Eastern Europe

The Trans-Caucasus in 2019 Is Not a Monolithic Region

Published

3 years ago

December 22, 2019

In late 2016, the Russian International Affairs Council published The Evolution of the Post-Soviet Space: Past, Present and Future, a major anthology attempting to conceptualise development trends in both domestic and foreign policies in the newly independent states that emerged after the collapse of the once-single state, the USSR. The Trans-Caucasus featured prominently in that collection, and for good reason.

The Trans-Caucasus as a region accounts for two-thirds of the armed conflicts that have followed the collapse of the USSR. It was a region of self-proclaimed republics; some of them became stable enough over time so that, even though they have not achieved broad international recognition, they could be categorised not just as separatist entities but as de facto states with their own governance bodies, ideological and political symbols.

When the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was recognised in August 2008, it was the Caucasus that saw the precedent of changed borders between the former Soviet republics.

It was in the Caucasus that Georgia, in its bid for NATO membership, held a referendum on acceding to the alliance and over two-thirds of Georgians voted for accession. Consequently, strategic cooperation with NATO was, in addition to rhetoric, bolstered by a popular vote.

The Trans-Caucasus is the only region in the post-Soviet space where presidential power has been transferred from father to son. Azerbaijan was the trailblazer in this mode of power transfer. For nearly two decades, Georgia has not been able to resolve the problem of a legitimate and legal transfer of supreme state power. Armenia’s gift to the post-Soviet space was also a curious precedent: for the first time since the collapse of the USSR, a former president, upon leaving office, attempted a return to politics as a die-hard opposition member. In 2008, Levon Ter-Petrosyan even came close to returning to the state’s Olympus after ten years of being an ex-head of state.

The Caucasus: An Independently Important Region

Currently, the Caucasus is seldom the focus of topical political discussions. As a rule, it is mentioned within a broader context, such as Black Sea region security or the state of affairs in the Greater Middle East.

In the first instance, settling the armed conflict in the south-east of Ukraine and minimising the costs of the West–Russia confrontation are priorities. In this context, the Caucasus is seen, particularly by European and American experts, as a potential recipient of the “Crimean case.” Initiatives intended to bolster integration ties between Moscow, Sukhum and Tskhinval periodically heat up this discussion. Such was the case when South Ossetian politicians debated a referendum on uniting with North Ossetia under the auspices of the Russian Federation. In his Letter of Instruction of 22 September 2016, Russian President Putin gave instructions to sign an agreement on financing modernisation of Abkhazia’s military, which spurred more heated discussions.

Regarding the Middle East, the focus is on the Iran–US escalation, since the Islamic Republic of Iran borders on Armenia and Azerbaijan and considers the Trans-Caucasus as a tool for building cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union. Syria is another equally important area. Armenia views Turkey’s involvement in Syrian affairs as a dangerous precedent while specifically emphasising that Azerbaijan supports Turkey’s operations, such as the Source of Peace.

Russia’s military participation in the Syrian conflict is of equal importance: for the first time since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has used its military power outside the territory of the single state. One should keep in mind that going beyond the post-Soviet political geography was primarily determined by the situation in the Caucasus: among radical Jihadis fighting in the Middle East were quite a few natives of the Russian North Caucasus republics, of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Whatever international security problems are put at the forefront today, thereby overshadowing the Caucasus challenges, this region retains its independent significance. The armed conflicts that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union have been significantly transformed and have partly lost their relevance (especially compared to the Donbass conflict). Yet, they remain unresolved, and the problem of de facto states is still relevant. Unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have achieved partial international recognition, but it is still disputed by Georgia and its western allies.

Moreover, disagreement with the new status quo that emerged after Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not confined to the rhetoric of public officials. What is far more critical is that Georgia is building up its military and political cooperation with NATO, the US and the EU, and even without Georgia’s official accession to NATO, this cooperation creates additional security risks in the region.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh has, for many years, been swinging like a pendulum. Armed incidents alternate with rounds of talks between just Erevan and Baku, or talks with the participation of international intermediaries. The result is the same: the focus is on managing the conflict by minimising the costs of the “neither peace nor war” state of affairs, rather than on settling it.

A deficit of regional integration still characterises the Caucasus. The three Trans-Caucasus states steer different foreign political courses. The absence of diplomatic relations and the unsettled Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict make Tbilisi an insufficient partner for both Erevan and Baku. Georgia does not want to make a “final choice” between its neighbours. At the same time, Tbilisi has no diplomatic relations with Russia and, since Armenia became independent, it has not established diplomatic relations with Turkey. Currently, the prospects for normalising Erevan–Ankara relations seem remote, and it is not only a matter of unresolved problems from the past, but also of the diametrically opposing views of a Karabakh settlement.

