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Far-Right Vigilantes

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In 2015, Europe faced a dramatic spike in the influx of refugees and illegal immigrants, the biggest since WWII. Migrating to the world’s most developed regions in search of a better life has always been an understandable and natural phenomenon. It cannot be denied that it also has an illegal dimension: some flee poverty without thinking about paperwork, some evade criminal prosecution in their homeland, some want to reunite with their families, and few think about learning the language, culture, laws and history of the host countries. There is another problem: many refugees spontaneously leave their countries in an emergency. The Refugee Convention dictates a favourable attitude to them, as well as providing them with legal and material aid. Refugees would appear to be able to stay in their new country for good: they cannot be deported due to considerations of humanity (with the exception of “compelling reasons of national security”), and once the emergency is over, there is no particular desire to go back to one’s home (even a destroyed one).

Yet pressing issues emerge. Do refugees want to accept the laws and culture of the states that take them in or are they attracted by generous welfare payments? Is a specific individual a refugee or just an illegal immigrant who underhandedly joined the unmanageable flow? Finally, there is the cornerstone of all immigration-related disputes, the rather inconvenient question of whether the natives of host states need all this and, if they do, how many refugees are they ready to take in? And if they are very unhappy with the immigrants’ behaviour, for how long are they willing to bear it and how competent are the authorities in combating it? The events of the migration crisis (and such a powerful flow that cannot be taken in and distributed should already be called a crisis) in Europe demonstrate an increase in ordinary people’s negative attitudes, lack of new solutions to the migration problems, and some countries’ refusal to take in immigrants. Some people are beginning to handle this problem independently and not through talks. The authorities have labelled these vigilantes [1] the far-right.

Has it always been that bad?

In the first half of the 20th century, Europe saw significant migration stemming from raging wars, redefined borders and the collapse of empires. Yet this has all affected the people who have been living in Europe for centuries. In the 1960s-1970s, Western Europe, the engine of economic development, initially encountered migrants from Europe’s own least developed sub-regions. By the early 1990s, the states of Northern Europe that had implemented the Scandinavian “welfare state” model had also become recipient states. There is also a reverse movement: many people from the cold North prefer to move to the sunny South. For instance, British citizens have actively explored France, Spain and Cyprus. The Schengen Agreement is in force, and the EU is beginning to emerge. The European Union expands eastward, and its new members enjoy the benefits of free movement, while their citizens seek their fortune abroad.

The wealthiest part of the European continent also appealed to those who lived outside Europe. It all started with the former colonies: former metropoles needed labour force, their birth rates were falling, and the people of the newly-independent states had no language barrier. For instance, migrants from the Maghreb went to France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany and, in the 1980s, they also started moving to Italy and Spain. However, back then, there was work waiting for them, and they travelled legally, as labour migrants while, beginning in the 1990s, increasing numbers of people from less prosperous countries wanted to take advantage of the social state.

The Mediterranean was the main route for African immigrants: they crossed it on boats, but such journeys are risky, and there have been casualties. The Italian island of Lampedusa has suffered a lot: since 1998, it has been the main refugee acceptance centre; already in 2003, there were voices in the Italian government proclaiming a migration crisis. Back then, the figures of “over 2,500 refugees” a month seemed scary, while today, it is but a drop in the ocean. And for some people, it is business: smugglers’ assistance costs USD 2,000. Coping with the influx has been hard: Italy reached a secret agreement with Libya on sending refugees back, the EU criticised this step, the camp was overflowing, living conditions were grossly violated, the local population was becoming progressively anti-migrant.

The immigration statistics in the early 2010s were no more optimistic: North Africa and the Middle East were going through the Arab Spring, consisting of numerous protests, some of which resulted in coups d’état and civil wars. Between 2010 and 2013, about 1.3 million people migrated to the EU annually (not including asylum seekers). Yet migrants’ geography was rather diverse, spanning far-away from China, India and the US and nearby Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey. Later, the arrivals’ composition changed significantly, with the Middle East accounting for the majority of migrants. And the increased numbers of refugees in the Mediterranean resulted in a humanitarian disaster, with Italy having to use the military to receive migrants. Ultimately, 150,000 people were rescued.

The population of the states where the Arab Spring raged deserves special mention. These are mostly “young” people, few over 65 years old, and a high proportion of the employable population. For instance, one-third of Egypt’s population is under 14, the elderly accounting for 3–4%. Syria and Lebanon present a similar picture. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries experienced a baby boom and falling mortality, which resulted in a demographic explosion and, today, these generations have grown up and are taking part in revolutions. Young hotheads see war around them, perceive extremist ideas as a clear-choice, “easy,” and “convenient” way of resolving all problems, and join armed groups. Scientific achievements of the civilised world have reduced mortality, while reproductive traditions remain the same, and no one is going to give up on them.

Previously, European states managed to cope with refugee flows, but the numbers of those wishing to settle in the EU without necessarily earning a living create an economic burden and prompt resentment among the local people: many immigrants are not eager to learn the language and find a job. Europeans looked around and saw whole neighbourhoods with an entirely immigrant population; they saw “Islamic patrols” in the UK and Germany. Far-right parties gain electoral support, while politicians currently in power speak about the threat to European values, yet invite more immigrants. Residents of Europe no longer understand whose side their governments are on and whether the governments are going to change the situation for the better.

Tolerance test: meeting the refugees

The worsening of the Syrian crisis reduced financing for refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (at first Syrians fled there), and then a new route via Greece prompted a spike in refugee numbers: a million in 2015, nearly four times more than in 2014. The highest numbers seek asylum in Germany, Hungary, France, Italy, and Sweden. Yet the powerful migrant flow only split the EU states on the asylum issue. Countries began to reinstitute border controls or simply let people travel on to Germany, where refugees wanted to go in the first place. Hungary closed its borders, but physical obstacles did not stop refugees from seeking other routes via Croatia, Slovenia and Austria. North Macedonia and Bulgaria are strengthening their borders. The human flow reaches Austria, and Vienna, too, decided to erect a border fence. EU members quarrel over quotas: Eastern Europe does not want to take in refugees, Italy threatens to send its migrants north, Hungary and Austria continue to tighten border controls. When a common disaster strikes, European unity begins to show serious cracks.

Citizens did not particularly welcome immigrants. The eve of 2016 was particularly odious, when over 1,000 women in the west of Germany were harassed, and later it became known that the perpetrators were immigrants. Most attacks went unsolved, and Chancellor Angela Merkel even cancelled her Davos visit. German citizens responded with a rally, but everything ended in confrontation with the police. In addition to harassment, they were disconcerted by the police hiding information about the perpetrators and the number of victims. The “Refugees welcome” slogan was transformed into “Rapefugees not welcome.” The attitude to migrants in everyday life deteriorated rapidly, the problem lying not only in possible clashes, but in this attitude easily being extended to those who had immigrated to Europe, obtained citizenship and long been part of European society. This is a view of not just of today’s immigrants but all people of non-European origin. The difference in the mindset is significant, and the issue of vast numbers of refugees became a matter of European survival and how Europe would look in the future. The citizens themselves begin to take the immigration agenda into their own hands, even though previously it had been the purview of political parties reflecting, through representation, opinions on a particular issue and building state policies accordingly. If a problem becomes unmanageable, some individuals begin spontaneously participating in certain movements not represented at the top level.

PEGIDA

The movement was founded in Dresden back in late 2014: it started with a social network group criticising Germany’s immigration policy. The first rally was held on 20 October 2014, followed by weekly marches. In December, the number of demonstrators reached 10,000 and, in January 2015, it climbed to 25,000. The protesters’ main slogans were “For the preservation of our culture”; “Against religious fanaticism”; “Against religious wars on German soil.” Germany had never previously had such a rapidly growing anti-immigrant movement. Before, it had been the prerogative of fringe right-wing groups, but now Germany’s middle class was speaking out against the country’s immigration policy. Various types of hoodlums are always around, but their threatening, anti-social behaviour would never have attracted such numbers. Owing to threats against the movement, the rallies were suspended and then resumed in October with 20,000 people attending. The movement’s information activities are concentrated on the Internet since mainstream German media do not broadcast such an agenda, which they immediately dubbed Nazi and chauvinist.

Despite accusations of populism and of attempts to overthrow the system of government, this method of protesting against the failed immigration policy demonstrates Germans’ tremendous self-possession and tolerance. These are not isolated radical groups attacking refugee centres but a regular declaration of will on a pressing issue, even if this declaration is made on the streets rather than through political institutions. Something similar has already happened in recent history: 30 years ago, weekly rallies were held in East Germany but, back then, people were demanding political freedoms. It resulted in the reunification of Germany, which is perceived in a positive light, while such a profoundly negative attitude to refugees is not approved of in Germany, which diligently conducts a policy of overcoming its Nazi past. Now PEGIDA is also accused of “appropriating” this freedom-loving spirit of 1989, and indignation over immigration is mixed with ethnic hatred of Hitler’s Germany. Thus far, German citizens choose rallies and voting: at the 2017 parliamentary elections, the nationalist Alternative for Germany (which cooperates with PEGIDA) came in third. The opposition to taking in higher numbers of immigrants remains high, at 72%.

Soldiers of Odin

This movement emerged a year after PEGIDA in the north of Europe, but it is not as large. In addition to rallies, its members patrol the streets and keep a record of crimes committed by immigrants. The first patrols appeared in Kemi, a border town in Finland where refugees from neighbouring Sweden arrived. As with PEGIDA, its groups coordinate their actions via social networks and expand their patrolling throughout the country. Its founder, Mika Ranta, was previously accused of a hate crime and cooperated with the far-right Nordic Resistance Movement. The patrols’ organisers claim that their objective is to provide voluntary assistance to the Finnish police in stopping crime, irrespective of the perpetrators’ ethnicity (such independent action is not prohibited in Finland). But they do not hide the fact that it was the harassment in Cologne that prompted them to patrol crowded areas (in particular, Soldiers of Odin said that immigrants chase girls near schools). Finnish law enforcement authorities treat such assistance with great caution and view these people not as patrols but far-right racist groups. Even so, the police are very reluctant to publish crime statistics and are very afraid of drawing parallels between increased refugee numbers and increased crime (in Finland’s statistics, natives of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Turkey are among the leaders in sexual offences). In response, sales of pepper spray grew, new self-defence classes opened, rallies were held, and street patrols were implemented. That is the only way for citizens to convey their stance both to politicians and to the immigrants themselves. Soldiers of Odin have spread beyond Finland: newly-minted “public order squads” have been spotted primarily in Sweden, Norway and the Baltic states (in Oslo, immigrants responded with patrols of their own).

The Nordic Resistance Movement also deserves a brief mention. It is a radical right-wing organisation that cooperates actively with Soldiers of Odin. In Finland, this cooperation ended in the Resistance being prohibited, since its members, in addition to patrols and rallies, promulgated openly Nazi ideology and attacks on immigrants. Curiously, despite the small number of refugees, it was Finland that generated the anti-immigrant patrol trend. Members of these patrols often have a criminal record of hate crime or statements. Most Finns, Danes, Norwegians and Swedes believe that no more immigrants should be taken in.

Labour and education

Even so, refugees are a specific issue. People fled a humanitarian disaster and Europeans showed mercy to dispossessed people. The host countries responded with educational services since a large number of refugees do not even have a secondary education: 67% of refugees in Norway, 50% in Sweden (and only 4% attend school after being given a residence permit). Only 38.3% of immigrants in Germany have a professional or higher education (and that includes incomplete studies). Germany stands out with the biggest number of initiatives for immigrants in providing language training, seeking housing, providing medical services and scholarships. UNESCO estimates that only a third of sub-Saharan Africans have even an elementary education and only 1% of refugees receive higher education. The education problem is determined not only by a shortage of teachers (Germany needs an additional 42,000 teachers) but also by special requirements for professional training: the multicultural approach entails teaching students of different ages and with diverse linguistic backgrounds in overfilled classrooms. Expenditures on refugees are not perceived in a negative light: German economists see it as stimulating the economy by creating new jobs.

The new far-right base

Vast numbers of new arrivals are hard to assimilate, it is easier for them to move in with their compatriots who arrived earlier, and live on welfare. This prompts discontent among the locals and could cause a recession. This situation is hard to manage, and it can quickly become unmanageable: and vigilant public order squads run the risk of turning into storm troopers who no longer expect help from the police. Attacks on refugee centres and mosques happened before, but they were carried out by fringe groups of local thugs from among local troubled youth. Yet exacerbation of the immigration situation provides fertile soil for extreme right-wing parties that do not look deep into the reasons for immigration, into refugees’ social problems, and lump all people of non-European origin together, no matter what education they have and what work they do. This is the fight for the middle class, educated people with a stable income, who are good at counting their money and do not understand all the subtleties of the increased economic burden caused by refugees. Europe boasts the world’s biggest middle class: 194 million people in 2015. In percentage terms, this class is most visible in Belgium, Italy, the UK, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland, with over 50% of these countries’ population considered middle class. In France, Germany, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Austria, this figure ranges between 40 and 50%. Yet the middle class prefers a stable income and lack of any radical shifts, while the desire for greater wealth is international.

After WWII, in addition to proscribing ethnic nationalism, civil nationalism was also being erased: European integration created new supra-national institutions and erased borders between states. Taking in refugees from regions far from Europe picked up pace in the 1990s, and it has gradually caused cracks to appear in intra-European relations: less affluent countries have been shifting immigration problems on to the more affluent ones. New EU members, formerly closed states with a small middle class, refuse to assume obligations to take in immigrants who need to be provided with housing, work and education. Naturally, political parties form a communications channel between the public and the authorities, and there are such parties that promote an anti-immigrant agenda. Still, this today translates into Euro-scepticism and nationalism, with each state not only wishing to be free from Brussels’ commands but also projecting the difficulties and privations stemming from taking in refugees on to all representatives of non-European peoples, even if they came earlier and were assimilated. The trouble is, the current immigration crisis in Europe was caused by a sharp, massive influx of people from other cultures and the inability to “digest” this influx rapidly created room for uncompromising rhetoric that is simple and easy to understand. Nationalist parties propose a quick response to any sudden phenomena without looking deeply into its causes and without thinking about the consequences, and their popularity is growing sharply in those states that have suffered most in the immigrant crisis. Even so, elections are held only once in several years whereas ethnic hostility is manifested daily. The increase in anti-immigrant crime shows that ordinary people are not going to wait until new members of parliament take office. The most dangerous thing happening is that people who have never before seen themselves as nationalists are now joining the process of resolving the immigration problem with the help of those very nationalistic bodies (of varying degrees of radicalism and legality). Anti-EU and anti-immigrant sentiment (and this applies even to immigrants from previous generations) are already represented in Europe’s parliaments, and ratings are growing, but not owing to their own appeal or the appeal of their political programmes. This is an expression of desperation and disappointment with the current immigration policy. This is a protest and a censure vote.

[1] They are persons or groups that, without recourse to legal proceedings, punish those accused of real or imagined offences and, in the vigilantes’ opinion, those who have not been adequately punished by law.

From our partner RIAC

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Tackling migration crises: Fighting corruption may help

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Increasing numbers of migrants are moving towards the Belarus/Poland border.photo: Belarus Red Cross

Twenty-three-year-old Mohamed Rasheed was at a loss after returning to Iraq from a grueling failed attempt to cross the Belarus-Polish border. “There’s no life for us here. There are no jobs; there is no future,” he told a Washington Post reporter.

Another man, who had just disembarked from a repatriation flight from the Belarus capital of Minsk to Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, frowned and obscured his face with a scarf, according to the reporter, as he responded to a question about why he had left.

“Those words cannot leave my mouth. Who dares to tell the truth here?” the man said.

The two men were returning to a country whose population has largely been excluded from sharing in the benefits of its oil wealth. Youth unemployment hovers at about 25 per cent. Public good and services are poor at best. Security forces and militias crackdown on and fire live ammunition at protesters demanding wholesale change.

Mohammed and his fellow returnee could have been from Lebanon, a middle-income country in which three-quarters of the population lives under the poverty line thanks to a corrupt elite unwilling to surrender vested interests irrespective of the cost to others.

In fact, they could have been from any number of countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and their African and Asian peripheries.

Almost half of the youth from non-Gulf countries in the Middle East and North Africa want nothing more than to leave in the absence of opportunities and prospects. They are exasperated with corrupt, self-serving elites.

This is a part of the world where devastating wars have wracked Syria, Yemen, and Libya. More recently, these countries were joined by Ethiopia while others in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel reel from jihadist violence that feeds on social and economic grievances.

To primarily hold responsible for the migrant crisis, human traffickers and cynical authoritarian leaders like Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, who are willing to play power games and turn a profit on the back of innocent men, women, and children is swatting at symptoms of a problem that goes to the root of instability in the Middle East and North Africa.

To be sure, Mr. Lukashenko and the traffickers are part of the problem. Moreover, many Middle Easterners on the Belarus-Polish border appear to be economic, not political refugees with a legal right to asylum.

One could argue that the European Union’s refusal to take in the refugees on humanitarian grounds led to their repatriation to Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, which may have shortened their ordeal. Many risked being ultimately rejected, even if they had been granted entry to the EU because they were not political refugees.

The jury is out on whether the refusal will serve as a warning to the many in the Middle East and North Africa contemplating ways to get to Europe by hook or by crook.

All of this describes the immediate aspects of a dramatic crisis. The danger is that the focus on the immediate will obstruct badly needed thinking of ways to prevent or reduce the risk of future such crises and human suffering, aggravated by the willingness of governments to fight their battles on the backs of the least protected.

The framing of the crisis as a security rather than a political, economic, and social problem further takes away from the development of policies and tools to tackle the root causes of repeated migrant crises – economic mismanagement; political, economic, and financial corruption; nepotism; and loss of confidence in political systems and leadership.

“Addressing population challenges, the youth bulge, and refugee and migration pressure from natural or man-made crises will require measures to promote sustainable economic growth and enhanced educational and healthy capacities,” said George M. Feierstein, senior vice president of the Washington-based Middle East Institute and a former State Department official with multiple postings in the Middle East and North Africa.

Acknowledging that a broader US policy focus is likely to prove more challenging than one narrowly concentrated on security, Mr. Feierstein argued that the United States could “bring assets to the table that could potentially enhance its role in the region and strengthen its position as the preeminent outside power.” The former diplomat was referring to big power rivalry with China and Russia in the Middle East and North Africa.

Adopting Mr. Feierstein’s policy prescription would involve greater emphasis on regional approaches to global challenges, including climate change and public health; conflict management and resolution efforts to safeguard populations and minimize internal displacement and migration; and institutional capacity and resilience building; all backed by greater US private sector engagement.

Kyrgyzstan has potentially emerged in what could provide evidence that a de-emphasis of the security aspects of the migration crisis would not automatically surrender real estate and /or leverage and influence to China and Russia.

Part of a Central Asian world sandwiched between Russia and China on which the United States has seemingly turned its back with its withdrawal from Afghanistan in August, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov is using his election pledges to fight corruption and offer financial rewards to whistleblowers to lure the US back.

Mr. Japarov’s proposition, designed to rescue Kyrgyzstan from the clutches of Russia and China, is the central theme of a document that he has sent to the US State Department. The document outlines proposals to revive a broad political, economic, and civic engagement with the US bolstered by anti-corruption measures and affirmation of democratic freedoms.

S. Frederick Starr, founding chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, suggested that Mr. Japarov is providing a template for US reengagement with Central Asia and Afghanistan. In fact, the Kyrgyz president is offering a formula equally relevant to the Middle East and North Africa.

If adopted by the Biden administration, Kyrgyzstan “would become ‘The Mouse that Roared’ to cite the title of the droll 1959 British film.  This time, however, the lesser power will have advanced its cause not by threatening military action…but with a sensible proposal by which a great power—the United States—…can once more become a serious presence in a major part of Asia that lies on China’s and Russia’s doorstep,” Mr. Starr said.

In contrast to Central Asia, the United States remains the dominant power in the Middle East and North Africa. But it’s a power seeking to redefine the role it wishes to play going forward in a region struggling to come to grips with an uncertain but changing US approach.

Kyrgyzstan could be showing the way for both United States and the Middle East. However, to make it work and reduce, if not stop, migration flows, the United States and its Western partners would have to prioritise confronting corrupt elites who will stop at nothing, including displacing populations, to preserve their illicitly gained privileges.

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An election, another one, and yet another one: Will Bulgaria finally have a functioning government?

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As of November, Bulgarian voters headed to the polls four times this year. Therefore, the news of a new election evokes little surprise — almost like in Israel before Netanyahu’s ousting. In both countries, the tension kept rising while expectations became more and more modest with each successive electoral round. However, the contests that took place on Sunday 14th were of the utmost importance for the country; and not only. In fact, Bulgaria is the EU’s and NATO’s south-eastern bulwark and hosts a tract of the South Stream gas duct. Moreover, Sofia is currently blockingthe next round of EU enlargement negotiations over North Macedonia’s disrespect of extant bilateral obligations. Finally, the Biden administration has manifested the US’s renewed interest in the Bulgaria’s internal politics and international orientations. Thus, the result of the vote has wider implication for the European and Euro-Atlantic political and geo-strategic stability.

Background — Two failed elections

April 2021: How the parties ‘hung’ the parliament

Last April, Bulgarians voted to renew the sitting parliament in the general elections. However, after a summer-long wave of protests against the Prime Minister and the Attorney General, established parties looked rather weak.

According to most experts, this new season of contestation has mobilised new voters, previously disenchanted about politics. As a result, the parties and the leaders who casted themselvesas supportive of the protests increased their votes. In particular, the neo-liberal coalition Democratic Bulgaria (DB) got the support of the well-educated and those residing in bigger cities. Meanwhile, the personal parties Stand Up! Bastards Out! (ISMV) and There is Such a People (ITN) fished across the board.

But they cannot persuadePM Boyko Borisov’s supporters that his removal from office is a precondition for societal improvement. Thus, despite the many corruption scandals involving Borisov’s cliques, all polls forecasted his party, GERB, would have won the election.

Or, to be more precise, GERB won the ballot count — but without a majority (see Figure 1). Moreover, the indignation did not spare the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which sometimes vents sympathies  for GERB despite its corruption. In addition, the elderlies are overrepresented amongst the BSP’s voters, the party suffered from Covid’s increasing morbidity during the spring. Hence, the main traditional opposition party lost votes in favour of the abovementioned ‘protest parties’, weakening the wider anti-Borisov front.

Against this background, there was absolutely no chance of seeing a cabinet get through a vote of confidence. In fact, GERB won 75 seats and the DPS, an ethnic-Turkish party closely associated with GERB, got other 30. Meanwhile, the so-called “parties of the protest” had only 93 representatives on the 121 needed to form a government. True, the BSP managed to hold on to 43 seats — enough to make the protest parties’ eventual confidence motion pass. But DB and ITN refused to engage in serious negotiations with the socialists, forcing the parliament to disband.

The President scheduled new election in July.

July 2021: How politicians (did not) made it through another hung parliament

Most Bulgarian parties and their leaders failed to understand the real meaning of the election results in July. In fact, for the first timesince its appearance in 2009, GERB failed to win the most votes. In part, this could be explained arguing that a large share of GERB’s constituency does not vote ideologically. On the contrary, researchers hypothesise that support for Borisov’s party stems chiefly from the networks of clienteleshe has established. Thus, it was relatively uncomplicated for the President-appointed caretaker government to disincentivise practices such as vote buying and controlled voting. Either way, subsequent sociological analyses and available data show that GERB’s voters demobilised more than other parties’ supporters in July.

Conversely, the so-called ‘parties of the protest’ were the main beneficiary of the disengagement of GERB’s voters. True, most of the ITN’s, DB’s and ISMV’s voters were not ideologically committed to their party of choice either. Nevertheless, the results showed that protest voting can be powerful enough of a force to uproot an already-destabilised party system. In fact, all three parties increased their share of the vote and number of seats (see Figure 2). In addition, ITN’s votes increased in absolute terms by 92,000 units despite an eight-percent reduction in turnout.

After having seen the results, Borisov’s adversaries, especially President Radev, imagined the parties could agree on a new cabinet. In fact, GERB and the DPS lost 13 seats. Meanwhile, the so-called “parties of the protest” had as many as 112 representatives and the BSP was left with 36. Eventually, strong of its 65 deputies, ITN came up with the offer for DB, ISMV and the BPS. Essentially, ITN would form a minority “cabinet of experts” following an agenda agreed amongst the four parties. In other words, ITN came up with a confidence-and-supply arrangement which would have denied its partners any post. However, the populist reason which drives ITN’s strategy led to a massive failure although there was a draft government programme. Namely, according to several rumours, DB requested to rediscuss some of the cabinet members’ nomination as part of the agreement. Predictably, ITN’s preconceived denial to negotiate on the names caused DB’s rebuttalof the entire confidence-and-supply mechanism. Obviously, the BSP and ISMV opportunistically abandoned ITN’s wretched locomotive before the egregious failure of its government in pectore.

The President scheduled new election in November.

Yet another parliamentary… and finally a cabinet?

Considering the previous two votes’ result, it is unsurprising that few analysts tried to call the last electoral round. Indeed, much of this unpredictability stemmed from the decision of two President-appointed caretaker ministers to form a new party. Actually, the names of former finance minister Kirill Petkov and former economy minister Asen Vasilev were little known until May. However, the former’s intense public activity in the revealing the corrupt practicesof Borisov’s administration made him very popular. Moreover, Petkov’s rhetoric emphasises, unlike that of most other Bulgarian political leaders, dialogue, trust and teamwork— especially with Vasilev. Lastly, Petkov and Vasilev made a wit choice in calling their party We Continue the Change (PP). In fact, the name underlines continuity with the caretaker government’s activity and suggests a connection with its appointer, President Radev. After all, the President remains the most popular Bulgarian politician and PP benefitted from his informal blessing (Figure 3).

Overall, the results are surprisingto say the least (Figure 4). Although the turnout fell again to slightly less than 40% of eligible voters, PP achieved a convincing lead over GERB. At the same time, the entire political panorama changed dramatically virtually overnight. After a months-long decline, ISMV failed to clear the four-percent threshold to enter the parliament and risks disappearing. Evidently, the BSP continued its decline, ranking fourth – even after the DPS – and losing 54 seats on its pre-2021 level. Interestingly, PP seems to have syphoned offso many votes from the protest party par excellence, ITN, to shrink it to 25 seats.  The same dynamic drove votes from PP to DB, whose leader admitted the two parties’ self-evident ideological affinity recently. Finally, a nationalist ‘protest’ formationmanged to elect 13 deputies, remedying nationalists’ failures in April and July: Văzrazhdane (‘National Revival’).

Looking at the mere numbers of seats in the parliament, one would reach a simple conclusion. And some already say that the Bulgarians will soon have to deal with a new cabinet, with Petkov as PM. However, the most refined analysts have noted that the parties may fail to form a government for the third time.

