The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated its 70th anniversary and after the long passage of time, it is almost as if the alliance has become a fixture of Europe’s security architecture. Founded at the start of the Cold War as a collective response to the threat of Soviet expansion into Western Europe, the alliance has since outlasted the conflict by close to three decades. This longevity should not be taken for granted. Similar organisations like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) failed to even last the full stretch of the Cold War, and in order to remain relevant, the alliance has had to reinvent itself politically following the end of the Cold War, a process that again became necessary in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, it is the ability of Western Europe’s old guard dog to learn new tricks that has helped extend its lifespan beyond the completion of its original mandate.
Nonetheless, age has not been kind to the alliance. “No Action Talk Only” – a tongue-in-cheek play on the abbreviated version of alliance’s name –is a less than flattering description of its effectiveness but one that is perhaps becoming increasingly justified as criticisms against it mount. Ironically, it is the resurgence of Russia that has precipitated the latest round of soul-searching, with the annexation of Crimea and NATO’s relatively muted response highlighting concerns over its continued ability to live up to its raison d’être of being a collective bulwark against external encroachment. The findings of a recent study showing that NATO lacks the capacity to effectively defend its Baltic members against Russian adventurism does little to alleviate these concerns, nor do U.S. President Donald Trump’s latest allegations which suggest that the alliance has outlived its usefulness. NATO certainly has its flaws, but these imperfections aside, how valid is this latest wave of criticism? Is it perhaps time to put the old dog down?
The U.S. and NATO: First among Equals
To address the question of whether the alliance still has a future, it is important to examine what allowed it to succeed in the past. Essentially, the question that should be asked is why has NATO managed to survive as long as it did where many of its peers have not. There is one important reason for this – the tangible commitment of U.S. military forces to the defence of Europe. Despite the U.S.’ own initial misgivings over the benefits and costs of maintaining a permanent military presence in Europe,the fact of America’s eventual contribution provided the foundation upon which a lasting security arrangement could be based. The importance of this cannot be understated. Under the Cold War’s bipolar framework and with most of Western Europe’s post-war economies in tatters, American commitment was crucial to constructing a collective framework that was credible and effective enough to deter Soviet expansion.
Equally important was the idea that NATO was from the very onset more than just a military pact. It was also an alliance of shared values, underpinned by America’s commitment to rebuilding Western Europe’s shattered economies and fostering long-term economic growth and prosperity.As encapsulated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, America’s involvement in NATO was not just a marriage of convenience – it is also an acknowledgement of the shared belief in “the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”. NATO’s existence was therefore as much a product of ideology as it was of practicality. This does not however mean that the U.S. was purely altruistic in its outlook toward European security, but there were certainly more commonalities that could be leveraged and built upon than not. Resulting from this, NATO’s framework of collective security was a more deliberate and holistic undertaking than similar projects initiated in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where partnerships were often more opportunistic in nature. U.S. involvement in Vietnam for example was more focused on finding military solutions at the expense of other possible diplomatic and political options, a decision that ultimately doomed the enterprise to failure.
A subtler but no less important contribution which the American involvement in Europe provided was to serve as a moderating force between its European allies, helping to allay pre-existing tensions and mistrust. It should not be assumed that a Europe unified is the natural state of affairs, particularly given the continent’s fractious history. It is worth pointing out that in the half-century prior to NATO’s formation, the greatest threat to stability in Europe was Germany, not the Soviet Union, a fact that was painfully demonstrated by the two World Wars. Even in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Western Europe was more concerned with a potential threat of a revived Germany than that from the Soviet Union.The U.S. may therefore be unequally yoked in terms of its contributions to Europe’s collective defence as compared to that of the other NATO member states, but its status in the alliance as a first among equals places it in a unique position to foster greater unity than would otherwise have been possible.
