Connect with us

Middle East

Libya: Is reconciliation possible?

Published

on

The recent talks between President Vladimir Putin of Russia and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan focused on the commissioning of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline – a major infrastructure project of today: the pipeline is 930 km long, with a capacity of 31,5 bln м3 yearly. According to Gazprom, the Turkish Stream gas is already being pumped to some countries of the European Union, and next on the waiting list are Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Serbia and Hungary.

Although the launch of the pipeline stands out as an event of tremendous importance for the two countries, one of the top points on the agenda of the talks was the situation in Libya, which has come into the global spotlight again in recent months. The Instanbul meeting took place behind closed doors – no statements were made either before or after it, which triggered doubts as to its effectiveness. However, the negotiations resumed after the launch of the pipeline and were followed by the two leaders’ joint statement.

The overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime with the help of NATO forces split the country. The north-west of Libya is run from Tripoli by the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, while the eastern part is governed by the nationally elected and thus equally legitimate parliament (the House of Representatives), which has formed its own government. The latter structures are largely under control of Khalifa Haftar, the Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). In addition, some sections of the Sahara are so far free from Haftar’s control. Such a situation is quite understandable: Tripolitania (in the west), Cyrenaica (in the east) and Fezzan (in the south) are known since antiquity and were formed into a single state (or rather, a colony) by the Italians in 1934. The centrifugal processes continued even during Gaddafi’s tough rule.

Ankara has been seeking closer ties with Tripoli in recent months. A memorandum on the sea boundary delineation agreement which was signed with the GNA at the end of last year provides Turkey, along with hypothetic geopolitical gains, with a chance to assume, even if slight, control, of the development of natural gas deposits at sea which are claimed by other countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, first of all, by Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel – countries that form the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. It is no secret that looming behind them is the United States. Besides, considering that the European Union’s position on this issue is pretty tough, Ankara is highly unlikely to run the risk of facing a new aggravation of relations with Europe. This time, Brussels may choose to impose sanctions on Turkey, whose exports and imports are more than 50% dependent on European partners. 

The prospect of facing regional isolation in connection with “gas activity”, on the one hand, and plans to intervene in the civil war in Libya (which none of international legal entities seemed to support), on the other, forced Erdogan to look for allies. This explains his unexpected voyage to Tunisia during which he was accompanied by the minister of defense and director of the national intelligence service. Referring to certain mercenaries, Erdogan sort of “justified” the dispatch of Turkish servicemen to Libya.

However, Erdogan failed to win over the Tunisian leadership: after his departure a Tunisian presidential spokesperson said his country would stick to neutrality in relations with Libya. The spokesperson also disavowed Erdogan’s allegations that Turkey had struck a “union” with Tunisia on Libya.

The failure in Tunisia did nothing to discourage the Turkish leader. In the first week of January Turkey’s Supreme National  Assembly approved of the president-initiated mandate on the dispatch of Turkish servicemen to Libya.  Haftar responded by announcing a general mobilization with a view to “dislodge foreign forces” and prevent Ankara from “bringing back the Ottoman legacy”. On January 5th Erdogan acknowledged the dispatch of Turkish military to Libya, where he said they would engage in “coordination”. Traditionally, every meeting with the Russian president is preceded by the Turkish president’s steps to consolidate his positions – be it expression of reverence to the Atlantic alliance, or a visit to Washington. This time, the tradition was observed as usual.

For many political and economic reasons, Turkey is unlikely to launch a large-scale military operation in Libya. Unlike the last Turkish campaign in Syria, when Turkey’s military activity in a neighboring country seemed natural to most of the electorate (common  border, the refugee problem, the “Kurdish threat”), the situation in remote Libya triggers no immediate response in Turks and is thus unlikely to secure their support for a military campaign there, which is fraught with new political tensions.  Besides, given that Turkey cannot afford the “luxury” of running two military campaigns at a time, the Turkish contingent is unlikely to be numerous – in all likelihood it is but a “flag demonstration” in the Mediterranean. 

