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The clash between Iran and the United States after Soleimani’s death

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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“Operation Martyr Soleimani” began on the night of January 8. The leader of the Pasdaran Al Quds Brigade had died on the night of January 3.

 Some Iranian missiles hit two Iraqi bases, Ayan al-Asad and Erbil, in the Kurdish region. In Erbil there were also Italian troops, who hid in a bunker.

The Kurds are targets for Iran since they are allies of the United States and – at least initially- enemies of Assad’s regime.

 Iranian sources reported a number of U.S. victims of at least 80 people, a toll denied – at first – by the United States and later by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif, who subsequently stated that the Iranian Government did not know the number of enemy’s victims.

Indeed – as an important sign of psywar-Minister Zarif himself said he did not know what nationality the victims of the Iranian missile attack were.

 The attack was carried out after midnight so as to replicate the time and ways of Qasem Soleimani’s targeted assassination – an essential theme in the Shiite war theory.

Iran, however, launched at least twelve short-to-medium range ballistic missiles against groups of US soldiers, according to the rule of Qisas, i.e. “life for life”, which follows verse 178-179 of the Sura Al-Baqarah: “the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female”. This means blood for blood, possibly in the same way and form as the first offense.

According to the Iranian leaders, the missile attack is a “measure proportionate” to the U.S. action against Soleimani. Hence, again according to them, Operation “Martyr Soleimani” is expected to be concluded today but, not by chance, for other sources from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the so-called Pasdaran, there are still as many as 104 possible targets in the United States, Europe and the Sunni countries.

Hence targets in the United States and in the territories of the U.S. European allies that are under the Iranian scrutiny and can be hit at any time.

Therefore, it is the probable beginning of an asymmetric war between Iran and the United States, which will polarize much of the Middle East and will become increasingly uncontrollable as the current U.S. demilitarization of the Greater Middle East proceeds.

 Furthermore, this operation designed to avenge Qasem Soleimani’s targeted assassination – according to the principle of Qisas- entailed the use of only a small part of the Iranian missile apparata. In Iran’s mind, this implies triggering a response against increasingly virulent and ever less proportionate U.S. attacks.

If the U.S. attacks are progressive and significant, Iran will have a base of popular support throughout the Middle East, from which – at that time – the United States will be out. Hence there will possibly be a real regional war between Iran and U.S. Arab and Jewish allies, i.e.the dream of Ayatollah Khomeini who saw the final clash between the “two Satans” and “sacred” Iran.

Furthermore, after the missile attack, Imam Khamenei spoke of a “slap on the face” for the United States, considering that the primary aim – despite President Trump’s temptations to walk out – is to force the United States to a quickly and complete withdrawal from the whole Middle East region. Currently, however, there are 5,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq, in addition to further 10,000 on the way.

Now, in the likely prospect of an open clash between the United States and Shiite Iran, there are some technical-military factors to be considered.

 The United States can annihilate the Iranian Navy and Air Force within 48 hours.

 A real all-out conflict is no good to either of the two strategic players. The United States would certainly hit primary targets within the Iranian territory, thus causing incalculable damage, but it is certain that also the U.S. soldiers would have great difficulty in penetrating the Iranian territory, with rapidly unsustainable losses.

 It is obvious that this policy of attrition between Iran and the United States has a worldwide geopolitical value.

The U.S. primary interest is to defuse Iran as a regional player and fully weaken the “Shiite crescent” between Iran, Yemen, the Lebanon and Syria, thus directly favouring the Sunni countries, which are not necessarily more pro-USA than the others.

 Obviously in the U.S. strategists’ minds, hitting Iran also means hitting the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, for which Iran is the most reliable and important ally in the Middle East, not to mention Iranian oil transfers to China or military cooperation between Iran and Russia.

 The beginning of this new configuration of the confrontation between the pro-American and the pro-Russian and pro-Chinese blocs can be seen in Iran’s reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2019.

Conversely the EU did not react at all to President Trump’s new sequence of sanctions against Iran, imposed after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear agreement in which also the EU participated.

