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Arab Spring and Third Wave of Democratisation: The case of Egypt

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Professor Huntington introduced the concept of the third wave of democratization in five phases. They are the emergence of reformers, acquiring powers, failure of liberalization, backward legitimacy and co-opting opposition. The third wave of democratization further focused through the lenses of modernization, social equality, mass mobilization and elite pact approach. According to Huntington, the third wave of democratization occurs with the emergent of opposition groups and indigenous sources against local power’s enforcement, particularly when there is a military regime, a one-party system, or an autocratic dictatorship. In these contexts, this essay examines Huntington’s five phases in the context of the Arab Spring in Egypt. Further, this essay examines whether what happened in Egypt can be considered as a common structure of the third wave of democratization by comparing the exploration of revolution in Syria.

Reviewing the brief history, the exploration of the Arab Spring kicked off in Tunisia following the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi. The existential crisis resonated with the revolution. Protesters marched with the slogan “The people want the fall of the regime,”to build democratic societies, all the way to Egypt to finally in Syria. In the case of Egypt, the brutal death of Khaled Said by the autocratic government of Hosni Mubarak instigated reformists to rebel against the government.

According to Huntington, the first phase is the emergence of reformers. Reformers demand change from an autocratic, tyrannical regime to a democratic, transparent government. This phase encourages the public to voice for their rights through protests, which will lead toa revolution against the existing government. Revolution instigated on January 25, 2011, in Egypt subsequently evolved to overthrow the government, which was in power since 1952. The autocratic government indicted for the enactment of Emergency Law, which extended the police power, further suspended constitutional rights, including the abolishment of habeas corpus. These acts severely condemned the validity of political subjectivity and the rule of law.

The report from the U.S. State Department in Human Rights pointed out the Ministry of Interior, State Security Investigative Service (SSIS)of Egypt and the police employed torture to extract information. According to the report, police brutality shut down all civilian protection mechanisms, led to massive human rights violations. It deterred the significance of individualism, individual autonomy and social control in the name of absolute state sovereignty.

However, it is worthy to note that the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan comments, the state sovereignty should be the relationship of an individual to the state regarding being responsible as well as responsive. That means the sovereignty is not about the state interest, but about the interest of the individuals against state actors. Schumpeter notes that the idea of sovereignty is connected with representative governance, determined by the votes of the people by fair elections (Schumpeter, 1970). In the case of Egypt, the protestors claimed that no fair election conducted in the country since 1952. The Guardian addresses that the manipulation of election results swung in every election, while the international election monitoring groups noted the high level of corruption and coercion. Blaydes articulated that “competitive electoral authoritarianism” was in place in Egypt since Mubarak comes to power.

Cook argues the parliamentary election 2010 was the initial provocation for the protest in 2011. The opposition to the Mubarak’s government claimed that the government intervened in the electoral process and restricted the opposition party to participate in the election ,both caused political illegitimacy. The action of the president to dismiss the shadow parliament further instigated the protest, with the demands for fundamental freedom and fair and transparent election. Protesters also assembled in large numbers against the excess amount of unemployment, inequality economic status, political corruption, particularly through the Ministry of Interior, and on the monopolized steel industry.

The second phase of democratization occurs when the reformers acquire power. Huntington argues that this can happen in three formats. The first format is when the autocratic dictator dies, and the successor becomes in control with more democratic indications. For example, in Libya,the Arab spring overturned the dictatorship of Gadhafi in 2011, opened an opportunity for the first parliamentary election and to draft a new democratic constitution to be approved by referendum. The second format is the power acquisition, from dictatorial ruler through a procedural based transition, where the autocratic leader asserts the transition to avoid revolution by reformed oppositions like Portillo’s concession of power to De la Madrid in Mexico. The third format would be the transition caused by the pressure from the reformers to the existing autocratic leader, eventually, cause to resign. In Egypt, the dictatorship government of Mubarak brought up to the end through the occurrence of the third way of acquiring power. Although in the last phase of the revolution, Mubarak transferred his power to the Military Council, ordered to follow his instruction, he was driven to resign in eighteen days due to the protest by the Egyptian people. The protest indicated the strong desire of the public for the change of regime and his decision prevented further insurrection.

