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Southeast Asia

A Reflection on the 2019 White Paper on Vietnamese National Defense

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Authors: Do Quynh Anh & Yang Yizhong

Among more than one dozen of the neighbor states of China, Vietnam is of special interest in terms of their mutual relations which are based upon the past legacies, current ideologies and geopolitical concerns. Henry Kissinger wrote in his work On China that “Vietnamese national identity came to reflect the legacy of two somewhat contradictory forces: one the one hand, absorption of Chinese culture; on the other hand, opposition to Chinese political and military domination from time to time. As a result, Vietnam has confronted China with unprecedented psychological and geopolitical challenge”.

This comment is not exaggerated if we look at that Vietnamese have eyed their northern neighbor with suspicion and even fear. Yet meanwhile viewed from China, a strategic nightmare of encirclement might appear if a hostile power(s) work on a coalition with Vietnam, no matter which power is, such as the United States, Japan or the Soviet Union. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, this nightmare seemed to approach rapidly because Vietnam and the Soviet Union formed allies in 1978 and then invaded Cambodia by force. In light of this, China seemed to be in an exceptionally vulnerable position as both north and south of China’s borders were threatened by a two hostile powers. The strategic encirclement of China did disappear in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed. However, with the rapid rising of China over the past decade, the United States has been more proactive and even outrageous to bring forth in 2010-11 a U.S. “pivot” toward Asia and primarily against China. Since then, the United States has openly made efforts to forge a kind of Asian-version NATO, which would cover its core allies such as Japan and Australia, but certainly Washington eyes India and Vietnam in particular.

It is self-evident that the United States has increased its FDI into Vietnam and even tried to woo the liberal leadership in Hanoi by lifting former arms embargo against the communist-regimes, previously including Vietnam. In order to persuade Hanoi to side with it, Washington has used all kinds of means from political, economic, educational, cultural and even to military to approach Vietnam. Yet, what has Vietnam responded to the United States and its strategic encirclement of China in terms of the bilateral relations and regional stability?

True, Vietnam is a weaker power in comparison to China in all the hard terms. Thus it is sensible for Hanoi to seek for a stronger power to be its strategic partner if not an ally. In light of the de facto alliance between China and Russia, which were the vital allies during the Vietnamese war 45 years ago, Vietnam is also necessary to go to the United States for help. As Stephen Walt argued, when confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Here balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing or a perceived threat. In theory and practice as well, states will select their alliance partners on the basis of whether they would ally against or with the external threat.

Taking into account all the concerns, on November 25 Vietnamese government published the2019 White Paper on its national defense and highlighted self-sufficiency and reaffirmed the consistent “Three No’s” policy. More precisely, the White Paper confirms that “Vietnam will not form military alliances with other countries, will not align with one country against another, and will not allow foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil, adding “not use force or threaten to use force in international relations.” The White Paper includes three parts: strategic context; a framework for defense policy; and the development of the Vietnam People’s Armed Forces. Yet, meanwhile the White Paper outlines a commitment to “introduce modern equipment” and continue to build defense and diplomacy ties with the international community. More other priorities are contained in the White Paper such as the requirement to continue to enhance Vietnam’s self-reliance by “building and enhancing weapons and equipment”, and to provide a level of defense investment that is “in line with the country’s economic development”.

In effect, the 2019 White Paper is seen as a sort of public diplomacy by Vietnam with a view to showing its good-will to the international community as in 2020 Vietnam will host 20 ASEAN military-defense conferences and activities, which are regarded as the primary task of Vietnam’s diplomacy for the years of 2018-20. More than this symbolic role, Vietnam is well-aware that rising U.S.-China tensions over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea have increasingly pressured other states, particularly within Southeast Asia, to choose sides. As a key maritime counterclaimant to China’s expansive sovereignty claims in the region, Vietnam in the last a few years has played a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, Hanoi has been working directly with Beijing on confidence-building measures to prevent total Chinese domination of the South China Sea. As Vietnam has worked with China to enhance mutual understanding through pragmatic cooperation between the two countries and two parties. On the other hand, Vietnam is actively pushing back against China by bolstering defense ties to major powers with a stake in maintaining the rules-based international order.