 The EU is the so-called “stone guest” of any agreement.

 The new U.S. sanctions hit Iran by reducing oil exports by at least 300,000 barrels/day, with a series of trade restrictions that are particularly damaging to the EU. However, as often happens to teenagers, Europe’s childish love for the United States is such as to tolerate any offense.

Iran decided to respond to this new geopolitical and economic order with a de facto alliance with Russia and China, but without direct military implications, as well as with a calculated tension with the Sunni petro-monarchies.

Allegedly the current reserves of the Iranian Central Bank amount to 110 billion US dollars, of which just over 50% “cash”.

 This allows at least two years of State-funded imports and this is the time horizon in which the Iranian strategic and military operations must be considered.

 Another variable that Iran is waiting to calculate is 2020, the year of the U.S. presidential elections.

The ability to destabilize the Middle East – the real factor on which Iran can count in the clash with the United States – is Iran’s real asset.

The network of proxies to systematically harm Israel, such as Hamas (the network of the Muslim Brotherhood, currently in Iran’s pay),Hezbollah, the Shiite organization created on Ayatollah Khomeini’s direct orders, and finally the Islamic Jihad, another Sunni organization now shifted under Iran’s umbrella.

Hence a strategy of irony, which has dissimulation as its original meaning.

Also cyberwarfare must be considered: the first Iranian cyberattack against the United States was against a U.S. government website, just the day after Soleimani’s death.

Later the Iranian cyberattacks hit the Federal Depository Library Program website, as well as other targets.

 In an all-out attack on the United States, certainly Iran will operate at first with cyberwarfare.

 The potential of Iran’s new cyberwarfare probably began in 2010, with the discovery of Stuxnet.

In all likelihood, it was an attack of Israeli origin, since the Stuxnet computer virus came from there.

 That was the time when Iran really brought itself up to date in cyberwarfare.

 From that moment on, the Iranian Shamoon viruses appeared, which in 2017 severely infected the computer network of the Aramco refineries in Saudi Arabia. Later, in November 2019, Iran knocked out the personal and corporate networks of some Saudi Aramco’s operators.

Hence Iran has developed a specific cyber-ability to hit critical infrastructure, financial institutions, major manufacturing companies and universities.

Iran can also change-forge air and maritime GPS.

 In the hierarchy of States capable of launching cyberattacks, the United States, Russia and China rank first, followed by Iran and North Korea.

With specific reference to proxies’ war, however, Iran has two major strongholds: the Lebanon, with Hezbollah’s fragmented power, and Syria.

Nevertheless, another future area of tension between Iran and its Sunni or Western enemies will be the Strait of Hormuz. Probably the Iranian Armed Forces’ future attacks in that area will take place simultaneously with cyberattacks.

 Russia, however, does not want any clash – even indirect – between the United States and Iran.

Furthermore, for Saudi Arabia, Soleimani’s assassination is obviously good news, albeit with some “ifs”.

Meanwhile a conflict – even an indirect one – between Iran and the United States could block the great G20 Meeting scheduled in Riyadh for late 2020.

Furthermore, in case of a war between Iran and the United States, the Saudi Defence would be obliged to use many of the resources otherwise devoted to the Vision 2030 project, which is number one in Mohammed bin Salman’s mind.

Finally, the financial insecurities already triggered by Soleimani’s assassination could harshly hit both the national and international interests of Saudi Arabia.

 As can be easily imagined, so far insecurity has led to a sharp increase in insurance premiums for all oil and gas transfers. This refers to a total value of transported oil and gas of at least 1.2 trillion US dollars.

 It should be noted, however, that 80% of all Gulf States’ GDP depends on oil.

Nevertheless, oil and gas account for only 30% of Iran’s GDP.

 Saudi Arabia exports approximately 6.5 million barrels/day, which leave from the ports of Ras Tamura and Ju’aymah and from King Fahd Industrial Port in Jubail.

 All targets which can be easily reached by Iranian operations.

