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30 years after 9/11: How many Germanies should Europe have?

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2019 sees the 30th anniversary of the European 9/11 – the fall of the Berlin Wall. Dislike the 9/11 that came 12 years later, which many now associate with the demise of the Anglo-American dominant capitalism, for the most– this European 9/11 marks the final end of the Cold War. Downing the Wall brought about the subsequent collapse of communism – narrative goes. Hence, it should be a date to celebrate annually as a final,everlasting opening of the road to universalfreedom prosperity, globally shared rosy future – in word: a self-realisation of humankind.

The counter narrative claims something else. All the major socio-political movements, since the Enlightenment until the end of XX century, offered a vision for the entire human race: Universally concepted (or to say ideologiesed) for a universal appeal. Each of them had a coherent theory and strong intellectual appeal on fundamental issues (i) redistribution and (ii) access. E.g. the redistribution of knowledge and access of illiterate mases of burgeoning societies to it; redistribution of means of production and access of proletariat in critical decision-making; redistribution of production locations and access for all through unconstrained trade over the free oceans and seas, open to all. So, the claim goes that the collapse of the Berlin Wall was not an end of Communism (marked by the unilateral takeover of the Eastern German society). Thatmeant far more. It marked an end ofthe planetary visions. Two competing ideologies heavily contested each other all over the globe, particularly in Berlin. And there, on 9/11, they lost both – beyond recovery. Ever since the 9/11 (of 1989), nobody is able or willing to offer any universally conductive vision for all.

Finally, it is wrong to conclude that it is (only) the end of coherent universalism – it might be rather an (irreversible) end of the redistribution and access.

9/11 as a De-evolution ?!Let us take a closer look.

Ever since the Peace of Westphalia, Europe maintained the inner balance of powers by keeping its core section soft. Peripheral powers like England, France, Denmark, (Sweden and Poland being later replaced by) Prussia, the Ottomans, Habsburgs and Russia have pressed and preserved the center of continental Europe as their own playground. At the same time, they kept extending their possessions overseas or, like Russia and the Ottomans, over the land corridors deeper into Asian and MENA proper. Once Royal Italy and Imperial Germany had appeared, the geographic core ‘hardened’ and for the first time started to politico-militarily press onto peripheries, including the two European mega destructions, known as the two World Wars. Therefore, this new geopolitical reality caused a big security dilemma lasting from the 1814 Vienna congress up to Potsdam conference of 1945, being re-actualized again with the Berlin Wall destruction: How many Germanies and Italies should Europe have to preserve its inner balance and peace?

At the time of Vienna Congress (1814-15), there were nearly a dozen of Italophone states and over three dozens of Germanophone entities – 34 western German states + 4 free cities (Kleinstaaterei), Austria and Prussia. But, than after the self-defeating entrapment of Napoleon III and its lost war (Franco-Prussian war 1870-71), Bismarck achieved theilliberal unification. That marked a beginning of vertigo for the Germanophones, their neighbors and rest of the world. The Country went from a failed liberal revolution, hereditary monarchy, authoritarianism, frail democracy and finally it cradled the worst planetary fascism before paying for the second time a huge prize for its imperialism in hurry. Additionally, Germany was a serial defaulter – like no other country on planet, three times in a single generation. All that has happened in the first 7 decades of its existence.

The post-WWII Potsdam conference concludes with only three Germanophone (+ Lichtenstein + Switzerland) and two Italophone states (+ Vatican).Than, 30 years ago, we concluded that one of Germanies was far too much to carry to the future. Thus, it disappeared from the map overnight, and joined the NATO and EU – without any accession talks – instantly.

Today west of Berlin, the usual line of narrative claims that the European 9/11(11 November 1989, fall of the Berlin Wall) was an event of the bad socio-economic model beingtaken over by the superior one – just an epilogue of pure ideological reckoning. Consequently – the narrative goes on – the west (German) taxpayers have taken the burden. East of Berlin, people will remind you clearly that the German reunification was actually a unilateral takeover, an Anschluss, which has been paid by the bloody dissolutions affecting in several waves two of the three demolished multinational Slavic state communities. A process of brutal erosionsthat still goes on, as we see it in Ukraine today.

Sacrificing the alternative society?

What are Berliners thinking about it?                                                                                     

The country lost overnight naturally triggers mixed feelings. In the case of DDR, the nostalgia turns into ostalgia (longing for the East). Prof. Brigitte Rauschenbach describes: “Ostalgia is more like unfocused melancholy.” Of the defeated one?! It is a “flight from reality for lack of an alternative, a combination of disappointment with the present and longing for the past”. The first German ever in the outer space, a DDR cosmonaut, Sigmund Jähn is very forthcoming: “People in the East threw everything away without thinking… All they wanted was to join West Germany, though they knew nothing about it beyond its ads on television. It was easier to escape the pressures of bureaucracy than it is now to avoid the pressures of money.” Indeed, at the time of Anschluss, DDR had 9.7 million jobs. 30 years later, they are still considerably below that number. Nowadays, it is a de-industrialized, demoralized and depopulated underworld of elderly.

If the equality of outcome (income) was a communist egalitarian dogma, is the belief in equality of opportunity a tangible reality offered the day after to Eastern Europe or just a deceiving utopia sold to the conquered, plundered, ridiculed and cannibalized countries in transition?

Wolfgang Herr, a journalist, claims: “The more you get to know capitalism the less inclined you are to wonder what was wrong with socialism.” This of course reinforces the old theme – happiness. Why Eastern Germans were less discontent in their own country than ever since the “unification”? Simply, happiness is not an insight into the conditions; it is rather a match with expectations.

