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Turkey’s presence in Syria

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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Following their meeting in Sochi on October 23, 2019, Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyp Erdogan officially announced a ceasefire throughout Northern Syria.

 The bilateral agreement reached in Sochi strengthens the role played by Bashar al-Assad in the region between the Syrian Kurdish world and the area on the border with Turkey. It also ensures the permanence of Russian forces throughout Syria and finally serves to formalize the Turkish military presence in the region and in Syrian territory. A position of the Turkish forces on the border between Syria and Turkey, for about 32 kilometres from the borderline between the two countries.

With a view to separating the Syrian Rojava (which means “East”, in Kurdish) from the Kurdish areas of Iran, Turkey and Iraq.

Russia regards this agreement as the final confirmation of the victory of the Syrian forces of Assad (and Russia) in the long Syrian war.

 The Russian Federation won in Syria because it bet on the comparatively stronger horse, i.e. Assad’s regime, and also because it had a coherent and stable strategy, compared to Obama’s and Trump’s ambiguities. An additional reason was that no European country, frightened by the instability of the North American attitude, joined the United States in its actions on Syrian soil.

 The agreement between Erdogan and Putin in Syria, which was born as early as the Turkish leader’s repression of the 2016 attempted coup d’état, has even created the “Astana Process” involving also Iran in a negotiation which has metaphorically “killed” the Geneva talks, where many pro-American elements were also present and active.

However, even after the knocking out of the Geneva talks, the United States was still significantly present in North-Eastern Syria, before the arrival of Turkey throughout Northern Syria.

 Now the U.S. forces have largely withdrawn, precisely as a result of Turkish operations. Hence there is no possibility, however remote, that the USA can wage again a war against Assad starting from North-Eastern Syria.

 That was Russia’ greatest fear.

In Syria, as early as 2015, Russia has always attached greater importance to operations in Western Syria, while the recent Turkish attack against Afrin has ensured that Turkey and Russia actually expelled the Kurds from the area – the Kurds who, after all, were the only U.S. real strategic asset.

 All the Turkish projects for Northern Syria, ranging from the transfer of the Turkey-supported jihadists from Idlib eastwards to the use of the many Syrian Sunni refugees in Turkey to replace the Kurds in North-Eastern Syria, are a strategic blessing for Russia.

 On the one hand, it is currently possible for Assad to directly hit Idlib alone but, on the other, we also need to consider the Turkish  pressure on the Kurds towards the East, which jeopardizes the link between Turkey and the United States.

This is another excellent result for the Russian strategy in Syria. There was also the U.S. forces’ hasty relinquishment of their role in protecting the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by the Kurds, which put the Kurds themselves in a position to accept the new Russian “protection”.

Russia also reaffirmed the 1998 Adana Agreement between Syria and Turkey, which envisaged the possibility for the Turkish forces to cross the border and exert strong pressure on the Kurds.

Nevertheless, what does the Russian Federation really want from the Kurds and especially from their Syrian Democratic Forces?

 The agreements reached so far to organize Turkish-Russian “joint patrol units” on the Syrian border enable Russia to become the only future peace broker in Syria, while Assad’s army has moved to  North-Eastern Syria, by establishing itself well away from the safe zones that Turkey has already occupied.

 A “zero-sum game” for everyone, except for the United States. The European Union, as usual, is not part of the game.

Russia, however, does not want to shoulder the whole burden of territorial control of Eastern Syria, but it lacks the new proxies, i.e. the autonomous forces acting in its name and on its behalf.

 At the beginning of Russia’s engagement in Syria, its aim was only to support Assad and put an end to the US obsession for the “Arab springs”, which were destabilizing as never before. However, now that there are multiple actors on Syrian territory, Putin wants to manage relations with everyone and with the utmost care, considering that his primary goal is currently not to accept a simultaneous clash with many opponents.

Other problems for the Russian strategic decision-making are to avoid the clash between Iran and Israel passing through Syria, but not only on Syrian territory, as well as to limit the Turkish, Kurdish and even Syrian expansion on Syria’s northern border – a situation that would no longer enable Russia to manage military equilibria  with a minimum effort.

However, what are Turkey’s real regional aspirations?

 Firstly, there is the stabilisation of Syria, and not just for the Kurdish issue. Secondly, there is the Eastern Mediterranean region and finally the Turkish positions in the Black Sea region.

 The Kurdish issue, which is well clear for Turkey, is related to its awareness of having to control its East without problems: if there are opposing forces in the Turkish expansion line towards Iraq, Syria and Central Asia, the deep core of Turkey’s current foreign policy disappears.

 There is also the energy issue, considering that Turkey buys most of its oil and gas from Russia and that it wants to play a decisive role in the new extractions that are being prepared in the Eastern Mediterranean region, between Cyprus, the Lebanon, Israel and Greece.

 Turkey is hungry for foreign investment and this must also be taken into account when defining the Turkish strategic equation.

 Turkeys’ recent purchase of the Russian S-400Triumfmissile and defence systems (NATO reporting name: SA 21 Growler) places Turkey in the position of having to rebalance its military relations with the United States but, in the Black Sea area, Turkey’s and Russia’s interests tend to conflict.

As stated above, the relationship between Russia and Turkey was born from the Turkish perception that the United States is somehow involved in the 2016 attempted coup.

Moreover, Russia wants to take Turkey out of the NATO geostrategic environment, both through the sale of weapons such as the S-400 and with the wise exacerbation of tensions between Ankara, the EU and the USA.

 All potential breaks that will not occur. President Erdogan still has his own European policy in mind and has no interest in definitively abandoning the USA just now that – with President Trump – the United States is showing its desire to move away from NATO’s European axis, but certainly only to a certain extent.

Turkey is not so much interested in this axis.

With specific reference to Syria, Russia has so far shown it wants to keep the Kurds in their traditional areas, without changing the borders of Iraq, Syria and Iran.

 On the contrary, Russia – which has not yet a formal relationship with the Kurdish YPG, i.e. the “self-defence force” of the Kurdish community – wants to create a sort of autonomy agreed between the Kurds’ Rojava in Syria and Bashar al-Assad’s government – a special autonomy guaranteed by a new future Syrian constitution.

It is also extremely important to note that Russia is the second economic partner of Turkey, immediately after Germany, while Turkey is only Russia’s fifth largest trading partner.

 In 2018, the last year for which data is available, trade between Turkey and Russia increased by as much as 37%, while Turkish exports to Russia alone increased by as much as 47%.

 Not to mention the planned renewal of the Turkish Stream Project, the natural gas transport line going from Anapa, near Krasnodar, Russia, through the Black Sea, up to Kiyikoy, on the Thracian coast of Turkey.

We should also recall the Turkish-Russian project for the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant.

 For the time being and also for a long time in the future, Turkey will not leave NATO.

In terms of structures, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is not even comparable to the traditional network of the Atlantic Pact.

 The three factors that make full security and defence cooperation between Turkey and Russia difficult are respectively the still important presence of Turkey within NATO, the Ukrainian crisis and finally the Russian annexation of Crimea.

With specific reference to the purchase of the Russian S-400s, Turkey maintains that this stems from the particular difficulty of acquiring the new Western weapon systems, but Russia has not offered any co-production of its advanced weapons to Turkey.

 If Turkey could decide quickly and well on the F-35s, the new Patriot missiles, and on some co-productions of weapons with the West, it would certainly know how to get out of the agreement with Russia for the S-400s tactfully, without even severely undermine its relations with Russia.

 As to the energy trade between Turkey and the Russian Federation, the former depends on the latter for 55% of its natural gas requirements and for 12% of its oil ones.

It is not possible, however, to easily replace imports from Russia.

Moreover, Turkey exports most of its oil and gas imports from Russia to the EU. In this sector, it is second only to Nord Stream’s Germany.

 Moreover, a joint financial fund has been established between Turkey and Russia to organise their bilateral relations.

 Turkish leaders argue that this fund strengthens local currencies against the US dollar.

It is probably true.

The Fund, however, also serves to support Turkey’s true and traditional vocation to become the great oil hub from Russia, but also from the Middle East and the Caspian Sea to Europe.

 This is the reason why Turkey entered Syria.

 This is one of the necessary keys to rationally interpret the Syrian issue.

Currently Turkey’s primary strategic interest is to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas, but also to increase its clout as a necessary transit area for all energy trade from the Middle East and from the Russian Federation.

 In 2003, the Blue Stream completion multiplied Russian gas exports to Turkey.

 The future Turkish Stream will bring 15.75 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkey to Southern Europe within 2020.

 Russia wants to build two parallel lines, at least for the first phase.

 Obviously one for Turkey alone, and another one only for Europe.

In the Black Sea area, the USA has so far counterbalanced the Russian Federation only through Atlantic Alliance’s operations.

NATO’s presence in the Black Sea area is fundamental also for Turkey, which mainly fears that the Black Sea will become a “Russian lake” – just to use President Erdogan’s words.

Even before the war in Syria, Russia has been using Sevastopol for actions towards the Eastern Mediterranean region and this is certainly not good for Turkey.

 Moreover, at the time, Turkey favoured NATO’s institutional rooting in the Black Sea, by means of a task force between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Germany with the U.S. tactical support.

 The project, however, failed.

Nevertheless, the Russian military presence in Syria, Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in the Crimean Peninsula, continues to fuel the Turkish fears of Russian encirclement.

Turkey, however, also avoided supporting the Western sanctions for the annexation of Crimea and Donbass, for obvious reasons of expediency, but it carried out a careful and subtle action against the Russian annexation of Crimea and for the protection of the local Tatar minority.

 Turkey is also a direct competitor of the Russian Federation in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Here Turkey has operated in connection with the European Commission to create the Southern Gas Corridor, also operational as from 2020, which will bring resources from the Middle East and Central Asia (and especially from the Caspian Sea) to the EU countries.

Since 2015 Turkey has also been supporting Georgia’s adhesion to NATO, while preserving its special relationship with Azerbaijan – a country with which Turkey signed a Strategic and Mutual Aid Agreement in 2010. Here the issue of the structural contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan comes to the fore.

 As is well known, Russia supports Armenia, as it already did at the dawn of the Cold War.

The Russian Federation, however, also sells weapons to Azerbaijan, with a view to favouring the success of the Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan Initiative.

There is also the long-standing and unresolved problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, a low-intensity conflict that has been lasting with ups and downs since 1994.

 In this case, nothing has been decided yet in the relations between Turkey and Russia.

 Turkey, however, will keep on strengthening its relations with the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless, Turkey will never establish a stable strategic relationship with Russia, to the detriment of its participation in NATO as the second force after the United States.

 Also in the case of Italy, we will need a broader and naturally complex vision of the international relations and the national interests of Turkey and the Russian Federation itself, which are not the strategic monoliths that many Italian decision-makers unfortunately imagine.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Middle East

Iran crisis: A high-stakes bet on who blinks first

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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Two sets of US government cables suggest that Iran hawks in and outside the Trump administration appear to have the upper hand as European countries give hardliners a helping hand by attempting to force Iran to seek a diplomatic solution to a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in yet another military conflict.

Disclosure of the cables advocating a military strike such as this month’s killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani coupled with the withdrawal of a US State Department olive branch that was intended to reassure Iran about the Trump administration’s intentions appear designed to persuade the Islamic republic to back away from its strategy of gradual escalation.

The strategy aims to engineer a situation in which a return to negotiations on the basis of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program is the only way to avoid an all-out war. The Trump administration withdrew from the accord in 2018 and has since imposed ever harsher economic sanctions on Iran.

Hardliners in Washington believe Iran’s accidental downing of a Ukrainian airliner that sparked anti-government protests days after millions of Iranians came out to mourn Mr. Soleimani’s death in what Iranian leaders project as a rallying around the regime is a proof of concept of their approach.

The hard-liners’ strategy was spelled out in a series of unclassified memos sent by David Wurmser, a close associate of John Bolton, while Mr. Bolton was serving as national security advise to President Donald J. Trump. The memos projected a US military operation on the scale of the killing of a Mr. Soleimani as a way of destabilizing the government in Tehran.

Mr. Wurmser’s advice was in line with proposals for destabilizing Iran presented to the White House by Mr. Bolton in the months before his appointment. Mr. Bolton was fired by Mr. Trump in September of last year.

“Iran has always been careful to execute its ambitions and aggressive aims incrementally to avoid Western reactions which depart from the expected. In contrast, were unexpected, rule-changing actions taken against Iran, it would confuse the regime. It would need to scramble,” Mr. Wurmser wrote.

 Such a U.S. attack would “rattle the delicate internal balance of forces and the control over them upon which the regime depends for stability and survival… Iranians would both be impressed and potentially encouraged by a targeted attack on symbols of repression,” Mr. Wurmser added.

The leaking of Mr. Wurmser’s memos coincided with a cable from the State Department to US diplomatic missions worldwide that walked back an instruction earlier this month by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to limit contacts with Iranian opposition and exile groups in a bid to reassure Iran that the Trump administration was not seeking regime change in Tehran.

The Pompeo cable seemed to be a first step at bridging the gulf of distrust between Washington and Tehran that makes a resolution of the two countries’ differences all but impossible. Iran has long been convinced that regime change is the main driver of US policy since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Mr. Pompeo’s instruction came on the heels of Mr. Trump’s decision not to respond to Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Iraq in retaliation for the killing of Mr. Soleimani.

With the government in Tehran on the backfoot as a result of the downing of the Ukrainian airliner and renewed anti-government protests, leaders of Britain, France and Germany, cosignatories of the 2015 nuclear accord, appear to be buying into the strategy of the Washington hardliners.

The Europeans, responding to Iran’s gradual withdrawal from its commitments under the accord as part of its strategy of gradual escalation, this week triggered its dispute resolution mechanism, that could put Iran’s actions on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council and lead to a re-imposition of international sanctions.

British prime minister Boris Johnson further raised the stakes by telling the BBC that he would be willing to back an as yet non-existent proposal by Mr. Trump for a new agreement with Iran. “If we are going to get rid of it (the nuclear accord), then we need a replacement,” Mr. Johnson said.

The proof will be in the pudding whether the two-pronged stepping up of US and European pressure on Iran will be sufficient to engineer a breakthrough in efforts to avert escalating tension and a return to the negotiating table.

So far, Iran’s response suggests tensions may have to further escalate before parties, all of whom do not want an all-out war, pull back from the brink.

In a first, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, insisting that all foreign forces should leave the Middle East, warned, in response to the European move and statements, that British, French and German troops may be in danger.

“Today, the American soldier is in danger, tomorrow the European soldier could be in danger,” Mr. Rouhani told a Cabinet meeting.

Said a Western diplomat, spelling out European thinking: “This allows us to buy time while making clear to Iran that they cannot continue on this path of non-compliance with no consequences.”

For now, it’s a high stakes poker bet on who blinks first.

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Middle East

Assassination of Qassem Solemani: Strategic American Re-course

Sisir Devkota

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For Iran, international sympathy dissolved all very quickly. Ukrainian International Airlines 752 was downed by a surface to air missile; moments after it took off from Tehran. Such is the nature of modern news coverage; the crash did not find space until Tehran admitted a catastrophic mistake on its part. Victims from flight 752 had to wait until the next morning for attention after crash; President Trump made a stride towards de-escalation while the Canadian Prime Minister first declared that Iran was behind the blunder. Events swung dramatically, in a span of few days, sympathy turned into protests; Iranian people found their government more hostile than foreign forces. For years, the West has continuously manufactured a troublemaker tag for the regime; latest events have testified the “rogue-ness” of a nation that now stands at crossroads.

In its own words, an admission of “unforgivable mistake” was quickly judged as an act of de-escalating the US-Iran rift. Both Iran and the United States dusted it off very well, the Islamic regime claimed that revenge had been sought without killing a single soldier, whereas the US determined such events as Iran’s giving in gesture. For both countries, the fate of flight 752 came as a surprising sacrifice to help situational matters. Iran’s acceptance went well with other western nations; unlike how the Russians dealt with a similar tragedy, the regime can be looked upon as a lesser aggressor. If decades of experience of dealing with Khomeini successors did not warrant its intentions; it has now. Iran can be deemed as a satisfactorily peace-seeking nation. Rusting military expertise with a heightened sensitivity to claim a safe spot is a valid evidence. Adding to it, the unusual combination of hollow threats and the agility to escape a challenging situation, satisfactorily distinguishes Iran from a terrorist network. Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran has promised to punish the culprits in an attempt to save faces.

Months before his assassination, Qassem Solemani himself testified numerous escapes from Israeli air raids. In May 2019, the United States had officially ordered its equipped battleships to raid the Gulf, in order to scan Solemani’s whereabouts. The military leader was not killed in hesitation; his assassination plot lived on a wishful ambition that President Trump eventually delivered. Hence, the outpour of millions at his grave. Solemani was prized by his regime; his skills, leading to strategic warfare was exceptional. The fact that the United States finally got his blood, sent shockwaves into Iranian administration. It was exceptional but more so an intolerable truth to swallow.

Such was the euphoria leading to his death, more than his crimes being highlighted, global attention drifted to the legitimacy of killing a leader on a foreign soil. Circumstances arrested significant nations from taking sides; the standoff witnessed how divided the world really has become. Tensions between an uncharacteristic Trump administration and the untamed Iranian regime was well anticipated; the possibility of it happening anytime soon was not. For many decades, the American leadership had safely ignored Iranian adventures; Iran had successfully become a policy hallmark in the Middle East. Unlike other Middle Eastern regimes, Iran came across as thoughtful, rational and co-operative at times. That dynamics has now changed, Iran will no longer sleep peacefully over past trade-offs with the United States. Luckily, for President Trump, his Iran card has bolstered for good. The events that led to Solemani’s death has penetrated into Iran’s deeper problems, like its military capabilities. Next time when Iran speaks, the world will realize its shortness of breath. Next time when President Trump tweets, the world will take him seriously, more than ever.

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Middle East

2020 Forecast: Revealing the Future of the Middle East

Maria Al Makahleh

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Authors: Maria Al Makahleh (Dubovikova) and Shehab Al Makahleh*

“When I thought I had already reached the bottom, they knocked from below.”-Stanislaw Jerzy Lec

This quote of the polish aphorist and poet of the 20th century, Stanislaw Jerzy Lec, serves as a perfect epigraph to this in-depth 2020 forecast and ideally characterises the last 5–6 years of the developments in international relations and the crash of most of the “cautious optimism” that has ever been expressed within this period. Pessimists are the winners of the epoch in terms of prediction. Every time it seems that things can not get any worse, they actually get much worse. Thaws in conflict and progress that might take place on individual tracks are unreliable, uncertain, weak and very temporary. Additionally, they frequently end up with no concrete and significant results.

The system of international relations remains relatively chaotic. Nonetheless, there are stand-alone attempts to systematise it in a way or another at certain regional levels, especially while talking about security issues and the need to tackle the growing security challenges. The establishment of collective security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the reformation of collective security in Europe were discussed frequently in 2019. Emphasis was made on the clear understanding in global decision-making circles that the ongoing earthquake can only be weathered with minimal losses if there are attempts to keep at least some of its fragments relevant and solid. However, none of the players can put words into real action due to growing contradictions, even between “natural” allies. These contradictions keep growing as old paradigms are collapsing under the pressure of disillusionment and new challenges created by ill-management and populism.

These rising divergences with growing contradictions and decrease of common ground between international players will lead to a rise in confrontation. At the same time, the parties will be running out of diplomatic or non-violent approaches to deal with the contradictions, while pushing for decisive steps could spark violence.

General Global Overview

The year 2020 will be the most challenging and dramatic year since the beginning of the 21st century. It will be crucial in terms of shaping the world for the upcoming 20–25 years, laying the foundation for the emergence of a new system of international relations through the collapse of the elements of the latter one.

The rise of protest activities marked 2019. This tendency will gain momentum in 2020, leading to the collapse of individual governments and coup d’états, as well as plunging countries into the chaos of rising protest activities. This affinity will not be only limited to the rugged regions but will be standard for well-developed countries as well. Global confrontation will be on the rise, making international relations more explosive than ever before. Tension within societies is rising, while the governments are incapable of tackling them timely and properly, as they follow outdated principles poorly adapting to the dynamically changing world. Plus, according to statistics, there are already specific markers alarming that the world economy is moving quite fast to the new financial crisis that will impact all economies.

The heat in the Middle East will rise not only in terms of climatic changes but as well due to explosively increasing challenges in the regions, most of which are unsolvable.

The upcoming year will be more violent, and there is a high probability of triggering new global conflicts.

One of the main areas of global developments will be the Middle East. The Middle East was finalized 2019 with many countries on the brink of economic and political volatility.

Since the youth form more than 70 per cent of the population in the Middle East, increased access to the Internet and social media networks will provide them with direct information from the source. This will put some despotic regimes in the region at stake, as new mechanisms of demonstrations and protests will be orchestrated beyond governments’ capacities. Intelligence bodies in these states will fail to control digital media where the activists will call for rallies to save the jobless youth, fight gender parity and secure the rights of minorities, accelerating social and political transformation.

Middle East 2020: Political and Economic Forecast

Governments and institutions will face significant challenges in the coming few years, mainly in 2020–2021 as the world order and global trends undergo a major restructuring process. It is expected that all Middle Eastern regimes will experience snowballing tensions with mounting types of terrorism and the ability of strong, asymmetric and non-state actors to negatively affect the world order and the global balance of power.

Moreover, the social contract between Middle Eastern communities and governments would collapse and fail as people will call for meeting further their economic and social needs, security and prosperity (at a time when populism is rocketing in the West), thus threatening the whole world order. The tension between the ruling elites and citizens will reshape regional political geography.

With conflicting principles of superpowers, the Middle East will undergo a high risk of conflict in spheres of influence between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other rising regional powers which seek to play a pivotal role in local and global affairs, attempting to shape the multipolar world.

The persistence of conflicts and the absence of real effective political and economic reforms will not reduce poverty as oil prices are not expected to return to the oil boom levels, forcing governments to limit cash payments and subsidies.

Social media is likely to become the key source of revolutionary activities and off-line coordination again, forcing the governments to shut down the Internet as an instrument of cracking down the protest movements. Though taking into account growing public dissent, these measures will become less effective and in the opposite will become dangerous and counterproductive, leading to broader civil uprising.

Polarisation vs Pluralisation in the Mena

Tenacious social and economic disparities over the coming years will inexorably be cemented by empowering sectarian, ethnic, ideological, regional and tribal identities. This might lead to a new wave of the Arab Spring, similar to what was witnessed in the cases of Syria and Libya, as well as Yemen. In the cases mentioned above, regional powers supported by global forces acted to instigate differences to reap more benefits. This was done by dividing these countries in order for the industries and economies of some of these regional and global powers to flourish. By 2021, it is also expected that the Islamic camp, which groups Muslim nations, will be fragmented, bringing about other Islamic camps in the Far East and Central Asia, as well as Africa, to compete with the Islamic camp led by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the competition will not be limited to a confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis, but we will also see the growing power struggles within the Sunni political-religious camps (Turkey — Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Nigeria and Indonesia). Another split will be between countries backing moderate Islam and those claiming to support moderate Islam, but in reality funding extremist cells.

In 2020, the assiduous fading of state bodies in many Middle Eastern countries will craft favourable environments for strengthening domestic and international collective identities. By the same token, despotic political regimes still ruminate miscellany as key to power and feebleness. Such undemocratic Middle Eastern governments will proceed further with the unstated or uncluttered split of minorities, disregarding the opposition blocs and activists.