 Iraq, the second largest exporter in the Middle East and Italy’s second or sometimes first supplier, exports 3.8 million barrels/day, accounting for 90% of Iraq’s public revenue.

 It exports through Basra and the Kawr Al’Amiya terminals. Once again, it is extremely easy to hit these targets from the Iranian bases.

Bypassing the above mentioned ports, Saudi Arabia’s, Iraq’s and other minor producers’ alternative options can be the Rabigh terminals, on the east coast of the Red Sea, or the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.

Hence this will be the general framework of a probable military conflict between Iran and the United States, although certainly not planned by Iran.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Berlin Conference on Libya

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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What are the strategic, military and political differences between the war in Libya of  2011-2012 and the current conflict in post-Gaddafi Libya?

There are many differences. The first one is that the powers that started the clash between an ambiguous Cyrenaic “entity”, with strong jihadist connotations (it should be recalled that, also with Gaddafi, Cyrenaica was the greatest geographical area from which the jihadists of the Afghan and Central Asian wars originated) and the Tripolitan entity were, at the time, separate and almost all Western entities. Currently, those who command and rule on the ground in Libya are only formally subject to a droit de regard of other powers outside the Middle East or Asia.

Due to its sloth, the whole of Europe is about to disappear from the Maghreb region and, in the future, from Africa. Moreover, the latter would be the “complementary continent” of the Eurasian peninsula.

 The proxy war between Colonel Gaddafi who, in any case, acted proudly alone, except for a limited Chinese and East Slavic support, and the Jihadist friends of the West in Cyrenaica – where the tradition of specific Islamic radicalism (the Senussite brotherhood) was still strong – was the last operation of the unfortunate and foolish U.S. project of the “Arab Springs”, based on the techniques of “unorthodox, but non-violent and mass warfare” developed at the time by the Albert Einstein Foundation, an association promoted by Gene Sharp in 1983.

As a CIA Vice-Director said, the idea of the “Arab springs” was “to avoid any contact between the Arab crowds and Al Qaeda” and hence to make the Arab crowds turn against the jihad.

Needless to add anything else, History has already taught us its lesson.

Currently the great proxy war has turned into a great operation in which the major points of reference for the forces on the ground in Libya are not ahead, but are strategically following their forces of reference on the ground in Libya.

Because power relations count on the ground while, as Giacomo Leopardi taught us, the “belle fole” are ineffective and illusory.

In the Berlin Conference, General Haftar – the strong man of Cyrenaica’s Government – presents himself with a never fully completed and unsuccessful advance towards Tripoli, in spite of the fact that the UN-sponsored government of al-Sarraj had important defections from the qatibe group of Misrata and that the forces of former Colonel Gaddafi have now reached Tripoli suburbs, as well as in spite of the fact that the financial and operational support from  Egypt – especially now-from the Russian Federation, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia has never ceased.

Due to his poor health and to “keep” its troops under control, which could disperse exactly as those of al-Sarraj, General Haftar needs a symbolic, but also politically effective and quick victory against the people of Cyrenaica, once hated by the people of Tripolitania.

 King Idriss II, the last Libyan monarch before Gaddafi’s coup, organized by the Italian intelligence Services, boasted of “having never been to Tripoli”.

Hence Khalifa Haftar, the man who was harshly punished by Colonel Gaddafi himself for his clumsy operation in Chad – the long and decades-long Libyan operation in the South to repel the pro-French forces of Tombalbaye and Hissene Habrè – has not yet won and cannot fail to win in a short lapse of time. Otherwise he becomes irrelevant to its supporters and will lose his social and economic credibility, which is essential in this type of war.

However the Russian Federation, which has openly supported him and which still holds him in high esteem, does not want rash decisions and presses for an agreement with Turkey enabling Russia to act as a real mediator, since Westerners still talk about irrelevant issues with the representatives of al-Serraj, the man still surrounded in his palace on Tripoli’s port, at which h arrived – just appointed by the United Nations without any particular rational reason – by sea, because he knew that he would immediately be taken out or killed in Tripolitania’s airport of Mitiga.

Russia wants to exploit – in a short lapse of time – the strategic void that is on the ground and in Western decision-makers’ minds.

Therefore, it needs a quick agreement between the Libyan parties to exploit the central role played by Russia and hence dictate its own conditions to Italy, Germany, France and Turkey, with which there are other Russian outstanding issues, as well as with the other players in the Gulf, who still do not know how to make the most of the new tension on the ground between the United States and Iran, which could start operating again in Libya through Qatar and, possibly, with its own expeditionary force, organized by the new leadership of the Al Quds Force, full of Syrian Shiites and former collaborators of the Pasdaran Iranian forces in Syria.

Exactly the same as Turkey is doing, by sending – from the Northern Syrian areas currently acquired by Turkey –  the Syrian “Turkish” jihadists, who were created and trained by MIT, i.e. Erdogan’s intelligence Services, to support the “Muslim brother” al-Sarraj.

 In other words, it is the division and/or availability of the proxy players, the fighters on the Libyan ground, which determines the behaviour of their “great” points of reference, not vice versa.

 Furthermore, in the Russian Federation, the new political configuration of the country’s leadership is not irrelevant to Russia’s engagement in Libya.

With his new reform of the representative system and the Russian government, announced on January 16, President Putin wants to reassure himself of the possibility of appointing his future successor, without particular contracts and agreements with other Russian power groups and lobbies.

 The Russian power, which has long been firmly in Vladimir Putin’s hands, now finds itself more divided and less malleable in the hands of the current Kremlin’s nomenklatura.

The latter is changing its skin and is probably also using the street riots against President Putin to push for a new power struggle between Putin’s “heirs apparent”, thus forcing him to make unavoidable choices even in foreign policy.

In the future President Putin probably wants to concentrate on Europe and on the economic transformation of his country and he will be ever less interested in embarking on peripheral adventures than in his primary goal, which will be the internal economic and social reconstruction and the stability of his Near East.

Nevertheless the former Head of the Russian intelligence Services no longer has in his hands – smoothly and without discussion – his old “power elite”, whom he wants to radically reform, also with the pretext – or perhaps the real intention – of eradicating “corruption”.

Therefore even President Putin cannot play all his cards in the Berlin Conference.

France almost explicitly says it wants to extend the truce in Libya, waiting for better times, which will never come. It also wants small hegemony over the possible agreement between al-Sarraj and General Haftar.

 Even if there were an agreement, it would not be determined by France or Italy, but by the real forces on the ground, that is to say by the actual power of the local military organisations, all of which are almost in non-European hands.

 Even if there were an agreement, the fact of stating at first want you want shows the existence of suicidal ideation.

 What does France really want, whose intelligence services are at the origin of the first scenes of the insurgency, supported by a phantom section of the Parisian “association for human rights”, Libyan section – and which today, for the most part, is still behind General Haftar? Certainly, for obvious anti-ENI reasons.

 First of all, France wants – from General Haftar- the management of the oil reserves between the East, Sirte and the first part of Tripolitania in favour of France, as well as strategic control of the Libyan South for further exploration by Total, which should achieve the objective No.1 of the French presence in Libya since 2011, i.e. the taking of ENI and Italy’s total expulsion from the Maghreb region.

 Russia instead wants-at the very least – to reach the goal of a military base in Cyrenaica, which should change Russia’s whole strategic equation vis-à-vis the EU, although Europe is not yet aware of this.

  This is not fully incompatible with certain Italian interests, which could play Russia against France.

 Russia is not interested in those who control Libyan oil from the Eastern and central areas of the country, but in those who supply it to it better and at a lower price.

 Moreover, France wants to hegemonize the new “interposition force” that should be established by the United Nations.

 Here the Italian government’s ambiguities have been dangerous and sometimes funny.

 Firstly, there was the idea of entrusting everything to Europe, an organization that certainly has a “deep void” as Foreign Affairs Commissioner – albeit I am not referring to the current Commissioner Borrell – but neither does it have any credible political and military organization for out-of-area operations.