Another thing is that unnamed Reuters sources within the Turkish leadership report  Ankara’s plans to send hundreds of pro-Turkish militants from Idlib to Libya (according to other sources, they are already there). This sounds quite plausible in view of the close denouement in the Idlib zone. It is these militants’ actions that the Turkish instructors are supposed to “coordinate”.

Ankara’s recent geopolitical initiatives received a cool response from Moscow: on December 26, Dmitry Peskov told reporters: “The situation in Libya is undoubtedly causing a lot of concern, including ours … We believe that any intervention by third countries in Libya is unlikely to contribute to a settlement, but any attempts by third countries to directly contribute to solving the problem and help the parties involved in the conflict to reach a solution are always welcome – international efforts are always supported by the Russian Federation. “

In other words, Moscow,  after saying it is against an escalation of the conflict, has de facto invited Ankara to join forces in searching for a solution through diplomatic means.

Three days earlier, on December 23, a Turkish delegation consisting of diplomats, military officials and intelligence officers arrived in Moscow to discuss the situation in Libya and Syria. According to Turkish media, the consultations lasted three days, but, apparently, no solution was produced, and, according to some experts, the discussions were postponed until a face-to-face meeting between the Russian and Turkish leaders. Significantly, these days the main strike of the Haftar army’s December offensive on Tripoli (where the GNA is based, A.I.), has been redirected to Sirte and Misurata, while military operations in the direction of the capital have entered a sluggish phase.

Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have made a joint statement  reaffirming commitment to the territorial integrity of Libya and stating that stability in the country can be achieved only through an inclusive inter-Libyan dialogue. And most importantly: the two leaders “decided to act as intermediaries and call on all parties involved in the Libyan conflict to stop all military operations as of 00:00 on January 12, declare a lasting ceasefire backed by the necessary measures that must be taken to stabilize the situation on the ground and normalize everyday life in Tripoli and other cities, and immediately sit at the negotiating table in order to put an end to the suffering of the Libyan people and reinstate peace and prosperity in the country. ”

France, Italy and the UN leadership have all made attempts in recent months to secure a ceasefire and arrange a meeting between Haftar and Sarraj, but so far without success. Will Moscow and Ankara be more successful? The chances are there for grabs: Sarraj needs to clinch a deal – the more he moves on, the more he loses in the confrontation with Haftar, who seems to heed recommendations from Moscow, which has established itself as a mediator for a wide variety of conflicting parties in the Middle East.

From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

Qatar World Cup offers lessons for human rights struggles

Published

on

It’s a good time, almost 12 years after the world soccer body, FIFA, awarded Qatar the 2022 World Cup hosting rights and five months before the tournament, to evaluate the campaign to reform the country’s erstwhile onerous labor system and accommodate fans whose lifestyles violate restrictive laws and/or go against deeply rooted cultural attitudes.

Ultimately the balance sheet shows a mixed bag even if one takes into account that Qatari autocracy has proven to be more responsive and flexible in responding to pressure by human rights and labour groups than its Gulf brothers in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

On the plus side, the initial wave of condemnation of the country’s repressive kafala labour system that put employees at the mercy of their employers persuaded Qatar to become the first Gulf state, if not the first Arab state, to engage with its critics.

Engagement meant giving human rights groups and trade unions access to the country, allowing them to operate and hold news conferences in Qatar, and involving them in drafting reforms and World Cup-related model labour contracts. This was unprecedented in a region where local activists are behind bars or worse and foreign critics don’t even make it onto an inbound flight.

The reforms were imperfect and not far-reaching enough, even if Qatar introduced significant improvements in the conditions for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

Furthermore, on the plus side, the hosting rights sparked limited but nonetheless taboo-breaking discussions that touched on sensitive subjects such as LGBT rights and the granting of citizenship to non-nationals.

Qataris openly questioned the granting of citizenship to foreign athletes so they could be included in the Qatar national team for the 2016 Olympics rather than medical personnel and other professionals who had contributed to national welfare and development.

Hosting the World Cup has further forced Qatar, albeit in a limited fashion, to come to grips with issues like LGBT rights that do not simply violate the country’s laws but go against its social grain to produce an inclusive tournament.

