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US-North Korea denuclearization talks: Pyongyang opts for higher stakes

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The year 2020 is witnessing radical changes to the denuclearization talks between the United States and North Korea. In the second half of last year the talks faced a final deadlock following North Korea’s repeated statements of discontent over the US’ refusal to cancel sanctions against Pyongyang and stop military exercises with South Korea despite North Korea’s acting on its pledge to cease nuclear tests, freeze intercontinental ballistic missile launches and c;ose nuclear test sites.

Pyongyang has opted for raising the negotiating stakes. «There will be no more negotiations on the  lifting of UN sanctions in exchange for  all major nuclear facilities of North Korea», – North  Korean First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye-gwan said.

While addressing a plenary session of the Korean Labour Party’s Central Committee at the end of 2019, President Kim Jong-un said that unless the United States agreed to a compromise, North Korea would continue to develop nuclear weapons. 

Washington was quick to respond that the United States was prepared to take retaliatory measures in case North Korea carried out a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. A statement to this effect was made by presidential national security adviser Robert O’Brian.

So, although the situation has reached a critical point, it is too early to suggest that the talks have suffered a fiasco – the change in Pyongyang’s position comes useful in a way – it helps to clarify the situation and dot all the Is and cross all the Ts. On the other hand, it becomes crystal clear that North Korea is unlikely to abandon its nuclear  missile program even in the event of complete lifting of sanctions. On the  other hand, the United States is not prepared to provide North Korea with security guarantees it has been asking for.

Meanwhile, the potential for reaching agreement is far from exhausted. According to Mainiti Shimbun, «Kim Jong-un is refraining from direct criticism of President Donald Trump. In all likelihood, he is counting on high-level diplomacy. Trump, who is willing to demonstrate diplomatic success in the run-up to presidential elections due in November, is also keen on emphasizing good relations with Kim».

At present, chances for reaching a final settlement of the North Korean nuclear missile problem are next to zero, whereas the probability of the disruption of talks the participants of which are both unpredictable and emotional, is fairly high.

This, however, does not mean that a reasonable compromise cannot be reached. Statements to this effect have been made regularly by Russian and Chinese diplomats, who have formed a consolidated position on the situation involving the Koran Peninsula which is enshrined in the Joint statement of the two countries’ foreign ministers of July 4th 2017. What Russia and China propose is action in exchange for action and a gradual lifting of sanctions depending on the progress achieved at the talks.

South Korean Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul has signaled the need  for an “interim agreement” between Washington and Pyongyang with a view to move towards a mutually acceptable compromise. He also recalled a joint draft resolution of the UN on North Korea which was put forward by Russia and China on December 16th 2019 and which envisaged the softening of international sanctions against Pyongyang and resumption of negotiations.

History repeats itself, but, in this case, this repetition appears to be the only way out which would make it possible for the parties involved to “keep face” and achieve (for the umpteenth time) a mutually acceptable compromise. Once they have made clear their commitment to denuclearization, the two sides may devise a stage-by-stage “road map” in the direction of this goal and get down to work to pursue this  plan step by step, gradually lifting sanctions in  exchange for an equally gradual elimination of all components of the North Korean nuclear missile program.

From our partner International Affairs

Ph.D. in Political Science, An active member of the Academy of Military Science, Chief Researcher, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS)

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East Asia

The Mystery of China’s Internment Camps: Genocide of Uighurs

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Human rights abuse is not an alien concept to the world, especially over the ghastly events posted through the two decades into this century. Whether it’s the mutiny in Syria leading to the rise of ISIS; dismembering the regional population, or the massacre of the Rohingya community at the hands of the draconian military of Myanmar; trudging the Muslim minority under the most inhuman conditions known to mankind in the name of ethnic cleansing. Even the lockdown of innocent Kashmiris, under over-the-top scrutiny and extremist mindset of the BJP-championed government of India, has been the highlight in the discussions heated in the Human Rights Councils around the globe. However, none of the human rights violations have been so systematically concealed that the very existence of a genocide is rendered a rumour for years and continues to challenge the authenticity of the news coverage obtained in today’s modernised world. The genocide of the Uighur Muslim Community in China is an accurate example of such a pogrom; the community being deliberated to renounce their faith and being subject to servile conditions, incarcerated in controversial camps under the prevailing communism in China.