Following his abdication, until the new government formed through a democratic election, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces governed Egypt. However, it is worthy to note, that according to Rabau, the role of the Supreme Council was an uncertain one. He noted that, although the people of Egypt accepted the newly drafted constitution in March 2011, there was a legitimate fear among the public of the role of the Supreme Council, whether it might have influenced the democratic election. Further, vagueness towards the role of the military, particularly after the election, brought further challenges in the democratization process in Egypt. That means the transition did not get accomplished the second phase of democratization, ‘acquisition of power by reformist.’

The third phase of democratization, according to Huntington, is the failure of liberalization. That means the existing government would make minor, temporary, superficial reforms towards liberalization to respond to the demand by international and domestic actors against economic stagnation or political autonomy. Saudi Arabia is a good example, where the existing government has conceded to give political rights to women by allowing them to vote in the elections in 2011, which was then seen as a minor reform to avoid uprisings in Saudi Arabia. Note, this approach is entirely different from the ideal theory of liberalization, genuinely anticipated by Gorbachev to save the Soviet Union from economic stagnation through glasnost and perestroika reforms.

In the context of Egypt, Mubarak developed the liberalization through economic and political reforms. In the economy, the establishment of a foreign exchange market lifted formal and informal restrictions on access to foreign exchange. It encouraged the private sector to involve in the economy and decreased the level of customs duties. Further, the introduction of the new Tax Law Act reduced personal and corporate taxes. These reforms increased the economic growth by7 % between the years 2006-2008 and Egypt was honoured as the ‘top reformers’ in the world in 2007.

Despite economic growth, these reforms did not raise the standard of living of ordinary people. The absolute poverty increased from 16.7% to 20% of the entire population. Further, 20% survived with less than $2 per day increased as 44% in 2009.The inflation rate rose to 11.49%, and the unemployment rate was over 20% in 2009. On the other hand, the illiteracy rate was 27% and the rate of underemployment of youth between the ages of 15-24, still at 24.8%.These indicate that the reforms were just superficial and benefited only the high-class people.

Political reforms also did not make any qualitative change in governance or the political system. The First Amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution was enacted to allow multi-candidates for the presidential election. Although the Amendment legally allowed other candidates to participate in the election, in reality, due to the autocratic power, no candidates were free to challenge Mubarak. Banning of Muslim Brotherhood from nominating a presidential candidate and the rejection of Talaat Sadat from participating in the election ultimately resulted in the seventh victory of Mubarak with 88.6%.

Second, the announcement about the removal of party restrictions to increase party independence was considered as another liberalization of reform. Nevertheless, in reality, the Political Parties Committee (PPC) was formed to decide the eligibility of every party to participate in the election and interestingly, the General Secretary of the National Democratic Party head by Mubarak appointed as the head of the PPC.

Third, Mubarak promised in the campaign 2005 to re-elect him, for restricting presidential power, power devolution to the parliament, for the judicial reformation and independency. Sharp mentions, it was seen as a real possibility to change the entire regime among Egyptian people; however, unsurprisingly, Mubarak was persistent in keeping the power himself after the victory. He further jailed his opponent, Ayman Nour. That election in 2005 made many criticisms at home and abroad. Larry Diamond points out that “Arab autocrats adopt the language of political reform to avoid reality.”Addressing the third phase, in reality, none of the reforms made by Mubarak attempted for real democracy in Egypt. Nevertheless, unexpectedly, they motivated the opposition to demand liberal improvement with greater desperation, ultimately reasoned for the ‘uprising’ of Egyptians.

The backward legitimacy and co-opting opposition worktogether in the third wave of democratization. The reformers invoke when they texture difficulty on rebel against the existing leadership. They then attempt to damage the legitimacy of the autocratic leader by co-opting their opposition by working together against the dictatorship. The collaboration could be taken place among political leaders, social groups, civil societies or military who wanted to reform the democratic government.