Famously comparing the two systems 15 years later, one former East Berliner blue-collar has said: “Telling jokes about Honecker (the long-serving DDR leader) could lead to problems,but calling your foreman at work a fool was OK. Nowadays anyone can call (Chancellor) Schröder names, but not their company’ supervisor, it brings your life into a serious trouble.”

The western leftists involved in the student uprisings of the late 1960s were idealistically counting on the DDR. When the wall fell, they thought it marked the start of the revolution. After sudden and confusing ‘reunification’, they complained: ’But why did you sacrifice the alternative society?’

They were not the only one caught by surprise. In the March 1990 elections, the eastern branch of Kohl’s Christian Democrat party, passionately for ‘reunification’, won an easy majority, defeating the disorganized and dispersed civil rights activists who – in the absence of any other organized political form, since the Communist party was demonized and dismantled – advocated a separate, but democratic state on their own. The first post-‘reunification’, pan-German elections were held after 13 months of limbo, only in December 1990. “Our country no longer existed and nor did we,” Maxim Leo diagnosed. “The other peoples of Eastern Europe were able to keep their nation states, but not the East Germans. The DDR disappeared and advocates of Anschluss did their best to remove all trace of its existence”. Vincent Von Wroblewski, a philosopher, concludes on Anschluss: “By denying our past, they stole our dignity.”

Defeated Greece conquering Rome

30 years after abandoning and ridiculing socialism, its (German-born Marx-Engels) ideas seem regaining the ground. That is so especially among the US Democrats and Greens, and the millennials all over the planet, including a global follower base to the Swedish ‘baby revolutionary’ Greta Thunberg.

In his 2019 International Labor Day speech, the Prime Minister of the turbo-liberal Singapore’ delivers a clear massage of socialism: “A strong labour movement (from confrontation 50 years ago to cooperation today) remains crucial to us. In many developed countries, union membership is falling, and organised labour is becoming marginalised. Workers’ concerns are not addressed, and they feel bewildered, leaderless and helpless. Not surprisingly, they turn to extreme, nativist political movements that pander to their fears and insecurity, but offer no realistic solutions or inspiring leadership to improve their lives. In Singapore, constructive and cooperative unions, together with enlightened employers and a supportive government, have delivered better incomes for workers and steady progress for the country. We must stay on this path, and strengthen trust and cooperation among the tripartite partners, so that despite the uncertainties and challenges in the global economy, we can continue to thrive and prosper together as a nation.”

Back in Berlin, a 29-year-old Kevin Kühnert openly calls for socialism arguing that it ‘means democratic control over the economy’… over a tiger that in the meantime became too big and too wild to be controlled. He doesn’t shy away that his aim is ‘to replace capitalism as such not just to recalibrate it’. Kühnert’s socialism puts needs before skills and collective well-being before individual reward. Companies like BMW would be collectivized, meaning ownership by the workers. “Without collectivization of one form or the another, it is unthinkable to overcome capitalism” – this native of western Berlin claims.

Ideas might sound radical, but this raising star of the eldest and the second largest German political party – SPD, and its current Youth Chair (JUSOS), Kühnert enjoys huge support and popularity among millennials. It is a generation surprised by the social fairness,cultural broadness and overall achievements of the ‘defeated’ DDR.

The same principle would be applied to real estate: “I don’t think it is a legitimate business model, to earn a living from the living space of other people. Everybody should at most own the living space he himself inhabits – everything else would be owned collectively” – he explained in the mesmerizing interview for the leading German daily ‘Die Zeit’.

The triumphant neoliberalism of the German post-1989 dizzy years brought about fast and often opaque financial gains upwards, while the growing list of social risks were shifted downward. Today, the wealthiest are mostly those with the resources and skills to avoid taxes and ship jobs to China. Very often they are not even German; Warren Buffett is a major investor in Berlin real estate. Thirty years ago nobody from either side of the Berlin Wall imagined such scenarios. “Russians were here, but the culture and the restaurants were still German. Look at this now; what is German in this city – neither sports, food, outfits, property nor culture” – laments a baby-boomer Berliner at the Alexander Platz.

Unrestrained capitalism was clearly not what the founders of Western Germany had in mind. “Thecapitalist economic system did not serve the interest of the German people” – even the center-right Christian Democrats declared already in 1947. That is why – leaning on its own parallel society, that of the DDR – the Western German republic was built on the idea of the social market economy (sozialeMarktwirtschaft) in which individual initiative was prized, but so was the obligation of the wealthy to help those socio-economically behind.  

Alarming figures of the Gini index (including the income share held by lowest as well as by highest 10%) in Germany display a high child and youth poverty rates which significantly perpetuate the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Declared dream of the western German founders increasingly becomes a German illusion. The equality of opportunity – so much prized in theory – in practice is just a myth, especially for eastern portions of Germany, minorities, women, but also for an everlarger echelons of the middle-class.

“Socialism is not defeated, it is only hijacked. Nowadays, it is held by the ‘One Percent’ – they enjoy subsides, tax breaks, deregulations and executive bonuses. The rest of population lives unfair system of inequality and segregation, struggling to meet its ends under severe austerity, confusing migration policies, and never ending erosion of labour rights” – explains the Leipzig’s professor of political economy. “Even when Al Qaeda or ISIL strikes Germany, it is not an upper end elite restaurant, but the Munich working class suburban location, in front of inn that belongs to the chain of cheap fast food” – concludes his assistant. 

DDR was abruptly eliminated as a territorial reality. 30 years later, for many Germans, it comes back – between utopian dream and only remaining hope. No wonder that the elections, just 10 days before the 30th anniversary of Berlin Wall downing, in a focally important German federal province (Bundeslander) of Thuringia ended up with a total triumph of the Linke. This successor party to the former DDR’s Communists repeated their winning results yet again by late October 2019. This time it was with a stunning 31% of total votes – nearly equalling the combined vote won by the three most established German political parties, that of the Christian-democrats, Social-democrats and Liberals (8% +21%+5%).