Proxy Wars and Protest to Escalate in the MENA

The conflict between Saudi and Iranian agents will continue in some countries in the Middle East. Although the Iranians proved to be more skilled in this competition, the Saudis count on American support. Washington will continue to escalate pressure on Iran using Europe as a springboard for further sanctions on Tehran and Iran would probably consider future moves using its proxy agents similar to Abqaiq refinery attack in Aramco.

Political instability will continue to hit the Middle East region. While the protests in Iraq and Lebanon will continue to achieve their goals with international support. Many demonstrations will be fuelled in other Middle Eastern states starting from Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, and some Gulf nations. As pro-Iran forces control Iraq and Lebanon, Tehran is likely to persuade its allies to make some concessions. This will require the efforts of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps to intervene when ordered.

Thus, three main focal points will prevail in 2020:

First: the impact of global economic trends on domestic politics; the influence of regional power struggles on unresolved conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya. In many ways, these dynamics are interconnected and feed into one another. However, evidence of increased contact with Russia by countries like Egypt and Jordan should be taken in the context of the US disengagement from the region, which began during the Obama administration, and concern about the Trump administration’s disorganised, chaotic foreign policy. Furthermore, if the US administration announced the “long-awaited for the deal of the century”, this would push many Middle Eastern countries which have no peace deal with Israel to reconcile and naturalise ties even if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved based on the Arab Peace Initiative (adopted in Beirut Arab League Summit).

Therefore, the Middle East will witness demonstrations in a number of countries, but without a regulatory framework to bring about regime change. Besides, economic conditions will aggravate, leading to more tensions.

The Three Core Sub-Regions of the Middle East

The Fertile Crescent (The Levant and Iraq)

Some experts believe that different paths will prevail in the sub-region of the Middle East: North Africa, the Gulf and the Fertile Crescent (the Levant and Iraq). The focus will be on resolving the Syrian crisis with the victory of the Assad regime and allies. Yet, Russian-Turkish ties will be affected by Russian-Syrian-Iranian intervention near the Turkish border. The threat that this would impose on the Turkish armed forces could spark a proxy war in Syria or at least in the North-West of the country.

Lebanon and Iraq would undergo a state of great internal turmoil that could either consolidate Iran’s power in both countries or lead to civil war by forming a techno-political government that consists of both former politicians and technocrats.

Having become the battlefield of the US and Iran, Iraq is risking to plunge in into severe instability and insecurity due to regional and international intervention in its internal affairs. It has been evident that when the Iraqi parliament asked the Americans and the international coalition to withdraw from Iraq, the Americans delinked the request, in a sign that whenever American military bases are present in countries, such states will have no independence or sovereignty to say no to the American who have the upper hand in these countries politically, economically and militarily. As Iraqi example shows, with the Americans threatening Iraqi government with sever sanctions Baghdad does not withdraw its request to the international troops to pull out of Iraq, it is clear that the first penalty on Iraq would be imposition of economic and financial sanctions that would badly affect economic activities and cause many financial and political issues in a bid to twist the arms of politicians and decision-makers in Iraq to reconsider their relationship with Iran and to ask Iranian troops to pull out of Iraq rather than asking the Americans.

In Iraq, there is little prospect of establishing a stable and popular government that can address the population’s genuine social and economic concerns, put an end to corruption and limit any foreign presence and interference in the country. Instability will generate violence; government hardship will fuel discontent and could herald the return of terrorist activities in Iraq as many countries prefer the country to be under the continued threat of jihadism, guaranteeing Iraqi’s allegiance to the West and the the US in fearing the repetition of the scenario of a strong Iraq of 1980s when the Iraqi army was one of the top ten world armies and used to have a say in political roadmap of the Middle East region, mainly in the GCC states.

Experts forecast that Jordan’s 2020 outlook will be promising as it is not involved in regional tensions. Although Jordanian diplomacy keeps walking the Middle East tightrope policy, the country closely monitors extremist factions and terrorist group leadership which seek to restore their power and evolve into a stronger caliphate relying on social media networks to recruit members and launch attacks. Jordanian Israeli bilateral relations will be tense because of Israel’s intransigence concerning the Palestinian issue, East Jerusalem and the expectation that the Israeli government would annex the Jordan Valley, exerting more pressure on the Palestinians in this region to move to Jordan, causing huge burdens on the Jordanian regime.

Syria will see national reconciliation due to internal and external dynamics paving the way for this end. Yet, Syria will not return to its pre-2011 state, as the Syrian regime will think twice before planning and acting to serve the people, businesses, and new generations which have lived the war and offered sacrifices. In the meantime, Moscow and Tehran will try to make sure that their interests in Syria are not shaky after all the sacrifices both countries have made to protect the regime and keep Syria united. The draft constitution proposed will be approved based on the partial decentralisation of power, which could lead to the return of many refugees from European and Arab countries.

