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The narrative approach of Lebanon’s uprising

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In Social Politics, intellectuals and scholars are surely defined political protestation as new concept of a social group that operates action together to obtain a political and social outcomes in terms of contemporary democracies, Indeed, some have included currently in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan as a continuation of what happened at the end of 2010 and early 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia, and the events of proxy war in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, or somewhere else as part of the American creative disorder delusively labeled the Arab Spring.

Truly speaking, the current demonstrations in Lebanon are similarly shaped in a form of previous Arab anti-government uprisings scenario due to decisions that are seen as unfair socially and politically taking place within the constitutional process of people interest conciliated by political institutions at affecting public and Scio-cultural processes, which therefore challenge the status quo of which makes what happens in these states out of chaos of the “Arab Spring”, even for the current overturning demonstrations, we find divergences in each state has its own Arab spring based on its social perspective.

For Lebanon, the people demonstration for the second week, provoked by ineffective  of government laws management and unfair situation of handling peoples social needs that affect the standard of million citizens suffering from a serious depreciation in life productivity, hides deep and complicated causes and has several Lebanese specificities and approaches:

First, The sectarian approach, where the masses are clear in their demands to overthrow sectarianism and change all status of the political class, the protestation initiate a auspice of a outbreak against the sectarian system of all sects and indicates that sectarianism rolling party is fully responsible for impoverishing Lebanon’s people and corruption of state institutions and detriment of political standing.

Second, The absence of Islamic party from the scene, might be invisible but Hezbollah and other Islamist groups are highly cautious about the seriousness of out breaking and imperils of other external involved parties pushed to change the current government and destabilized the regime, Therefore, there are unknown reports saying that this uprising in Lebanon is driven by Hezbollah group.

Third, The protestors stick to their commitment to democratic principles and fight all injustice and grievance in the civil state based on citizenship. Besides, despite the absence of clear international stands, particularly from Washington and the West, which is taking place in Lebanon, the Lebanese geopolitics enhances fears of the ability of the Lebanese people to distance themselves from outside interference.

The fourth, The fundamental fuss is not foreign intervention or interference of states’ military, but rather the armed party militias related to the government coalition, whether it is Hezbollah or Christian parties. These militias are much powerful than the Lebanese army itself and it could demount the structure of the army and might provoke a proxy war.

In addition, as a result of these frequent Lebanese popular uprising occurrence is the accumulations of combining the deterioration of the weak economic circumstances with the irresponsible political experience of Lebanese political system and the crisis of democratic strategies of portions or consensus among the sects, rather than a prolonging the disorder of the Arab Spring. In the past decades, Lebanon has seen several bloody uprisings as a form of proxy war in 1958 and 1975 until the Taif Conference 1989.

It is understandable that what is happening in Lebanon or even the Arab Middle East region is based on mal-political calculations in resolving the current economic grievances and socio-cultural standards. it is clear to perceive the root of the Lebanese sectarian system which is based on confessionalism power-sharing system and the historical setting of its functioning, and before the digression came in the discourse of defining the political sectarianism as subjective context it is “an exchange of social-political system, focus on the handling of the individual part of the religious group in his political positions, and formed as sectarianism political sect of the state “.The Lebanese state emerged in 1920. unlike the rest of the Arab states from the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and as Britain’s delegate to Palestine committed itself to the Balfour Declaration that grants a state to the Jews in Palestine, Also France committed itself to make Lebanon as a sole for Christians, especially the Maronites, who constituted the majority of the population. So the separation or portion in several positions six for Christians and five for Muslims and the rest of the religious sects. Thus, the unwritten legislative charter agreed in 1943 was based on sectarian sharing power politics between Muslims and Christians within the constitutional and for the rest of the high ranking positions, with the head of state is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the House of Representatives a Shiite Muslim.

Accordingly, At the 1989 Taif conference, which came after the proxy war, there was unsubstantial change that was recognized to be fifty per cent for each party within Lebanon the parliament, with the extension of the sectarian dominance and covenants to overcome it to change Lebanon from a sectarian democracy status based on portions into a modern democracy that blackout sectarianism, but this did not Politicalized sectarianism in order to be reinforced by a social sectarianism that was overtaken by all modern societies. Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine.