Feared and admired, overindustrialisedovermigrated, overheatedand überperforming,Germany of today is increasingly isolated. The (AfD and other) schuldkult abolitionists are getting ready for a new version of the past that is already ‘sold’ all over Eastern Europe. All the while France – as Robert Kagan says: “is only one elections away from a nationalist electorate victory that will hit Europe like an earthquake” and will end “Franco-German partnership around which European peace was built 70 years ago”.

The Wall was downed 30 years ago, but the silent fences of solitude are erecting all within and around the Überland.

Yet another alternative society, butchered

The collapse of the Soviet Union – which started in Berlin on 09th November 1989 – marked a loss of the historical empire for Russia, but also a loss of geopolitical importance of nonaligned, worldwide respected Yugoslavia, which shortly after burned itself in series of brutal genocidal, civil war-like ethnical cleansings. The idea of different nations living together and communicating in different languages in a (con-)federal structure was (though imperfect) a reality in Yugoslavia, but also a declared dream of the Maastricht Europe. In fact, federalism of Yugoslavia was one of the most original, advanced and sophisticated models as such worldwide. Moreover, this country was the only truly emancipated and independent political entity of Eastern Europe and one of the very few in a whole of the Old Continent.

Yugoslavia was by many facets a unique European country: No history of aggression towards its neighbors, with the high toleration of otherness, at home and abroad. Yugoslav peoples were one of the rare Europeans who resolutely stood up against fascism, fighting it in a full-scale combat and finally paying it with 12% of its population in the 4-years war – a heavy burden shouldered by the tiny nation to return irresponsible Europe to its balances.

Besides the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was the single European country that solely liberated itself from Nazism and fascism. (Relative to the 1939 demographic volume and incumbent population within the national border, the top WWII fatalities were suffered by Poland – 18%, the Soviet Union – 15%, Yugoslavia 12%, III Reich/Germany – 10%. For the sake of comparison, the Atlantic rim suffered as follows: France – 1,3%, UK –0,9%, the US – 0,3%.)

Yugoslavs also firmly opposed Stalinism right after the WWII. Bismarck of southern Slavs – Tito imposed the so-called active peaceful coexistence after the 1955 Bandung south-south conference, and assembled the non-Aligned movement (NAM) in its founding, Belgrade conference of 1961. Steadily for decades, the NAM and Yugoslavia have been directly tranquilizing the mega confrontation of two superpowers and satellites grouped around them (and balancing their irresponsible calamities all over the globe). In Europe, the continent of the sharpest ideological divide, with practically two halves militarily confronting each other all over the core sectors of the continent (where Atlantic Europe was behind some of the gravest atrocities of the 20th century, from French Indochina, Indonesia, Congo, Rhodesia to Algeria and Suez), and with its southern flank of Portugal, Spain and Greece (and Turkey sporadically) run by the military Juntas, Yugoslavia was remarkably mild island of stability, moderation and wisdom.

Additionally, the Yugoslav way of socialism inspired the largest European communist parties outside the Soviet sphere to emancipate themselves, and to formulate the so calledEurocommunism. Notably, the Spanish PCE, Italian PCI and French PCF communist parties have evolved from the pro-Russian into the modern eurocommunist popular parties with a help of Yugoslav thinkers and practitioners.

Domestically, Yugoslavia had a unique constitutional setup of a strictly decentralized federation. Although being a formal democracy in its political life, many aspects of its social and economic practices as well as largely enjoyed personal freedoms and liberties featured the real democracy. The concept of self-management (along with the Self-managing Interest Community model) in economic, social, linguistic and cultural affairs gained a lot of external attention and admiration in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Still, there was neither enough sympathies, nor mercy towards-EU-heading Europe, to save either the Yugoslav people from an immense suffering or the symbol that this country represented domestically and internationally. Who needs alternative societies and alternative thinking?!

TRABANTize yourself!

Despite the post-Cold War, often pre-paid, rhetoric that Eastern Europe rebelled against the Soviet domination in order to associate itself with the West, the reality was very different. Nagy’s Hungary of 1956, Dubček’s Czechoslovakia of 1968 and (pre-)Jeruzelski Poland of 1981 dreamt and fought to join a liberal Yugoslavia, and its world-wide recognized 3rd way!

By 1989-90, this country still represented a hope of full emancipation and real freedom for many in the East. How did the newly created EU (Atlantic-Central Europe axis) react? At least tolerating (if not eager to support), or actively eliminating the third way of Yugoslavia? It responded to the Soviet collapse in the best fashion of a classic, historical nation-state, with the cold calculi of geopolitical consideration deprived of any ideological constrains. It easily abandoned altruism of its own idea by withdrawing its support to the reformist government of Yugoslavia, and basically sealed-off its faith.

Intentionally or not, indecisive and contradictory political messages of the Maastricht-time EU – from the Genscher/Mock explicate encouragement of separatism, and then back to the full reconfirmation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia – were bringing this multinational Slavic state into a schizophrenic situation. Consequently, these mixed or burial European political voices – most observes would agree – directly fed and accelerated inner confrontations of the (elites claiming to represent) Yugoslav peoples.

Soon after, Atlantic-Central Europe axis contained its own candidate country, Yugoslavia (and started calling it euphemistically the western Balkans), letting the slaughterhouse to last essentially unchecked for years. At the same time, it busily mobilized all resources needed to extend its own strategic depth eastwards (later formalized by the so-called enlargements of 1995, of 2004, of 2007 and finally of 2013).