It is perhaps then this tacit acceptance of America’s unofficial leadership that has helped the alliance survive its initial birth pangs and even thrive thereafter. At the same time, it is this very dependence on American support that has made President Trump’s recent comments about the potential withdrawal of the U.S. from NATO so problematic. While Western Europe has come a long way since the bleak post-war years – the European Union’s (EU) total value of all goods and services produced (GDP) surpassed the U.S. in 2017 – future predictions for a NATO shorn of U.S. assistance are understandably pessimistic even if, to paraphrase the famous American author Mark Twain, the rumours of its death are greatly exaggerated. Nonetheless, the historical record proves that NATO will be better off with the continued involvement of the U.S. than without.
The Case for NATO
Should NATO then be allowed to continue to exist? There are numerous angles with which to address this question but this paper shall focus on three conceptual perspectives. First, before deciding whether to put down the guard dog, it is important to consider why it was placed there in the first place. NATO’s primary mission has always been the defence of Western Europe, specifically from Soviet encroachment, and while the end of the Cold War provided a brief respite from a state of constant vigilance, the recent tensions with a revanchist Russia suggest that the threat has merely been dormant. The issue then is less whether the guard dog still has a purpose but how the new parameters of its assigned domain should be defined.
Indeed, NATO’s post-Cold War eastward extension has been a significant contributing factor toward escalating tensions with Russia,particularly with Russia’s interests predominantly focused in the post-Soviet region where it seeks to reinstate and maintain its position as the dominant regional actor, by military force if necessary. Where NATO draws the line is important then because while Russia does not necessarily seek to recreate the Soviet Union, it cannot tolerate Western encroachment into what it perceives as its own backyard. Part of NATO’s earlier success rested on the simplicity of its mission as well as the clear dualistic nature of the Cold War’s bipolar framework. NATO’s eastward expansion has however arguably corrupted its mission and added unnecessary complexity.Despite the gains that have been made thus far by NATO, particularly in the Baltic region, further modification to the existing status quo must be tempered by prudence.
Second, it has already been argued that NATO is more than just a military pact, but the extent to which the ties that bind its member states have evolved bears further examination. In his study on the security dynamics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Dr. Ralf Emmers explored the concept of security communities. According to the constructivist approach, a security community is the final evolution of a defence network, which when fully integrated is characterised by shared identities, values and meanings; multiple and immediate relations among its members; and numerous instances of reciprocity based on long-term interest.In this state, the use of force within the community becomes unthinkable, resulting in a lasting peace. After decades of cooperation, NATO’s member states have arguably become, or approached a state close to, what a security community is. While Western Europe enjoyed a long peace during the Cold War in terms of its successful avoidance of open war with the Soviet Union, the long peace was also embodied by the lack of hostilities between the member states of NATO, a feat that Admiral James Stavridis (Ret.), a former Supreme Allied Commander, has described as the alliance’s greatest accomplishment. The value of maintaining this community therefore extends beyond the alliance’s military objectives, and its successful political and military integration of Germany is perhaps the most prominent testament to the alliance’s enduring ability to positively shape and influence the region’s security architecture.
Furthermore, NATO’s existence serves to enshrine a regional form of strategic culture, one that directs the bellicose energies of Western Europe outwards against an external threat as embodied by the Eastern “Other”. Dr. Yitshak Klein defined strategic culture as “the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it”, and in the case of NATO, the most obvious means of countering the potential encroachment of a more powerful Eastern foe was through collective defence.The nature of the foe is more subjective, but while the role of penultimate villain has most recently been filled by the Soviet-Russian menace, similar parallels can be drawn to historical precedents such as the Mongols and Ottomans. Neither is the notion of a collective response new, and the German historian Hubertus Prince zu Löwenstein and diplomat Dr. Volkmar von Zühlsdorff, observing the alliance in action during its formative years,even described it as but another manifestation in a long tradition of Western collective defence, one that included the likes of the Hellenic League and Roman Empire. NATO of course formalises these mechanism more concretely, and with the western reaches of the European continent bounded by the sea, ensures the internal peace of Western Europe as long as sufficient buy-in exists in the centrality of the alliance to regional security.