The demonstration was the initial stage to damage the legitimacy of Mubarak’s administration, conducted by the reformist. It questioned the validity of the existing government domestically but also rooted for severe policy changes and distinct perceptions against Mubarak’s administration internationally. President Barak Obama addressed on February 1, 2011, that “relinquishing power was the right decision, but the transition to a new government must begin now” clearly indicated the policy deviation since the protest had begun.

Protestors sought support from International Organisations as well as the Western States, including NATO alliances. Hillary Clinton, in her book, Hard Choices mentioned that she was consistently more cautious on taking the side of protestors based on their promise for an uncertain future over the autocratic in Egypt, but “swept away by idealism and approached swiftly to usher the regime of Mubarak.”The reformers then associated with the Egyptian military to takeover Mubarak’s regime by pointing out that the Mubarak cannot provide good governance for the country. This initiative ultimately offered no choice in Mubarak’s hand, forced him to resign after eighteen days of protest.

The above- analysis shows how Huntington’s five phases of democratization were put forward with the understanding of what has happened in the Arab Spring. However, the question arises that are these phases typical in every revolution, particularly in other Arab Springs. To examine this section of the essay compares the revolution in Egypt with the uprising in Syria. The purpose of this comparison is to understand common structures and virtual differences, which may lead to the conception of pseudo- democratization.

Mubarak received support from domestic and international actors throughout his regime until the reformist started to protest for the liberalization of reform. He maintained excellent economic and political relationships with regional powers and others, including Israel and the United States of America. Tony Karon comments, along with the falls of Mubarak, “a central pillar of U.S. regional strategy has become an untenable ruler.” However, after the revolution, those states were pushed to turn against Mubarak, particularly after they understood the fall of the Mubarak regime is inevitable. Although the marginal group supported the government of Mubarak to protect their prime economic, social and political positions, the religious groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, supported the revolution. It found lately that the support of the Muslim Brotherhood was not to build a democratic Egypt, but for a Sharia Egypt.

On the other hand, although the military helped the revolution, their view was to build a powerful Egypt through the powerful army – not to transfer the power to the civil government. This complexity in priority created an unbalanced situation in Egypt for the democratic transition. Further, the external actors who played a critical role in the revolution, including the United States and European Union adopted, “wait and see” approach, headed an unlikely situation for an emergent of democracy in Egypt in the near future.

Considering the situation in Syria, Assad gained support from the same kind of groups who supported Mubarak. However, the situation varied in Syria since the military throughout the process of uprising supported the Assad regime like the military supported the government of Gadhafi in Libya. Further, the reformers in Syria were not the majorities as in Egyptian insurgency; they are middle class, oppressed Kurds. Professor Humphrey articulates the war in Syria is a “proxy war” in the default position. He addressed the proxy war undermined the diplomatic approaches, and the events turned from humanitarianism towards international security when Syria used chemical weapons.

On the other hand, although international democratic actors called Assad for resignation, they could not intervene or support the reformers directly as they have occurred in Libya due to the failure of the United Nations Security Council resolution and diplomacy. Hence, the only options that were available for the international community were to bring up international economic and travel sanctions against Syria. Assad’s step down would have been possible only if the military supported the reformers. However, even if Assad would have stepped down, such an event exclusively would not have provided a solid ground to the rising of democracy if the transition period could have been long enough to open for new conflicts as in Egypt. Such events would have led Syria to get in another civil war, rather than turning into democracy.

It brings to the conclusion that although the reformers fight against autocratic governments such as in Egypt, for sustainable democratic governance, finding the root for the anti-democratic system in the past, the expansion and the institutional transformation in political and economic arenas are significant. The individual freedom, transparent election, competitive political parties and vigorous civil societies are the backbones to democratization, thus for a democratic society, ensuring such fundamentals are significant. Huntington’s five phases of democracy might be the start-up to think and evaluate the third wave of democratization in countries like Egypt and Syria. However, that cannot be the only tool to evaluate every democratization that occurred since the beginning of the Arab Spring.

