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Iran: How to keep the nuclear deal alive

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The situation around the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA) is getting worse every day as US President Donald Trump and his administration keep ramping up and diversifying financial and economic sanctions against Tehran. Speaking at a summit of Islamic states held in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) on December 19, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said: “The Islamic Republic of Iran has been under oppressive sanctions of the United States of America. Recently, they were seeking the collapse or surrender of the Islamic establishment through the imposition of the heaviest sanctions or so-called crippling sanctions. While only since May 8, 2018, when the US withdrew from the nuclear deal, more than 93 sanctions measures have been imposed on Iran…”

On May 8, 2019, exactly a year after the United States pulled out from the JCPOA agreement, Tehran, tired of waiting for a solution to the problem, started gradually cutting down its commitments under the nuclear deal. Stage 4 of these reductions will be completed on January 6, 2020. During the intervening period, Tehran has managed to rebuild a significant portion of its nuclear infrastructure. The permissible amount of its stored enriched uranium and heavy water has been increased, the enrichment level has risen to 4.5 percent from 3.76 percent before, more advanced and efficient centrifuges have been introduced into the test stage and used in production – a measure banned by the JCPOA – and the process of uranium enrichment at the Fordo plant has been resumed, which also violates the terms of the 2015 nuclear accord.

During the next, fifth, stage of reduction of its compliance with the terms of the landmark nuclear deal, Iran may resume uranium enrichment to 20 percent – an alarming situation that could put the Islamic Republic on course to obtaining 90 percent weapons-grade uranium.

For fairness sake, however, it should still be borne in mind that Tehran’s reaction to Trump’s unfaithful moves is fully in line with Article 26 of the JCPOA, which stipulates that Iran will consider a re-introduction of sanctions or introduction of new sanctions pertaining to its nuclear sector as enough reason for complete or partial suspension of its commitments under the nuclear accord.

This is exactly what Iran is doing now.

Moreover, Russia’s envoy to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, has gone on record saying that: “It should be admitted that everything the Iranians have done so far [in terms of non-compliance with the requirements of the JCPOA – V.S.] is reversible. One should give them credit: they think through their every step and are not doing anything which could not be reversed.”

The Iranians are clearly taking their time, hoping for the better and avoiding a final breach of the nuclear accord, even despite their increasing loss of faith in Europe’s ability to stand up to the US sanctions against Tehran and keep the JCPOA alive.

With the year 2019 on its way out, however, Vladimir Chizhov believes that a “critical moment” has arrived.

And it certainly has, as the continued US policy of bringing “maximum pressure” to bear on Tehran, leaves no chance for dialogue. Under the circumstances, Iran will definitely refuse to engage in humiliating talks with Washington on resuming the JCPOA. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has repeatedly said that as long as the US sanctions remain in place, there will be no talks with Washington.

In recently televised remarks, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that “Iran can’t be treated in a way Washington is trying to do. Not just flagrantly violating the United Nations Charter, refusing to implement the binding United Nations Security Council resolution but rudely addressing demands to Iran, a country with a millennia-old civilization, traditions and immense self-esteem.”

Meanwhile, many “hawks” in the United States see the October mass protests in Iran, sparked by gasoline price hikes, as a sign of the US sanctions taking their toll. They believe that even if the Iranian regime survives, it will still be shaken to a point when, bending under popular pressure, the country’s authorities will be forced to come to the negotiating table.

In this case, the United States will be ready for dialogue (on its own terms, of course). Until this Iranian “surrender” happens, however, the Americans will keep their sanctions in place, all the more so since the situation with Donald Trump’s continuing impeachment saga in Washington is doing little to ensure such a political decision, so important for the ongoing political struggle inside the United States.

All this means a no-go situation relative to the survival of the JCPOA agreement.

What needs to be done?

This is something all the authors of the JCPOA deal, with the obvious exception of the US, are concerned about. (Well, who knows, maybe during a rare break in the ongoing tug-of-war around his proposed impeachment, President Trump might be giving a thought to the Iranian problem after all).