Yet, some scholars argued that the common refrain on the latter point, however, is that no one should get overly excited about Vietnam’s balancing because of the challenges inherent in its “Three Nos” defense policy—that is, no military alliances, no aligning with one country against another, and no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil. In effect, the Three Nos first made an appearance in Vietnam’s 1998 defense white paper and then reappeared in subsequent papers issued in 2004 and the most recent in 2009. The policy is also mentioned in Hanoi’s new Law on National Defense, which was passed in June and took effect on January 2019. It is quite sure that the Three Nos policy complicate the Trump administration objective, per the National Security Strategy, to bolster Vietnam ties to counter Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and broader Indo-Pacific. Growing U.S.-Vietnam defense ties in the last a few years—headlined in March by the first U.S. aircraft carrier visit to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War—appeared to stumble this past fall when Hanoi abruptly cancelled 15 defense engagements for 2019. Hanoi’s decision was probably largely the result of disgruntlement over American crusade against the communists globally, but it also was, at least in part, due to growing concerns with America’s will and capacity to resist the rise of China.

To be sure, there will always be setbacks in diplomacy, yet Vietnamese leaders are very familiar with ancient Chinese statecraft and well employed its principles to significant effect against looming external threats. Historically, they took China against France and then sided with China and the Soviet Union combating the United States, followed by using the Soviets against China. Now both China and Vietnam have realized that the next context is already unfolded between themselves, for example, Vietnam in May 2019 hosted India for an unprecedented joint naval exercise in the South China Sea. It is hard to envision any country other than China that the exercise was aimed at deterring. The same could also be argued about the U.S. aircraft carrier visit. Either way, these occurrences are likely to be relatively rare, since it is patently risky for Hanoi to fully engage in military cooperation with Washington for the sake of both the terms of ideology and national security.

Fortunately, Hanoi has been quite welcoming of many foreign naval port calls to its shores, including from the United States, India, Japan, Australia, European powers, Russia, China, and others. In light of this, Vietnam necessarily makes the engagement fit within the Three Nos policy or keeps the balance of power politics relatively quiet. If Hanoi sees a benefit in a particular defense exchange, it is also the core of classical diplomacy.

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Southeast Asia

Application of PLTU Batubara in the Perspective of Kalimantan people

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Photo: Wikipedia

Indonesia is one of the largest coal producers and exporters in the world. Since 2005, there have been many small pockets of coal reserved on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. This makes Indonesia increasingly utilize all natural resources that have existed in the ancestral lands to make coal energy sources as a Steam Power Plant (PLTU) in addition of abundance basic materials, this coal-based PLTU is considered to have better efficiency in terms of price. Cheaper and faster in process compared to other energy sources.

Behind the efficiency of coal, which is used as the main fuel, there is a process that is considered ineffective for local residents and the surrounding environment, because in PLTU, coal is burned to take heat and steam, so it can release combustion residue in the air. From this combustion residue, it will spread to aquatic plants or enter the human lungs. Coal is burned to take heat and its steam releases combustion residue in the air. The remainder of this combustion will spread to aquatic plants or enter human lungs.

In the theory, all of this has been filtered so that the smoke that comes out is not dangerous, but the reality can be different from the facts in the field.

Inside the PLTU smoke, there are pollutants which contain dangerous compounds such as mercury and other compounds such as arsenic, lead, PM 10, sox and PM 2.5. These particles stay in the air for a long time and can fly hundreds of kilometers. If humans are exposed to mercury or pm 2.5 continually, there will be asthma, respiratory infections, lung cancer and even damage to the brain, kidneys and heart. It is clear that the air environment and settlements are not good for local residents due to the danger of compound content that will threaten the health of the surrounding community, especially since the PLTU distance from residents’ settlements is not a safe distance. This is evidenced by the case that occurred in November 2018, Sangah Sangah village Kutai Kartanegara, East Kalimantan, experienced 5 houses destroyed, 11 others were damaged and the main road collapsed due to mining activities that were too close to public facilities and settlements.  

Kalimantan, Borneo, some of farmers in the suburbs of Samarinda Timur have lived for 20 years as neighbors that  are very close to the coal mines in this village. Meanwhile, according to the regulations of the minister of environment and regional regulations Kutai Kartanegara the minimum distance between mining activities and settlements is 500 M but in fact, all of the regulations are not applied. While the existence of a coal-fired PLTU has made clean water is only a history. The residents stated that they only relied on rainwater and water from the emblem that brought along the silt Previously, before there was a coal mine, the rice fields were not damaged, the environment was beautiful and safe, but the situation drastically changed since the coal power plant, residents’ crops such as rice fields and so on were exposed to mud so that they produced plants that were not of the same quality as before.