 Which EU structure should deal with the pacification of Libya?

 The political and military Group? The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), which “provides military advice to the CFSP” (the EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner) and is currently chaired by the Italian General Graziano?

 It is not suitable to command and control, but only to ask the EU Member States what they want to do with their individual Armed Forces.

Furthermore – just to use a metaphor – when there are always many of us at lunch, we must always know who pays.

The Italian idea of replicating Unifil II, the 20-year-old adverse possession of a large part of South Lebanon, which was not even able to stop Hezbollah’s “little war” of August 2006 against Israel is not a model, but just naivety.

Unifil is something different from an area ban or an Interposition Force. It is a political-military platform for the whole Middle East, where everyone talks to everyone, but sheltered from everyone, which could not be the case for a Force between al-Sarraj and Haftar.

 I also have the strong impression that, after the statements made by Italian Prime Minister Conte and Foreign Minister Di Maio regarding the fact that the Italian soldiers (Who? Those recalled from other African or Middle East positions, connected to Libya and no less important than it?) “will never be engaged, for any reason, in armed actions”, all the other EU Member States got a good laugh out of it.

 So what does Italy want to do with the Interposition Forces, whose Rules of Engagement are also inevitably drawn up by the United Nations, not by Italy?

  Probably, the idea is for it to be a sort of unarmed security guard for some international judges, who will verify without being able to notify the truce breaks. Hence it would be like the global export of the “Clean Hand Operation”, the judicial probe which is at the origin of Italy’s poor “Second Republic”, rather than the development of a smart Italian policy for the Maghreb region.

From the very beginning, Italy- intoxicated from its supposed Kantian ethicality, but still proud of its “Article 11” of the Constitution – has declared, as a country defeated in World War II, that it still wants to be so and to remain so sine die.

 The Armed Forces of any country are like the bank deposit of any foreign policy.

 If decisions are taken without the Forces’ cash that serves to put them into practice and, above all, to force the others to accept the geopolitical stare decisis, hence decisions or blank checks are issued.

Hence what does Italy want from Libya and from the next Berlin Conference?

 To be expelled from North Africa, which is essential for its energy and material-military security, as well as for civilian and military communications.

 Italy now plays the role of the geopolitical waiter, a role not far from some of the professions actually carried out by some of the current decision-makers until a few years ago.

Just to use again a metaphor, currently Italy prefers to pick up crumbs and concessions – which will not be there – from the African meal of others.

Moreover, in a context where – as is right -the following countries have been invited to the Berlin Conference: Algeria, which we have also lost; China, which is very interested in the Libyan reconstruction business; the African Union, which will represent above all the interests of the sub-Saharan countries; the Arab League, which will set great store by a stable pacification of the jihad with the rest of the African Muslim community, so as to take the jihad out of Westerners’ hands; the Republic of Congo, ready to play an important role for its internal energy and economic reconstruction needs; Egypt, which wants to take General Haftar out of the other Middle East players’ hands to use him as a force for redesigning Egypt’s Western security and against the expansion – through Turkey – of the Islamic Brotherhood, i.e. enemy No.1 of Al Sisi’s power; the United Arab Emirates, which want to obtain the maximum economic and political leverage from their new and unusual position in the Maghreb region, designed to exclude much of “Old Europe”.

 Saudi Arabia – also central to General Haftar – does not want to go against the United States and Israel, thus increasing its commitment to the Tobruk government that organizes Haftar’s policy, but it also wants to maintain a sound hegemony over the Maghreb region against Turkey (but without harming its good relations with Russia and the United States, still essential for its regional Wahhabi wars). Hence support to General Haftar, but wisely and with discretion.

What does Turkey want? Currently it strongly supports al-Sarraj, backed  also by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose primary point of reference is Qatar, an ambiguous correlator between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with whom it has decisive economic relations. Erdogan wants a Tripolitania that has fallen into Turkey’s hands because Italy has not been able – or rather has not wanted – to support it militarily, possibly also with a real interposition force – not a newly-armed escort for the Maghreb “Clean Hand Operation”.