On December 19, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov met with the UK, German and French foreign ministries’ political directors for security Richard Moore, Jens Ploetner and Philippe Errera to discuss just one issue – how to preserve the JCPOA.

Even though the outcome of that meeting was not made public, it still can be assumed that a very important moment is coming not only for the JCPOA, but for the entire security system in the Middle East (if it still exists) as well.

What is crystal clear, however, is that the problem of the 2015 nuclear deal must be solved without any further delay, as the whole process is now approaching the “go/no-go” point, as pilots say during takeoff. Now is the   time to decide whether to save the JCPOA or let it fall apart with unpredictable consequences. Besides, there are certain things limiting the time frame for a possible mutual agreement.

The first is January 6 – the start of the fifth stage of Iran’s reduction of its compliance with the nuclear accord. Cautious as it is to make a “soft” way out of the JCPOA, and its desire to maintain a face-to-face dialogue, Tehran’s next step in reviving its nuclear infrastructure could sow panic even among Europeans who are critical of Washington’s sanctions against Iran, resulting in the EU joining the US sanctions that it hates so much. This will mean a return to a dangerous confrontation with Iran.

The second one – other milestones are positioned closer to February 21 – is the day of parliamentary elections in Iran. It is clear that if the present state of things continues, President Rouhani and his supporters’ chances of faring well in the polls will be close to zero. Their radical opponents in the newly-elected parliament will be doing all they possibly can not to engage in any dialogue with the American “shaitan” and rule out any concessions regarding the country’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, which will effectively render the milestone agreement null and void.

Moreover, the parliamentary opposition will certainly try to further undermine President Rouhani’s ability to build consensus as part of a much-needed deal with Washington.

How to prevent this happening?

Well, perhaps one way of doing this could be to get back to and adopt a roadmap proposed by the French President Emmanuel Macron this past fall, which provided for a $15 billion loan to Iran for trade and economic operations and a permission to export at least 700,000 barrels of oil a day. According to various sources, Iran is currently selling between 100,000 to 350,000 barrels per day.

In addition, in October, France and Japan proposed a joint plan to give Iran with a loan of about $18.4 billion to be secured by oil if Tehran returns to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on its nuclear program.

Implementation of these plans will certainly require a more active and focused effort by diplomats from many countries, concerned about the situation around the JCPOA and in the Middle East as a whole, above all France, Japan and Russia, which are acting as mediators, or, rather, peacekeepers in the standoff between Iran and the US. How to convince President Trump and President Rouhani of the need to adopt such a plan?

First of all, if implemented, this project will not destroy the system of US sanctions and will actually help the Trump administration to “save face” amid its aggressive confrontation with Tehran. As recently as in September, Donald Trump was almost ready to agree with Macron, but backed off following rocket attacks on Saudi oil facilities, which Washington was quick to blame on the Iranians. Unfortunately, the political situation now existing in Washington has seriously complicated the diplomatic efforts to keep the JCPOA alive.

In Iran, all final decisions are made by the country’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, but local JCPOA supporters could present Macron’s idea as a crushing defeat for the country’s sworn enemy, the global hegemon and the most powerful imperialist force around. Such an interpretation would make it possible for Tehran to curry public support for such a settlement plan. In this case, Ayatollah Khamenei would most likely endorse this whole idea and, by extension, the idea of a dialogue with the United States.

All this being said, Macron’s plan, backed by all signatories to the JCPOA (minus the US), and many other countries, is still a necessary, but temporary measure.  

The plan does not ensure the preservation of the nuclear deal, but it still allows postponing the final and destructive moves by both Iran and the EU that could seal the fate of the 2015 nuclear accord. Macron’s plan wins some additional time for dialogue between Iran and the United States, and offers an opportunity to work out more reasonable and mutually beneficial options for resolving the conflict around the JCPOA in the best long-term strategic interests of the United States, Iran, and other countries of the Middle East, in the interests of preserving and safeguarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

From our partner International Affairs

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The US-Iran deal and its implications for the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe

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Image credit: EPA

The ongoing meetings between the US and Iran since the beginning of April in Vienna show new signs of progress. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s chief negotiator and Deputy Foreign Minister, in the last days suggested that a ‘new understanding’ is being shaped. Any possibility of reaching an agreement and the US returning to the deal once abandoned by former US President Donald Trump, will result in a new state of affairs in wider Eurasia. New opportunities may also emerge for the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe creating new sources for security and development.

The nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and six world powers – the USA, Russia, China, France, the UK and Germany – back in 2015 was envisaged to bring Iran’s nuclear enrichment process under stricter international inspection and monitoring. In response, the US and other participants of the deal pledged to lift sanctions imposed on Iran. 

However, in May 2018 the process was mostly undermined by former US President Donald Trump, whose administration decided to withdraw from the deal. The withdrawal was followed by a new wave of sanctions and targeted assassinations of a few prominent Iranians, among them General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, killed by an American drone strike in Iraq in January 2020. All the efforts of the Trump administration to dismantle the Iranian regime and its ambitions resulted in the resumption of the nuclear enrichment program. Upon his election, President Joe Biden expressed his sincere interest in returning to the deal. This led to the recent negotiations between Tehran and Washington in the Austrian capital. 

The fact that Iran and the US are mutually interested in the restoration of the JCPOA can be explained in a number of ways. The most apparent aspect is the US return to the international arena which it, to some extent, left under Trump’s isolationist policy. The American active engagement in the nuclear deal with Iran is aimed at various targets. In reviving the deal, Washington may hinder the hardliners’ return to power in Iran during the upcoming presidential elections this summer. Besides, Iran is becoming a regional bastion for China, which uses Iran’s economic vulnerabilities to maximise its gains. Finally, the rapprochement of Turkey and Russia creates another danger for US interests in the region, prompting it to reconsider its politics in the Middle East. In other words, the US and Iran need this recovery in relations for reasons stemming from the core principle of Realism, the balance of power; in order not to allow dramatic shifts in the geopolitical landscape, not only in the Middle East but also in central Eurasia. 

Russia’s strengthened stance in the South Caucasus following the second Karabakh war can primarily be explained by its emerging relations with Turkey, which were described by Russia’s chief diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, as ‘sui generis co-operation and competition’. This odd couple could dismantle hopes of peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by the US, France and Russia. The Russian-Turkish duo have created the vast majority of the broader region’s flash points ranging from Libya to Syria and Karabakh. Russia’s rapprochement with Turkey is in Moscow’s favour and is aimed at disuniting NATO. On the other hand, Turkey’s bold politics speak about its global ambitions and desire to set its own course. Both behaviours are in direct contradiction of American vital interests, which is reflected in harsh criticism of the Kremlin and Ankara. In the case of Moscow, this reached a historic post-Cold War peak – Biden’s recent scandalous statement on Putin, calling him a ‘killer’, has inflamed relations between the two countries. 

The USA is actively supporting any activities aimed at decreasing the influence of Russia and China in various parts of the world. One of such projects is the so-called ‘Three Seas Initiative’. Created in 2015 by the presidents of Croatia and Poland, this project brings together the twelve states of Eastern and Central Europe located between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. The main goal is to counter the growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region, which is less developed than Western Europe and more open to foreign direct investments. Aimed at developing infrastructure, energy co-operation and digitalisation, the initiative seeks to create ”North-South” energy and infrastructure corridors. Given the US ambitions to reduce the region’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, the nuclear deal with Iran opens new opportunities. The fact that the Chinese Silk Road is heading to Europe via Central Asia and Turkey, it could be better to allow Iran to export its gas through Armenia and Georgia to Eastern Europe under the Black Sea. Firstly, this would solve the European dependence on Russian energy supplies. The export of natural resources has been traditionally used by the Kremlin as a foreign policy instrument. The reduction of dependence on Russian commodities will ultimately reshape the Kremlin’s behaviour abroad making it more predictable and constructive. The fear that this may plunge Russia into China’s orbit, turning it a puppet state for Beijing, are groundless given the Russian bear’s historical caution of the Chinese dragon. The second important contribution of the Iranian pipeline will be to increase the energy security of Ukraine, which is trying to integrate itself into European infrastructure and move come closer to EU standards at the same time as coping with Russian energy blackmail.