This is quite superficial with regards to the past decades, the Status of Lebanon was able to extend a formula of inter-communal coexistence within the framework of so-called “sectarian democracy”, As a matter of fact,  the outbreak of the 1975 proxy war, and with the exception of the events of 1958, Lebanon was qualified to live in stability with economic and cultural prosperity and more importantly openness to all states of the world. Therefore, the great Palestinian refugee in the camps resulting from the 1948 war did not confuse the internal political balances.

With a new chapter turned in this formula of sectarian power-sharing system, the sectarian quota democracy creating a transitional step through the democracy of Lebanon citizenship that denies sectarianism and power-sharing which enhancing the confessionalism political system in accordance with to the sectarian representatives of the communities. this sharing power formula becomes the property or the estate of the confessionalism sect, especially its high ranking men, and the appointed Politicians have chosen by the sect to sustain in their positions without accountability or responsibility, though each sect has become like a state within a state, with its areas of influence and armed militias, these sects can maintain foreign relations as the legitimate state symbolized protecting entity of sectarianism, and attempts to inclusive development were confronted with the interests of communities and external alliances, as the law of recognized state of Lebanon was absent due to mediation and interventions of the sectarian communities, but other non confessionalism sect their people and families, became living on the ounce left by sectarian quotas.

In fact, what makes Lebanon uprising different and more fascinating from other the Arab movements is that it is so soft that the beauty of the Lebanese women who suddenly participated has forgotten the sameness of some outbreaks, and sometimes even covered the demands of the revolutionary street in Beirut communities and the rest of the cities, and the political details operating the movement. Making many Arab observers unconcerned with Saad Hariri’s proposals, eager only for the continuation of the Lebanese revolution.

As noted, The demonstrations in the communities and streets were an opening for Lebanese women to demonstrate their strength and ability to influence not only their violent and unbreakable hardness, or their confrontation with the military, but also the dominance of their intellectualism statements, their sedition, their beauty, and their nationalism. Sometimes, with her very realistic comments, she complains to the media how corruption has deprived her of the better social life that this beauty, which God has given for her, asked for fair political, social and better economic conditions.

Though controversial, The woman’s moves into the streets to protest is evidence that the outbreaks in Lebanon have become more than a necessity, and that it is a consistent decision among the Lebanese. Women, in general, are characterized by conservatism and tranquility. When women decide to strike against irresponsible political and social conditions, it means that the crisis is really true, and to that extreme, in Lebanon uprising, women should show to the world that women have the right to express their political and social attitudes towards stimulating protest among the general public.

To sum up, as a cliché says, where there’s a will, there’s a way. the outbreaks who took to the streets of Lebanese cities may be qualified to overthrow the existing legitimate government and circumstances may change to constitutional rules. The upset and rejection of sectarianism, although as noble goal, it needs a radical change in the structure and socio-cultural of Lebanese society, and if the Lebanese are committed to their democratic behavior to overthrow political sectarianism, Then this will be a great victory for the Lebanese people and will pave the way for eradicating political and sectarian confessionalism throughout the Arab world, particularly in Syria and Iraq.

Jamal Ait Laadam, Specialist in and North African Studies and Western Sahara Issue, a Ph.D. fellow in Jilin University School of Public Affairs

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The Formation of the Political Elite in Modern Iraq: The U.S. and Iranian Factors

Ruslan Mamedov

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Three major events transformed Iraq and the Middle East: the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 and the Gulf War of 1991, the latter of which led to a change in the domestic policy of President of Iraq Saddam Hussein and thus brought about new dynamics in the relations between the Iraqi government and the country’s ethnoreligious groups (mainly the Shiites and the Kurds). Iraq was under an embargo imposed by the United Nations at the time, which limited access to resource distribution for a part of the elite and, combined with the government’s practices that marginalized a part of the population, led many to flee the country, strengthening the opposition forces in exile. The United States used both economic and military tools to exert pressure on Baghdad. The U.S. military tactics destroyed Iraq’s infrastructure and undermined the stable operation of government agencies in the country.

The U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 allowed the American side to exert multifactor influence on the formation of a new elite. Even the technical implementation of the voting process, not to mention the principles of the new Constitution, were dependent on the United States. But the United States had directed the political process in Iraq even before the country adopted its new Constitution in 2005 by creating two key bodies: the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). On June 9, 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1546 that endorsed “a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq” and a “timetable for Iraq’s political transition to democratic government.” [1]

The 2005 election urged forward by the United States established a new political elite that received international recognition but limited legitimacy at home. Since the election was held in a very difficult environment and was boycotted by a large share of the Sunni population, just how representative it exactly was has been called into question.