This is very unfortunate because in 1991 this village was designated as a village of rice barns with a production of 2600 tons of unhulled rice in every harvest time. Disappointment and despair began to appear on the faces of the villagers who felt the problems that were increasingly choking local residents, not only polemic about the environment and plants. The existence of a coal company and a PLTU have also claimed the lives of several villagers due to the reclamation of coal mines.

The local community certainly did not remain silent, so they filed a protest by one of the residents of Nyoman Derman from Kertabuana Village, Kutai Kertanegara Regency. Nyoman intercepted heavy equipment but was instead arrested and given a 3-month prison sentence on the grounds of disrupting company operations. When the community takes an active role to defend and protect all assets owned by the government, the government does not protect. On the contrary, this is not in accordance with the constitution of our country which upholds human rights which are emphasized in the 1945 Constitution in article 27 to article 34 of the 1945 Constitution which regulates Human Rights.

The problems do not end with environmental problems but also at the same time claiming the lives of many local residents. The excavation of ex-coal mining holes resulted in many human lives being lost, among others in 2011-2018 in East Kalimantan as a result of the mining excavation hole itself. At least, it has been claimed the lives of as many as 39 people. Between 2014-2018 nationally, there were 115 people who died as a result of mining holes

This can’t be underestimated into an ordinary problem caused by the longer, it continues to claim casualties due to 3,500 former mine pits that have not been properly filled so that it continues.

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Southeast Asia

The Impacts of the Covid-19 on Vietnam’s Workforce

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By March 2021, Vietnam has experienced 3 phases of the Covid-19 pandemic (phase 1: from March to April 2020; phase 2: from July to September 2020; phase 3: from January to March 2021), with 2,575 infected cases, 302 cases undergoing treatment, 2,234 recovered cases and 35 deaths. Similar to many other countries in the world, Vietnam has suffered serious impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic in all fields: economy, politics, culture, social life, yet the most direct influences were on Vietnamese workforce.

Major impacts that the Covid-19 epidemic has exerted on the Vietnamese workforce can be summarized as follows:

First, the impacts on the employees’ job

This was one of the basic and direct dominant impacts over others. According to the Report of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO), due to the sudden fall in the labor force in the2nd quarter, the general number of employees (aged 15 and above) in the economy in 2020 sharply decreasedin comparison to that in 2019. The number of working employees aged 15 and abovewas53.4 million people (a decrease of 1.3 million people compared to that in 2019 – arespective decrease of 2.36%). A comparison of the decrease in the number of labor force between 2019 and 2020 is shown in Figure (1). This demonstrated an obvious drop in the number of jobsfor Vietnamese workforce under the impacts of Covid-19 pandemic.

Figure 1: Labor force growth/decrease rate

Unit: %

(Source: GSO)

The Covid-19 pandemic did not only deprive many workers of opportunities for formal employment, but also left them inunemployed. To be specific: generally in 2020, the number of under-employed workers was roughly 1.2 million, an increase of 456.7 thousand people compared to that in 2019. The underemployment rate in the working age group is 2.51%. (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Number of people and underemployment rate by quarter, 2019-2020

(Source: GSO)

With animproving multilateral diplomacy and expanding international relations, Vietnam now has diplomatic relations with 189 countries and territories around the world,maintains close relations with more than 30 countries and three major countries (China, Russia, India) are comprehensive strategic partners. Economic-trade relations play a key role in the international relations of Vietnam and the country is currently considered an attractive destination for investment and international cooperation in Southeast Asia. As a result, the Covid pandemic has influenced Vietnam’s economic relations with their international partners in both ways. Approximately one third of businesses suffered shortage of input materials; the larger the enterpriseswere, the more serious the shortage was; domestic and foreign consumption markets were narrowed, export orders declined and goods circulation faced various difficulties … Due to theweak financial potentials and liquidity in the business sector, the fact thatthe COVID-19 pandemic spread with complicated progressesresulted in production delays, difficulties in production capital, with 52.8% of businesses experiencing a decline in annual business profits4 in 2020. Therefore, businesses were forced to use redundancy, unpaid job leave, shortened working hours … as temporary solutions to maintain their operation and stability.