The first ever fully televised war with its highly disturbing pictures of genocidal Armageddon came by early 1990s. It remained on TV sets for years all over Europe, especially to its East. Although the Atlantic-Central Europe axis kept repeating we do not know who is shooting whom in this powder keg and it is too early to judge, this –seemingly indecisive, wait-and-see, attitude– was in fact an undeniably clear message to everyone in Eastern Europe: No alternative way will be permitted. East was simply expected to bandwagon – to passively comply, not to actively engage itself.

This is the only answer how can genocide and the EU enlargement go hand in hand at the same time on such a small continent. At about same time, Umberto Eco talks about eternal yet reinvigorated Nazism. By 1995, he famously diagnosed: ‘Ur-Fascism speaks Newspeak’.

No surprise that the East has soon after abandoned its identity quest, and capitulated. Its final civilizational defeat came along: the Eastern Europe’s Slavs have silently handed over their most important debates – that of Slavism, anti-fascism and of their own identity – solely to the (as we see nowadays) recuperating Russophone Europe.

Europe of Genocide and of Unification – Happily Ever after

As said, the latest loss of Russophone Europe in its geopolitical and ideological confrontation with the West meant colossal changes in Eastern Europe. One may look intogeopolitical surrounding of at the-time largest eastern European state, Poland, as an illustration of how dramatic it was. All three land neighbors of Poland; Eastern Germany (as the only country to join the EU without any accession procedure, but by pure act of Anschluss), Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have disappeared overnight. At present, Polish border-countries are a three-decade-old novelty on the European political map. Further on, if we wish to compare the number of dissolutions of states worldwide over the last 50 years, the Old continent suffered as many as all other continents combined: American continent – none, Asia – one (Indonesia/  East Timor), Africa – two (Sudan/South Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea), and Europe – three.

Underreported as it is, each and every dissolution in Europe was primarily related to Slavs (Slavic peoples) living in multiethnic and multi-linguistic (not in the Atlantic Europe’s conscripted pure single-nation) state. Additionally, all three European – meaning, every second dissolution in the world – were situated exclusively and only in Eastern Europe. That region has witnessed a total dissolution of Czechoslovakia (western Slavs) and Yugoslavia (southern Slavs, in 3 waves), while one state disappeared from Eastern Europe (DDR) as to strengthen and enlarge the front of Central Europe (Western Germany). Finally, countless centripetal turbulences severely affected Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the SU (eastern Slavs) on its frontiers.

Irredentism in the UK, Spain, Belgium, France and Italy, or Denmark (over Faroe Islands and Greenland) is far elder, stronger and deeper. However, the dissolutions in Eastern Europe took place irreversibly and overnight, while Atlantic Europe still remained intact, with Central Europe even enlarging territorially and expanding economically.

Ergo: Our last 30 years conclude that (self-)fragmented, deindustrialized, rapidly aged rarified and depopulated, (and de-Slavicized) EasternEurope is probably the least influential region of the world – one of the very few underachievers. Obediently submissive and therefore, rigid in dynamic environment of the promising 21st century, Eastern Europeans are among the last, remaining passive downloaders and slow-receivers on the otherwise blossoming stage of the world’s creativity, politics and economy. It seems that Europe still despises its own victims.

Interestingly, the physical conquest of the European east, usually referred to as the EU eastern enlargement was deceivingly presented more as a high virtue than what that really was – a cold realpolitik instrument. Clearly, it was primarily the US-led NATO extension, and only then the EU (stalking, TRABANT-ising) enterprise. Simply, not a single eastern European country entered the EU before joining the NATO at first. It was well understood on both sides of the Atlantic that the contracting power of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin Russia, in the post-Cold War period,would remain confused, disoriented, reactive and defensive. Therefore, the North Atlantic Military Alliance kept expanding despite the explicit assurances given to  Kremlin by the George H.W. Bush administration.

It is worth remembering that the NATO was and remains an instrument (institutionalized political justifier) of the US physical, military presence in Europe. Or, as Lord Ismay vocally defined it in1949: ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’. The fact that the US remained in Western Germany, and that the Soviet Army pulled out from Eastern Germany did not mean ‘democratization’ or ‘transition’. It represented a direct military defeat of the Gorbachev Russia in its duel over the core sectors of Central and Eastern Europe.

(A total ‘reimbursement’ of the Helmut Kohl’s government to Soviet Union was less than €6 billion; DEM 12 billion + DEM 3 billion in loan. That little Gorbachev accepted in order to pull out from East Germany almost half a million strong army – which marked beginning of domino effect.)

As direct spoils of war, DDR disappeared from the political map of Europe, being absorbed by Western Germany, while the American Army still resides in a unified Germany. In fact, more than half of the US 75 major overseas military bases are situated in Europe. Up to this very day, Germany hosts 25 of them.   

Theletzte Mensch or Übermensch?

In the peak of Atlantic hype of early 1990s, Fukuyama euphorically claimed end of history. Less than three two decades later, twisting in the sobriety of the inevitable, he quietly moderated it with afuture of history, desperately looking around and begging: ‘Where is a counter-narrative?”  Was and will our history ever be on holiday?

One hundred years after the outbreak of the WWI and 30 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, young generations of Europeans are being taught in school about a singularity of an entity called the EU. However, as soon as serious external or inner security challenges emerge, the compounding parts of the true, historic Europe are resurface again. Formerly in Iraq (with the exception of France) and now with Libya, Mali, Syria and Ukraine; Central Europe is hesitant to act, Atlantic Europe is eager, Scandinavian Europe is absent, and while Eastern Europe is obediently bandwagoning, Russophone Europe is opposing.

The 1986 Reagan-led Anglo-American bombing of Libya was a one-time, headhunting punitive action. This time, both Libya and Syria (Iraq, Mali, Ukraine, too) have been given a different attachment. The factors are multiple and interpolated. Let us start with a considerable presence of China in Africa. Then, there are successful pipeline deals between Russia and Germany which, while circumventing Eastern Europe, will deprive East from any transit-related bargaining premium, and will tacitly pose an effective joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states, Poland and Ukraine. Finally, here is a relative decline of the US interests and capabilities, and to it related re-calibration of their European commitments, too. All of that combined, must have triggered alarm bells across, primarily Atlantic, Europe.