In some ways, that may have been more difficult than reforming the labour regime if one considers the difference between standing up for democratic freedoms that may have broad public support and the recognition of LGBT rights. In contrast to democratic rights, opposition to LGBT rights is deeply engrained in Qatar and other Muslim societies. It would likely be socially rejected, even if they were enshrined in law.

The difference means that the defense of LGBT and other socially controversial rights forces activists and human and LGBT rights groups to rethink their strategies and adopt alternative, more long-term approaches.

It also means that they will have to embrace less Western-centric attitudes frequently prevalent in the campaign to reform Qatar’s labour system. Those attitudes were evident in debates that were also often skewed by bias, prejudice, bigotry, and sour grapes.

Moreover, the criticism often failed to consider the context. As a result, achieving results and pushing for reform was, to a degree, undermined by what appeared to be a ganging up on Qatar and a singling out of the Gulf state.

Labour is an example. Human rights groups and trade unions treated onerous labour conditions in Qatar, even if the World Cup turned it into a prime target, as uniquely Qatari rather than a global problem that manifests itself in other parts of the world such as Southeast Asia and even Western democracies like Britain. Recent reporting by The Guardian showed that expatriate medical and caregiver personnel face similar curtailing of rights and abuse in Britain.

By the same token, Qatar was taken to task for being slow in implementing its reforms and ensuring that they were applied not only to World Cup projects but nationwide.

The fact is that lagging enforcement of policies and legal changes is a problem across the broad spectrum of Qatari policies and reform efforts, including the Gulf state’s high-profile, fast-paced, mediation-driven foreign policy.

Qatar’s handling of illegal recruitment fees paid by workers is a case in point.

The Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy, the Qatari organizer of the World Cup, has obliged companies it contracts to repay the fees without workers having to provide proof of payment. Companies have so far pledged to repay roughly USD$28.5 million to some 49,000 workers, $22 million of which have already been paid out.

It is a step the government could apply nationally with relative ease to demonstrate sincerity and, more fundamentally, counter the criticism.

Similarly, in response to complaints raised by human rights groups and others, the government could also offer to compensate families of workers who die on construction sites. Again, none of these measures would dent Qatari budgets but would earn the Gulf state immeasurable goodwill.

Continue Reading

Middle East

‘Effort and patience’ required to restore Iran nuclear agreement

Published

on

A view from the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. (file) Photo: IAEA/Paolo Contri

Despite diplomatic engagements, restoring the so-called Iran nuclear agreement continues to be hindered by political and technical differences, the UN political and peacebuilding chief told the Security Council on Thursday.
 

In the landmark accord, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – reached in 2015 between Iran, the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom – Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear programme and open its facilities to international inspections in exchange for sanctions relief.

In 2018, then-President Trump withdrew the US from the agreement and reinstated the sanctions.

Achieving the landmark JCPOA took determined diplomacy. Restoring it will require additional effort and patience,” said UN political affairs chief, Rosemary DiCarlo.

Although the landmark Joint Commission to restore the Plan resumed in November 2021, she acknowledged that despite their determination to resolve the issues, the US and other participants are yet to return to “full and effective implementation of the Plan, and [Security Council] resolution 2231”.

Appealing to both

Together with the Secretary-General, she urged Iran and the US to “quickly mobilize” in “spirit and commitment” to resume cooperation under the JCPOA.

They welcomed the reinstatement by the US in February of waivers on nuclear non-proliferation projects and appealed to the country to lift its sanctions, as outlined in the Plan, and extend oil trade waivers.

Together they also called on on Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are inconsistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan.

Monitoring enrichment

While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran, it estimates that there is currently more than 15 times the allowable amount under the JCPOA, including uranium enriched to 20 and 60 per cent, which Ms. DiCarlo called “extremely worrying”.

Moreover, on 8 and 20 June, IAEA reported that Iran had started to install additional advanced centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and began feeding uranium into advanced centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Fordow.

In his latest report, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, informed the Council that the UN agency’s ability to verify and confirm the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities are key to the JCPOA’s full and effective implementation.

Iran’s decision to remove site cameras and place them and the data they collected under Agency seals, “could have detrimental implications”.