At the same time, the Caucasus agenda is changing. It has never been possible to paint it in just two colours, merely as a Big Game between the West and Russia, both using the Trans-Caucasus countries. Today, however, we are seeing new actors being pulled into regional processes; previously, these actors had either insignificant or no influence in the region. China is the starkest example. As Asian Studies specialist Stanislav Tarasov aptly said, China has launched “diplomatic probing” in the Caucasus. In May 2019, Wang Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Councillor, visited all three Trans-Caucasus states, his visit being called “historic.” Beijing offers the region respect for its territorial integrity, non-interference in its domestic affairs and pragmatic economic cooperation. Naturally, China incurs no losses, its primary objective being to implement its strategic “One Belt — One Road” project.

Past and Current Forecasts

Azerbaijan: Effective Ties and Pragmatics

In his article “Azerbaijan in 2021: Reasserting Sovereignty”, Murad Gassanly stated that the Karabakh issue was the key one on Baku’s political agenda. And this issue remains such today. Azerbaijan’s principal decisions, such as participating in integration projects and handling its bilateral relations with the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Israel are dictated precisely by the prospects of resolving this issue in favour of Azerbaijan. Baku has little interest in the fact that Tehran and Tel-Aviv, Moscow and Washington are locked in harsh confrontations.

Azerbaijan’s approaches to all areas are primarily pragmatic. Consequently, Gassanly (and many other experts) justly notes that Baku distances itself from alliances, complex mutual commitments, from seeking effective bilateral ties. “There will be no place for abstract ideological notions and sentimental concerns”, Gassanly states. I believe this course will remain relevant for the near future.

Azerbaijan will strive to avoid getting involved in a large-scale military conflict. The “four-day war” of 2016 showed clearly that the chances of a blitzkrieg under current circumstances are slim. Yet Azerbaijan will continue to build up its economic potential, strive to attract various investments (from both the West and China), and to diversify its economy. This started in 2018–2019 with a large-scale personnel replacement. Such political heavyweights as Ramiz Mekhtiev, Artur Rasaidze, Novruz Mamedov, Gadjibula Abutalybov, and Ali Gasanov have already left their offices. Comrades-in-arms of Geidar Aliev and mentors of his son Ilham are being replaced by those who owe their career and achievements in politics and business to the current President.

The new staffers should, on the one hand, give a new impetus to the “non-alignment” policy while, on the other hand, ensuring new blood in the authorities without “maidans” and major social upheavals. In the medium-term and particularly the long-term, the threat to Azerbaijan from the non-systemic opposition, including radical Islamists, remains. Azerbaijani authorities have experience of countering this threat and they have developed certain skills for containing it. Even so, it is much easier to influence weak and disjointed secular opposition than extremists.

Armenia: Course toward Moscow Continues

In his article “Armenia after Twenty-Five Years of Independence: Maintaining Stability in an Unpredictable Neighbourhood”, Hovhannes Nikoghosyan lists the following principal domestic policy trends in Armenia: the succession of generations and evolution of a parliamentary republic. The “velvet revolution” symbolically emphasised both tendencies. The generation now in power had no political careers in the USSR. It is also symbolic that, for Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s new Prime Minister, Russian is the second language he learned, not a second native language.

At the same time, Serzh Sargsyan had been building a parliamentary republic to prolong his own political tenure, not finally to separate the branches of power, and such a republic has already encountered functional difficulties. So far, the ratings and standing of Nikol Pashinyan, recent idol of the street protests, are high, and no significant problems await the authorities. Yet the moment the situation changes, the prospects of endless elections, talks about coalitions and the reshuffling of political combinations will materialise. Whether this development will boost the stability of a country involved in an unresolved ethnic political conflict is a purely a rhetorical question. This is the context for understanding the Prime Minister’s statement that he does not rule out the possibility of Armenia returning to a presidential state. Most likely, such attempts will be undertaken in the future. Pashinyan intends to stay in power for a long time and, during his first year on the republic’s Olympus, he has already faced social discontent and political opposition. In the near outlook, he will most likely face the task of staying in power by using administrative and bureaucratic methods, rather than a tide of revolution.

