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Riots in Iran

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Protests against the petrol price rise and rationing in Iran began on November 15 in Ahvaz, when the Iranian government announced the fuel price increase up to 300%.

 They quickly spread to major Iranian cities.

 Before the enactment of this new rule, car owners could buy up to 250 litres of petrol per month, at the subsidized price of 15,000 rial per liter, for the first sixty ones, and then at the price of 30,000 rial per litre for the additional ones.

It should be noted that currently the rial is worth0.000027 euros approximately.

The riots – strangely similar to those that gave rise to the phenomenon of the gilets jaunes in France-have erupted because the rule just approved grants a subsidized price of 15,000 rials per litre only for the first 60 litres, but obliges to pay the new price of 30,000 rials per litre after this limit.

This is unsustainable for ordinary Iranian citizens, who are forced to use cars more frequently than anyone living in Western countries’ suburbs.

Hence a 300% price rise, albeit hidden, considering that all Iranians who own a car need much more than 60 litres per month.

 The riots, which also caused some victims, initially broke out in Sirjan, but later the protests spread to Mashhad, the second largest city in Iran, and to Qods, a suburb of the capital city. They were massive and the reaction of the police, of the Armed Forces and the Basiji was not long in coming.

For Iranian consumers the issue of oil rationing is part of the strategic triangulation between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States for the geopolitical management of this commodity.

 In September 2019, in fact, there were attacks with drones, probably launched from Iraq or, also, from Yemen – in the hands of the Houthi rebels, linked to Iran – which hit some Saudi wells.

There was unanimous condemnation of the attacks in the West, but there is another issue to consider. Currently, in the Arab and Islamic world, additional extraction areas are conquered. All OPEC countries do so, thus destabilizing oil producing countries and joining them to their extraction and price system.

Indeed, the right to plunder is established in the Qur’an. “The Spoils of War” is the title of the Surah 8 of Medina’s Qur’an, which establishes (verse 8) that “the decision concerning the spoils of war is for Allah and His Messenger”.

 The Prophet, however, was entitled to a fifth (khums) of any war booty, at least since the battle of Badr (642 A.D.,the Second Year of the Hijra).

As said in verse 8:41, however, the Prophet Muhammad was entitled to one fifth of all public finances of the Islamic tribe, while all the rest was to be equally distributed among the members of the war expedition.

This is one of the foundations of the specific “Arab socialism”.

 The Prophet was also granted a further part of the booty, as a member of the war expedition.

 We are talking about cultures in which war is inherent in political action and in the economy – unlike what happens in the West, which has removed the military clash from its horizon, at its own risk. We are not referring here only to jihad.

 In the case of spoils resulting from an agreement and not from a victory on the ground, the Prophet claimed for himself the entire booty, and the traditional comments on Surah8agree on stating that “all that the earth contains has been attributed by Allah to his faction”.

 Hence the productive areas left alone by the West or subject to possible ethnic, religious or political destabilization are Al Anfal, namely booty, and the Muslims share it among themselves, according to the complex Qur’anic rules concerning war and the sharing of its spoils, many of which are found in the Caliphate tradition common to both Shiites and Sunnis.

Nevertheless, the attacks launched on the Saudi wells last September 14, 2019 – with drones, because the war is to be waged with the updated techniques and technology that Allah has provided –  caused the temporary suspension from the market of as many as 5.7 million oil barrels a day, about half of the Saudi standard production.

 From the viewpoint of the old liberal theory of competition, however, Saudi Arabia has been greatly favoured by the sanctions which, since the beginning of the Shiite revolution in 1979, have thrown Iranian oil production into crisis.

 A severe distortion of the oil market that Iran tries to oppose with direct but, above all, indirect war methods – to which Saudi Arabia responds blow by blow.

In 1995, the year in which US President Carter strengthened the sanction regime, which had begun in 1979, after the revolutionary students’ assault  on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the system of sanctions implied, inter alia, the prohibition to support the Import-Export Bank for transactions with Iran; the refusal to grant any commercial license to companies that broke any trade restriction rulesvis-à-vis Iran; the ban on any loan exceeding 10 million US dollars during the year, obviously by U.S. financial institutions; the prohibition of becoming an agent for bank or debt securities issued by the U.S. government in Iran; finally a ban on all the specific goods or services included in the special list of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

 In 1997, President Clinton relaxed the sanctions against Iran as a result of the election of Khatami as President of Iran, who was considered a “reformist” by the naive Western press and, above all, a political opponent of Ahmadinedjad, the future Iranian President.

 The same man who, as a university student, had warned his colleagues who were about to attack the US diplomatic offices by saying: “We must not only show hatred towards America, but also towards the atheist and materialistic Soviet Union”.

 The sanctions imposed again by the United States on Iran – with a deliberate choice by President Trump, after the US unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 14, 2015, namely the P5+1 agreement to limit the enrichment of Iranian uranium – concern about 80% of Iran’s current oil exports.

 After the choice made by President Trump, France offered 15 billion US dollars, if Iran adhered again to the full formulation of the JCPOA prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty, certainly to favour Iran’s economic recovery, but certainly also to avoid the probable U.S. block.

Moreover, since President Trump has denounced the P5+1 Agreement, Iran’s official sources have stated that the minimum oil exports that Iran wants to maintain are 700,000 barrels a day, so as to later reach 1.5 million barrels a day, should the West still want to renegotiate the entire agreement of July 14, 2015.

 This is the reason underlying the restriction on consumption for Iranian citizens: that oil is needed to be sold and not to be distributed to Iranians at a subsidized price.

 It is said that the savings resulting from this new restrictive rule on oil consumption will benefit the poor people, but now all Iranians are becoming poor.

 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia reached 12 million oil barrels a day in 2018, well over the six million that Iran exported in its pre-revolutionary phase.

The oil market is a “seller’s market”, as we used to say when we were still studying economics in universities.

Hence, after decades of commercial impositions and Western embargoes, all the Iranian oil industries – now devoid of any technological transfer and adequate investment – have seen their production levels plunge.

 It was precisely Iran that in 1974, under the Shah’s rule, brought the OPEC price to 11.58 US dollars per barrel, equal to the current 53 US dollars.

 It should also be recalled that in 1973, immediately after the Yom KippurWar, the Iranian Shah supported Israel and hence did not participate in the embargo of the OPEC Arab oil producing countries.

 Then Iran became the fourth largest oil producer in the world, after the USSR, the USA and Saudi Arabia, with a daily level of 5.7 million barrels a day. This happened in 1977, but that level was never reached again later.

Since August 2014, however, the oil barrel extraction price has systematically fallen to the current 30%.

 According to the latest data available, the oil barrel production cost sees Great Britain ranking first, followed by Brazil and Nigeria while, coincidentally, Iran and Saudi Arabia are competing for being the cheapest oil producing country, at least as far as extraction is concerned.

Some specialized analyses, however, suggest that Iran’s extraction cost is even considerably lower than the cost currently borne by Saudi Arabia.

This is an important factor of trade war between the two countries.

Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia charge taxes on extraction, unlike the Russian Federation, currently the most taxed country among producers. The last one is Venezuela, which, apart from the current political disasters, has a very high tax burden for extraction alone.

Let us revert, however, to the economic-strategic duel between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Currently the price of Iranian oil is below the price of Saudi Arabia and of other regional competitors.

 The fact that now determines Iran’s real choices is the declared IPO of Saudi Aramco, the great Saudi oil company, a deal which is worth 1.5 trillion US dollars.

 The Saudi government plans to initially sell a small amount of shares on the Stock Exchange of the Saudi capital, before assigning at least over 5% of the company.

At the beginning of the Saudi oil company’s privatization, Prince Mohammed bin Salman hoped for a higher final value, i.e. an official pricing totalling at least 2 trillion US dollars, but it has not gone so well so far.

 Saudi Aramco’s annual net profit is about 100 billion and, at the time of the IPO, the Saudi company promised to pay annual dividends of at least 75 billion.

Later the company began a series of works for infrastructure and renewables and, above all, to redress the Saudi public debt, which has been recording a deficit since 2014.

In fact, despite Saudi Aramco’s considerable liquidity, the company took out a loan of 12 billion US dollars, all collected with long-term securities.

 Shell, however, now pays a yearly 6% of its investment value as a dividend. Hence, if Saudi Aramco were really attractive on the market, the IPO total value should fall to 125 trillion US dollars.

Furthermore, the bonds already issued by the Saudi company, are now worth 4% only. Considering that bonds tend to be worth less than the foreseen growth of equity capital, this means that the Saudi oil growth rate gets lower than that of other competing sectors. Hence, inevitably, international investors tend to see oil as a declining sector.

 If we were around the corridors of MOIS, the Iranian intelligence services, and around the intelligence offices of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, we would surely listen to considerations, ideas and proposals on the possibility of making the privatization of Saudi Aramco difficult and even a failure.

Nobody knows the exact amount of the Saudi oil reserves. This is a State secret.

Moreover, all oil companies – but this holds true also for Iran – are faced with issues triggered by climate change and the worldwide fall in demand for oil and gas.

Hence, either we proceed to theirquick replacement with far less polluting oil products – and this is the reason underlying Qatar’s new strategic autonomy – or all oil investments tend to become stranded assets.

  Therefore, in this case, the world’s investors do not place their capital in this sector, but focus on financial and productive areas with higher returns.

Also the Sovereign Fund of Norway, the largest sovereign fund in the world, is currently “decarbonizing” all its investment.

To some extent because it is fashionable and for taking a politically correct approach in the energy field, much more for a rational investment choice.

Hence, as was the case with cigarettes and tobacco products-in which the international capital is no longer interested – will the same soon happen also to oil and gas?

Therefore, if capital flight from the oil sector really takes place, while the United States is fully self-sufficient, Saudi Aramco shall separately sell other shareholdings of its oil company, even if only to fund its public budget deficit and the transformation of its domestic economy into a non-oil dependent system.

Just to put in the words of its oil Minister, Zanganeh, in Iran, however, the long embargo has turned many wells into “operational museums”.

The strategic issue, however, concerns above all the United States: in 2018, for example, in the midst of the shale oil expansion, the United States became the largest oil producing country in the world, with an average level of extraction to the tune of 15 million barrels a day.

As early as the Kippur War, following Henry Kissinger’ personal mediation, the Arab oil of the first real great post-war boom in prices was traded only in U.S. dollars, with the creation of preferential and confidential channels for investment defined in an agreement between Kissinger himself and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia.

Obviously this has greatly expanded the global demand for U.S. dollars, which has enabled it to best manage its huge trade deficit while maintaining its very low rates.

 Even today, as one of the FED Governors told his colleagues of the European Central Banks, “the dollar is our currency, but your problem”.

 The United States controls all the world’s oil flows by tracking all bank transfers.

Moreover, it still maintains its military bases in 13 Gulf and Middle East countries.

This is the essential point that explains the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

 Outside the US technological and financial cycle, Iran can only play what political scientists and economists call the free rider role.

 In contemporary political theory, the free rider is the whoever, within a group, avoids providing his contribution to the common good, because he/she believes that the group can work equally well despite his/her non-involvement.

 Free riding is literally the behaviour of those who get on the bus without paying the ticket.

 In economics, free riding is a process of underproduction or over-consumption of goods.

Currently we are basically in a situation of oil underproduction, decided by the OPEC price cartel, and also resulting from under-consumption, due to the structural decrease in oil consumption in the West, considering the great transition to renewables and the economic crisis of oil buyers.

 The goods that are usually subject to free riding are those that cannot avoid not excluding non-payers.

 The oil market cannot penalise bad payers, but the point is that it cannot even sanction those who change seller.

 If anything, the punishment is geopolitical and military.

 As Alfred O. Hirschman maintains, the free rider problem typically arises – in a cyclical way – in capitalist economies, just when a producer does not consider external costs: certainly the environmental cost in the oil and gas market, but above all the political or strategic cost connected to the goods purchased.

 This is why Shiites and Sunnis are harming each other.

 This is exactly the current condition of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, even in Pareto’s terms or of game theory.

 In the phase of Arab Springs, initially organized by the United States, Saudi Arabia – although being a U.S. stable ally throughout the Middle East – strongly opposed the operations for “spreading  democracy” staged by the United States.

 Certainly Saudi Arabia helped the Egyptian Salafists after Hosni Mubarak’s fall and later the Sunnis of various jihadist or fundamentalist origin against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Later Saudi Arabia backed almost entirely Al Khalifa’s regime in Bahrain, where the ruling class is Sunni and the great majority of the population is Shiite.

With its Islamic Awakening project, Iran instead supported and funded some strands of the “democratic” rebellion in the Middle East and the Maghreb region, above all in Egypt and Libya (Ansar al Sharia, for example, and other groups opposing General Haftar).

Hence Saudi Arabia believes that Iran has excessively expanded its area of influence throughout the Arab world, also with the Iranian support to the Palestinian groups on the Israeli border, especially after the 2006 “August war” of Hezbollah. Later there was Iran’s commitment in favour of the Yemeni Houthi and also of the rebellious Shiite crowds in Bahrain. All those operations were seen by the Al-Saud dynasty as an illicit attempt at hegemony over the entire Arab, Shiite and Sunni world.

With a view to making more oil without extracting it or being embargoed.

  Not to mention the operations of continuous destabilization that Iran pursues in the central areas of Saudi Arabia itself.These are areas that host a large Shiite minority, mainly in the provinces with the greatest level of oil extraction.

Hence if Bahrain collapses, Saudi Arabia will interpret this destabilization as the end of the cold peace between the Iran-led “Islamic Awakening” and its area of influence, not only the Shiite one.

Clumsy as usual, however, with the sanctions against Iran or through the USA, the Westerners artificially favoured Iran’s free riding.

Nevertheless, the United States has at least a real strategic interest in the region, followed, however, by the spineless EU, which anyway counts for nothing, also internally.

  All this has given Iran the possibility of making a strategy of free riding and generalized insurgency in the Persian Gulf useful.

If, however, the two competitors avoid trying to win the whole stake, i.e. the entire and very unlikely control of the Greater Middle East, they will therefore have every interest in seeking a modus operandi, which will depend above all on the stability of the Syrian regime.

 If Bashar al-Assad succeeds in stabilizing Syria, also with the help of Russia that, in the meantime is taking a good part of Iraqi oil, the trigger for a regional clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be avoided, and both will have every interest in negotiating an armed peace, i.e. a clear division of the areas of influence.

 If this does not happen, we will have the long war in the Greater Middle East, with an uncertain outcome which, however, will lead to two certain results: the West and EU greater dependence on Iranian or Saudi oil products, as well as the US gradual expulsion from the region and finally the continuous attack on Israel. The ultimate scenario will be the definitive jihadist destabilization of the Maghreb region.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Middle East

UAE schoolbooks earn high marks for cultural tolerance, even if that means praising China

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An Israeli NGO gives the United Arab Emirates high marks for mandating schoolbooks that teach tolerance, peaceful coexistence, and engagement with non-Muslims.

“The Emirati curriculum generally meets international standards for peace and tolerance. Textbooks are free of hate and incitement against others. The curriculum teaches students to value the principle of respect for other cultures and encourages curiosity and dialogue. It praises love, affection, and family ties with non-Muslims,” the 128-page study by The Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se) concluded.

However, at the same time, the report appeared in its evaluation of Emirati textbooks to hue closely to Israeli policy towards the UAE and, more generally, most states that populate the Middle East.

As a result, the report, like Israel that seemingly sees autocracy rather than greater freedoms as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East, skirts the issue of the weaving of the principle of uncritical obedience to authority into the fabric of Emirati education.

That principle is embedded in the teaching of “patriotism” and “commitment to defending the homeland,” two concepts highlighted in the report. The principle is also central to the notion of leadership, defined in the report as a pillar of national identity.

Ryan Bohl, an American who taught in an Emirati public school a decade ago, could have told Impact-se about the unwritten authoritarian principles embedded in the country’s education system.

There is little reason to believe that much has changed since Mr. Bohl’s experience and every reason to assume that those principles have since been reinforced.

One of a number of Westerners hired by the UAE to replace Arab teachers suspected of sympathising with the Muslim Brotherhood, Mr. Bohl described in an interview teaching in Emirati classrooms as “following the autocratic method, very similar to the ruler and the ruled.”

It’s in classrooms, Mr. Bohl said, “where those political attitudes get formed, reinforced, enforced in some cases if kids like they do, decide to deviate outside the line. They understand what the consequences are long before they can become a political threat or an activist threat to the regime. It’s all about creating a chill effect.”

Seemingly to avoid discussion of the notion of critical thinking, the IMPACT-se report notes that students “prepare for a highly competitive world; they are taught positive thinking and well-being.”

The report’s failure to discuss the limits of critical thinking and attitudes towards authority that may be embedded in the framing of education rather than in textbooks raises the question of whether textbook analysis is sufficient to evaluate attitudes that education systems groom in their tutoring of successive generations.

It also opens to debate whether notions of peace and cultural tolerance can be isolated from degrees of social and political tolerance and pluriformity.

The report notes positively that the textbooks “offer a realistic approach to peace and security,” a reference to the UAE’s recognition of Israel in 2020, its downplaying of efforts to address Palestinian aspirations, and its visceral opposition to any form of political Islam with debilitating consequences in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

It would be hard to argue that intervention by the UAE and others, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, France, and Russia, in whatever form contributed to peace and security.

The report notes that “support for the Palestinian cause continues but no longer (is) seen as key to solving the broader range of regional challenges. Radicalism and hate are the chief threat. Iranian expansionism is a threat.”

This is not to suggest that IMPACT-se’s evaluation of textbooks should judge Emirati policies but to argue that rather than uncritically legitimising them, it should explicitly instead of implicitly acknowledge that the country’s next generation is being shaped by a top-down, government-spun version of what the meaning is of lofty principles proclaimed by Emirati leaders.

To its credit, the report implicitly states that Emirati concepts of tolerance are not universal but subject to what the country’s rulers define as its national interests.

As a result, it points out that “the People’s Republic of China is surprisingly described as a tolerant, multicultural society, which respects religions” despite the brutal crackdown on religious and ethnic expressions of Turkic Muslim identity in the north-western province of Xinjiang.

IMPACT-se further notes that the textbooks fail to teach the Middle East’s history of slavery. The report insists that the Holocaust and the history of Jews, particularly in the Middle East, should be taught but makes no similar demand for multiple other minorities, including those accused of being heretics.

The NGO suggests that the UAE could also improve its educational references to Israel. The report takes note that “anti-Israeli material has been moderated” in textbooks that teach “cooperating with allies” and “peacemaking” as priorities.

However, UAE recognition of Israel does not mean that a map of Israel is included in the teaching of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.

To be fair, Israel may not yet feature on Emirati maps, but Jewish life is increasingly part of public life in the UAE. Kosher restaurants are open for business, as is a Jewish cultural center. Large menorahs were lit in city squares to celebrate the Jewish feast of Hanukkah in December, and a government-funded synagogue is scheduled to open later this year.

Meanwhile, Arab Jews who once fled to Israel and the West are settling in the UAE, partly attracted by financial incentives.

Striking a mildly critical note, IMPACT-se research director Eldad J. Pardo suggested that Emirati students, who were well served by the curriculum’s “pursuit of peace and tolerance,” would benefit from courses that are “equally unrelenting” in providing “students with unbiased information in all fields.”

Mr. Pardo was referring to not only to China but also the curriculum’s endorsement of traditional gender roles even if it anticipates the integration of women into the economy and public life, and what the report described as an “unbalanced” depiction of the history of the Ottoman Empire.

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Middle East

Iraq: Three Years of Drastic Changes (2019-2022)

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When the wave of the protests broke out at the beginning of October 2019 in Iraq, the Iraqi politicians did not realize the size of the gap between the demands of the protesters which were accumulated more than seventeen years, and the isolation of the politicians from the needs of the people. The waves of the protests began in a small range of different areas in Iraq. Rapidly, it expanded as if it were a rolling snowball in many regions of Iraqi governorates. Moreover, the platforms of social media and the influencers had a great impact on unifying the people against the government and enhancing the protest movement.

Al Tarir Square was the region where most protesters and demonstrators were based there. At that time, they stayed all day in this region and set up their tents to protest and demonstrate against the public situation of their life.

The protesters demanded their looted rights and asked for making economic reforms, finding job opportunities, changing the authority, and toppling the government presided by Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi. The protest stayed between ebb and tide, pressuring the political authority in Iraq.

A new period began in the history of Iraq where clashes between the protesters and the riot forces broke out in Al Tahrir Square and many governorates in the south of Iraq. Tear gas and ductile bullets were used against the protesters to compel them to retreat and disperse them. But the protesters insisted on continuing their demands. Many protesters were killed and wounded due to the intensive violence against them. The strong pressure with falling many martyrs gave its fruit when the Iraqi representatives of the Parliament endeavored to achieve the protesters’ demands by changing the election law into a new one. On 24 December 2019, the Iraqi Parliament approved of changing the unfair Saint Leigo election law into the open districts. The new law divided Iraq into 83 electoral districts.

Moreover, this violent protest led to the collapse of the Iraqi government presided by Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi. He was compelled to resign by the end of 2019. Many political names were nominated by the Iraqi politicians but the protesters refused them all because they were connected with different political parties.

Finally, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, who worked in the Iraqi Intelligence Service and had no party, was nominated by the politicians to be the new Prime Minister. He was well-known for ambiguity and far from the lights of media.

Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has become the Prime Minister in March 2020. The protests were over at the beginning of April 2020. With the taking of responsibility of helping Iraq, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi promised the protesters, who were called “Octoberians”, to hold a premature election, and the election was fixed on 10 June 2020.

Many politicians tried to postpone or cancel the premature election. Under their pressure, the premature election was postponed and fixed on 10 October 2020. During Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s period as a Prime Minister, he opened new channels with the Arab states to enhance the cooperation and held many summits to support Iraq in the next stage.

Attempts to postpone the premature election by the Iraqi politicians were on equal foot, but all these attempts failed and the election occurred on the due time.

Before the election, many Octoberians and influencers encouraged the people not to participate in the election. On the day of the election, it witnessed low participation, and people were convinced of not happening any change. These calls gave their fruits in the process of elections in Iraq where the election witnessed very low participation, and most Iraqis refused to participate and vote to the nominees even though there was a new election law. When the elections were over, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Iraq announced that the results would be within two days. After announcing the results of the election partially and defeating many political factions in the Iraqi arena, many convictions were directed to the commission, and it was convicted by fraud and manipulation with the results. This aspect affected the activity of the Commission and led to put great pressure on it. After two weeks of pressure and convictions, the final results of the elections were announced and many political elite Iraqi leaders were defeated gravely.

The results of the election gave a new start through new leaders who were supporting the October revolution that happened in 2019. And most names of these winning movements and alliances were inspired by the October Movement. Those, who represented October Revolution, were also convicted by other Octoberians that Octoberian winners in the election deviated from the aims of the October Revolution.

A new struggle has begun between the losers in the election and the new winners who will have the right to be in the next term of the Iraqi Council Parliament of Representatives. Moreover, many independent individuals won in the election, and the conflict would deepen the scope of dissidence between the losers and winners. Finally, all raised claims of election fraud have not changed the political situation.

The final results of the election had been announced, and the date of holding the first session of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives was fixed to nominate and elect the spokesman of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives.  The Shiite Sadrist movement, which represents 73 seats, has wiped out its competitors. This aspect has compelled the losing Shiite competitors to establish an alliance called “Coordination Framework” to face the Sadrist movement, represented by the cleric Sayyed Muqtada al-Sader. On the other hand, Al-Takadum Movement (Progress Party), represented by the spokesman of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives, Mohamed Al-Halbousi, has taken the second rank with 37 seats.

The final results of the election had been announced, and the date of holding the first session of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives was fixed to nominate and elect the spokesman of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives.

Finally, the first session of the Iraqi Council Parliament of Council was held. Mohamed Al-Halbousi has been elected as the spokesman of the Iraqi Council Parliament of Council. During the next fifteen days, the president of the republic will be elected.

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Middle East

China-US and the Iran nuclear deal

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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amirabdollahian that Beijing would firmly support a resumption of negotiations on a nuclear pact [China Media Group-CCTV via Reuters]

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with  Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi on Friday, January 14, 2022 in the city of Wuxi, in China’s Jiangsu province.  Both of them discussed a gamut of issues pertaining to the Iran-China relationship, as well as the security situation in the Middle East.

A summary of the meeting published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry underscored the point, that Foreign Ministers of Iran and China agreed on the need for  strengthening bilateral cooperation in a number of areas under the umbrella of the 25 year Agreement known as ‘Comprehensive Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China’. This agreement had been signed between both countries in March 2021 during the Presidency of Hassan Rouhani, but the Iranian Foreign Minister announced the launch of the agreement on January 14, 2022.

During the meeting between Wang Yi and Hossein Amir Abdollahian there was a realization of the fact, that cooperation between both countries needed to be enhanced not only in areas like energy and infrastructure (the focus of the 25 year comprehensive cooperation was on infrastructure and energy), but also in other spheres like education, people to people contacts, medicine and agriculture. Iran also praised the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and said that it firmly supported the One China policy.

The timing of this visit is interesting, Iran is in talks with other signatories (including China) to the JCPOA/Iran nuclear deal 2015 for the revival of the 2015 agreement. While Iran has asked for removal of economic sanctions which were imposed by the US after it withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, the US has said that time is running out, and it is important for Iran to return to full compliance to the 2015 agreement.  US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in an interview said

‘Iran is getting closer and closer to the point where they could produce on very, very short order enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon’

The US Secretary of State also indicated, that if the negotiations were not successful, then US would explore other options along with other allies.

During the course of the meeting on January 14, 2022 Wang Yi is supposed to have told his Chinese counterpart, that while China supported negotiations for the revival of the Iran nuclear deal 2015, the onus for revival was on the US since it had withdrawn in 2018.

The visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister to China was also significant, because Foreign Ministers of four Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain — and Secretary General of GCC,  Nayef Falah Mubarak Al-Hajraf were in China from January 10-14, 2022 with the aim of expanding bilateral ties – especially with regard to energy cooperation and trade. According to many analysts, the visit of GCC officials to China was driven not just by economic factors, but also the growing proximity between Iran and Beijing.

In conclusion, China is important for Iran from an economic perspective. Iran has repeatedly stated, that if US does not remove the economic sanctions it had imposed in 2018, it will focus on strengthening economic links with China (significantly, China has been purchasing oil from Iran over the past three years in spite of the sanctions imposed by the US. The Ebrahim Raisi administration has repeatedly referred to an ‘Asia centric’ policy which prioritises ties with China.

Beijing is seeking to enhance its clout in the Middle East as US ties with certain members of the GCC, especially UAE and Saudi Arabia have witnessed a clear downward spiral in recent months (US has been uncomfortable with the use of China’s 5G technology by UAE and the growing security linkages between Beijing and Saudi Arabia). One of the major economic reasons for the GCC gravitating towards China is Washington’s thrust on reducing its dependence upon GCC for fulfilling its oil needs. Beijing can utilize its good ties with Iran and GCC and play a role in improving links between both.

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is likely to become more complex, and while there is not an iota of doubt, that the US influence in the Middle East is likely to remain intact, China is fast catching up.

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Africa Today17 hours ago

1.5 million children lack treatment for severe wasting in Eastern and Southern Africa

At least 1.5 million children are not receiving life-saving treatment for severe wasting in Eastern and Southern Africa, warned the United Nations...

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