Following its own logic in relations with Iraq and being embedded in the regional context, Iran decided to use the levers already at its disposal to influence the Iraqi political process and shape a favourable political elite in the country. In fact, this process began long before the U.S. invasion, because movements opposing Saddam Hussein had already been formed and their leaders often lived in Iran. Despite the fact that most religious and political movements in Iraq can trace their origins back to the 1950s or 1960s, as the Islamic Dawa Party, which has become the most formidable opponent of the Iraqi authorities, actually developed during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988. The leaders of Dawa, who were in exile, mostly lived in Iran.

Starting in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the exiled opposition was increasingly influenced and dominated by Kurdish ethnocentric and Shia faith-based political forces. Opposition figures that aspired to keep the vision of Iraqi nationalism homogenous and centralized increasingly gave way to political forces driven by an ethnoreligious agenda [2]. Depending on the political situation, Iran continued to lend limited support to various Kurdish forces opposing the central authorities in Iraq.

After 2003, Shia political forces sought to form coalitions, a key example of which was the alliance between the Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was founded in 1982 and had engaged in close cooperation with the United States even before 2003. The key constituency for SCIRI was Iraqis of Iranian origin and the Marsh Arabs that migrated to Iran at times of crisis. Baghdad has always seen these population groups as untrustworthy [3]. SCIRI was headed by representatives of the country’s religious elite – the well-known Hakim family of Shia religious scholars. Support from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani consolidated the position of Dawa and SCIRI in post-Saddam Iraq.

After the United States occupied Iraq, the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr from the influential Sadr family called his supporters to take up arms against the occupants. His followers formed the Mahdi Army that killed hundreds of American soldiers. The Sadrist Movement attained considerable influence in parliament and represented Shia communities from south and central Iraq, the Marsh Arabs and the Baghdad district of Sadr City (named after Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, who opposed the regime and suffered at its hands) [4]. The Sadrists’ military wing retained considerable influence over the state security system.

Despite having some political clout and a few ministerial posts, the Sunnis found themselves marginalized in the new situation and did not have influence over the decision-making process in Baghdad as the case for, for example, the Nujaifi clan from Mosul. The main forces opposing the United States and the central government in Baghdad were the Naqshbandi Army (which had ties to the former Ba’ath Party) and Al Qaeda in Iraq [5]. Attempts to inject Sunni groups (the Sahwa or the Al-Iraqiya movements, which also included Sunnis) into the political elite were generally unsuccessful.

The ongoing marginalization of the Sunni population by the Nouri al-Maliki government and the radicalization of society, compounded by falling oil prices and the war in Syria, led to the establishment of an alliance of various groups in 2014. That alliance became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIS (a terrorist organization that is banned in Russia). The new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who assumed the post in 2014 and represented the Dawa Party, decided not only to fight ISIS, but also to carry out some reforms. His efforts were greatly facilitated by the positions of Tehran and Washington, which have tacitly supported Abadi’s initiatives to form a technocratic government to fight corruption since 2016.

By jeopardizing the patron-client relationship and the distribution of wealth enjoyed by the old Iraqi establishment, al-Abadi fell into disfavour with many, including members of his former party Dawa. As a result, many wanted to oust him from the post of Prime Minister. But Iran and the United States put pressure on their partners within Iraq to prevent that from happening. This led to a reconfiguration of political forces in 2018 that nevertheless preserved the same elite.

The training of new security forces in Iraq by American experts, including in U.S. training camps effectively amounted to training various militias or groups linked with militants from the Badr Organization and the Mahdi Army. For them, collaboration with the United States was a matter of pragmatism, since everyone realized that Washington would play a defining role in the future federative Iraq. At the same time, the Shiites, who had become the dominant group in Iraq, were looking to the Iranian model of governance.

The formation of the new political elite in Iraq and the country’s security forces was thus directly dependent on the presence of U.S. occupation forces, the policies of Iran and Iran’s ties with movements opposing Saddam Hussein. The dominant Shia political groups proved to be very diverse and heterogenous, with different political interests and a strong radical influence.

The 2018 Election Results in Iraq: The U.S. and Iranian Trace

Stopping ISIS was the main objective for the Iraqi Army. But achieving a national conciliation between the political forces proved to be a key condition for the country where Sunni interests were deeply embedded in the power structure. The “Kurdish issue” also popped up on the agenda. The independence referendum held by the Kurds in territories controlled by Erbil in September 2017 put Baghdad and Prime Minister al-Abadi personally in an awkward position before the 2018 election and lent strength to their political opponents.