Nikoghosyan rightly noted the development of allied relations with Moscow as determining Armenia’s foreign policy. Even though Russia reacts very painfully to the revolutionary transfer of power in post-Soviet states, the Kremlin perceived Pashinyan in a positive light. The reason is that he steered Armenia’s traditional post-Soviet course of a state conducting a diversified foreign policy while clearly emphasising the usefulness of its ties with Russia.

This approach allowed a conflict between Moscow and Erevan to be avoided even after such sensational events as “the Kocharyan case” and “the second stage of the revolution” intended to break Armenia’s old judicial system. In some areas (such as participation in the pacification of Syria), Nikol Pashinyan’s Armenia went even further in consolidating ties with Russia than Armenia under Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency. Most likely, Moscow will be able to forgive Armenia’s Prime Minister any eccentric steps and populist revolutionary rhetoric as long as it does not break down the Russo-centrism of Armenia’s foreign policy.

Georgia: The Bonds of Post-Sovietness

In his article “Georgia: A Time of Anticipation”, Nikolay Silaev focused his attention on the country’s flight from both Soviet and post-Soviet affiliation. In the meantime, both such kinds of affiliation are holding Georgia back, in the form of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and unresolved territorial disputes (both with Russia and Azerbaijan).

Tbilisi is attempting to break these bonds by stepping up its contacts with the West (NATO, the EU, the US). In and of itself, this cooperation pursued by all de facto and de jure Georgian leaders from Zviad Gamsakhurdia to Bidzina Ivanishvili has not helped Georgia resolve any of its problems, be it efficient economic development, democracy (why is a kind of “democratic beacon” governed by a successful oligarch?), security or territorial integrity.

“NATO is hesitant in its relations with Georgia. Brussels, Washington and major Western European capitals likely view it as too dangerous for NATO to give Georgia security guarantees when Russian troops are located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Silaev states.

Taking this assessment made in 2016 even further, one might say that these hesitations have only grown and will continue to do so in the near future. In this context, it is quite logical that Luke Coffey from The Heritage Foundation or Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s former Secretary-General, publicly discuss “the price tag” attached to the issue, such as Article 5 on the collective defence in the Washington Treaty not extending to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is certainly not official discourse yet; it is only an invitation to a discussion. Even so, these invitations will multiply over the years, and they will be made against the background of two crucial domestic political developments in Georgia itself.

The first one is disputing the dominance of the “Georgian Dream” and the leadership regime built by Bidzina Ivanishvili to serve his own interests. Mass protests in June and November 2019 are unlikely to bring down the current authorities. Yet they will create a powerful charge of discontent and a bizarre coalition of Atlanticists, Eurosceptics and pragmatists founded on the negative agenda of forcing Ivanishvili’s withdrawal from politics. This process might take a while, but it has already been launched.

The second development is the bolstering of a foreign political alternative against the background of disappointment in NATO and the West in general. The key problem here is politicians’ personal ambitions and ideological fogginess. What is proposed in place of a strategic alliance with the West? Movement toward a compromise with Russia concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia is restricted; without significant changes to the international and regional agenda, Moscow will not change its mind regarding the status of the two former autonomous republics of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.

As a consequence, the demand may strengthen for diversification, for equal relations with Iran, China and Moscow’s Eurasian partners (Belarus and Central Asia states). There will also be the question of making relations with Russia more pragmatic, although there will be no quick solutions here even if Georgia proclaims its non-aligned status. The differences between Moscow and Tbilisi run too deep today.

Forecast: The Region Will Remain Divided

In the long and medium-term, the Trans-Caucasus will remain a divided region. The “three countries — three different strategies” principle will remain. Armenia will attempt to remain an ally of Russia, while Georgia will try to stay an ally of the “collective West in general” without forgetting to diversify its foreign political ties. Both Erevan and Tbilisi will have internal and external restrictions. Moscow will hardly welcome Erevan expanding its cooperation with NATO and the EU, while Washington will hardly welcome Georgia improving its relations with Russia and China. Azerbaijan will have no alternative to the “non-alignment” policy both within the so-named movement Baku joined back in 2011 and owing to its national interests. All these factors make pan-Caucasus projects, unions or alliances virtually impossible.

As regards external actors, the Caucasus will not lose its significance even if it is overshadowed by other political conundrums, such as the south-east of Ukraine, the “Kurdish issue”, Iran or Syria. It is hard to expect a common approach to the region. The US and Russia will continue to interact selectively on the Karabakh settlement, but will still be locked in a bitter confrontation over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Iran and Turkey will play their own parts without joining either the Russian or the Western sides, although Ankara will formally remain a NATO member. China will step up its economic presence, although, in the near future, the Caucasus will not become Beijing’s political priority comparable to Central Asia.