Xinjiang is the extreme western region of China and enjoys the entitlement of being the largest autonomous region of the mainland yet still being a notch lesser in degree from Beijing. However, the self-governance status is as superficial and contrasting to the status of Taiwan; little to no discretion awarded to the region yet still hailed as autarchic. The Uighur community decent from the Turkic ethnicity and make up about 50% of the total population of Xinjiang, a tally totalling to about 11 million people. China was accused in the preceding years of intense surveillance of the Uighur Muslims eventually escalating to the point of being taken captive in internment camps; being forced to learn mandarin, pushed to relinquish their religion and even forcing Uighur women to marry non-Uighur men in a systematic attempt to erase the community from the region in a gruesome exercise that could only be described as an ‘extermination’ as per the definitions of The United Nations.

China’s position over the state-run genocide has stayed intricate over the years, since the initial reports of the internment camps breezed to light through international media and local activists. The Chinese officials claim that the world outside doesn’t realise the true essence of the situation in Xinjiang. The Chinese authorities have labelled the genocide as ‘Defence’ and ‘Retaliation’ against the specific groups of Uighur militants operating to bombard China with rampaging violence pivoted on the grounds of ethnic separation in the region; a movement sighted by China Communist Party as an effort to gain independence from China stemming from the brief campaign launched back in the 20th century before the communal population submitted to Communist China in 1949. China has repeatedly denied the accusations of ‘Ethnic cleansing’ and has continued to push the narrative of conducting ‘Vocational Camps’ for willing participants to fight against the militants instead of running internment torture camps to decimate the entire community.

While the world has remained dormant over the excessive brutality within the borders of the People’s Republic, the apparent heat of the genocide is pervading over China under the communist ideology posed by President Xi Jinping. His extremist comments have incited a crunch against not only the Uighur community but the Muslims residing all over China, being forced against fasting in Ramadan and even being mocked in daily prayers and for wearing veils. The recent movement in Xinjiang is projected as a programmed skit to promote the Han Chinese community in the industrial flourish of the region, thereby settling the non-natives and skimming the Uighur population gradually. The United Kingdom has continually threatened sanctions over China and even the rising Biden administration in US has addressed the genocidal tendencies within Xinjiang on the account of utter violence and discrimination. However, no substantial efforts have been taken to even probe into the situation let alone resolve it. As ethnic and religious violence continue to rage under the arching communist regime of China, a little more than critical comments and envisioning threatening policies is required from the global community to relieve Uighur’s from their misery.

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Nanjing tragedy – massacre or “incident”?

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On December 15, China was marking the 80th anniversary of the Nanjing massacre by Japanese troops.

In Japan, they avoid using the term “massacre,” however, so when covering the tragic event the local media referred to it as the “Nanjing incident.”

In December 1937, at the height of the second Sino-Japanese war, Japanese forces entered the city of Nanjing, then the capital of Nationalist China, which had been used by the Kuomintang government as its headquarters since 1927. The Chiang Kai-shek government had earlier decided to move the bulk of its forces out of the city, leaving behind just a small garrison. All that time, the citizens were kept in the dark about those plans. Moreover, they were prevented from escaping, even though there still was plenty of time to evacuate the civilian population. As to the Japanese, in Nanjing they didn’t encounter the serious resistance they had faced in the battle for Shanghai.  And still, in addition to mass-scale looting and torching of houses, they staged a real bloodbath killing thousands of unarmed city residents and POWs. Judging by numerous accounts of that massacre, including by a handful of Europeans who remained in the city and were spared by the Japanese, who agreed to place them in a special “safety zone,” it seems that the city was being overrun not by soldiers but a giant crowd of characters from American movies about sadistic serial killers. The elaborate torture and murder of pregnant Chinese women was especially shocking.

The reasons for such behavior by the Japanese military still defy a clear explanation. One thing is clear, though: Japanese militarism as a phenomenon is characterized by the complete loss by politicians of control over the military and of officials closely associated with it. That being said, senior officers, unlike the “field generals,” were often unable to prevent the atrocities committed by the lower ranks that quickly became widespread. Unlike in the Navy, the system of personnel training in the Imperial Army allowed uneducated conscripts from peasant families to rise to the rank of officers. A chance to feel oneself as part of the “military caste” and traditions of the samurai, which their ancestors could not even dream of, might be a reason why many of those new officers began to “revel” in their own power. At the same time, medieval customs, like testing the sword’s sharpness on unarmed people, and ritual cannibalism were coming back. Japanese newspapers of that period wrote about two officers in Nanjing who competed who of them would chop off more heads, thus executing hundreds of people.

It was not until the close of World War II that the events in Nanjing attracted international attention, as even the Kuomintang propaganda had been keeping mum about it. The Japanese militarists committed countless other crimes, but for them the Nanjing massacre carried a special meaning, not because of the number of victims, but because of the reputational risks it posed for the imperial family, since one of their members (Prince Yasuhiko of the Asaka clan) was the one who personally supervised the capture of Nanjing. After the war he was not put on trial and enjoyed immunity granted to members of the imperial family, with the full consent by the US occupation authorities.