The insight here is that although seemingly unified, Europe is essentially composed of several segments, each of them with its own dynamics, legacies and its own political culture (considerations, priorities and anxieties). Atlantic and Central Europe are confident and secure on the one end, while (the EU and non-EU) Eastern Europe as well as Russia on the other end, insecure and neuralgic, therefore, in a permanent quest for additional security guaranties.       

“America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself”– Robert Kagan famously claimed. Paraphrasing it, we may say: From 9/11 (09th November 1989 in Berlin) and shortly after, followed by the genocidal wars all over Yugoslavia, up to the Euro-zone drama, MENA or ongoing Ukrainian crisis, Europe didn’t change. It only became more itself – a conglomerate of five different Europes.

Therefore, 9/11 this year will be just another said reminder: How our winners repeatedly missed to take our mankind into completely other direction; towards the non-confrontational, decarbonized, de-monetized/de-financialized and de-psychologized, the self-realizing, generationally fairer and greener humankind.

To Trabant (our lives) or not (drive) Trabant, question is now? Where is the better life that all of us have craved and hoped for,that we all deserve and that were repeatedly promised of that day in Berlin?

Modern Diplomacy Advisory Board, Chairman Geopolitics of Energy Editorial Member Professor and Chairperson for Intl. Law & Global Pol. Studies contact: anis@bajrektarevic.eu

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Is British Democracy in Danger?

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On Sunday 12th of December 2021 Boris Johnson went on national television to warn about a tidal wave that would threaten Britain. He was back then referring to the Omicron Covid-19 variant, little did he know back then that he could have been referring to his own political future. Johnson is facing increasing demands from his own party to step down after having admitted to attending a party in Downing Street on May 20th, 2020, during the UK’s first national lockdown.

Johnson has been facing increasing risks for quite a long time by now: from collapsing poll ratings, to violation of lockdown rules and an ill-managed pandemic that has continued to strain the National Health Service; among many others. These crises have compromised his moral authority both with the citizenry and with his own frontbenchers. Although in the UK confidence votes can happen relatively quick: the no confidence vote on Theresa May’s government was held on December 12th, 2018, just a day after she was informed that the minimum threshold had been reached, this is still not on the horizon for the current Prime Minister.

To trigger a leadership contest 15% of the Tory MPs need to submit a letter to the chair of the 1922 Committee. There are currently 360 Tory MPs, 54 of them are needed to spark a confidence vote. As up to now, very few have publicly confirmed to either have submitted or to have the intention to submit a letter. If such threshold is reached, this would open the debate as to whether there is someone suitable enough to replace him. The frontrunners are Chancellor Rishi Sunak and Foreign Secretary Liz Truss; neither have the proven record of vote-winning Boris Johnson has had ever since he was the Mayor of London. Such vote of confidence is also unlikely to happen as majority of the crises the government has faced are of their own making. Johnson is not the cause; it is the symptom of a deeper decay of the British State and their politicians.

While the Conservatives will not be able to escape the cumulative effects of current and past scandals, this latest turmoil us unlikely to trigger the collapse of Boris Johnson. The next British election is scheduled to happen in May 2024, giving both Johnson and the Tories enough time to move on from this crisis and work on rebuilding electoral support. Boris Johnson has long defied political gravity and has survived a long history of scandals and mismanagements that may have destroyed the electoral chances of many other politicians and their political parties. It is highly likely that in the coming local elections in May 2022 the Conservatives will suffer electoral defeats, this is still preferable than what the political and electoral consequences for the Conservatives would be if they were to get rid of Johnson. Sacking him now would be accepting losing the war rather than losing a battle in the coming local elections. The long-term aim of the Tories is to hold on power for as long as they can, and at least ensure their electoral base is secure coming the 2024 general elections. For this, Boris Johnson still may come in handy.

Although Boris Johnson’s record has been shockingly poor; the Tories will not give Labour a chance for a general election before the scheduled for 2024, especially not now that they are leading the polls on the question as to who would make a better prime minister. The reality is that although his ratings have plummeted dramatically over recent years, there is no real threat of a general election for at least 2 years if one considers the larger political landscape.

One of the major threats British democracy does not come from Boris Johnson but rather from a deterioration of what sustains democracy as a healthy system of government. The UK electorate is highly volatile. Unlike countries like the US whose electorate has become highly polarised, the British electorate has shown less party loyalty, and voters have switched more and more between political parties in each election. However, this volatility will not get Johnson out of office, that is something only the Conservatives can do. This is closely linked to trust in politicians and the government. Lack of trust in both is one of the major issues of contemporary democracies around the world. Trust, is, after all, the basic condition for a legitimate government. Lack of trust in politicians, institutions, political parties, and the government in general enables populist tendencies, polarisation, political extremism and impacts the voting preference of citizens. It also favours the support of more stringent stances towards minorities, opposition, immigration, and human rights violations. A second threat that should not be disregarded is the attitude towards democratic institutions and bodies that sustain the British political system. While it is true that Johnson’s behaviour does not push to extremes such as Donal Trump did, or many other highly divisive politicians around the world, he is drawn to the same unconventional styles to deal with political challenges.