Finally, the reality is that there is no real viable alternative to NATO. Even the United Nations (UN) is inadequate, hampered by its inability to take decisive action in the event of a crisis by the potential abuse of the veto powers afforded to the permanent members of the Security Council. This problem is exacerbated when such actions run counter to the national interests of that member, such as when the Soviet Union vetoed the 1947 decision to restore order in Greece following an earlier local communist uprising.Ultimately, in spite of all its flaws and imperfections, NATO remains the most viable means of enhancing regional security, and while that speaks more to the lack of alternatives than to NATO’s own capabilities, it should not detract from the benefits the alliance brings as described above.
it is fair to say that NATO still has something to contribute in terms of
enhancing stability in Europe, and by extension the world. Pressing issues will
still need to be resolved, not least the repairing of NATO’s fractured
relationship with the U.S., but the sense is that the continued presence of
NATO is on the whole a positive rather than a negative. Like an old guard dog,
NATO can at times be underappreciated, receiving less love than its contributions
otherwise deserve. This is because the value of guard dog is measured in what
does not happen. It is only in its
absence that the guard dog’s true worth becomes evident although by then it
might already be too late. At age 70, NATO is the venerable guard dog of
Western Europe, and old it might be, it still has some teeth to bare.
 Douglas, Frank R. “American Focus on a Credible Defense of Western Europe.” Chap. 1 in The United States, NATO, and a New Multilateral Relationship. Connecticut & London: Praeger Security International, 2008. 7-27.
Perlmutter, Amos. “The Corruption of NATO: The Alliance Moves East.” Chap. 7 in NATO Enters the 21st Century. London & Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. 129-153.
 Renz, Bettina and Hanna Smith. “PART 3: What does Russia want? The importance of understanding Russian goals and intentions.” In Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label, Aleksanteri Papers 1/2016. Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2016. 14-24.
Perlmutter, Amos. “The Corruption of NATO.”
 Emmers, Ralf. “Enduring Mistrust and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia: An Assessment of ASEAN as a Security Community.” TRaNS: Trans –Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia 5, no. 1 (2017): 75-97.
Perlmutter, Amos. “The Corruption of NATO.”
Klein, Yitzhak. “A Theory of Strategic Culture.” Comparative Strategy 10, no. 1 (1991): 3-23.
 Prince zu Löwenstein, Hubertus and Volkmar von Zühlsdorff. “The Right to Self-Defense.” Chap. 1 in NATO and the Defense of the West. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher, 1962. 3-16.
 Prince zu Löwenstein, Hubertus and Volkmar von Zühlsdorff. “When the West Disarmed.” Chap. 4 in NATO and the Defense of the West. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher, 1962. 40-50.
Test of Agni Prime Missile and India’s Counterforce Temptations
South Asia is widely regarded as one of the most hostile regions of the world primarily because of the troubled relations between the two nuclear arch-rivals India and Pakistan. The complex security dynamics have compelled both the countries to maintain nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis each other. India is pursuing an extensive and all-encompassing military modernization at the strategic and operational level. In this regard, India has been involved in the development of advanced missiles as delivery systems and improvement in the existing delivery systems as well. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and delivery systems are solely aimed at India; however, India aspires to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China. Therefore, the size and capability of its nuclear deterrent and delivery systems are aimed at countering both threats. However, most of the recent missile delivery systems made by India appear to be more Pakistan-centric. One recent example in this regard is the recently tested nuclear-capable cannisterized ballistic missile Agni Prime, which is insinuated as Pakistan-centric. These developments would likely further provoke an action-reaction spiral and would increase the pace of conflict in South Asia, which ultimately could result in the intensification of the missile arms race.
Just quite recently, on 28th June 2021, India has successfully tested an advanced variant of its Agni missile series, namely Agni Prime or Agni (P). The missile has a range between 1000-2000 kilometers. Agni Prime is a new missile in the Agni missiles series, with improved accuracy and less weight than Agni 1, 2, and 3 missiles. It has been said that the Agni-P weighs 50 % less than the Agni-3 missile. As per the various media reports, this missile would take the place of Agni 1 and 2 and Prithvi missiles, however officially no such information is available. This new missile and whole Agni series is developed as part of the missile modernization program under the Defence Research and Development Organization’s (DRDO) integrated guided missile development program.