Turkey also wants strategic continuity between its very recent oil and gas agreements with Tripolitania – primarily maritime continuity, but which needs a very efficient land coverage.

 Even this redesign of the SAR and the Maritime Control Areas, which are by nature bilateral agreements, will see Italy excluded from the direct control of its ENI oil networks from central Libya to the Libyan coast. And this is no coincidence, considering that Tunisia – a possible Italian alternative to the restriction of ENI’s Libyan area – has not yet been invited to the Berlin Conference of January 19, 2020.

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Iran crisis: A high-stakes bet on who blinks first

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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Two sets of US government cables suggest that Iran hawks in and outside the Trump administration appear to have the upper hand as European countries give hardliners a helping hand by attempting to force Iran to seek a diplomatic solution to a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in yet another military conflict.

Disclosure of the cables advocating a military strike such as this month’s killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani coupled with the withdrawal of a US State Department olive branch that was intended to reassure Iran about the Trump administration’s intentions appear designed to persuade the Islamic republic to back away from its strategy of gradual escalation.

The strategy aims to engineer a situation in which a return to negotiations on the basis of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program is the only way to avoid an all-out war. The Trump administration withdrew from the accord in 2018 and has since imposed ever harsher economic sanctions on Iran.

Hardliners in Washington believe Iran’s accidental downing of a Ukrainian airliner that sparked anti-government protests days after millions of Iranians came out to mourn Mr. Soleimani’s death in what Iranian leaders project as a rallying around the regime is a proof of concept of their approach.

The hard-liners’ strategy was spelled out in a series of unclassified memos sent by David Wurmser, a close associate of John Bolton, while Mr. Bolton was serving as national security advise to President Donald J. Trump. The memos projected a US military operation on the scale of the killing of a Mr. Soleimani as a way of destabilizing the government in Tehran.

Mr. Wurmser’s advice was in line with proposals for destabilizing Iran presented to the White House by Mr. Bolton in the months before his appointment. Mr. Bolton was fired by Mr. Trump in September of last year.

“Iran has always been careful to execute its ambitions and aggressive aims incrementally to avoid Western reactions which depart from the expected. In contrast, were unexpected, rule-changing actions taken against Iran, it would confuse the regime. It would need to scramble,” Mr. Wurmser wrote.

 Such a U.S. attack would “rattle the delicate internal balance of forces and the control over them upon which the regime depends for stability and survival… Iranians would both be impressed and potentially encouraged by a targeted attack on symbols of repression,” Mr. Wurmser added.

The leaking of Mr. Wurmser’s memos coincided with a cable from the State Department to US diplomatic missions worldwide that walked back an instruction earlier this month by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to limit contacts with Iranian opposition and exile groups in a bid to reassure Iran that the Trump administration was not seeking regime change in Tehran.

The Pompeo cable seemed to be a first step at bridging the gulf of distrust between Washington and Tehran that makes a resolution of the two countries’ differences all but impossible. Iran has long been convinced that regime change is the main driver of US policy since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Mr. Pompeo’s instruction came on the heels of Mr. Trump’s decision not to respond to Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Iraq in retaliation for the killing of Mr. Soleimani.

With the government in Tehran on the backfoot as a result of the downing of the Ukrainian airliner and renewed anti-government protests, leaders of Britain, France and Germany, cosignatories of the 2015 nuclear accord, appear to be buying into the strategy of the Washington hardliners.

The Europeans, responding to Iran’s gradual withdrawal from its commitments under the accord as part of its strategy of gradual escalation, this week triggered its dispute resolution mechanism, that could put Iran’s actions on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council and lead to a re-imposition of international sanctions.

British prime minister Boris Johnson further raised the stakes by telling the BBC that he would be willing to back an as yet non-existent proposal by Mr. Trump for a new agreement with Iran. “If we are going to get rid of it (the nuclear accord), then we need a replacement,” Mr. Johnson said.