Democracy around the world is facing a backlash that is organised and coming from within, from elected officials. Our democratic rights can either be taken away suddenly as a result of a revolution or a coup d’état, or gradually through the election of leaders who slowly erode rules, standards and institutions that help sustain democracy. This is potentially more dangerous for the overall prospects of democracy because gradual erosion of democratic values is harder to perceive. The state, under this progressive attack, becomes prone to the systematic corruption of interest groups that take over the processes and institutions in charge of making public policy. It is during this gradual democratic backsliding that elected officials disregard norms and institutions while, at the same time, trying to redesign the structure of the state. An informed and active citizenry is crucial to prevent further erosion of democracy. We need to be aware that it is not only democratic rules and institutions that are in danger, but also the respect of our fundamental civil, political, social and human rights.

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The French Dispatch: The Year 2022 and European Security

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2021 has been rich in negative events for European security: the world has witnessed the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty, American-French discord concerning AUKUS, the termination of the official dialogue between Russia and NATO, and the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border.

Over the past year, the Western countries seem to have been searching for new strategies. Since the end of 2019, NATO has been developing a new concept, and in June 2021 at the summit in Brussels, to the displeasure of sceptics, it was possible to agree on its basis—the transatlantic agenda NATO 2030 (# NATO2030) . While the broad formulations and a direct hierarchy of threats still require clarification, new projects in the field of weapons development, combating climate change, and increasing interoperability have already been declared.

In parallel, since the end of 2020, work has continued on the EU European Parliamentary Research Service project—the Strategic Compass. The dialectic between Atlanticism and Europeanism softened after Joe Biden came to power in the United States, but the European interests and red lines retain their significance for transatlantic relations. In 2022, together with the rotating post of the President of the EU Council, the role of a potential newsmaker in this area has been transferred to Emmanuel Macron, who feels very comfortable in it.

On December 9, the provisions of the Paris programme were published under the motto “Recovery, power, belonging” France, as expected, is reiterating its call for strengthening European sovereignty. The rhetoric of the document and its author is genuine textbook-realism. But now for the entire European Union.

Objectives of the French Presidency, are not articulated directly but are quite visible—making the EU more manageable and accountable to its members, with new general rules to strengthen mobilisation potential, and improve the EU’s competitiveness and security in a world of growing challenges.

Paris proposes reforming the Schengen area and tightening immigration legislation—a painful point for the EU since 2015, which has become aggravated again in recent months. This ambitious task has become slightly more realistic since Angela Merkel’s retirement in Germany. At least a new crisis response mechanism on this issue can be successful, even if it is not fully implemented.

In addition, the Élysée Palace calls on colleagues to revise the budget deficit ceilings of the Maastricht era to overcome the consequences of the pandemic and finally introduce a carbon tax at the EU borders. The latter allows for a new source of income and provides additional accountability for the implementation of the “green” goals by member countries.

The planned acceleration of the adoption of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA), developed by the European Commission at the end of 2020, is also aimed at unifying the general legislation and consolidating the European position in the world. In other words, the French Foreign Ministry quite soberly assesses the priority areas and vulnerabilities of the European Union and focuses on them, but with one exception.

A special priority of the French presidency is to strengthen the defence capabilities of the EU. On the sidelines, the French diplomats note that the adoption of the Strategic Compass in the spring of 2022, as originally planned, is a fundamental task, since otherwise the process may be completely buried. With a high degree of probability, this is so: the first phase of the development of the Compass—the general list of threats—lasted a year, and consisted of dozens of sessions, meetings, round tables with the involvement of leading experts, but the document was never published. If Macron won’t do it, then who will?

As the main ideologist and staunchest supporter of the EU’s “strategic autonomy”, the French president has been trying for five years to mobilise others for self-sufficiency in the security sphere. With his direct participation, not only the Mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the defence area was launched, where France is the leader in a number of projects, but also the so-far failed European Intervention Initiative. Even without focusing on French foreign policy traditions and ambitions, the country remains a major European arms exporter and a nuclear power, where the military-industrial complex is closely affiliated with the state.

Implementing the 2022 agenda is also a matter of immediate political gain as France enters a new electoral cycle. The EU Summit will take place on March 10-11, 2022, in Paris, a month before the elections, and in any case it will become part of the election campaign and a test for the reputation of the current leader. Macron has not yet officially announced his participation in the presidential race, but he is actively engaged in self-promotion, because right-wing politicians espousing different degrees of radicalism are ready to take advantage of his defeats to purchase extra points.

The search for allies seems to be of key importance for victory at the European level, and the French Foreign Ministry has already begun working on this matter. In 2016–2017 the launch of new initiatives was predetermined by the support of Germany and the Central and East European countries. The change of cabinet in Germany will undoubtedly have an impact on the nation’s policy. On the one hand, following the results of the first visit of the new Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Paris on December 10, the parties announced the closeness of their positions and a common desire to strengthen Europe. On the other hand, the coalition of Social Democrats (SDP) was made up with the Greens and Free Democrats (FDP) who are not at all supporters of excessive involvement in security issues. What “strategic autonomy” means for France, constitutes a more restrained “strategic sovereignty” for Germany Therefore, an intensification of dialogue with Italy and Spain, which are both respected and potentially sympathetic, is likely. The military cooperation agreement concluded in the autumn of 2021 with Greece, an active member of PESCO, can also help Paris.

Gaining support from smaller countries is more challenging. Although the European project is not an alternative to the transatlantic one, the formation of a common list of threats is a primary task and problem for NATO as well. As mentioned above, it is around it that controversy evolves, because the hierarchy determines the distribution of material resources. The countries of Eastern Europe, which assume that it is necessary to confront Russia but lack the resources to do so, will act as natural opponents of the French initiatives in the EU, while Paris, Rome and Madrid will oppose them and the United States in the transatlantic dialogue. The complexity of combining two conversations about the same thing with a slightly different composition of participants raises the bar for Emmanuel Macron. His stakes are high. The mobilisation of the Élysée Palace’s foreign policy is one of the most interesting subjects to watch in the year 2022.