Similar to the fight against ISIS, the United States and Iran sided with the central government. This led Baghdad to carry out a military operation to restore sovereignty and even regain control over the rich oil fields of Kirkuk. This loss for Kurds – meaning a failure of the referendum – revealed a rift between the two major forces of Iraqi Kurdistan: the Barzani and Talabani clans (the latter was experiencing division itself after the death of former President of Iraq Jalal Talabani). However, this heralded a new stage in the consolidation of power of the central government and even a rise in nationalist sentiment.

A critical event that happened even before the 2018 election was the split within the State of Law Coalition and the Dawa Party, which had been in power since the U.S. invasion of 2003. Most of the seats in parliament were won by the Saairun coalition (also known as Marching Towards Reform), giving it the upper hand in forming the government. The coalition was headed by the leader of the Sadrist Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, who is an extremely influential religious figure. However, this did not prevent his movement from using a nationalist and anti-corruption agenda as a platform. However, the Fatah Alliance (sometimes translated as the Conquest Alliance), a coalition that had been accused of ties with Iran on numerous occasions, finished a close second to the Sadrists, winning almost as many seats in parliament. The Fatah Alliance is believed to have been supported by the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) formed in 2014 to fight ISIS. However, none of the abovementioned parties won a majority in parliament. It was clear that even the most prominent players would have to negotiate a compromise with each other, as well as with less influential forces.

It was more than three months before the new parliament met in early September 2018. The political process stalled as thousands of people took to the streets for rallies and demonstrations, with the biggest protests taking place in Basra. The political forces eventually had to find common ground and start forming a government. Again, it was the intervention of Marja Ali al-Sistani that became the catalyst for agreement.

The first step that signalled the redistribution of power was the election of Chairman of the Council of Representatives (Parliament) of Iraq. On September 15, 2018, the 37-year-old member of parliament from the province of Anbar and member of the Al-Hal (“Solution”) party Mohamed al-Halbousi was elected by a majority (with 167 votes) as the Speaker of the national parliament. Hassan Karim from Saairun took the post of First Deputy Speaker. He garnered an even larger majority than the speaker, receiving 210 votes. On the whole, al-Halbousi can be considered a compromise figure both for Iran and the United States. His first visit, however, was to Kuwait, which hosted the International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq early that year. This suggests that the new speaker is counting on the support of the Gulf monarchies and intends to focus on reconstructing the country after the war.

The next step was the election of the president and prime minister. The presidential post had been traditionally held by a representative of one of the largest Kurdish political forces, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Despite the presence of several other candidates on the list, the most likely was former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Barham Salih, considered to be pro-American. Salih was not running as a single candidate for Kurds, as had been the practice since 2003. The very return of Salih to the PUK (he had quit the Union just before the election to form his own party) and the support he received as a presidential candidate were predictable.

But the Iraq Kurds could not agree on a single candidate for president, which, again, exposed a division among the elites. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (Barzani clan, Erbil) nominated Fuad Hussein, the former President of Kurdistan Region. Evidently, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah reached a last-minute agreement on the distribution of power at the federal and regional levels. Barham Salih ultimately became President, and Fuad Hussein became Minister of Finance.

The Prime Minister and his cabinet are a key junction in the power architecture of Iraq, and it was this point that became the focus of struggle. All parties had to trade concessions and search for compromise. A way out of the deadlock was ultimately found, and the solution was not in favour of Prime Minister al-Abadi. Several days before the election it was clear that the pendulum had swung in favour of former Minister of Oil and Vice President of Iraq Adil Abdul-Mahdi.

The country continued to be run based on the quota principle of Muhasasa Ta’ifia, with a member of the Kurdish community as president, a Sunnite as a parliament speaker and a Shiite as prime minister. In reality, the system that had been established remains essential for Iraq. External forces, both in Iran and the United States, continue to work with Shiite political and military groups. They remain an organized force and are viewed as the basis for security and statehood, just as they were before the 2018 elections.