Janakan Muthukumar is a young academic, currently undertakes a research project at the University of Toronto on G7 commitments on International Security. He holds an LLM in International Law from the University of London, UK and a Master in Human Rights and Democratisation at the University of Sydney, Australia. His research focuses on armed conflicts, counterterrorism and counterproliferation.

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Abraham’s peace agreements and the Chinese and Russian coordination towards JCPOA

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The Egyptian researcher, as a well-known expert in the Middle East region on Chinese Political Affairs, called for an international interview with the well-known (Bloomberg International News Agency), which is published on Friday, November 26, 2021, regarding (the role of China and Russia in the developments of the Iranian nuclear file within the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”), and its relationship with the “New AUKUS Defense Agreement”, sponsored by Washington to confront the Chinese influence, and its impact on the overall upcoming interactions.

  Considering that my mentioned interview with “Bloomberg News Agency” was going done as well with the current permanent official representatives of China and Russia in the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”, namely: the Chinese Ambassador “Wang Qun”, as (the current permanent Chinese envoy to “IAEA”), and Russian Ambassador “Mikhail Ulyanov”, as (the Russian permanent envoy to “IAEA”

   But, despite the mentioned interview was being shortened to a very large extent on the “Bloomberg News Agency Website”, due to the available limited space that has been permitted. So, the Egyptian researcher, as an expert in Chinese Politics has decided to present to all those interested around the world this comprehensive analytical file on the Iranian nuclear issue, from my own perspective and experience to understand the Chinese side in the first place and their direct thinking towards the mechanisms of response towards the (American policy of encirclement / scaling/ restriction/ containment against China). Whatever those names or terminologies are, they are all pouring into American tactical plans and strategies against China.

  Therefore, it has become imperative for all my fellows and researchers around the world who are concerned with the matter, and with the current international interactions, to try to understand and analyze these new data and developments, and bring them into the heart of the current “international equation” and the (policy of American-Russian-Chinese polarization), and then, all of us should try, as well-known international academics and scholars in our regions, to convey the point of view of all its parties. Concerning the impact of these new interactions on the future of the Middle East region and the other places and areas, and the most dangerous to me is that: “The extent of the impact of peace agreements or Israeli normalization with the Arab Gulf states on the future of Sino-American competition and influence in the Middle East”, which is leading to a comprehensive analysis, regarding:

  “The impact of the policy of American alliances directed against Beijing, especially the “New AUKUS Defense Nuclear Agreement”, and before that the “Quad Quartet Agreement” or what is known as “Asian NATO” on the developments of the Iranian nuclear file, within the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”

    Here, we find that China’s support for Tehran is one of the most important current global problems, especially in the face of US policies and the constant pressure on Beijing.  And through my careful reading of the scene in the region, especially in light of these new changes and the reassessment of international relations on new foundations, and the United States of America’s “politics of alliances” to put pressure on the Chinese side in its areas of influence, especially Washington’s signing of the new “Aukus Defense and Security Agreements” with Australia  Britain, and the Quad Quartet Agreement with Japan, India, and Australia.  In addition to my meticulous follow-up of all secret American moves and their attempt to include (Australia and Japan) in the membership of the “Nato Military Alliance”, despite this violation of the “NATO constitution” of itself, given their extreme distance from the two shores of the Atlantic and North Atlantic as one of the basic conditions for “NATO’S membership”. Then the provocative American attempt to open a (permanent branch of the NATO’S military office in the “Indo-Pacific” region – in the American sense – which includes the Indian and Pacific regions), with the aim of restricting Chinese influence in its regional and Asian areas of influence themselves.

From here, the Egyptian researcher reached a number of profound changes in the entire global scene, represented in:

    China’s intensification of its support for Tehran in confronting the United States of America in alliance with Russia to unify their decisions within the corridors of the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”, especially after the summit of the American challenge to China in its regional and border surroundings, with the signing of the “New AUKUS Defense Agreement of a nuclear nature, in violation of the terms of membership of the International Agency  for atomic energy in the first place”, and for Beijing to resort to an official complaint to the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”  against the United States of America, alleging a violation and Washington’s violation of the foundations of its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA” by sponsoring the AUKUS nuclear agreement, and the completion of the Australian nuclear submarine deal. This represents a nuclear threat to China, near its neighboring areas of influence in (the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Pacific Ocean region).