However, thanks to proactive and creative countermeasures at all levels and decisive policies to prevent economic slowdown, Vietnam’s economy has developedits ownresilience, gradually resumed its operation under new normal conditions, becoming one of three countries in Asia with positive growth in 2020.Accordingly, the number of unemployed and underemployed workers in the fourth quarter of 2020 witnessed a sharp decrease compared to that in the previous quarters and gradually stabilized.

Secondly, the Covid-19 pandemic affected employees income

Loss of job opportunities, shortened working hours, layoffs, unemployment had direct impacts on employees’ income. According to the Report of the General Statistics Office, compared to that in 2019, the average monthly income of Vietnamese employees in 2020 decreased in all three economic sectors. Specifically: In 2020, the average income of employees was 5.5 million VND, a 2.3% decrease compared to that of 2019 (equivalent to 128 thousand VND less). Income of employees in service sector witnessed the highest decrease of215 thousand VND; followed by those in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, with 156 thousand VND. Employees in industry and construction suffered the lowest decrease, with 100 thousand VND /person/ month. This impact was clearly illustrated in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Average income of workers by economic sector, 2019-2020

Unit: million dong

(Source: GSO)

Third, the Covid-19 pandemic directly affected the employeesmental factors

When employment and income are affected, workers’ mental health will be direcly influenced too. To be specific, employees may experience frequent anxiety, pessimism, insecurity and mood swings. Results from a scientific survey showed that: only 8% of office employees and managers suffer from stress and pressure during a pandemic, but up to 86.9% of workers have feelings of anxiety, pessimism, insecurity and mood swings. This impact was most evitable among workers with children (including married or single parents), female workers, and especially female migrant workers with children.

In addition, the Covid-19 crisis created aninconsistent impact on relations among employees’ family. In particular, forsome part of employees, family relationships were greatly improved when members stayed at home and spent more time together; on the other hand, a large part had the opposite experience(more disputes, domestic verbal or behavior abuse), especially forimmigrated workers and female immigrated workers with children. This was an evitable consequence when they worried about their health and future. TheCovid-19 pandemic also increased the risk of gender-based violence. Statistics of the Central Vietnam Women’s Union showed that, during Covid-19social distancing, the number of calls from violence-suffering women to the Association’s hotline increased by 50%; the number of victims receiving rescue assistance and acceptance to the House of Peace also increased by 80% over the same period last year.

Some solutions from the Government and businesses to contribute to overcoming the impact of the Covid 19 pandemic on Vietnamese workforce

Solutions from the Government of Vietnam

Confronting serious impacts of COVID-19 pandemic on the economyoverthree consecutive phases, the Government of Vietnam actively put their focus on administrating and providing methods as well as decisive actions with the mottos: “Fight the pandemic like fighting against enemies”, “Go to each alley, knock on each door andcheck on each person”; and “dual goals” (preventing and combating the pandemics while promoting socio-economic development), “lightning-speed tracking, zoning”, “four On-sitesguidelines”(on-site commands, on-site forces, on-site vehicles and equipments, on-site logistics), withcore focus on the active role of local governments. These directions were supported by all administrative levels, branches, localities and citizens. The Government as well as their organizations called for and mobilized all social resources for the pandemic prevention; citizens and business groups actively joined hands to fight the epidemic despite numerous difficulties. (For example, when the medical lacked espiratory machines, Vingroup immediately produced their own to provide for the country).

Also since then, the Government has quickly introduced monetary, fiscal, and social security policies in order to support businesses and people during the most difficult period of COVID-19 shock. Specifically: a financial package of 180 billion VND to support business; zero-interests loans to pay wages to workers; Social protection package of 61.580 billion VND (for employees who were distanced, delayed or lost their jobs due to post-pandemic impacts); 11.000 million VND of electricity bill discount; bank loans interest rates reduction; 285.000 billion credit package for commercial banks…..These practical guidelines and measures have assisted businesses to overcome difficulties, improved perseverence, gradually normalized or adjusted their production and business plans, enhancing digital transformation and trade promotion… These activitieshave created positive impacts on stabilization of job, incomes, daily necessity and mental health of the workforce.