Conclusion — What to look for in the next weeks and months

The most fascinating aspects of Bulgaria’s current election cycle is not new to those who follow Israeli politics, for instance. In fact, as it happened in Tel Aviv after Netanyahu’s failure to form a government, many feel changes coming. However, in Sofia like in Tel Aviv, there are still many unknown quantities to deal with in politics’ general equation.

Obviously, the reference is most directly to Văzrazhdane — this absolute newcomer to parliamentary politics. First, the party has adopted rather ‘atypical’ stances on, amongst other topics, Bulgaria’s NATO and EU membership. Curiously, most of the party’s propaganda material is freely and easily accessible online through social networksand Văzrazhdane’s website. Besides the fact that the majority of its activists and candidates are open to have an online chat with anyone. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that at least part of Văzrazhdane’s 127,568 voters is well aware of its ideals. Nevertheless, it may not be able to coalesce with a strongly pro-EU, neo-liberal and verticalized party as PP without denaturing.  Second, the party’s modest success may be more sustainable in the medium to long term than that of PP. Differently from PP, ITN, ISMV and otherBulgarian leader-driven political projects, Văzrazhdane has been growing up for year. In effect, a few sociologists and analysts were already singling out the party’s positive trajectory in July. Thus, its ideas may turn into a long-lasting destabilising factor for Bulgaria’s usually dull foreign policy in the coming years.

Furthermore, one can argue at length on what these results say on the state of Bulgaria’s liberal democracy. Sure, neither PP nor GERB are a serious threat to democracy as a procedural rule involving elections. However, both parties pose an unmistakable menace to the country’s already fledging liberal institutions. In fact, both Borisov and, in his short tenure to nowadays, Petkovhave shown little appreciation of parliamentarism. Moreover, Petkov embraces a brand of neoliberalismwhich implies a few carrots(e.g., raising pensions) and much more stick. In fact, he has only criticised entrepreneurs whom others have already associated with Borisov and promised not to raise taxes. In addition, he has an open feud with the Constitutional Courtover his dual citizenship — which invalidated his ministerial appointment. Finally, Petkov and his associated have approached the pandemicas a common-sense matterdespite the ongoing compression of citizens’ freedoms.

Therefore, the future remains unpredictable. Especially assuming that a Petkov cabinet would have the support of both the EU and the President. In fact, left unconstrained by Brussels in the name of stabilitocracy and supported by Radev to finish off his archenemy, Borisov, Petkov and his associated may end up rewriting the rules of Bulgarian politics in an elitist way. After all, they have already done it by violating all constitutional customs on caretaker governments’ self-restraint. Why not to try again?

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Engaging Morocco: A Chess Game Spain Does Not Want to Lose

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In a game of chess, each player knows the type of game they are playing and takes turns moving the pieces. In addition to the relative advantage of making an opening consistent with your objectives, you must anticipate your opponent’s moves and plan accordingly.

Morocco moved pieces on May 17 and 18, 2021, when it let in 8,000 immigrants in the city of Ceuta, a Spanish territory in Africa and external border of the European Union. It did so without warning, neglecting its functions as border guardian and allowing the entry of a mass of migrants amounting to 9.5% of Ceuta’s population.

This episode is of unprecedented character: it occurred in the context of a geopolitical change in the Maghreb, within an unparalleled worsening of Rabat-Madrid relations, and it was of an unmatched magnitude. The particularity of the event demands an assessment of the relations between both countries and of Spain’s strategy towards Morocco. Does Madrid know that it is playing chess with Rabat? Is it capable of reading the moves of Morocco in advance? Does it have an effective strategy?

Background

This act takes place during a period of dramatic change in the Maghreb area. Namely, hostilities over Western Sahara broke out again in 2019. Further, Morocco’s relations with Algiers have drastically deteriorated, while its relations with Europe have become more strained following the CJEU rulings in 2021 and conflicts with France and Berlin. Washington has increased its support for Morocco, recognizing its sovereignty over Western Sahara and providing arms supplies and military cooperation. In parallel, Rabat is making a pivot to Africa, strengthening ties with the Sahel and extending its diplomatic contacts with Nigeria, Senegal and other West African countries. These changes enhance the importance of Morocco’s movements and highlight the relevance of its interactions with its only European neighbor: Spain.

Relations between Spain and Morocco have always been conflictive and prosperous in equal parts. In addition to the positive aspects of trade relations, economic complementarity and cooperation in the fight against terrorism, there are also problematic aspects: territorial claims over Spanish possessions in Africa, maritime delimitation issues and immigration. Morocco’s rejection of the principle of Uti possidetis juris, seeking to change the borders inherited from colonialism, has brought conflict to its relations with its neighbors. With Spain, this is evident in events such as the Ifni War (Morocco-Spain), the Green March, the Perejil crisis and the events in Ceuta in May of this year.

In the media, relations between the kingdoms of Spain and Morocco are shaped by conflicts, such as the Perejil Crisis in 2002 and 2010-2011 without a Moroccan ambassador to Madrid. These confrontations, usually involving Spanish territories in Africa or issues of great public sensitivity such as migration or the Western Sahara, are short-lived and normally quickly resolved. As a result, relations between Madrid and Rabat are cyclical in nature and form part of Spanish domestic politics. This conditions that the high points in their relations never last long and that Spain’s responses in discussing the Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla publicly are avoidant rather than assertive. Within this framework, the events in Ceuta 2021 can be understood as a new setback in the development of complex relations.