U.S.–Iran Relations under Donald Trump and Challenges for Iraq’s Political Elite

Iraq has traditionally been influenced by the dynamics of U.S.–Iran relations. The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 reduced friction between the United States and Iran, strengthened pragmatic groups within the Islamic Republic, and created relatively favourable conditions for stabilization both in the region and in the Iraqi domestic political process. By the end of 2017, Baghdad had regained control of key cities and settlements largely thanks to the efforts of the al-Abadi government to coordinate the assistance of the two opponents and most important players in the region (the United States and Iran) in the fight against ISIS. However, with the defeat of ISIS and the removal of the topic from the global agenda, the United States and Iran no longer had any grounds for further “silent” engagement, so it ceased.

A new round of confrontation began following the arrival of the Donald Trump administration in 2018 and the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, which put Iraq in an uncomfortable position. The U.S. sanctions against Iran that followed Trump’s decision caused serious damage to the country’s economy and endangered any agreements between Tehran and third countries due to the extraterritorial nature of the sanctions. For example, under the threat of sanctions, the French concern Total withdrew from the largest project to develop the South Pars oil and gas field by selling its stake to the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

Large-scale U.S. sanctions against Iran could cause serious damage to Iraq due to the interdependence of the economies of these neighbouring countries. Iraqi representatives have held regular meetings with members of the U.S. administration, stressing the need for the country to cooperate with Iran. Baghdad has been able to secure several deferrals, and Washington has exempted Iraq from the sanctions regime (for 90 days each time).

Iran continues to be a vital source of electricity for Iraq. However, even though there is a need to replace Iranian oil on the world market – and Washington is working on this task – there is an increasing role for Iraqi oil in it. If the American side decides to stick to its policies, then it can also impose sanctions against Iraq, which will lead to increased risks and instability.

Constant pressure on Tehran did not lead to a revision of the “Iran deal,” which is what President Trump initially wanted. In such circumstances, Iran could have set about escalating regional affairs. In this case, it had the tools to undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East and, of course, in Iraq. For a long time, Major General and Commander of the Quds Force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) of Iran, Qasem Soleimani, was considered the key coordinator of Iranian actions in Iraq. He is credited with many of the achievements of Iranian politics in Iraq, including the agreement on the results of the elections and nullifying the results of the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017.

Iran demonstrated particular care and accuracy in establishing its influence on the Iraqi political process after the Iraqi elections in 2018. During their visits to Iraq in 2019, both Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif and President of Iran Hassan Rouhani held meetings with almost all political leaders and public figures over the course of several days. Unlike the Iranian side, U.S. representatives usually arrived with unplanned visits. On one such occasion, Donald Trump personally flew to Iraq to visit an American base, where he met with soldiers. The trip did not include meetings with any leaders of the variegated Iraqi political spectrum.

Iraq’s foreign policy as a whole became more balanced after the formation of the new government, where Mohamed Ali Alhakim stood at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Iraq prefers to have several points of reference to help it pursue its course. For example, while visiting Moscow, Alhakim outlined Iraq’s principled position on the return of Syria to the Arab League, a policy which runs counter to the U.S. agenda in the region. At the same time, Baghdad has its own interests, namely, to ensure security on the Syria–Iraq border. In addition to cooperating with the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Iraq interacts with Iran, Russia and Syria within the framework of the Baghdad information and coordination centre. At the regional level, Iraq seeks to become a platform for dialogue between various regional and global actors [7].

Since 2003, the United States and Iran have gained serious influence on the formation of the Iraqi elite. The new Iraqi elite, as well as its individual parts, has been influenced by the policies of Iran and the United States and the dynamics of their relations. Many politicians who came to power in Iraq after 2003 were previously in opposition and lived in exile. Part of this future elite has made a choice in favour of the West, while a much larger part has chosen Iran. After the 2018 elections in Iraq, the processes of distributing power and determining the degree of influence of external players continued.

It became increasingly clear that the elements of Iraqi politics that had become traditional since 2003 had been preserved. The political forces that had established themselves at that time and the external players supporting them – the United States and Iran – continue to perpetuate this system. At the same time, there are calls within the country to eliminate the influence of external players in determining the country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. This, of course, creates opportunities for other countries to pursue their interests, such as the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and Russia, but also makes them adjust their policies regarding the United States and Iran, which have a traditional presence in Iraq.

The unintended symbiosis between Iran and the United States in Iraq, brought about by the similarity of their interests in this country, is gradually being lost as the fight against ISIS fades into the background. Notwithstanding the fact that the 2018 elections and the escalation of tensions between the United States and Iran created a new configuration of forces, Iraq remains dependent on these external players, and its political elite continues to be based on the Muhasasa Ta’ifia system, approved by the country in 2003. Despite the demand for change that exists in Iraqi society, the current political elite, even though it may sacrifice individual political representatives, will retain its position without any fundamental changes.