Agni-P is a short missile with less weight and ballistic trajectory, the missile has a rocket-propelled, self-guided strategic weapons system capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Moreover, the missile is cannisterized with the ability to be launched from road and rail. The DRDO claimed that the test flight of the missile was monitored by the telemetry radar stations and its trajectory met all the objectives of the mission successfully with high level of accuracy. Agni-P missile because of its range of 1000 to 2000 km is considered a weapon against Pakistan because within this range it cannot target China. Although, India already has different missiles in its inventory with the same range as the newly developed and tested Agni-P missile, so the question arises what this missile would achieve.
Since the last few years, it has been deliberated within the international security discourse that India’s force posture is actually more geared towards counterforce options rather than counter-value options. Although, India’s nuclear doctrine after its operationalization in 2003, claims “massive retaliation” and “nfu” but in reality with developing cannisterized weapons like Agni-P, Agni 5, and testing of hypersonic demonstrative vehicles, India actually is building its capability of “counterforce targeting” or “splendid first strike”. This reflects that India’s nuclear doctrine is just a façade and has no real implication on India’s force modernization.
These developments by India where it is rapidly developing offensive technologies put the regional deterrence equation under stress by increasing ambiguity. In a region like South Asia, where both nuclear rivals are neighbors and distance between both capitals are few thousand kilometers and missile launch from one side would take only a few minutes in reaching its target, ambiguity would increase the fog of war and put other actors, in this case, Pakistan in “use it or lose it” situation, as its nuclear deterrent would be under threat.
In such a situation, where Pakistan maintains that nuclear weapons are its weapons of last resort and to counter threats emerging from India, its nuclear deterrence has to hold the burden of covering all spectrums of threat. It might be left with no choice but to go for the development of a new kind of missile delivery system, probably the cannisterized missile systems as an appropriate response option. However, as Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is based on principle of “CMD” which allow Pakistan to seek deterrence in a cost-effective manner and also by not indulging in an arms race. Therefore, other than the threat of action-reaction dynamic developments like Agni P by India, would make weapons more accurate and lethal, subsequently conflict would be faster, ambiguous, and with less time to think. In such a scenario, as chances of miscalculation increase, the escalation dynamics would become more complex; thus, further undermining the deterrence stability in South Asia.
India’s counter-force temptations and development of offensive weapons are affecting the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia. The deterrence equation is not getting affected just because India is going ahead with the development of offensive technologies but because of its continuous attempts of negating the presence of mutual vulnerability between both countries. Acknowledgement of existence of mutual vulnerability would strengthen the deterrence equation in the region and help both countries to move forward from the action-reaction spiral and arms race. The notions such as the development of offensive or counterforce technology or exploiting the levels below the nuclear threshold to fight a war would not be fruitful in presence of nuclear weapons. As nuclear weapons are weapons to avert the war and not to fight the war.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems & The Annihilistic Future
The unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly known as drones were introduced as a useful means to military, commercial, civilian and humanitarian activities but yet it ends up in news for none of its original purposes. Drones have rather resulted as a means of mass destruction.
The recent attacks on the technical area of the Jammu Air Force Station highlights the same. This was a first-of-its-kind terror attack on IAF station rather the Indian defence forces that shook the National Investigation Agency to National Security Guard. The initial probe into the attacks directs to involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group based out of Pakistan, in the drone attacks as the aerial distance from the point of attack was just 14 kilometers. The attacks took place via an Electric multi-rotor type drone between 11:30 P.M to 1:30 A.M on 27th June, 2021.
The above incident clearly points out the security issues that lie ahead of India in face to the asymmetrical warfare as a result of drones. The Indian Government after looking at the misuse of drones during the first wave of the pandemic realised that its drone regulations were nowhere sufficient and accountable and hence passed the Unmmaned Aircraft Rules, 2021. These rules imposed stricter requirement for obtaining license and authorisations by remote pilots, operators, manufacturers or importers, training organisations and R&D organisations, thereby placing a significantly high burden on the applicants but at the same time they also permit UAS operations beyond visual sight of line and allowing student remote pilots to operate UAS.