The proof will be in the pudding whether the two-pronged stepping up of US and European pressure on Iran will be sufficient to engineer a breakthrough in efforts to avert escalating tension and a return to the negotiating table.

So far, Iran’s response suggests tensions may have to further escalate before parties, all of whom do not want an all-out war, pull back from the brink.

In a first, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, insisting that all foreign forces should leave the Middle East, warned, in response to the European move and statements, that British, French and German troops may be in danger.

“Today, the American soldier is in danger, tomorrow the European soldier could be in danger,” Mr. Rouhani told a Cabinet meeting.

Said a Western diplomat, spelling out European thinking: “This allows us to buy time while making clear to Iran that they cannot continue on this path of non-compliance with no consequences.”

For now, it’s a high stakes poker bet on who blinks first.

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Middle East

Assassination of Qassem Solemani: Strategic American Re-course

Sisir Devkota

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For Iran, international sympathy dissolved all very quickly. Ukrainian International Airlines 752 was downed by a surface to air missile; moments after it took off from Tehran. Such is the nature of modern news coverage; the crash did not find space until Tehran admitted a catastrophic mistake on its part. Victims from flight 752 had to wait until the next morning for attention after crash; President Trump made a stride towards de-escalation while the Canadian Prime Minister first declared that Iran was behind the blunder. Events swung dramatically, in a span of few days, sympathy turned into protests; Iranian people found their government more hostile than foreign forces. For years, the West has continuously manufactured a troublemaker tag for the regime; latest events have testified the “rogue-ness” of a nation that now stands at crossroads.

In its own words, an admission of “unforgivable mistake” was quickly judged as an act of de-escalating the US-Iran rift. Both Iran and the United States dusted it off very well, the Islamic regime claimed that revenge had been sought without killing a single soldier, whereas the US determined such events as Iran’s giving in gesture. For both countries, the fate of flight 752 came as a surprising sacrifice to help situational matters. Iran’s acceptance went well with other western nations; unlike how the Russians dealt with a similar tragedy, the regime can be looked upon as a lesser aggressor. If decades of experience of dealing with Khomeini successors did not warrant its intentions; it has now. Iran can be deemed as a satisfactorily peace-seeking nation. Rusting military expertise with a heightened sensitivity to claim a safe spot is a valid evidence. Adding to it, the unusual combination of hollow threats and the agility to escape a challenging situation, satisfactorily distinguishes Iran from a terrorist network. Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran has promised to punish the culprits in an attempt to save faces.

Months before his assassination, Qassem Solemani himself testified numerous escapes from Israeli air raids. In May 2019, the United States had officially ordered its equipped battleships to raid the Gulf, in order to scan Solemani’s whereabouts. The military leader was not killed in hesitation; his assassination plot lived on a wishful ambition that President Trump eventually delivered. Hence, the outpour of millions at his grave. Solemani was prized by his regime; his skills, leading to strategic warfare was exceptional. The fact that the United States finally got his blood, sent shockwaves into Iranian administration. It was exceptional but more so an intolerable truth to swallow.

Such was the euphoria leading to his death, more than his crimes being highlighted, global attention drifted to the legitimacy of killing a leader on a foreign soil. Circumstances arrested significant nations from taking sides; the standoff witnessed how divided the world really has become. Tensions between an uncharacteristic Trump administration and the untamed Iranian regime was well anticipated; the possibility of it happening anytime soon was not. For many decades, the American leadership had safely ignored Iranian adventures; Iran had successfully become a policy hallmark in the Middle East. Unlike other Middle Eastern regimes, Iran came across as thoughtful, rational and co-operative at times. That dynamics has now changed, Iran will no longer sleep peacefully over past trade-offs with the United States. Luckily, for President Trump, his Iran card has bolstered for good. The events that led to Solemani’s death has penetrated into Iran’s deeper problems, like its military capabilities. Next time when Iran speaks, the world will realize its shortness of breath. Next time when President Trump tweets, the world will take him seriously, more than ever.

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Berlin Conference on Libya

What are the strategic, military and political differences between the war in Libya of  2011-2012 and the current conflict in...

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