From our partner RIAC

Related Topics:Armenia Azerbaijan Caucasus Defense Forecast Georgia Russia

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Eastern Europe

Bombing of the Kakhovka Dam could be the worst, and most desperate war crime yet

Published

1 day ago

June 8, 2023

Chris Fitzgerald

Image source: war.ukraine.ua

Social media was abuzz on Tuesday morning with footage showing the Kakhovka Dam had been breached, with water surging down the Dnipro River.

Later in the day, the southern command of Ukraine’s Armed Forces claimed the dam, which is in Russian-controlled territory, was blown up with explosives.

Russia’s TASS news agency confirmed the dam had “collapsed” and that nearby areas were beginning to flood.

The dam itself is huge, 30 metres in height and hundreds of metres wide. It forms part of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, with its reservoir containing the same amount of water as Utah’s Great Salt Lake.

The effects of the breach threaten to be immense.

The dam is a critical water source for millions of people in Kherson, the Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and Crimea. It will also likely impact agriculture and food production in what is already a war-torn region.

Flood waters have already affected over 80 towns and villages. Over a thousand people have been rescued in Kherson, with many more displaced. While there have been no report of human deaths yet, it has been reported that 300 animals at the Kazkova Dibrova zoo were killed in floodwaters.

Rare wildlife species and habitats have also been affected. The Ukrainian Environment Minister, Ruslan Strilets told the media yesterday that at least 150 tonnes of oil from the dam has leaked into the Dnipro, and that the environmental damage has so far been estimated at $80 million.

The breach also puts the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant at risk. The plant, which is in Russian hands, relies on water supplied by the dam, without which raises the threat of a nuclear meltdown. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced yesterday that there is “no immediate nuclear safety risk”.

Many of these issues cannot be solved until a new dam is built, something Russia is unlikely to do while it controls the area.

The breach has immediately raised questions about who is responsible.

Ukrainian officials have blamed Russia, with President Volodymyr Zelensky tweeting that “the destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant dam only confirms for the whole world that they (Russia) must be expelled from every corner of Ukrainian land.”

Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine’s Prime Minister, claimed that “Russia has unleashed an ecological weapon of mass destruction, inflicting grave consequences upon hundreds of cities and villages”, and called on the world to “condemn this crime”.

Last year, Ukrainian officials accused Russia of mining the dam, which Russia denied, calling for a monitoring mission and for the dam to be taken under international protection.

There are also reports the dam was at capacity before the breach, suggesting Russia purposely raised the water level to ensure maximum destruction.

Russia has denied blowing the dam, instead blaming Ukraine.

Ukraine, for its part, has said that it would be impossible for them to breach the dam from the outside, considering it has been under Russian control for months.

But, while there is no definitive proof, pointing the finger at Russia is not unreasonable.

The Russian military continues to target vital infrastructure in Ukraine, including power plants, dams, railways and ports, in a desperate attempt to make the Ukrainian population suffer.

Russia’s invasion has also shown that its military does not respect human life. Russian forces have allegedly committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against Ukrainians, including torture, summary executions and enforced disappearances. They have also continuously targeted civilian buildings, including hospitals and apartment blocks, killing countless civilians.

Blowing up the dam also comes at a time when Ukraine is poised to launch its counteroffensive, which likely involves attempts to retake the Zaporizhzhia oblast and Crimea. Flood waters would complicate any crossing of the Dnipro and may be an attempt by Russia to buy time.

In contrast, Ukraine has very little to gain from breaching the dam and, unlike Russia, doesn’t have a history of using civilians as collateral damage.

If Russia is responsible, it may constitute a war crime.

The Geneva Conventions explicitly bans attacks in war-time on “installations containing dangerous forces”, such as dams, due to risks posed to civilians. The conventions also oblige waring parties to distinguish between “civilian objects and military objects”, with attacks on the former forbidden.

While dams aren’t specifically mentioned, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court criminalises “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.”

Ukraine’s prosecutor general has opened an investigation into the dam blast, labelled it a possible war crime and “’ecocide” under Ukrainian domestic legislation. Ironically, Russia has similar ecocide laws.

Russia’s alleged involvement in the bombing of the Kakhovka dam would represent an incredibly desperate and dangerous act.