But these rules still don’t have any control on the deadly use of drones because multi-rotor drones are very cheap and readily available and what makes them lethal is their ability to be easily detected, additionally the night time makes it even worse. Their small size grants them weak radar, thermal, and aural signatures, albeit varying based on the materials used in their construction.
The pertinent issue to be understood here is that these rules can never ensure safety and security as they cannot control the purpose for which these drones maybe used. There are certain factors that are to be accounted to actually be receptive to such imminent and dangerous threats. Firstly, significantly increasing urban encroachments in areas around defence establishments, particularly air bases, has proved to be fatal. If frontline bases like Jammu or be it any other base when surrounded by unbuffered civilization poses two pronged problems, first it acts as high chances of being a vantage point for possible attackers and second, it also hampering the defence mechanism to come to an action. It is not limited to drone concerns but there have been cases of increased bird activity that has once resulted in engine failure of an IAF Jaguar and has caused similar problems all along.
Another important factor is that of intelligence. The Anti-drone systems will take their time to be in place and it is still a distant call to ascertain how effective will these systems be, so in the time being it is pertinent to focus on intelligence which may include sales and transfers of commercial drone, or the hardware that is required to build a basic multi-rotor drone. These are not something extraordinary because it is even in news when Pakistani drones were being used to supply weapons and ammunition to terror networks on Indian soil. Also, the past experience in handling ISIS have shown the weightage of intelligence over defensive nets.
Intelligence is no doubt a crucial factor in anticipation of drone attacks but what cannot be done away with is the defense mechanism. Efficient counter-drone technology is the need of the hour. DRDO has developed such technology that could provide the armed forces with the capability to swiftly detect, intercept and destroy small drones that pose a security threat. It is claimed that solution consists of a radar system that offers 360-degree coverage with detection of micro drones when they are 4km away, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors for detection of micro drones up to 2 km and a radio frequency (RF) detector to detect RF communication up to 3 km and is equipped for both soft kills as well as hard kills.
Hence, the above analysis brings out the need of the application of an international instrument because the technology used in such drone attacks is at an evolving stage and the natural barriers still have an upper hand over be it either flying a pre-programmed path aided by satellite navigation and inertial measurement units (IMUs), or hand controlled to the point of release or impact, both methods have significant limitations as satellite and IMU navigation is prone to errors even when it comes to moderate flight ranges while manual control is subject to the human limitations such as line of sight, visibility as well as technical limitations such as distance estimation of the target, and weak radio links. An example of this could be the Turkish-made Kargu-2 model of killer drone can allegedly autonomously track and kill specific targets on the basis of facial recognition and Artificial Intelligence (AI). As the AI becomes better and better, these drone attacks become more and more terminal.
The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an eye opener for India as well as the world as none of the countries considered the possibility of bio-defenses or made a heavy investment in it even when there was awareness about lethal effects of genetic engineering. Hence, it should be the priority of the government to invest heavily in research and make the development of defensive technologies a national priority else the result of artificially intelligent killer drones would be much more catastrophic.
Russia’s National Security Strategy: A Manifesto for a New Era
The central feature of the new strategy is its focus on Russia itself. The Russian leadership has every reason right now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country’s internal situation.
Russia’s new, forty-four-page National Security Strategy signed by President Vladimir Putin on July 2 is a remarkable document. It is much more than an update of the previous paper, adopted in 2015. Back then, relations with the West had already sharply deteriorated as a result of the Ukraine crisis, but were still considered salvageable; much of the liberal phraseology inherited from the 1990s was still in use; and the world still looked more or less unified. The current version of arguably the most important Kremlin strategy statement—covering not only national security issues, but a whole range of others, from the economy to the environment, and values to defense—is a manifesto for a different era: one defined by the increasingly intense confrontation with the United States and its allies; a return to traditional Russian values; and the critical importance for Russia’s future of such issues as technology and climate.