The Iranian pipeline is able to solve the economic and energy independence of the Eastern and Central European EU member states which participate in the ‘Three Seas Initiative’. It may liberalise the energy market of the region and will boost economic development, reducing its gap with Western Europe. 

Finally, the US-Iranian possible rapprochement may also change the state of affairs in the South Caucasus region. The increased Russian presence and active Turkish involvement in the region are aimed at keeping other external actors – and first and foremost the West – out of it. In the long run, this will threaten Georgia’s European dreams in the same way it has harmed Armenia’s democratic aspirations. Alternatively, the vision of being a transit route for Iranian energy pipelines to Europe, whilst also helping to connect India and Eastern Europe, could elevate the security of Georgia and Armenia to a new level.

Therefore, the US-Iran agreement is essential for restoring the balance of power in the region, in order not to allow the main competitors to maximise their gains. This deal promises new opportunities for Central Eurasia, creating room for manoeuvre for the region’s small and fragile countries.

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The Mediterranean: Will Turkey be successful in pulling Egypt to its side?

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The Mediterranean acts as a channel connecting Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The region has, however, become a bone of contention due to varying political setups, religions and cultural values, economic resources, and the existence of crisis situations. The maritime dispute between Turkey and Greece is highly contentious, developing new complexities that worries the international community. Greece prefersinternational arbitrationwhile Turkey favors the option of bilateral negotiationsconstituting asthe main cause of friction between the two countries.

Historically, root of the crisis also lies in conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece concerning maritime boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), threatening Ankara’s “Blue Homeland”doctrine. To further aggravate the situation, the dispute has now been intertwined withdisputes in the eastern Mediterranean among Turkey and a coalition of countries including France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates that are doused in geopolitical tensions, energy disputes and Libyan conflict.

Gas discoveries in eastern Mediterranean have increased Turkey’s greed for hydrocarbon exploration. Turkey aims to solve its longstanding economic challenges and reduce its energy dependency due to which the country has increased its energy-related exploration activities in the region resulting in a major gas discovery thus shaping the region towards resource competition. Moreover, Turkey seeks to establish itself as an energy hub for Europe and has signed several oil and gas pipeline deals with Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, and Russia. However, its aspirations have significantly remained unsuccessful, and the gas discoveries have deepened its concerns of being left out from the region’s emerging energy and security order due to the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF).

Conflict in the Mediterranean has unwittingly pushed Libya into a proxy war. Scuffle between Libyan National Army (LNA) and Government of National Accord (GNA) has pushed Turkey to increase its support for GNA by sending troops and weapons to Libya which is a move directly affecting the ongoing situation in the region. GNA signing its EEZ agreement with Turkey while Greece turning to LNA and signing an agreement with Egypt have contributed to exacerbating the dispute. Not only this, but major European powers have shown keen interest in the region that patently require Turkey’s support in terms of migration and counterterrorism. If the conflict between the Turkish-backed GNA and the LNA stabilizes, this would result in an ordered flow of migrants to Europe.

Moreover, Europeans do not wish to abandon a 2016 German-brokered deal between Turkey and the European Union (EU) that allows Turkey to maintain a considerable control over refugee movements into Europe. On counterterrorism, France to fight against the terrorism in southern Libya and Benghazi, allied with Haftar against Turkey, despite recognizing the GNA’s sovereignty.  France has developed security partnerships with UAE and Egypt, who are opponents of Turkey in the region.