It would also be added to the long list of war crimes committed by Russian forces, something Ukrainian and ICC prosecutors would surely investigate and seek to prosecute.

Either way, it is yet another disaster for Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Whoever is guilty needs to be held responsible.

Eastern Europe

Ukraine war: A new multipolar world is emerging

Published

6 days ago

June 3, 2023

Charles Pennaforte

Ukrainian defenders on the Leopard-2 tank at sunset. By Serhii Mykhalchuk image source: war.ukraine.ua

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is undoubtedly one of the biggest geopolitical conflicts of the 21st century to date. What would be a regional issue in our analysis, turned into a global event with economic and geopolitical impacts that will last for decades to come. The uncritical analysis of the subject is the main obstacle to a real geopolitical comprehension of the ongoing process. Our goal is to make some considerations to fill these gaps.

Russian demands about its geopolitical security have continuously been disregarded by either Washington or Brussels over the past three decades. On the contrary. Europeans and North Americans did their best to expand the European Union and NATO to Eastern Europe despite Moscow consistently expressing its dissatisfaction with such an advance.

In fact, Russia has always represented a *geopolitical concern* to Washington due to its military and technological capacity inherited from the USSR. The “ideal” Russia for the West only occurred under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) when the country made the transition to capitalism in a sudden and dramatic process, going through one of its most severe economic and social crises.

Kyiv’s move towards the European Union and NATO accelerated Moscow’s determination to firmly secure, or at least make a concerted attempt to do so, the still unconcluded chapter after the end of the USSR: its geopolitical security, as well as Washington’s use of Ukraine as a future NATO military base posing a significant concern for Russia. The second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked this second phase in our conception.

Western perspective has a divergent viewpoint. Maintaining NATO created in the Cold War to face the threat of no longer existing in the post-Cold War scenario makes no sense. However, it makes sense when we think of the billions of dollars in sales of war material produced largely by the US to its European partners and the multi-million commissions involved for the middlemen. It is fundamental to keep Europe under Washington’s political and military domain. On the economic side, the expansion of the European Union over Eastern Europe followed the same logic: “By increasing the number of member states, the aim is to address the challenges faced by a problematic economic union that has been subject to internal questioning, culminating in the apex of Brexit in 2020

Unlike the 2014 Crimean campaign when the Russian victory came relatively smoothly and quickly, the 2022 invasion may initially be considered, to say the least, disastrous. Moscow’s numerous errors in assessing the short- and long-term consequences of its subjugation strategy in Ukraine drew attention. The images of countless kilometers of trucks and military equipment along roads, the initial advance towards Kyiv, and various other parts of the country, followed by a withdrawal months later, exposed the flawed military calculations and the unforeseen consequences that ensued. This was despite Russia’s unquestionable military supremacy. The calculations were not well executed, leading to significant unforeseen consequences, despite Russia’s undisputed military dominance

In the Western diplomatic area, the situation completely got out of Moscow’s control when the US had the perception that it could take advantage of the moment to weaken Vladimir Putin’s leadership, promote an “upgrade” in the criticized existence of NATO and facilitate a possible “regime change” through economic strangulation. But Washington and its allies also made some misjudgments. They underestimated the neutral stance of China and several other countries such as India and Brazil, in addition to several countries on the African continent, for example. And the worst: they also provided the beginning of the acceleration of the de-dollarization of the world economy with the economic sanctions against the Russians, uniting the objectives of several countries that already questioned the supremacy of the dollar as the dominant commercial transaction currency. A supremacy’s downfall could certainly take decades, but that seems to be already underway.

We reiterate that the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict could never gain the international proportions that were generated from the action of the Washington-Brussels Axis. Their actions have directly impacted Europe, which bears the brunt of the consequences while the US benefits economically from Russian sanctions and Europeans suffer as much as Moscow from their effects.

In the military field, Ukraine is only managing to be able to withstand the hardships of the war due to the full support given by NATO. Even as reports of the military prowess of Ukrainian soldiers were disseminated by Western media. Without that support, the war would probably have ended. On the other hand, despite the initial military mistakes, Moscow seems to have preferred a strategy aimed at the attrition of its enemy even knowing that time would somehow help Kyiv to receive more weapons from the Western military alliance and delay the finalization of its plans.