1. Sapronova М. А. The Constitution of Iraq in the Past and in the Present. Moscow: Middle East Institute, 2005, p. 84.

2. Hashemi N., Postel D. Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 117.

3. Minyazhetdinov I. K. The Balkanization of Iraq: The Factors of Reproduction and the Spread of Political Violence // Conflicts and Wars of the 21st Century (Middle East and North Africa). Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015, p. 263.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Sapronova M.A. Op. Cit, p. 88.

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Iran, CPEC and regional connectivity

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Ever since taking over as President, Donald Trump’s approach towards Iran has been excessively rash and lacked nuance. US withdrawal from JCPOA (Joint Comprehension for Plan of Action) imposition of sanctions and brash statements by Trump have heightened tensions between both countries. Allies of the US, including EU member states (especially Germany and France) expressed their disapproval of Trump’s Iran policy on numerous occasions.

 In August 2019, during the G7 Summit at Biarritz (France) it seemed, that Trump may change his approach towards Iran.  The US President expressed his openness to engaging with Iran and dubbed it as a country of immense potential. After the attack on Saudi Oil facilities, there has been a visible shift in the approach of Germany, France and UK towards Iran. All three countries blamed Iran for the attacks. In a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) these three countries issued a statement condemning the attack. They also held Iran squarely responsible for the attack. Said the joint statement, issued by three countries:

‘It is clear to us that Iran bears responsibility for this attack,’

Why China is giving importance to Iran

The fact, that Tehran is rich in natural resources, and its geographical location which makes it important in the context of connectivity in South Asia and Central Asia (especially in the context of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor – CPEC).

This is one of the main reasons for Beijing seeking to strengthen ties in spite of US withdrawal from JCPOA and imposition of sanctions by the Trump administration. The importance of Iran in China’s strategic goals is reiterated from the fact, that it is part of the ‘home affairs region’.

China-Iran ties

In January 2016 (months after the JCPOA was signed), Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Iran. During his visit, it was decided, that China and Iran would expand their bilateral trade to 600 Billion USD over a period of 10 years. Iran also welcomed, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

According to the joint statement, ‘The Iranian side welcomes “the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative introduced by China’. As Iran-US ties have gone downhill under Donald Trump, Beijing has continued to strengthen ties with Tehran.

Both sides also a document which outlined the  strategic vision for a period of 25 years.

 In September 2019, China made a commitment of 400 Billion USD during Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif’s visit to China. While China will invest $280bn USD in Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemicals sectors, 120 Billion USD would be invested in Iran’s infrastructure.

In the energy sector, so far the key projects China is involved are phase 11 of the supergiant South Pars natural gas project and West Karoun.

China’s State-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), one of the country’s “big three” producers, holds an 80% stake in Phase 11 of the supergiant South Pars gas field ( CNPC stepped in after France’s Total withdrew in 2018 after the imposition of sanctions by the US). So far China has been slow in the development of Phase 11, but it is likely to accelerate the pace of the project. Similarly, Beijing has assured Iran, that it will increase production from the West Karoun Oil fields (from 5% to 25% by 2021)

China is financing some important infrastructural projects in Iran. This includes, the electrification of theTehran-Masshad railway line (a contract between both countries was signed in 2017, and the cost of this project is estimated at 1.5Billion USD). The other key project, where China will be involved is the Qom-Isfahan high-speed train line, and to extend this upgraded network up to the north-west through Tabriz (which is the starting point of the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline). Tabriz is also home to a number of energy projects. This project is especially important in the context of China’s connectivity goals, as it will connect Urumqi (Xinjiang) to Tehran, Central Asia and Europe.

At a recent meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which has 10 member states (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic) reviewed studies pertaining to a number of important projects pertaining to Iran, including the Iran-Turkey-Pakistan economic corridor (such a corridor will help in facilitation of hard and soft infrastructure).

Iran-Pakistan relations

Islamabad with has had an unpredictable relationship with Tehran has also begun to warm up. In February 2019, after the killing of 27 revolutionary guards,  Chief, of Revolutionary Guards Major General Mohammad Ali Jafar issued a stern warning to Pakistan:

“Why do Pakistan‘s army and security body … give refuge to these anti-revolutionary groups? Pakistan will no doubt pay a high price,”

In 2017, after the killing of 10 Border guards, head of the Iranian armed forces, Major-General Mohammad Baqeri, had warned Pakistan, that it should take action against the Jaishal Adl group lest it will be forced to strike the terror camps in Pakistan.