Improved relationships ‘key’

Bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with Iran remain “key” and should be encouraged and built upon, according to Ms. DiCarlo.

Additionally, Member States and the private sector are urged to use available trade instruments to engage with Iran and Tehran is requested to address their concerns in relation to resolution 2231 (2015) on its nuclear issues.

The senior UN official also drew attention to annex B of the resolution, updating ambassadors in the Council on nuclear-related provisions, ballistic missiles and asset freezing.

We hope that diplomacy will prevail – UN political chief

Triumph for multilateralism

The JCPOA was a triumph for non-proliferation and multilateralism,” said the UN political affairs head.

However, after many years of uncertainty, she warned that the Plan is now at “a critical juncture” and encouraged Iran and the US to build on recent momentum to resolve remaining issues.

“The Secretary-General is convinced there is only one path to lasting peace and security for all Member States, and that is the one based on dialogue and cooperation,” she said.  “We hope that diplomacy will prevail”. 

In Iran’s best interest

Olof Skoog, Head of the European Union Delegation to the UN, speaking in his capacity as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the JCPOA, to the Security Council, recognized the negative economic consequences that the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA has had on Iran but affirmed that restoring the agreement is “the only way” for the country to reap its full benefits.

He reminded that the Plan would comprehensively lift sanctions, encourage greater international cooperation, and allow Iran to reach its “full economic potential”.  

“It is, therefore, important to show the necessary political will and pragmatism to restore the JCPOA,” said Ambassador Skoog who, while acknowledging the sense of urgency, counselled against “escalatory steps” and to preserve sufficient space for the diplomatic efforts to succeed.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Dynamic diplomacy: From SCO to BRICS

Published

on

Image source: Tehran Times

The tree of Iran’s balanced foreign policy approach is on the verge of being a one-year-old child. Stronger than before, Iran is pursuing dynamic diplomacy in a variety of cities such as Doha, Ashgabat, and other capitals. Baghdad will also join the list soon.

While Iran’s top negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani is engaged in intensive negotiations in Qatar with the United States through the European Union delegation, Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and his oil and foreign ministers are in Ashgabat pursuing transit diplomacy as well as the legal regime of the Caspian Sea with the littoral states. 

Prior to his departure for Ashgabat on Wednesday, Raisi spoke to reporters about the purpose of his visit to Turkmenistan. 

“This visit is taking place at the invitation of the esteemed president of the brotherly and friendly country of Turkmenistan in order to attend the Caspian Sea littoral states summit,” he remarked.

The President called the Caspian Sea a common heritage and capital for the littoral states with more than 270 million people. 

“We have good relations with the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, but in addition to reviewing the legal regime of the Caspian Sea and peaceful use of the sea for the purpose of improving security at the sea, what will be discussed at the sixth summit of the Caspian Sea littoral states is cooperation between countries in the fields of transport, transit, trade, management of marine living resources, environment, as well as preventing the presence of outsiders in the sea, which is also agreed upon by all coastal countries.”

Prior to the beginning of the summit, Raisi met Serdar Berdimuhamedow, Turkmenistan’s President, as well as Chairman of the People’s Council of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow.

During the meeting with the President of Turkmenistan, Raisi pointed out that the implementation of the memoranda of understanding and cooperation documents signed by the two countries during Berdimuhamedow’s recent visit to Tehran will accelerate promotion of cooperation between the two countries.

Later, Raisi met with the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev. 

During the meeting, Raisi reminded Aliyev that the presence of the Israeli regime in any part of the world undermines security there.

The president also had a brief meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. 

There’s little doubt that Tehran has not put all its eggs into the basket of the JCPOA revival, as it actively seeks to establish trade relations with the neighbors. It’s short-sighted thinking to assume that Iran has to wait for the United States to return to the JCPOA, while it can enjoy the benefits of regional alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), or BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). 

On Monday, Iran’s former Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh, who was holding his last presser, told the Tehran Times correspondent that Tehran has submitted a membership request to the BRICS secretariat via Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian. While dynamically trailing balanced and active diplomacy with the neighbors, Tehran is awaiting Washington’s serious political decisions to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Source: Tehran Times

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending