economy fully returns to the pre-pandemic levels of employment and production. He further assuaged the concerns by signifying the future hike in the policy rate would be gradual in nature, contrast to the 2019 hike that shuffled the markets beyond expectation.
Reforms Key to Romania’s Resilient Recovery
Over the past decade, Romania has achieved a remarkable track record of high economic growth, sustained poverty reduction, and rising household incomes. An EU member since 2007, the country’s economic growth was one of the highest in the EU during the period 2010-2020.
Like the rest of the world, however, Romania has been profoundly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the economy contracted by 3.9 percent and the unemployment rate reached 5.5 percent in July before dropping slightly to 5.3 percent in December. Trade and services decreased by 4.7 percent, while sectors such as tourism and hospitality were severely affected. Hard won gains in poverty reduction were temporarily reversed and social and economic inequality increased.
The Romanian government acted swiftly in response to the crisis, providing a fiscal stimulus of 4.4 percent of GDP in 2020 to help keep the economy moving. Economic activity was also supported by a resilient private sector. Today, Romania’s economy is showing good signs of recovery and is projected to grow at around 7 percent in 2021, making it one of the few EU economies expected to reach pre-pandemic growth levels this year. This is very promising.
Yet the road ahead remains highly uncertain, and Romania faces several important challenges.
The pandemic has exposed the vulnerability of Romania’s institutions to adverse shocks, exacerbated existing fiscal pressures, and widened gaps in healthcare, education, employment, and social protection.
Poverty increased significantly among the population in 2020, especially among vulnerable communities such as the Roma, and remains elevated in 2021 due to the triple-hit of the ongoing pandemic, poor agricultural yields, and declining remittance incomes.
Frontline workers, low-skilled and temporary workers, the self-employed, women, youth, and small businesses have all been disproportionately impacted by the crisis, including through lost salaries, jobs, and opportunities.
The pandemic has also highlighted deep-rooted inequalities. Jobs in the informal sector and critical income via remittances from abroad have been severely limited for communities that depend on them most, especially the Roma, the country’s most vulnerable group.
How can Romania address these challenges and ensure a green, resilient, and inclusive recovery for all?
Reforms in several key areas can pave the way forward.
First, tax policy and administration require further progress. If Romania is to spend more on pensions, education, or health, it must boost revenue collection. Currently, Romania collects less than 27 percent of GDP in budget revenue, which is the second lowest share in the EU. Measures to increase revenues and efficiency could include improving tax revenue collection, including through digitalization of tax administration and removal of tax exemptions, for example.
Second, public expenditure priorities require adjustment. With the third lowest public spending per GDP among EU countries, Romania already has limited space to cut expenditures, but could focus on making them more efficient, while addressing pressures stemming from its large public sector wage bill. Public employment and wages, for instance, would benefit from a review of wage structures and linking pay with performance.
Third, ensuring sustainability of the country’s pension fund is a high priority. The deficit of the pension fund is currently around 2 percent of GDP, which is subsidized from the state budget. The fund would therefore benefit from closer examination of the pension indexation formula, the number of years of contribution, and the role of special pensions.
Fourth is reform and restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises, which play a significant role in Romania’s economy. SOEs account for about 4.5 percent of employment and are dominant in vital sectors such as transport and energy. Immediate steps could include improving corporate governance of SOEs and careful analysis of the selection and reward of SOE executives and non-executive bodies, which must be done objectively to ensure that management acts in the best interest of companies.
Finally, enhancing social protection must be central to the government’s efforts to boost effectiveness of the public sector and deliver better services for citizens. Better targeted social assistance will be more effective in reaching and supporting vulnerable households and individuals. Strategic investments in infrastructure, people’s skills development, and public services can also help close the large gaps that exist across regions.
None of this will be possible without sustained commitment and dedicated resources. Fortunately, Romania will be able to access significant EU funds through its National Recovery and Resilience Plan, which will enable greater investment in large and important sectors such as transportation, infrastructure to support greater deployment of renewable energy, education, and healthcare.
Achieving a resilient post-pandemic recovery will also mean advancing in critical areas like green transition and digital transformation – major new opportunities to generate substantial returns on investment for Romania’s economy.
I recently returned from my first official trip to Romania where I met with country and government leaders, civil society representatives, academia, and members of the local community. We discussed a wide range of topics including reforms, fiscal consolidation, social inclusion, renewably energy, and disaster risk management. I was highly impressed by their determination to see Romania emerge even stronger from the pandemic. I believe it is possible. To this end, I reiterated the World Bank’s continued support to all Romanians for a safe, bright, and prosperous future.
First appeared in Romanian language in Digi24.ro, via World Bank
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