North Africa

North Africa will have significant turbulence, and many North African states will be on the verge of violence starting from Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Western Sahara due to the flow of terrorist fighters from other African states. The only two countries that would be safe from terrorism and violence in north Africa are Morocco and Tunisia. In contrast, others will face waves of terrorist activities emanating from Mali, Nigeria and Somalia and Chad. The second version of the Arab Spring will spark in Lebanon and Iraq, then move to Algeria and Egypt for political and economic reasons. The outcome of regional and international interference and intervention in the Libyan affairs would backfire on its neighbours and further terrorist groups will arise, benefitting from international and regional rifts and disputes to settle down key conflicts in Africa where Iran, Turkey and some GCC states will have a proxy war that would split some of these countries based on conflicts of interests.

The GCC

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will continue to focus on tensions between some of their countries, Iran and Turkey. All of this depends on who will win in the coming American presidential elections in 2020. The next round of Israeli elections in March 2020 will help the GCC states take their final say about their political interests once Benjamin Netanyahu become the prime minister of Israel.

Yemen

The primary conflict in the Gulf now is Yemen, and the way to end it is problematic for the parties involved since the war in Yemen is not de-escalating as the gap between the warring parties remains wide and, in some respect, unbridgeable. Yemen will continue to be a war zone, and the Houthis will act to have the upper hand in north Yemen, rejecting any dictated agendas to resolve the conflict as their war with other parties and countries is a “to be or not to be”. KSA and the UAE will try through some agents to target the leader of the Houthis Abdul Malek Al Houthi to abort the dreams of the Houthis to have their political and military power in Yemen and in the region. Simultaneously, the Houthis will increase their targets in both KSA and UAE and this time by targeting entities of civic services to convey stronger messages to their leaderships.

Kuwait

In Kuwait, there is a new government, and new parliamentary elections will be held in 2020, paving the way for the country to have further democracy. Yet, the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would reflect on Kuwait as the Kuwaiti community is divided between both regional powers. Regarding the Sultanate of Oman, the country will continue to act as a bridge between Tehran and the GCC countries, the European countries and the US, working actively with Riyadh to put an end to the war in Yemen. However, success depends on how much effort the new Sultan Haitham bin Tarek can put into resolving these regional tensions: the Yemen war and Iranian-Saudi tension and whether he is going to follow the path of the previous Sultan. The new Sultan of Oman is to a great extent a replica of Sultan Qaboos’ policies.

Qatar

The Qatar crisis will be not solved as the recent meeting in Riyadh for the GCC was attended by the foreign minister, and there are no indicators that the dispute will be settled any time soon due to Doha’s steadfast stance. Moreover as the recent regional developments indicate that Qatar is trying to approach Iran at the expense of its GCC neighbours in order to be an alternative business hub if war erupts between Iran and the US with its other GCC allies. Furthermore, Qatar intensifies its contacts with Iran and broadens its cooperation in a bid to advocate itself later on as a mediator between Iran and other parties. And this will likely strengthen Qatari position in the region in 2020.

UAE and KSA

Any military intervention in the Gulf, if any, will not probably start before 2020 due to the many international events and meetings in the GCC countries. The UAE will host the World Expo in 2020, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will host the G20 in Al Khobar at Aramco’s compound which it considers as an important playground to promote for itself and its modernisation in the framework of its 2030 Vision it is implementing with much effort. The year 2020 also marks the start of the countdown to the implementation of reform programs in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for 2030 (Kuwait is 2035 and Oman 2040) based on the achievement of the sustainable development goals of the United Nations Development Program. All of these programs hinge on the stability of the Gulf region, as any regional war would destroy all these plans and projects.

Kuwait

The health of Kuwaiti emir Sabah al-Jaber al-Sabah is in critical condition and this would increase the rift over the coming ruler of Kuwait in 2020–2021, leaving all options open for the Islamists to have a big say at the political scene of the country. Though the country is deemed one of the most advanced in the Gulf region politically as the emirate has an elected parliament with true democracy and free press, many neighbouring countries turn Kuwait into a satellite state. This will mark the coming era which will witness many Kuwaiti liberals, calling for safeguarding the country from any foreign interference.

Bahrain

As for Bahrain which is almost connected in its domestic and foreign policies with Saudi Arabia, it is slated that Manama will proceed further with the current trend of policies which would affect its relations with other GCC states at a later stage including those with Oman and at a later stage with Iraq due to the strong connections between Iraqi military groups with those in Bahrain whom Bahrain would accuse of tampering with its security and stability.