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Unilateral vs Bilateral Euroisation: Political, technical and practical issues in the curious case of north Cyprus

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The island of Cyprus has been split between a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north since 1974. The Turkish Cypriot state declared in the north is recognised only by Turkey, while the Republic of Cyprus in the south is recognised internationally and is a European Union (EU) member since 2004. In 2004, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the United Nations’ Annan Plan for reunification only for Greek Cypriots to reject it. As a result, Cyprus joined the EU as a de facto divided island. Despite joining the EU as a divided island, the whole of Cyprus is considered an EU territory. However, the EU law is suspended in the north until reunification is achieved.

This resulted in the euro being the legal tender only in the southern part of the island. With the recent and continuous depreciation of the Turkish lira, the long-standing question of whether and how the north could switch to the euro has once again intensified. While a bilateral adoption of the euro is not on the cards until a reunification on the island, north Cyprus could technically unilaterally adopt the euro. However this could cause complications in the future as the EU is adamant that unilateral euroisation cannot be used as a mechanism by Member States to circumvent the stages foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty.

Under normal circumstances, “Member States with a derogation”, i.e. the Member States that have not yet fulfilled the necessary conditions for the adoption of the euro are first required to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) to achieve eurozone membership. This is a “waiting room” where any country aspiring to adopt the euro is required to stay for at least for two years. It is now a well-known fact that the ECB shares the opinion of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), i.e. the meeting of the finance ministers of EU Member States adopted in 2000, that this requirement should not be waived. Assuming the northern part of Cyprus is considered a Member State, the same principle will apply and therefore it would not be welcome to adopt the euro unilaterally, bypassing the convergence process foreseen by the Treaty for the adoption of the euro.

Currently, ERM II comprises the currencies of Bulgaria, Croatia and Denmark. Just like these countries, north Cyprus would be expected to peg its national currency to the euro and, given the consent of the European System of Central Banks, fixe a “central exchange rate” and a “deviation margin” under Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for a duration of no less than two years. If successful based on its ERM II performance, a final exchange rate would be determined and the redenomination would be done over a transition period. 

In the case of north Cyprus, it is understood that the EU might have already agreed to apply a fast track approach where there would be a one-year transition period. However, this has not been confirmed officially by the EU so the EU’s stance in practice is not known. After all, even Denmark, a Member State which has negotiated an opt-out arrangement before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty has been participating in ERM II although it chose not to adopt the euro. So the EU’s approach in the case of northern Cyprus would not expected to be too lenient. There is no way to find out unless north Cyprus continues the dialogue with the EU.

In the meantime, a more relevant question is whether a unilateral euroisation could be possible. The short answer is yes. For instance the euro was introduced in Kosovo and Montenegro that did not have a status of a sovereign state at the time. In both cases, the decision was made in 1999. Kosovo, defined the Deutsche Mark as the designated currency, which was replaced by the euro in 2002. Similarly, Montenegro introduced a parallel currency system in 1999, in which the Deutsche Mark was allowed to circulate alongside the then legal tender. In 2001, the Deutsche Mark became the only legal tender and was replaced by the euro in June 2002.

In the case of Montenegro, now an official EU candidate, the adoption of the euro without an agreement with the European Central Bank (ECB) was acknowledged by the European Commission as a measure which had to be taken due to “extraordinary circumstances” present in the country at the time. This could be precedent for north Cyprus. However, it is important to note that the ECB still supports the view that unilateral euroisation is not compatible with the Maastricht Treaty and cannot be a way to bypass the convergence process.

The implications of the Treaty framework for in the case of Montenegro currently remain unknown and are expected to be detailed “by the time of possible future negotiations for accession to the EU”. In particular it remains uncertain whether the country would be required to introduce its own currency before it can join ERM II. Should this be the case as Montenegro makes further progress towards EU membership, this would entail substantial operational and changeover costs. Authorities in north Cyprus, should therefore monitor the developments very closely.

Normally, non-euro area Member States are denied the option of unilateral euroization due the principle of equality, i.e. the EU considers bypassing the convergence process incompatible with the EU Treaty and actively discourages it.In particular, the Treaty sets out that there has to be a Community assessment of the fulfilment of these criteria and mutual agreement on the appropriate exchange rates. This means that the ECB does not welcome unilateral euroisation, as such an adoption of the euro outside the Treaty process would run counter to the underlying economic reasoning of European Monetary Union.

However, as north Cyprus is already an EU territory the adoption of the euro could be considered a “common interest of the EU” and therefore an exception could be possible. In fact, the policy of the EU with regard to the Turkish Cypriot community which was set out by the General Affairs Council in 2004 states that “the Council is determined to…facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community”. So in the case of north Cyprus, a switch to the euro could be allowed by way of exception although this would obviously imply circumventing the process of multilateral assessment by the EU Member States.

While the EU could give the green light to adoption of the euro by north Cyprus without a successful exchange-rate procedure under ERM II, it would not allow this to undermine the process of convergence prior to the adoption of the euro. In other words, the Convergence criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty would still remain relevant and important as the Treaty requires Member States to achieve a high degree of sustainable economic convergence before they can join the euro area.

In other words the economies of Member States with a derogation must be able to keep pace with those already using the euro. Exchange rate stability, for instance, is evaluated by assessing whether the exchange rate of the country’s currency has remained within the fluctuation bands provided for by ERM II for at least two years without devaluating against the euro.

Besides exchange rate stability, the convergence criteria also include price stability, sound public finances, and convergence in long-term interest rates. This means, for instance, that a country’s long-term interest rate, measured on the basis of long-term government bonds or comparable securities, should not exceed that of the three best-performing Member States in terms of price stability by more than 2 percentage points during the one-year observation period prior to the assessment.   