In 1948, the case of the Nanjing massacre was considered by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which handed down two death sentences. The tribunal determined that more than 200,000 people were killed in Nanjing. A year before that a series of “smaller courts” held in China, including in Nanjing, put the death toll at 300,000.

In post-war Japan, the “Nanjing Incident” remains a much-disputed issue giving rise to all sorts of conspiracy theories concerning not only the historical past, but also present-day relations between Japan and China.

These include attempts by the so-called “revisionists” to question both the methods of counting the victims (with just 40,000 mentioned as the lower limit) and the very fact of the Nanjing killings.

Meanwhile, a movement that emerged in Japan during the Cold War period, led by representatives of the country’s academic community, people of the arts and members of the teachers union, challenged the way historical facts, including the Nanjing massacre, were presented in school textbooks.  However, their activities started to die out during the 1990s, when the  nationalists, opposed to the “masochistic view” of history, began to play a bigger role in Japanese politics.

The famous Japanese writer Haruki Murakami took a lot of angry flak from the extreme right-wingers when in one of his books, published in 2017, he had one of the characters reflecting on the question about “the difference between 100,000 and 400,000” of people killed.

Getting back to the present, there is one question that is begging for an answer. Tokyo’s policy towards China was one of the biggest achievements of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who stepped down in September 2020. Amid a  deep crisis that Japanese-Chinese relations found themselves in in 2012, due to the inability of the Democratic Party, which was in power before him, to stand up to the nationalists’ populist actions, during his eight-year premiership Shinzo Abe managed if not to make them friendly, then at least to restore “normality.” Moreover, in solving this difficult task, he neither made any concessions on key issues for Tokyo, nor irritated Washington, which had its own plans for Beijing. At the same time, Shinzo Abe continues to be viewed in East Asia and also in the West as a “hawk,” whose statements and even some symbolic gestures clearly smack of revisionism. On one occasion, for example, he was photographed at the controls of a Japanese-designed fighter with “731” painted on its fuselage, evoking clear associations with the Japanese Unit 731, which was testing bacteriological weapons on humans in Manchuria. In 2013, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, drawing negative reaction not only from Japan’s regional neighbors, but also from Washington. How come a politician with such views was able to “make friends” with China?

There is a circumstance here that has not been lost on the Japanese media.  Since 2018, [Chinese President] Xi Jinping has not attended events marking the anniversaries of the Nanjing tragedy, although it was he who in 2014 proposed to mark the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre. This time round he did not show up either for the December 15 event (due to the pandemic, as was officially explained). On December 13, Japan’s state broadcaster NHK reported that amid a further deepening of its confrontation with the United States, China intends to demonstrate its interest in strengthening ties, primarily economic ones, with Japan. Therefore, the mourning ceremony was organized so as not to harm the current status of Sino-Japanese relations.

However, the gradual “unfreezing” of relations between the two countries began long before Donald Trump declared a sanctions war on China. It was Shinzo Abe who, speaking in parliament back in 2014, invited Beijing to resume the dialogue between the two countries’ leaders. In that same year, a group of prominent Japanese politicians, among them the former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, paid a visit to China. When Fukuda’s father, Takeo, was prime minister during the late 1970s, Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China, and his surname has since been a symbol of a “reset” in bilateral relations. This time the elderly politician was once again used as a “fire engine.” In the same year, Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing, and their meeting in Hangzhou, China, during the September 2016 G20 summit is now seen as the beginning of the active phase of mending fences between the two nations.

During the Trump presidency, this process only accelerated, much to the benefit of both Beijing and Tokyo, each of which had serious problems in relations with Washington. Notably, as the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in 1978, each year ending with “8” could bring new headways in bilateral ties. This tradition is especially important for China, where ceremony plays such a big role in politics. During Shinzo Abe’s first visit to Beijing in October 2018, the sides agreed to launch over 50 infrastructure cooperation projects, which experts were quick to hail as the dawn of a new era in Japanese-Chinese relations. In fact, many of these joint projects later turned out to be just for show, and were subsequently shelved. Still, when Shinzo Abe met his Chinese counterpart at the 2019 G20 summit in Osaka, they agreed that Xi Jinping would pay an official visit to Japan in the spring of 2020, but the visit was postponed due to the pandemic. The epidemic could also have been the reason why Xi Jinping refrained from attending this year’s memorial event in Nanjing.

As for Shinzo Abe’s revisionist views, they are probably seen in Beijing as mainly intended for domestic consumption, in contrast to the pro-American nationalism of another charismatic Japanese politician, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Unlike Koizumi, Shinzo Abe was more of a “nationalist-pragmatist,” focused on solving problems pertaining to the national interests of Japan.