These conflicts contrast with Spain’s deeply intertwined economic interaction with Morocco. Sectors such as automobiles, textiles and agriculture form part of the same value chain. Morocco is Spain’s second largest non-EU partner while Spain has overtaken France as the main supplier to Morocco. This responds to the concept of the “cushion of interests” put forward by Spain in the 1990s. The core idea of this strategy is that increased economic interdependence will reduce political tensions. According to this theory, since Morocco’s economy is more dependent on Spain than Spain is on Morocco, Rabat would be constrained in its political movements. However, given the frequency of conflicts between the two kingdoms, this liberal approach is of doubtful effectiveness.

The combination of frequent misunderstandings and growing economic interaction is not the only paradox to be noted in the relations of the two kingdoms. On the political level, the synchronization between the countries’ royal houses (mainly between Juan Carlos I and Hassan II in the past but also between Mohamed VI and Felipe VI at present) stands in contrast to the six years without the annual high-level meetings required by the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. Moreover, Prime Minister Sanchez has broken with the Spanish tradition of paying the first foreign trip to Morocco, in place since the 1980s.

In short, the problems between Madrid and Rabat are cyclical and greatly affect Spanish domestic politics. Neither the strength of the commercial interaction nor the closeness between their kings are enough to smooth relations between the two countries.

The axes of the relationship between Spain and Morocco

The complexity of the relationship between Spain and Morocco revolves around six axes: migration, terrorism, energy, Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, and the European Union. Each axis generates a series of opportunities and vulnerabilities for Spain, and it is the confluence of these axes that determines the ups and downs between the two countries.

The first of these axes is migration. Due to its sustained omnipresence in the media, it is the one that most concerns Spanish domestic policy. Sub-Saharan and Moroccan immigrants arrive to Spain through two different routes: by sea (to the peninsula and the Canary Islands) and by land (through the Spanish cities in Africa of Ceuta and Melilla). Since 1992, Madrid has increased cooperation with Rabat in this area.

Currently, the border externalization system is present in the repatriation of immigrants, the joint maritime police patrols, the joint police stations, the raids against massive assaults on border fences, and the construction and control of the Nador fence in Morocco. These projects are financed by European funds, which Morocco would like to see increase. This collaboration is asymmetrical: Morocco has sole control of the border, and Spain depends on its goodwill. Rabat, aware of this, does not hesitate to instrumentalize the issue.

The second axis is anti-terrorism and security cooperation. Collaboration in this area originated with the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Cooperation now extends to police, judicial and intelligence cooperation. In addition, with the aim of controlling radicalization, Rabat appoints part of the imams in Spain. Here again, the asymmetry is in favor of Morocco. The Moroccan imams could position themselves in favor of the interests of their country of origin. Moreover, anti-terrorist cooperation is essential for Spain’s national security, and its potential loss would put Spain at risk.

The third axis is energy. The Spanish presence in this field is extensive, with participation in Morocco’s solar and wind power development and in its combined cycle power plants. In addition, Spain exports electricity to Morocco through two interconnections with the Iberian Peninsula, which accounts for 20% of the Moroccan demand. Spain used to be dependent on the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline, which passed through Morocco. Its closure in November 2021 has reduced this dependence but has posed a problem to guaranteeing gas supplies to Spain. In this field, Spain has the upper hand: it has vetoed the Mediterranean Solar Plan in Morocco (to avoid competition with Spanish renewable production) and has rejected a 3rd electricity interconnection requested by Morocco.

The fourth axis is that of Western Sahara. This former Spanish colony is of visceral importance to Morocco. In the heart of its territorial claims, the conflict remains ongoing since it began in the 1970s, and Rabat lacks international support on its position. Moreover, it is a topical issue, around which Morocco has recently won American support, French and German rejection, and on which it has declared that it will not sign trade agreements that do not include Western Sahara.

Spain faces a dilemma since it must choose between its public opinion (sensitive to the Saharawi cause) and its trade relations with Morocco. As a result, it maintains a dual position. Officially, Spain supports a solution through the UN, sends humanitarian aid to the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf, recognizes the Polisario Front as representative of the Saharawi people and rejects Moroccan claims to Canary Islands waters on the grounds that Rabat has no sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Nevertheless, it applauds the autonomy project proposed in 2007 by Morocco (which does not envisage independence), rejected the US initiative to extend MINURSO’s mandate to human rights monitoring in 2013, and defends Morocco’s interests (and its own) before the judgments of the CJEU on trade agreements involving Western Sahara. The complexity of this axis, which forces Spain to walk in two directions at the same time, is a threat to any constructive relationship with Morocco.

The fifth axis is Morocco’s claims over the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the Spanish islands off the Moroccan coast. Rabat’s endeavor to re-establish its “authentic” borders does not end in the Sahara, further extending into these Spanish territories, over which it has a permanent claim.

These territories have four problems.

  1. Economically, they are dependent on Moroccan trade and on Spanish subsidies,
  2. demographically, the growth of the population of Moroccan origin causes changes in the social structure that can be a source of conflict,
  3. international protection is relative, since the Spanish territories are not explicitly protected by NATO, and although they are part of the EU and the Schengen Area, they are not within the Customs Union,
  4. the islands do not appear in the Spanish Constitution nor in the Spanish territorial organization.

Taking advantage of these weaknesses, Morocco has used different strategies to strengthen its claims: economic blockades, vetoes against further integration into the EU, a rhetoric of colonialism, and comparisons to Gibraltar, and even the Perejil crisis in 2002, in which a small group from the Moroccan navy occupied one of the Spanish islands. This axis has a latent presence in the relations between both countries: although Madrid avoids its public mention, Rabat’s claims may end up in direct confrontation Spanish national interests.