Egypt’s possession of two liquefication facilities, making the country act as both an exporter and re-exporter of LNG including a potential Cyprus-Egypt pipeline beneficial to Egypt in terms of economic stability, and help establish itself as a regional power. Cyprus-Egypt pipeline will allow Cyprus to export gas from the Aphrodite gas field to Egypt for liquefaction and Egypt would then reexport LNG to the European market. Turkey, however, argues that revenue generated from the process must be shared with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRC). Turkey’s continuation on the belligerent course will bring consequences for Egypt making its support for Greece more prominent. Turkey also stands with Mediterranean cooperation through initiatives like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum that focuses on exploitation and regional energy resource sale.

Turkey is keen to become a regional gas trade hub thus looks forward to the initiative of a Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) which transfers from Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey. Reducing the region’s reliance on Russian gas could certainly achieve the goals. Talks between Israel and Turkey of a pipeline from Israel to Europe were also initiated, however relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated following Erdogan blatantly supporting Palestine. This led Israel to work with Cyprus and Greece on the EastMed pipeline, stemming in devaluation of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline.

Most of the Middle Eastern countries have recalibratedtheir foreign policy following Joe Biden’s presidential win in the United States. Similarly, both Turkey and Egypt have begun to revise their foreign policies as well. The two countries have initiated a series of new diplomatic dialogue including Turkey and Greece signing a maritime delimitation agreement in August 2020.Nonetheless Egypt did not accept Greece’s thesis of having claims over islands in the south of Aegean Sea and it also announced a new oil and gas exploration bid with taking Turkey’s coordinates of the continental shelf into consideration. Moreover, Egypt began to change its Libya policy and improve relations with GNA. Turkey has stated that it is willing to negotiate dialogue with Egypt and focus on common interests.

Understanding the new developments, it is suggested to continue to alleviate tensions as the two countries enjoy same moral values at cultural level, given their shared past and historical ties. That is only possible if the expansionist pan-Islamistproject stops with Erdogan and does not continue with future Turkish governments. Cairo and Ankara must move together on the issues concerning Palestine, Libyan conflict, and the eastern Mediterranean. Despite possible pressure from the Democrats in the Biden administration, Egypt seems reluctant to consider convergence on Islamic synthesisand integration of Muslim brotherhood. Complete normalization of relations between the two sides may take time therefore to establish trust in one another, all parties must take certain confidence-building steps.

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Israel and Turkey in search of solutions

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Twelve and eleven years have elapsed since the Davos and Mavi Marmara incidents, respectively, and Turkey-Israel relations are undergoing intense recovery efforts. They are two important Eastern neighbours and influence regional stability.

Currently, as in the past, relations between the two countries have a structure based on realpolitik, thus pursuing a relationship of balance/interest, and hinge around the Palestinian issue and Israel’s position as the White House’s privileged counterpart. However, let us now briefly summarise the history of Turkish-Jewish relations.

The first important event that comes to mind when mentioning Jews and Turks is that when over 200,000 Jews were expelled by the Spanish Inquisition in 1491, the Ottoman Empire invited them to settle in its territory.

Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel in 1949. Israel’s first diplomatic Mission to Turkey was opened on January 7, 1950 but, following the Suez crisis in 1956, relations were reduced to the level of chargé d’affaires. In the second Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Turkey chose not to get involved and it did not allow relations to break off completely.

The 1990s saw a positive trend and development in terms of bilateral relations. After the second Gulf War in 1991 -which, as you may recall, followed the first Iraqi one of 1980-1988 in which the whole world was against Iran (with the only exception of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria, Libya and the moral support of Enver Hoxha’s Albania) – Turkey was at the centre of security policy in the region. In that context, Turkey-Israel relations were seriously rekindled.

In 1993, Turkey upgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to ambassadorial level. The signing of the Oslo Accords between Palestine and Israel led to closer relations. The 1996 military cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, which provided significant logistical and intelligence support to both sides.

In the 2000s, there was a further rapprochement with Israel, due to the “zero problems with neighbours” policy promoted by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party. I still remember issue No. 3/1999 of the Italian review of geopolitics “Limes” entitled “Turkey-Israel, the New Alliance”.

In 2002, an Israeli company undertook the project of modernising twelve M-60 tanks belonging to the Turkish armed forces. In 2004, Turkey agreed to sell water to Israel from the Manavgat River.

Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Israel in 2005 was a turning point in terms of mediation between Palestine and Israel and further advancement of bilateral relations. In 2007, Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas spoke at the Turkish Grand National Assembly one day apart. High-level visits from Israel continued.

On December 22, 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came to Ankara and met with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In that meeting, significant progress was made regarding Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria.

Apart from the aforementioned incidents, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations occurred five days after the above stated meeting, i.e. Operation “Cast Lead” against Gaza on December 27, 2008. After that event, relations between the two sides were never the same as before.

Recently, however, statements of goodwill have been made by both countries to normalise political relations. In December 2020, President Erdoğan stated he wanted to improve relations with Israel and said: “It is not possible for us to accept Israel’s attitude towards the Palestinian territories. This is the point in which we differ from Israel – otherwise, our heart desires to improve our relations with it as well”.

In its relations with Israel, Turkey is posing the Palestinian issue as a condition. When we look at it from the opposite perspective, the Palestinian issue is a vital matter for Israel. It is therefore a severe obstacle to bilateral relations.

On the other hand, many regional issues such as Eastern Mediterranean, Syria and some security issues in the region require the cooperation of these two key countries. For this reason, it is clear that both sides wish at least to end the crisis, reduce rhetoric at leadership level and focus on cooperation and realpolitik areas.

In the coming months, efforts will certainly be made to strike a balance between these intentions and the conditions that make it necessary to restart bilateral relations with Israel on an equal footing. As improved relations with Israel will also positively influence Turkey’s relations with the United States.

Turkey seeks to avoid the USA and the EU imposing sanctions that could go so far as to increase anti-Western neo-Ottoman rhetoric, while improved relations with Israel could offer a positive outcome not only to avoid the aforementioned damage, but also to solve the Turkish issues related to Eastern Mediterranean, territorial waters, Libya and Syria. Turkey has no intention of backing down on such issues that it deems vital. Quite the reverse. It would like to convey positive messages at the level of talks and Summits.

Another important matter of friction between Turkey and Israel is the use of oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean reserves between Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus (Nicosia).

This approach is excluding Turkey. The USA and the EU also strongly support the current situation (which we addressed in a previous article) for the additional reason that France has been included in the equation.

The alignment of forces and fronts in these maritime areas were also widely seen during the civil war in Libya, where Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, as well as other players such as Russia, Italy, etc. came into the picture.

Ultimately, a point of contact between Turkey and Israel is the mediation role that the former could play in relations between Iran and Israel, especially after the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the U.S. airstrike in Baghdad – which killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 -the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that the U.S. action would increase insecurity and instability in the region. He also reported that Turkey was worried about rising tensions between the United States and Iran that could turn Iraq back into an area of conflict to the detriment of peace and stability in the region. There was also a condolence phone call from President Erdoğan to Iranian President Rouhani, urging him to avoid a conflictual escalation with the United States following the airstrike.

Consequently, it is in the Turkish President’s interest to maintain an open channel with Iran, so that he himself can soften the mutual tensions between Israel and Iran, and – in turn – Israeli diplomacy can influence President Biden’s choices, albeit less pro-Israel than Donald Trump’s.

Turkey is known to have many relationship problems with the United States – especially after the attempted coup of July 15-16, 2016 and including the aforementioned oil issue – and realises that only Israel can resolve the situation smoothly.

In fact, Israel-USA relations are not at their best as they were under President Trump. President Erdoğan seems to be unaware of this fact, but indeed the Turkish President knows that the only voice the White House can hear is Israel’s, and certainly not the voice of the Gulf monarchies, currently at odds with Turkey.

Israel keeps a low profile on the statements made by President Erdoğan with regard to the Palestinians- since it believes them to be consequential – as well as in relation to a series of clearly anti-Zionist attitudes of the Turkish people.

We are certain, however, that President Erdoğan’s declarations of openness and Israeli acquiescence will surely yield concrete results.

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