A visit to Iran by Pakistan Army Chief, Qamar JavedBajwa in November 2017 (it was the first visit by a Pakistan army chief to Iran in 2 decades). During his visit, Bajwa met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, Defense Minister Amir Hatami, apart from senior military officials.

Some high level exchanges in 2018, also sought to mend ties and address misgivings between both countries.

Iran-Pakistan connectivity

In spite of bilateral tensions, Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif while speaking at a prominent Islamabad based think tank Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad invited Pakistan to join the Chabahar Project. The Iranian Foreign Minister also made the point, that Tehran was exploring participation in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In May 2019, Iran had mooted the idea of connecting Chabahar Port with Gwadar.

 Interestingly, India has taken over operations of part of the 1stphase of Chabahar in 2018. A statement, issued by the Ministry of Shipping stated:

The Government of India took over the operations of a part of Shahid Beheshti Port, Chabahar, in Iranduring the Chabahar Trilateral Agreement meeting held there on December 24, 2018,”

Initially Chabahar was perceived as a counter to Gwadar Port (Baluchistan). Both ports are 70 kilometres apart. New Delhi had invested in Chabahar with a view to get access to Afghanistan and Central Asia (Pakistan for long has refused to grant India transit rights to Afghanistan).

India-Iran relations

Ever since the removal of exemptions from US, Tehran and New Delhi ties have been witness to some differences. Iran has complained of New Delhi toeing US line, and failing to stand up to Washington unlike Beijing. Senior Iranian diplomats have complained on numerous occasions, about the slow progress on Chabahar Port, and the trilateral connectivity. The Iranian Foreign Minister’s proposal to connect Chabahar with Gwadar, needs to be viewed in this context.

More recently, Iranian Foreign Minister made a similar point echoing these views. He also said that Tehran would have expected India to be more ‘resilient’.

Indian PM Modi did however, meet Iranian President on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2019

While New Delhi-Iran ties have witnessed a slight deterioration. Iran-Pakistan ties have witnessed an upswing. In his first speech, after his party’s triumph Khan had said that he would seek to improve ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. In his first telephonic conversation with Rouhani, Khan stated that he wanted to build special trade relations with Iran.

In his first few months after taking over, Khan due to economic constraints, focused more on Saudi Arabia (Riyadh promised 6 Billion USD in assistance)

Pakistan-Iran ties

In recent months, Imran Khan has sought to play peacemaker between Iran and Saudi Arabia, after the attack on a Saudi Oil facility. Imran Khan visited both Riyadh and Tehran in October 2019. Khan also stated, that he was entrusted with this responsibility by US President Donald Trump.

Significantly, Iran praised Imran Khan for his efforts in trying to bring about peace in the Middle East. At a joint press conference, the Iranian President said:

“I told Prime Minster Imran [Khan] we welcome any gesture by Pakistan for peace in the region and appreciate his visit to our country,”

Pakistan Army Chief Qamar JavedBajwa also visited Tehran in November 2019,  and sought to strengthen defence ties between both countries. Apart from meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri and Army Commander Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi the Pakistan Army Chief also met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Iran-Pakistan connectivity

There have also been some interesting developments in the context of Iran-Pakistan relations in the context of connectivity and economic relations. Another interesting development is Pakistan’s recent idea of getting Iran on board the CPEC project.

Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, the prime minister’s adviser on finance, in an interaction with media stated that Pakistan was looking at a CPEC+ arrangement, where other countries get on board.

He also stated, that CPEC needed to be projected, as a potential connector between China and Iran and Saudi Arabia, and it

Islamabad’s decision to invite Iran to join CPEC, clearly reiterates Iran’s crucial location. It remains to be seen, how the Tehran-Islamabad-New Delhi trilateral will work out in the near future.