Finally, the sixth and last axis is the European Union. Spain´s relationship with Morocco is based on the European Neighborhood Policy and on the Union for the Mediterranean. Besides, this relationship currently revolves around the provision of funds to Morocco for the externalization of borders, the agriculture and fisheries trade agreements, and the rulings of the CJEU on these, which since 2015 have complicated Brussels’ relations with Rabat. Indeed, Morocco has changed its attitude towards the EU since 2008, reducing its concessions, increasing its demands and adopting a more pragmatic discourse. In the framework of Madrid-Rabat relations, the EU has acted as an appeaser, reducing bilateral conflicts. However, Spain is limited within the multilateral structure, since it cannot impose its preferences and its power is confined to blocking initiatives (as it did with agricultural liberalization for example). Moreover, the judgments of the CJEU have poisoned the bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco.

What nowadays is cooperation in migration, security and energy, due to conflicts around the Sahara or Ceuta and Melilla may one day become an undesirable dependency. Too many issues related to Spanish national security are subject to Rabat’s goodwill. That is why the disagreements between the two countries cause so much commotion in Spain, even if they do not always revolve around each of the 6 axes described above.

Ceuta 2021 — Another crisis or a point of no return?

This article begins with the events of May 18, 2021, when Morocco loosened its border controls and allowed more than 8,000 undocumented migrants, mostly young Moroccans, to enter the city of Ceuta. The figure is unprecedented, around 10 times higher than what used to be received until then. It is worth asking whether this event is a simple downturn in the cyclical relations between Morocco and Spain, or whether it implies something different.

When the Ceuta crisis in 2021 is put into context, an extraordinary deterioration of relations between Morocco and Spain is observed, enhanced by unilateral actions by Rabat. In 2018, Morocco closed the commercial border with Melilla. In 2019, it toughened the fight against smuggling in Ceuta, hindering the border crossing and prohibited its officials from entering Ceuta or Melilla. To this day, this has subjected both cities to an unprecedented economic asphyxiation. In 2020, Morocco vetoed the entry of Moroccan fish into Ceuta and revived the dispute over the delimitation of maritime borders in Canary waters. In 2021, it installed a fish farm in Spanish waters near the Chafarinas Islands without permission. In recent years relations between the two countries have worsened gradually, camouflaged behind the Covid-19 pandemic and around issues of relative relevance, which only indirectly affect the 6 axes above mentioned.

In contrast, the Ceuta crisis is relevant in almost every aspect.

  1. Morocco is instrumentalizing immigration, leaving aside its obligations as border guardian.
  2. The Western Sahara conflict lingers in the background: the crisis was a form of protest by Rabat against the hospitalization in Spain of the Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali, organized in an opaque manner by Madrid.
  3. Despite Rabat’s attempts to keep the crisis within the bilateral framework, it escalated to the European Union, where Spain received the support of the European Commission, the European Parliament (which issued a condemnation for violation of children’s rights against Morocco), and even of France.
  4. The crisis was followed by the reactivation of territorial claims over Ceuta and Melilla: The Moroccan Prime Minister compared the situation to Western Sahara.

Faced with the numerous and unusual vectors of this crisis, Spain must identify what objective Morocco is pursuing, and what its next steps will be. Rabat is obviously trying to capitalize on the momentum provided by the U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara and its vigorous relations with some of its African neighbors.

Moreover, the deterioration of relations has coincided with a deterioration of Spanish domestic politics, while Morocco is taking advantage of independence, government instability, COVID-19, etc. Is Morocco pursuing a strategy against Spain? That is what the Spanish intelligence presumes, without knowing very well what strategy it is. In fact, the CNI considers the Ceuta crisis not to be an immigration problem, but an invasion that can be repeated again. Rabat could have taken the conflict into a gray zone, in which case it would be establishing the environment, waiting for opportunities.

The current situation is not part of the cyclical pattern that characterizes its relations with Morocco. Ceuta and Melilla are suffocating, Spanish intelligence fears losing anti-terrorist collaboration with Morocco, Rabat is in a strong position, and Madrid is unable to recognize what Morocco’s next step will be, limiting itself to trying to put an increasingly entrenched relationship back on track. The impetus with which Rabat is pushing for the recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara, and its extrapolation of this to Ceuta and Melilla, suggests that the disagreements with Spain are not over.

In all this, Spain’s strategy towards Morocco is ineffective. The liberalism of the cushion of interests has failed. It was based on elements that were of national interest for Spain (migration, terrorism, etc.) but not for Morocco. The only sphere where Madrid has an advantageous position is energy: Spain exports electricity to Morocco, continues to refuse to establish a third electricity interconnection, and is receiving Moroccan requests for Spain to re-export Algerian gas. Moreover, Spain has learned that Morocco fears losing its reputation with the European Union and is trying to prevent the EU from getting involved in its bilateral relations. Thanks to the EU intervention, Morocco made a misstep during the Ceuta crisis this year.

However, everything suggests that Madrid is confident that the ups and downs will continue to prevail in its relations with Rabat and it accepts Mohamed VI’s invitation to inaugurate an unprecedented stage in the relations between the two countries. It is foreseeable, therefore, that Spain will keep Morocco as one of the two pilot countries of its Focus Africa 2023 plan, giving it and Senegal unparalleled attention in the development of constructive relations, and will export this experience to other African countries. In a game of chess, each player knows the type of game he is playing and takes turns moving the pieces. Spain knows that it is playing, but it has not realized that the game has changed, and that the chessboard is different. It has skipped several turns and, for too long now, its pieces have been sitting immobile.

From our partner RIAC

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