    Hence, the new connection came to my mind as an expert in the Chinese political file for many years, with profound changes in the mechanism of making and directing political decisions within Beijing after (AUKUS Defense Alliance sponsored by the United States of America and directed directly to China), then studying and analyzing the extent of its impact on the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency  “IAEA”, and even more dangerous to me is raising the following serious inquiry, on:

  (Can the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA” verify the Chinese complaint against the United States of America for its sponsorship of a nuclear agreement of “Aukus” and the nuclear submarine deal, and pass its decision to impose sanctions on the USA itself)?

   In my personal opinion, there are many changes that have occurred in the global scene as a whole, and the division of the whole world and its adoption of the policy of international alliances and polarization, including certainly China and its ally Russia, which is trying to respond to the network of American alliances to surround it with the work of new counter alliances, especially after the “New AUKUS Defense Agreement”. The Chinese side is also supporting building a network of new regional alliances related to the Middle East, throughout forming an alliance, which includes: (Turkish-Iranian-Pakistani) parties, as an attempt by  China to pressure the “State of India” by threatening its interests in the region, and thus forcing it not to cooperate and withdraw from the the “Quad Quartet Agreement”, which is sponsored by Washington to contain China, which is also called, as an “Asian NATO”.

    Therefore, China has already started planning to respond to “the policy of American alliances against it in Asia in the heart of the Middle East”, by following China’s policy of alliances and polarization of the actors in the region and hostile to Washington, especially in the Middle East, and the Chinese attempt to attract Turkey in particular.  Specifically, given its only membership in the Middle East in the (NATO’S Military Alliance), which is an opportunity for Beijing to form an alliance of countries close to the same American spheres of influence, as Washington does. Therefore, an alliance of Chinese banks, known as the “Consortiums”, expressing its willingness to lend Turkey three billion dollars, in order to finance several stalled projects in Istanbul, which can be considered analytically as (the largest financial support provided by China to the Turkish side in the modern history).

    Accordingly, we can present this new analysis on the impact of the policy of American and Chinese alliances on the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA” in the Iranian nuclear file, or the extent of its ability to exert pressures on the United States of America and its sponsorship of the Aukus nuclear defense agreement, or to impose sanctions on it, according to the official request submitted by the  China.

   Here, we can analyze that the Sino-Iranian strategic cooperation agreement for 25 years, which was concluded in March 2021, and China’s use of Iran’s card in its growing conflict with the United States of America, represents a challenge and a future problem for many countries in the region. Whatever the outcome of future developments and facts in the course of the intertwined relations between China and the United States and Iran in the future, this basically supports the reality of (the foundations of the inauguration of an era in which the United States of America does not have the keys to the main control over the Middle East, with the entry of major and pivotal players such as China and Russia). Therefore, the (multi-polarity) that China advocates is gaining tangible and realistic dimensions, and may develop to a degree that may increase the intensity of the regional competition between the two superpowers, which may exacerbate the instability that the Middle East is constantly witnessing.

    With the growing international role and influence of China and Russia in many files, whichever is (China sharing with Russia the desire to break the American hegemony over the shipping lines in the Middle East), and its most prominent indicators are (China’s pursuit of a military base in Djibouti, and its interest in conducting international shipping operations through waterways).

   China is proceeding here, according to long-term plans to challenge the US military hegemony in the region.  In addition to the Chinese ambition to maximize its role in ensuring security related to the safety of its trade, products and investments with all countries of the world within the framework of the “Chinese Belt and Road Initiative”, with China’s attempt to build new military bases both in the Arab Gulf and the United Arab Emirates to challenge the American influence as it has been circulated since a period in the Middle East, or China’s pursuit of a presence in the Arabian Sea and others, which means the importance of the Middle East in the strategy of the Cold War between the two parties.

   It is worth noting here that recent regional variables may lead to some changes, the most important of which are the “Abraham agreements for political normalization between Israel and the Gulf states, which are signed between several Arab countries with Israel, as they may have strengthened Washington’s position in the region in the face of China”, as an opposing force against the USA. Here, the United States seeks to follow (politics of mobilization and bringing together its partners to confront hostile parties, such as Iran), and then Washington benefits from the political normalization agreements with Israel to consolidate its position and ease the burden of maintaining security against the conflicting partners in the region, especially between the Arabs and Israel.

  But, the United States of America, through its current administration of President “Joe Biden” and during the period of the two previous administrations, has sent turbulent signals about (its inability to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East). Former President “Obama” hesitated at the time to intervene in Syria, and was succeeded by President “Donald Trump” that has suddenly withdrawn and reduced the American presence from it, which raised the fears and suspicions of the leading elites in the region, especially the Arab Gulf, regarding the American commitment (to ensure the security of maritime navigation and the protection of waterways in the region).

    In light of this current situation and growing doubts about the American position, especially the “Joe Biden administration’s focus on the human rights situation in the various countries of the region”, and the American administration’s invitation to the Iraqi side alone from all the countries of the region to participate in the conference of democratic countries in the world, and the current accusations by the administration of “Joe Biden” to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its involvement in the events of September 11, 2001, and demanding of huge amounts of compensations from the Saudi side. So, most of the countries in the region turned towards the other two superpowers, namely: (Russia and China), by activating the official visits with them at the highest levels, and establishing partnership rules in various fields, with  Russia’s desire and ambitions to restore its former global power during the Soviet era, and Russia intensified its military presence in Syria and Libya, as well as the interdependence of the Russian economy with many countries in the Middle East, such as: Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia (through the OPEC Plus system), and then Russia succeeded in restoring its bilateral relations with the countries of the region, and to highlight itself as a neutral mediator in the region’s conflicts. Also, China’s assistance to President “Bashar Al-Assad” against all of the Western pressures, that enabled him to continue and achieve several goals.

  The most important point for the countries of the Middle East region was that the “emergence superpowers of China and Russia in the region are peaceful and respect for the national sovereignty, and seek to maintain the status quo, compared to the USA”. In addition to the increasing interest of some countries in the region in the Russian weapons, besides, the desire of both Russia and China to push “Turkey”, as the most important member of the “NATO alliance” in the Middle East region, to play a pivotal role against the interests of the United States and the NATO’s military alliance itself.

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UAE and the opportunity for an India-Pakistan “sporting war”

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The Dubai Cricket Council chief, Abdul Rahman Falaknaz recently said that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was willing to host a bilateral India-Pakistan cricket series, provided both countries agreed. Said Falaknaz:

 ‘The best thing would be to get India-Pakistan matches here. When Sharjah used to host India and Pakistan all those years ago, it was like a war. But it was a good war, it was a sporting war and it was fantastic’

UAE along with Oman had hosted the recent ICC (International Cricket Council) Men’s T20 World cup (won by Australia). The second half of the Indian Premier League (IPL) T20 2021 was also played in UAE (both the World cup and the second half of the IPL had to be shifted from India, because of the Covid19 pandemic). One of the most exciting matches in the Men’s T20 World Cup was the India-Pakistan clash on October 26, 2021 played at the Dubai International Cricket Stadium. In spite of political relations between both countries being strained, the match was played in a cordial atmosphere. Pakistan one the contest by 10 wickets, and it was for the first time that it had beaten India in a World Cup match.

While scores and statistics relating to the match will remain only on paper, the image of Indian Captain Virat Kohli hugging Pakistani batsman Mohammad Rizwan after the match, in a wonderful display of sportsmanship, will be etched in the minds not just of cricket fans, but countless Indians and Pakistanis who yearn for normalisation of ties between both countries. The Indian captain did draw criticism on social media from trolls, but his gesture was also lauded by many cricketing fans in India.

India and Pakistan have not played any bilateral series, since 2013 ever since bilateral tensions have risen but have been playing each other in international tournaments. Significantly, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Sharjah was an important cricketing venue, which was witness to many gripping ODI cricket contests between India and Pakistan. After match fixing controversies in 2000, India stopped playing in Sharjah and as a result for some time, UAE’s importance as a cricketing venue declined significantly.

Ever since 2009 Abu Dhabi and Dubai have emerged as important cricketing centres, since Pakistan has been playing most of its home series (Tests and One Day Internationals) in UAE (after a terrorist attack on a Sri Lankan team bus in 2009, most countries have been reluctant to play cricket in Pakistan, though Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and West Indies have visited Pakistan)

Possibility of a cricket series in UAE

While it is always tough to hazard a guess with regard to India-Pakistan relations, there have been some positive developments in recent weeks; the re-opening of the Kartarpur Religious Corridor after 20 months, and Pakistan’s decision to allow a consignment of 50,000 tonnes of wheat and life saving drugs  from India for Afghanistan, to transit through its territory (the Pakistan government stated that it had made this exception, because this consignment was for humanitarian purposes). While there have been calls to revive people to people and trade linkages between both countries, especially between both Punjabs, playing a cricket series either in India and Pakistan seems unlikely at least in the imminent future.

The UAE as a neutral venue, for a bilateral series, has a number of advantages, which include not just the fact, that it is home to a large South Asian expat population (a large percentage of which consists of cricket enthusiasts), but also that matches would be played in a more relaxed atmosphere, with lesser pressure on players from both countries. UAE, an economic hub which has become increasingly cosmopolitan in recent years, has also been trying to promote local cricket and generate interest in the game amongst locals (other GCC countries like Oman and Saudi Arabia have also been trying to do the same, but UAE possesses a number of advantages vis-à-vis these countries). Hosting an India-Pakistan series will benefit the country immensely. Apart from this, if the UAE is able to convince both countries to play a cricketing series, it will also enhance not its diplomatic stock (it would be pertinent to point out, that UAE is supposed to have been one of the countries which played a part in the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan — across the Line of Control/LOC earlier this year).

  In conclusion, the revival of cricketing ties between India and Pakistan is no mean task, but it would be easier on a neutral territory like UAE, which also has a substantial South Asian expat population interested in cricket. Not only will hosting a bilateral series between India and Pakistan, help the UAE in achieving its objective of emerging as an important cricketing hub for South Asia, and enhance the country’s soft power considerably, but it will also be a big achievement in diplomatic terms. Soft power, including cricket has been one of the important components in the links between UAE and South Asia in the past, it remains to be seen if in the future, the role of soft power, via cricket, becomes more crucial in linkages between UAE-South Asia.

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Turkey’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act

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It is often claimed that Turkey made a definitive break with the West in the 2000s after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power. The argument is that by changing direction internally, Ankara turned away from what the West was hoping to achieve in terms of its relations with Turkey.

Since 2003, Turkey has indeed increased its influence in all the geopolitically important regions on its borders: the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Syria-Iraq. A general concept explaining this development can be found by looking at the map. There is no single great power in Turkey’s neighborhood which opens the door for greater Turkish economic and military engagement along its borders. Even Russia, arguably the biggest power near Turkey, could not prevent Ankara from giving its decisive support to Azerbaijan during the recent Second Karabakh War. Turkish troops, albeit a limited number, are now stationed on Azerbaijani soil alongside Russian.

The real reason for Turkey’s increasing engagement remains the Soviet collapse, though that engagement occurred over a longer period than many analysts expected. It took decades for Turkey to build its regional position. In 2021, it can safely be argued that Ankara has made a success of this venture. It is close to having a direct land corridor to the Caspian Sea (through Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan) and increases its military posture in the Mediterranean, and views northern Syria and Iraq as territories that can potentially provide strategic depth for an Anatolian defense.