Need to look beyond a zero-sum approach

While it is easy to look at connectivity from a zero-sum perspective, a change in Pakistan’s approach and statesmanship from the Indian side, could pave the way for a fresh approach towards connectivity. India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran can join hands. Such connectivity need not be under the rubric of CPEC, but could be driven by Pakistan providing land access to India to Afghanistan and Central Asia. At the inaugural function of the Kartarpur Religious Corridor, the need for re-examining bilateral ties, as well as regional connectivity was alluded to. Former Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh had also spoken of trilateral cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Said Manmohan Singh:

“I dream of a day, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived. That is how I want our grandchildren to live”

Conclusion

In conclusion, Tehran may be facing domestic challenges, but it is crucial not just in the strategic context, but also connectivity in South Asia. It also remains to be seen, whether India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran can set aside their differences, and can work towards an inclusive ‘New Silk Road’.

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Middle East

Algerian people shouted: No to corruption and mismanagement

Sadek Hadjal

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Credit: Institute of Security Studies

On February 22, 2019, Algerian people have taken to the streets across the country against the fifth term of the ousted president Bouteflika. But implicitly, people young, old, women and men have protested against the huge corruption and the mismanagement Scandal that characterized the state since the coming of Bouteflika in 1994, especially since his third term. Now, after ten months since the enormous popular movement, we have the right to ask: what has been achieved in order to eliminate the duality of corruption and mismanagement? We can answer without any doubt that nothing big has been achieved until now.

  Of course, the Algerian people and the Army have played a significant role to force Bouteflika to resign, and to imprison several symbols of Bouteflika’s corrupt regime. But, that was not sufficient to convince the angry people to go back home. “To imprison the theft and the corrupt doesn’t mean that we are going necessarily to the State of law and rights and doesn’t implicit that the public services will improve”, The Algerian people know this fact. That’s why we can still see a part of the popular movement take to the street, not convinced or satisfied with the authority steps, they afraid to see the Army does what Bouteflika regime did, Although the Army played a significant role to imprison corrupts, and has declared several times that It will be against corruption. The Algerians have no longer trusted anyone. 

Thus, the problem is not just about the conditions of elections, but basically about the absence of any Clear will or procedures to eliminate the causes of corruption and mismanagement, such as organize a scientific, political, economic, juridical, social and technical Dialogues and open a national dialogue to draft a national charter against corruption and mismanagement, etc. All we have seen, the insist of the Army to go to the presidential elections, elites and angry people divided between who is with the elections and who is against it, and divided too between who is with the Army and elections and who is against. All the parties have forgotten the big issue, even the popular movement itself. We no longer hear any words from any part about the big dilemma of Algeria “corruption and mismanagement”.

What had to be the first, presidential elections or procedures to eliminate corruption causes? 

The practical and implicitly answer from all parts in Algeria was: let’s put an elected president first, but they differed on the guarantees of fair elections. No one talked or poses questions about the historic dilemma of Algeria “corruption and mismanagement”, Even in what so-called presidential debate between presidents candidates.

Certainly, only the elected president who can fight and guide the multi parties of the society to eliminate the corrupt environment, But when we haven’t seen any debates about this dilemma before presidential elections we think, undoubtedly, that we are not going to focus on it after the presidential elections, and that’s not only because of the army or president but because of all the parties in Algeria. For example, during these ten months, we haven’t seen any serious academic conferences or initiatives about the best ways to eliminate the corrupt environment in State that has two million university students. As well as, at the political level, we haven’t seen political discourses focus on the solutions to this dilemma.

Now, what the Algerian people, through their elites, have to do in order to fight corruption and eliminate mismanagement is to push the newly elected president and cooperate with to find out solutions to this dilemma. by the way, even if this president “is not legal”, as some think, he will be, under pressure,  react with any anti-corruption initiative contains procedures to fight corruption, especially in this stage. The will that Algeria needs to overcome their fundamental crisis is the will of people, elites and intellectuals. the President can’t control corrupt university teachers but students can do, the president can’t control bosses and responsible in public institutions but the workers can do, etc. and the big case, a president can’t draft an earnest charter about how to eliminate the corrupt environment alone, but teachers, doctors, students, engineers and others can do that in a frame of a national comprehensive dialogue without waiting the authority to organize it for them.

The core thing that precedes everything we wrote is political awareness and knowledge of people about their rights; this can only be achieved by the intellectual and professors. But which professors and intellectuals we are talking about in Algeria? When we see a professor was employed by corruption and favouritism and he, in turn, employs others by the same method, then we can’t imagine any real reform that can be achieved in the medium-term. It is too big to confine it in just presidential elections. It’s related to the absent role of elites and intellectuals in the big battle against corruption, some of them have a dream but they don’t have any tangible planning to achieve.

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