The strategy lays out a view of a world undergoing transformation and turmoil. The hegemony of the West, it concludes, is on the way out, but that is leading to more conflicts, and more serious ones at that. This combination of historical optimism (the imminent end of Western hegemony) and deep concern (as it is losing, the West will fight back with even more ferocity) is vaguely reminiscent of Stalin’s famous dictum of the sharpening of the class struggle along the road to socialism. Economically, Russia faces unfair competition in the form of various restrictions designed to damage it and hold it back; in terms of security, the use of force is a growing threat; in the realm of ethics, Russia’s traditional values and historical legacy are under attack; in domestic politics, Russia has to deal with foreign machinations aimed at provoking long-term instability in the country. This external environment fraught with mounting threats and insecurities is regarded as an epoch, rather than an episode.
Against this sobering background, the central feature of the strategy is its focus on Russia itself: its demographics, its political stability and sovereignty, national accord and harmony, economic development on the basis of new technologies, protection of the environment and adaptation to climate change, and—last but not least—the nation’s spiritual and moral climate. This inward focus is informed by history. Exactly thirty years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed just as its military power was at its peak, and not as a result of a foreign invasion. Having recently regained the country’s great power status and successfully reformed and rearmed its military, the Russian leadership has every reason now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country’s internal situation.
The paper outlines a lengthy series of measures for dealing with a host of domestic issues, from rising poverty and continued critical dependence on imported technology to the advent of green energy and the loss of the Soviet-era technological and educational edge. This certainly makes sense. Indeed, the recent Kremlin discovery of climate change as a top-tier issue is a hopeful sign that Russia is overcoming its former denial of the problem, along with inordinately exuberant expectations of the promise of global warming for a predominantly cold country. After all, the Kremlin’s earlier embrace of digitalization has given a major push to the spread of digital services across Russia.
The strategy does not ignore the moral and ethical aspects of national security. It provides a list of traditional Russian values and discusses them at length. It sees these values as being under attack through Westernization, which threatens to rob the Russians of their cultural sovereignty, and through attempts to vilify Russia by rewriting history. In sum, the paper marks an important milestone in Russia’s official abandonment of the liberal phraseology of the 1990s and its replacement with a moral code rooted in the country’s own traditions. Yet here, the strategy misses a key point at the root of Russia’s many economic and social problems: the widespread absence of any values, other than purely materialistic ones, among much of the country’s ruling elite. The paper mentions in passing the need to root out corruption, but the real issue is bigger by an order of magnitude. As each of President Putin’s annual phone-in sessions with the Russian people demonstrates—including the most recent one on June 30—Russia is governed by a class of people who are, for the most part, self-serving, and do not care at all for ordinary people or the country, instead focusing single-mindedly on making themselves rich on the job. Money—or rather Big Money—has become that group’s top value, and the most corrosive element in today’s Russia. Therein lies perhaps the biggest vulnerability of modern Russia.
On foreign policy, the strategy is fairly elliptic, but it gives a hint of what the upcoming Foreign Policy Concept might include. The United States and some of its NATO allies are now officially branded unfriendly states. Relations with the West are de-prioritized and those countries ranked last in terms of closeness, behind former Soviet countries; the strategic partners China and India; non-Western institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Russia-India-China trio; and other Asian, Latin American, and African countries. In addition to U.S. military deployments and its system of alliances, U.S.-based internet giants with their virtual monopoly in the information sphere, and the U.S. dollar that dominates global finances are also seen as instruments of containing Russia.
Overall, the 2021 Russian National Security Strategy seeks to adapt the country to a still interconnected world of fragmentation and sharpening divisions, in which the main battle lines are drawn not only—and not even mostly—between countries, but within them. Victories will be won and defeats suffered largely on domestic turf. Accordingly, it is the Home Front that presents the greatest challenges, and it is there that the main thrust of government policies must be directed.
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