Other Key Players

Israel

Some important geopolitical trends in the region will be marked by March 2, 2020, with a new round of Israeli elections which would decide the future government of Israel. Indicators from Israel reveal that once Benjamin Netanyahu wins in the coming elections, he will announce the annexation of the Jordan Valley to Israel and this will adversely affect Israeli-Palestinian relations and Israeli-Jordanian relations, as this move violates the terms and articles of both Oslo (Palestinians and Israelis) and the Wadi Araba Agreements (Jordanians and Israelis). This would be at a critical time the threats of a regional war with Iran that would break out any moment as of summer 2020 after the American and western sanctions on Iran weaken the political regime and turn the Iranians against their rulers. thus, some GCC states will find it suitable to announce open normalisation of ties with Israel regardless of any Israel announcement with regard to the annexation process of the Jordan Valley as part of the so-called «Deal of the Century». The result will have an impact on the speed of development of relations between Israel and the GCC nations; Jordan and the Palestinian National Authority will feel marginalised or betrayed by other Arab states. Furthermore, Iranian comportment in the Gulf region (the increasing activities of Iranian naval forces) and Hezbollah in Lebanon will be taken seriously by Israel due to reluctance of the US administration to take military action against Iranian forces as Hezbollah will act even if by carrying out limited skirmishes that would lead to kidnapping some Israeli soldiers for further political and military concessions from both the Americans and the Israelis.

Iran

After the downing of the Ukrainian jet by Iranian forces, Iran has lost its fora and relatively privileged positions which Tehran has gained after killing of Qassim Soleimani which was a violation of international law. With the downing of the jet, Iran has lost the pretexts to act against any military provocations from other countries, fearing international outrage.

The general elections will be a sideshow for the vast majority of the population. But a more conservative and hard-line group will likely return to parliament to form a majority unless external interference is resorted to in order to affect people’s will, leading to further demonstrations and protests not only against the regime but also against its political elites and the Republican Guards who mostly control the country’s economy. On the other hand, there would be pro-government demonstrations and this would lead to direct clashes between both camps.

Furthermore, the so-called reformist/centrist/pragmatic camp would have a chance if regionally and internationally supported to change the pendulum of politics, especially after Iran has announced its pullout of the nuclear deal. Thus, the Western countries would find it easier to negotiate with a reformist camp rathe than to a rightist. Tehran and Washington are unlikely to make rapid progress, such as removing all sanctions in time. Therefore, the pressure of sanctions will continue to shape the Islamic Republic’s policies at home and abroad, and Tehran’s failure to protect its vulnerable population from harsh sanctions will lead to more unrest, violence and the erosion of the Iranian regime’s legitimacy. The sanctions have primarily secured the regime’s policies, and this is unlikely to change in 2020 if there are no improvements in Iran’s economic conditions and a radical change in the mindset of the American administration.

Turkey

Turkey’s sway in regional affairs will increase. Turkey will continue to play the double Dutch foreign policy cunningly between both Western and Eastern camps to secure their national interests domestically and externally. Turkish President Recep Erdogan will continue his repressive policy against any Kurdish state by the borders with Turkey as this will have problematic political developments. Yet, the political landscape in Turkey will be very critical with the Republican People’s Party (CHP)’s Ekrem Imamoglu, Ali Babacan (who was former prime minister) and former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu will nominate themselves for presidential elections against Erdogan in the coming elections.

Erdogan is playing all political games with regional and international powers that serve him and his party. He is cautious when dealing with Russia, but in 2020 Russia will become Turkey’s key ally, though Ankara had been keeping Moscow before as Plan B for next scenarios against any American threat against political regime. Cooperation of Moscow and Ankara will intensify shaping a kind of alliance that limits Western opportunities to have an upper hand in regional affairs.

With Iran, Erdogan is also benefitting from the energy market, using the sanctions imposed on Tehran. With Syria and Iraq, he seeks to keep pushing for buffer zones to keep his borders clear and to distance Kurds from the Turkish borders. With the approval of the Turkish parliament to send troops to Libya to support Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Al Sarraj, the Turkish seek not to lose their final base in North Africa to other regional powers, considering that the loss of a presence means the loss of influence. Furthermore Turkey states clear that it is ready to step against the US and play its own geopolitical games freely and independently. Besides, Ankara made it clear that it is ready to play a «bigger» and more significant role in regional affairs than ever.

Conclusions

The expected re-election of US President Donald Trump will continue to have profound implications on the Middle East, and the inability to predict Western actions in the region and the profound absence of a coherent policy will affect regional actors such as Turkey, Iran and Israel. Thus, the Gulf is slated to explode even without war on Iran because the whole region is divided based on each country’s national interests which contradict other states. Regarding the civil war in Libya, security will aggravate in the country, mainly in Tripoli, unless an agreement is reached among militant groups in addition to Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, the USA and Russia. The impeachment process of US President Donald Trump and the US role in the MENA region would determine the future of conflicts in many countries starting from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and the future government in Lebanon, Iraq and Algeria, Turkey and Iran. It is also expected that many MENA capitals will witness protests that would change the balance of power in the region. The outlook of the MENA in 2020 reveals that there will be a Sunni-Sunni split similar to the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

*Shehab Al Makahleh President of the Jordan-based Political Studies of the Middle East Center, Founder of the US-based Geostrategic and Media Center

From our partner RIAC

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