During his first news conference after taking office, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, said that he would like to build stable relations with neighboring countries, including China and Russia.  Still, chances are high that the subject of the Nanjing massacre may return to the bilateral agenda since the age-old traditions of historical memory will not let the onetime foes forget this tragic event.

From our partner International Affairs

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South Korea’s Potential for Global Influence is Weakened by its Mistreatment of Women

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In recent years, the Republic of Korea has become a pop culture juggernaut.

Eight years after “Gangnam Style” went global, K-Pop still reigns supreme with boy band BTS topping charts and issuing IPOs. Bong Joon-ho’s film “Parasite” swept last year’s Oscars, kimchi now has UNESCO cultural heritage status, while Samsung smartphones are used all over the world, second only to the mighty Apple.

The global appeal of the Korean Wave, known as “Hallyu,” recently attracted the attention of a report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which argued that this rising soft power could in turn boost South Korea’s global influence and drive diplomatic leadership on a broad range of transnational issues, from climate change to public health to democracy promotion.

This all sounds great, but there remains a nagging problem. Despite its flourishing culture, there have also been a string of scandals highlighting the plight of women in the country, who facing everything from inequality to workplace discrimination and rampant sexual harassment.

By any measure, the problem is significant and costly to the country’s interests. According to a 2019 report by the World Economic Forum, South Korea ranks 124 out of 149 countries in the world in terms of economic opportunity for women, while another report cites the highest gender pay gap among OECD nations at 35%. This low level of female participation in the economy is not only a drag on future GDP growth, but also coincides with a parallel mental health crisis: suicides among Korean women in their 20s have jumped by more than 40 percent in the last year, at the same time that male deaths are in decline.

Mistreatment of women in Korea may be a feature, not a bug, of the system. A recent string of sexual abuse scandals has reached the highest levels of the country’s political elites.

This past July, the country was shocked to wake up to the news that the popular Mayor of Seoul Park Won-soon had committed suicide when accusations of sexual assault against his secretary were made public. Mayor Park had built his image as stalwart champion of women’s rights, and yet, the secretary, who has been threatened and blamed following the suicide, says that she “felt defenseless and weak before the immense power” of the Mayor.

Months later, we are discovering the very people meant to protect the victims instead act to protect the alleged perpetrators. Congresswoman Nam In-soon, one of South Korea’s highest profile women’s rights activists, is being called on to resign after it was revealed that she leaked news of the sexual harassment investigation into Mayor Park. Another member of congress, Yoon Mee-hyang, was forced out of the ruling Democratic Party after facing criminal charges of embezzlement from the “comfort women” charity she used to direct, which raised money for survivors of World War II military brothels.

Before Mayor Park’s suicide and the comfort women scandal, there were many others. Last year, South Chungcheong Province Governor Ahn Hee-jung was convicted on nine counts of rape and sentenced to three and half years in prison. Mayor of Busan Oh Keo-Don was forced to resign following the assault accusation. Ahn Tae-geun, a former senior prosecutor whose case had become symbolic for the #MeToo movement, had his conviction overturned earlier this year.

These patterns stand in stark contrast to the image the government seeks to project.

In public speeches, President Moon Jae-in frequently advocates in defense of women’s rights in speeches and interviews. Speaking at the last UN General Assembly, he declared a commitment to inclusiveness and reducing inequalities. The ruling DPK has long associated itself with rights activists, and has made gestures toward combating misconduct and mistreatment of women – but critics say they aren’t doing enough. A headline on CNN last summer went so far as to call out the hypocrisy: “South Korea’s President says he’s a feminist. Three of his allies have been accused of sex crimes.”

Despite numerous protest movements and well supported marches, Korea has not yet experienced a breakthrough #MeToo moment. According to media testimonials, many women continue to face significant obstacles to advance in their careers. Even after 70,000 women marched last year to protest the prolific abuse of spy cams set up in bathrooms and changing rooms, patriarchal attitudes continue. This month, guidelines published on an official government website advising pregnant women to cook, clean, and to lose weight for their husbands after childbirth caused a social media uproar.

This is a deeply concerning problem. As highlighted by the Carnegie report, Korea’s role as a “middle power” in a such a volatile region would be highly welcome, and not just on things like climate and coronavirus vaccine distribution, but also their crucial role in containing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and holding firm in the shadow of China’s expanding authoritarian reach.

Some Korean groups have advocated internationally against gender-based violence, which is undoubtedly a very worthy cause. But until the Moon government can get serious about tackling these inequalities and abuses at home, its efforts to project influence abroad will fail to meet potential.

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