Second, solutions from businesses and unions

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the enterprise community quickly came up with new directions and solutionsin order tocontinue their operation duringhard time. Approximately two thirds of enterprises have applied at least one of the abovementioned solutions, trying to adapt their production activities to new normal conditions.

Demonstrating the motto“love and support”, many businesses used different combined measures, such as deferred goods payment (used by 33.3% of businesses), shared orders (used 7.9 % of businesses), barter goods (used by 3.8% businesses), customers loans (used by 2.8% of businesses) …

Besides, in order to join hands with businesses in supporting employees, government organizations, especially trade unions, constantly stand out to help workers overcome their difficulties (for example: The Trade Union of Ho Chi Minh City Industrial  -Processing Zone has organized various activities such as visiting, sending gifts, supporting funding and persuading landlords to reduce house rental, especially for female pregnant workers or those nursing a child under 12 months old …)

In general, the Covid-19 pandemic has created great impacts on all aspects of life in Vietnam, especially the workforce – the most vulnerable group facing numerous difficulties so far. However, the Government and people of Vietnam are determined and strictly follow these policies: “Joining hands to protect the workers’ interests and rights, encouraging workers to overcome difficulties together”;targeting at “dual goals” to secure stable jobs and income for employees, supporting post-Covid-19 business recovery. On the spirit of “Employees First”, the government and enterprises are unanimously determined to overcome theevitable challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic, to make Vietnam a spotlight in the region and the world in preventing Covid-19 in generaland protecting the legitimate rights of employees in particular.

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Southeast Asia

Why Indonesia is keeping a distance from the Indo-Pacific “Quartet”

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Caption: Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, along with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi held the 2nd Japan-Indonesia Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2 + 2”). in Tokyo, Japan, March 30, 2021. (Twitter/MofaJapan_jp)

Japan and Indonesia agreed to expand defense cooperation and conduct joint exercises in the South China Sea. Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi stated so after meeting with his Indonesian counterpart Prabowo Subianto. The Indonesian Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs are visiting Tokyo for bilateral talks with their Japanese counterparts and to attend the second 2 + 2 ministerial meetings since 2015. It has not been announced when and the specific location for the joint exercise

In October last year, the parties held a naval exercise in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone off the west coast of Natuna Island. Indonesia and China are at odds over the demarcation line of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, so observers believe that holding a new joint exercise there could be considered a provocation to China. Furthermore, Japan can, by all means, emphasize that it is developing military relations with its partners in Southeast Asia in response to China’s increasingly assertive policy in this region.

Japan, along with the United States, Australia and India are part of the “Indo-Pacific quartet”, one of the main regional mechanisms against China. Indonesia is unlikely to par- ticipate in this “quartet” soon, it is difficult to have such a plan at this time.

The reason is simple; the contradictions and frictions between Indonesia and China have not yet reached the point where it takes such clear anti-China move. Otherwise this will undoubtedly have a negative backlash against Beijing, and the disadvantages it causes outweighs the advantages it can take into account. Indonesian leaders understand this very well.

Compared with Vietnam, which has a much more tense relationship with China, however shows no sign of any intention of joining the “quartet”. The members “quartet” themselves have not named specific candidates for the new members of the coalition.

In the short term, There’s no such country that can enter the quartet, although the quartet itself is not always consistent, so it is difficult for Indonesia to enter this anti-China force in the near future. Indonesia is trying to balance relations between China and Japan.

This mere incident cannot be regarded as having a certain symbolic signi cance, or that Indonesia wants to join the anti-China Force with the West. Because Indonesia’s foreign policy has always insisted on seeking a balance between major powers. If it joins the United States and the encirclement of its allies against China, can be said to violate its principle, and it is not a good thing for Indonesia’s national interest in the entire region.

So, Indonesia will still maintain neutrality. China and Indonesia are very intense in the South China Sea. The dispute is an issue of maritime rights and interests in the northern waters of the Natuna Islands. Although Indonesia has long insisted on not recognizing China’s “nine-dash line” proposition and the traditional fishing rights of Chinese fishermen in the waters, it is maintaining the so-called territorial water rights.

Indonesia believes that it could be maintained by its strength. Therefore, on the Natuna Island issue, judging by some signs of Indonesia’s past behavior, it does not want external forces to intervene. All parties must eliminate interference from external forces and focus on the negotiation of “norms” involving the interests of the region, to truly turn the South China Sea into a sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation.

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