A revealing element in Ankara’s foreign policy is that geography still commands the country’s perception of itself and its place in the world, perhaps more so than for any other large country. Rather than being attached solely to the Western axis, over the past two decades, Turkey has pursued a multi-vector approach to foreign affairs.

The country is on the European periphery. Its experience is similar to Russia’s in that both have absorbed extensive western influence, whether in institutions, foreign policy, or culture. Both have been anchored for centuries on the geopolitics of the European continent. Because a multi-vector foreign policy model provides more room for maneuver, economic gains, and growth of geopolitical power, both countries wanted to break free of their single-axis approach to foreign policy.

But neither Turkey nor Russia has had an opportunity to break its dependence on the West entirely. The West has simply been too powerful. The world economy revolved solely around the European continent and the US.

Turkey and Russia have significant territories deep in Asia and the Middle East, as well as geopolitical schools of thought that consider Europe-oriented geopolitical thinking contrary to state interests, particularly as the collective West has never considered either Turkey or Russia to be fully European. The two states have always pursued alternate geopolitical anchors, but had difficulty implementing them. No Asian, African, or any other geopolitical pole has proven sufficient to enable either Turkey or Russia to balance their ties with the West.

No wonder, then, that over the past two decades Turkey has been actively searching for new geopolitical axes. For Ankara, close relations with Russia is a means to balance its historical dependence on European geopolitics. The same foreign policy model can explain Moscow’s geopolitical thinking since the late 2000s, when its ties with Asian states developed quickly as an alternative to a dependence on, and attachment to, Western geopolitics.

Thus we come to the first misconception of Turkish foreign policy: that Ankara is distancing itself from the West with the aim of eventually breaking those ties entirely. Breaking off relations with NATO is not an option for Turkey. Its goal is to balance its deep ties with the West, which for various reasons were no longer producing the benefits it was hoping for, with a more active policy in other regions. Hence Turkey’s resurgence in the Middle East.

Turkey’s Middle East pivot (championed by former FM Ahmet Davutoglu) is not an exceptional development in the country’s foreign policy. During the Cold War, when Turkey’s focus on the Western axis was strong, leftist PM Bulent Ecevit promoted the idea of a “region-centric” foreign policy. The main takeaway was that Ankara should pursue diversification of external affairs beyond its traditional Western fixation, meaning deeper involvement in the Middle East and the Balkans. In 1974-1975, then Turkish deputy PM Necmettin Erbakan tried to pivot Ankara toward the Arab world. There were even attempts to build closer ties with the Soviets.

But throughout this period of reorientation, no move was ever made to sever relations with the West. Turkish politicians at the time believed diversification of foreign ties would benefit the country’s position at the periphery of Europe overlooking the volatile Middle East. The diversification would not hurt the country’s Western axis but would in fact complement it.

Contrary to the belief that Atatürk was solely interested in Turkey’s Western axis, the country under his leadership had close ties with nearby Middle Eastern states, as was necessary considering the geopolitical weight of those states at the time. Thus he hosted Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1934, and in 1937 signed a non-aggression pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy has been a hallmark of Turkish political thinking. Even during Ottoman times, when a Europe-centered foreign policy was inescapable, the sultans sought alternatives to their dependence on Great Britain and France. Following the disastrous 1877-1878 war with Russia, Sultan Abdul Hamid began a cautious balancing effort by building closer ties with Imperial Germany, a trend that contributed to the German-Turkish alliance forged during WWI.

Returning to the present day, the Chinese factor is causing a reconfiguration in Turkey-West relations. The Asian pivot brings economic promise and increases Ankara’s maneuverability vis-à-vis larger powers like Russia and the EU. This fits into the rise of Turkish “Eurasianism,” the aspirations of which are similar to those that have motivated Russia for the past decade or so.

Turkey’s policies toward the West and the ongoing troubles in bilateral ties can best be described as intra-alliance opposition. It is true that in recent years, Turkey’s opposition to the West within the alliance has intensified markedly, but it has not passed the point of no return. Ankara is well aware that it remains a valuable ally to the collective West.

Author’s note: first published in Georgia today

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