It’s expected that this clash between NATO and Russia will bring about a permanent reordering in the power dynamics of geopolitical forces in the 21st century. The so-called “American Century” is being finalized by the rise of new and future powers such as China, whose global role is gaining strength. Beijing’s performance in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrates that its action is guided by long-term projects: collaboration in the weakening of the North American power to determine the “punishment” of its enemies through economic means, consolidating BRICS as a “global influencer”, the decrease of the dollar as an international currency and the support for a multipolar spectrum as the basis of the international system in the current century.

Eastern Europe

Pakistan-Belarus Ties Set to Boost and Strengthen

Published

6 days ago

June 3, 2023

Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan

Image source: Pakistan MFA

The Republic of Belarus is a landlocked country in Eastern Europe. It is bordered by Russia to the east and northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. Covering an area of 207,600 square kilometers and with a population of 9.2 million, Belarus is the 13th-largest and the 20th-most populous country in Europe. The country has a hemiboreal climate and is administratively divided into seven regions. Minsk is the capital and largest city. Belarus is a developing country, ranking 60th on the Human Development Index. The country has been a member of the United Nations since its founding and has joined the CIS, the CSTO, the EAEU, the OSCE, and the Non-Aligned Movement. It has shown no aspirations of joining the European Union but nevertheless maintains a bilateral relationship with the bloc and also participates in two EU projects, the Baku Initiative, and the Eastern Partnership. Its strategic location has been more prominent due to the Ukraine crisis and has become the focus of the Western world due to its close relations with Russia.

Belarus–Pakistan relations refers to the current and historical relationship between Belarus and Pakistan. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize Belarus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Pakistan maintains an embassy in Minsk; Belarus maintains an embassy in Islamabad.

Pakistan and Belarus initiated joint ventures (JVs) in the textile, pharmaceutical, and lighting solution industries while sharing technological expertise with each other. Pakistan’s imports from Belarus stood at $42.65 million which mainly consisted of tractors (62.04%), artificial filament yarn (13.01%), and rubber tires (8.06%). Belarus has lauded Pakistan’s role and efforts in bringing peace and stability to the world by countering terrorism and offered his country’s full support in this fight.

On the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan H.E. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus H.E. Mr. Sergei Aleinik visited Islamabad from May 30 – 31, 2023 on an official visit.

During the visit, Foreign Minister Sergei Aleinik paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister H.E. Mr. Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and the Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir, in addition to holding comprehensive delegation-level bilateral talks.

H.E. Mr. Sergei Aleinik also held meetings with the Minister of Economic Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan H.E. Sardar Ayaz Sadiq.

During their meeting, the two Foreign Ministers had a wide-ranging and substantive discussion on a variety of topics including political, economic, technological, cultural, educational, and multilateral cooperation in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding. The two sides agreed to take practical measures to translate the mutual goodwill between the two governments and their peoples into tangible cooperation in different fields.

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the friendly relations based on mutual respect, friendship, and trust established between the Republic of Belarus and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and highly appreciated the bilateral meetings and interaction at the highest and high levels that have taken place in recent years.

The Ministers appreciated the holding of the 6th Session of the Joint Belarusian-Pakistani Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation on January 12-13, 2023 in Minsk under the chairmanship of the Minister of Energy of the Republic of Belarus H.E. Viktor Karankevich and the Federal Minister of Energy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan H.E. Khurram Dastgir Khan.

The Ministers expressed their interest in strengthening cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the United Nations, and other International Organizations on matters of mutual interest, and reaffirmed their readiness to mutually support each other.

The Ministers noted the desire of both countries to expand the legal framework of bilateral relations and welcomed the signing of

the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Abolition of Visas for holders of Diplomatic and Service Passports as well as between the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and the Belarus Institute of Strategic Research.

The Ministers intend to support business initiatives aimed at the development of trade and industrial cooperation between the two countries, among other things, through the participation in exhibitions and fair events in both countries, holding face-to-face and online negotiations, and business councils.

Taking into consideration, that February 3, 2024, will mark the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Belarus and Pakistan, the Ministers welcomed the intention to develop a plan of joint events dedicated to the anniversary of diplomatic relations.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus expressed his gratitude for the reception given to the Belarusian delegation and invited the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to visit the Republic of Belarus at a convenient time. The invitation was accepted with gratitude and the dates of the visit will be finalized through diplomatic channels.

Both countries are committed to supporting each other and benefiting from each other’s strengths. It is desired from both sides to enrich and strengthen the relations in all walks of life covering trade, economy, industry, science and technology, education, etc. Long lives Pak-Belarus friendship.