On the other hand, a country is considered to meet the price stability criterion if its average inflation rate does not exceed the inflation rate of the three best-performing EU Member States by more than 1.5 percentage points during a one-year observation period. These criteria are intended to ensure the sustainability of public finances and that the government is able to manage its debts.

Article 140 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) to report to the Council, at least once every two years, or at the request of a Member State with a derogation on the progress of the country in fulfilling their obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union. In addition to preparing these “Convergence Reports”, both the ECB and the Commission regularly monitor progress throughout the year.

A Convergence Report is normally published at least once every two years or at the request of an EU Member State which would like to join the euro area. Both the ECB and the European Commission issue these reports describing the progress made by non-euro area Member States towards achieving the criteria necessary for a country to adopt the euro. According to the latest report, among countries legally committed to adopting the euro, Croatia and Sweden fulfil the price stability criterion, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Sweden fulfil the criterion on public finances, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Sweden fulfil the long-term interest rate criterion. However none of them meet all the requirements for adoption of the euro. So convergence process is very strict and challenging.

In particular, it should be noted that convergence must be sustainable, meaning that satisfying the economic convergence criteria at one point in time is not enough and they are expected to be met on a lasting basis. A Member State’s general financial position is considered sustainable based on two criteria, namely, the government’s annual fiscal deficit should not exceed 3% of gross domestic product, and overall government should not exceed 60% of gross domestic product. This is very important for northern Cyprus as it will need to ensure that its economy is resilient.

It is known that the Maastricht Treaty provides some flexibility and the final assessment depends on the ECOFIN Council. Whether and how this would apply in the case of northern Cyprus remains a mystery. While details remain unknown to the public, the one-year transition period envisaged in the case of northern Cyprus could be related this. However, it should be noted that the decision on whether north Cyprus can adopt the euro would ultimately be a political one and would lie with the Council of the European Union. This means that representatives from all EU countries would be required to take a decision based on a proposal by the EC and after consulting the European Parliament.

Given that participation in the ERM II is a precondition for as well as fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria to join the euro, it is binding and is unlikely to be waived for any country regardless of any special circumstances. This is because ERM II provides the framework to manage the exchange rates between EU currencies, which is necessary for exchange rate stability. As such north Cyprus would be expected to participate in the mechanism without devaluing its central rate against the euro before it can qualify to adopt the euro.

While no provision of the EU Treaty states explicitly that Member States with a derogation must have their own currency, the Treaty is by and large based on this assumption. In addition, the entry into ERM II is decided by mutual agreement of all ERM II parties, which consist of the ministers of the euro area Member States, the President of the ECB and the minister and the central bank governor of Denmark, as the only non-euro area Member State currently participating in the mechanism.

So in the case of north Cyprus adoption of the euro could mean that the country should first introduce its own currency. This could be a more viable alternative and north Cyprus could then peg its currency to the euro as a preparation for an eventual switch to the euro. Indeed, some countries joined ERM II with their preexisting currency pegs. To give a recent example, the currencies of Bulgaria and Croatia were already closely tied to the euro at the time of applying to the ERM II. Bulgaria had a currency board, first with the Deutsche Mark, and subsequently with the euro after 1999. Croatia had a peg first with the Deutsche Mark, and from 1999 to the euro, with a narrow band.

During this process, legal requirements should not also been underestimated. Article 140(1) of TFEU requires the convergence reports to assess the compatibility of national legislation, including the statutes of the national central bank and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB. There could also be additional unprecedented requirements and countries may be required to commit to implementing specific policy measures on a variety of topics. For instance, in the case of Bulgaria and Croatia, such requirements range from the anti-money laundering framework, state-owned enterprises and the insolvency framework, to the non-banking financial sector, corruption and even organised crime. It is highly unlikely that the national legislation in north Cyprus is currently compatible with that of the EU as the latest convergence report suggests that the respective national legislations in none of the seven new EU Member States would be deemed “fully compatible” with the exception of Croatia.

In fact, the former north Cyprus President Mustafa Akıncı himself had confessed that “serious work” would needed to ensure the harmonization of the national institutions with the EU acquis. As can be seen in the case of Croatia and Bulgaria, this has now become a prerequisite not only for joining the EU but also in terms of adopting the euro as a new Member State. For instance, this was the main reason behind the delay in Bulgaria’s acceptance to ERM II. Bulgaria was able to get the green light to join ERM II two years after it formally announced its intention to join the mechanism.

The delay was due to the requirement imposed by the Eurozone governments requiring Bulgaria to join ERM II and the Banking Union simultaneously. This prerequisite is known as “the Cooperation Decision” and requires Member States which adopt the euro to also participate in the Banking Union, i.e. the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). . Therefore, participating in ERM II with a view to later adopting the euro will also involve preparing for joining the Banking Union.

This requirement will now apply to all future candidates including north Cyprus. However, it should also be noted that the procedure for entering the Banking Union is separate from the assessment of the convergence criteria. Joining the Banking Union is irreversible and involves direct powers of the SSM and the SRM over its banking system. This has important implications for the banking sector as banks that will come under the direct supervision of the ECB will also be subject to the direct supervision of the Single Resolution Board (SRB).

To be more specific, this means that, the ECB will become responsible for the direct supervision of the significant credit institutions following the “significance assessment process”. This applies to banks considered to meet the “materiality criteria” as set out in the SSM Regulation (Regulation 1024/2013) and the SSM Framework Regulation (Regulation 468/2014). The criteria include “economic importance for the country” so could technically apply to banks in north Cyprus despite their insignificant sizes in comparison to the EU economy. Therefore, for new joiners like north Cyprus the accession process would involve not only the harmonization with the aquis but also the strengthening of their institutions and administrative capacity that will enable them to implement and monitor the enforcement of the harmonized legislation.

Therefore, adoption of the euro by north Cyprus, bilaterally or unilaterally, would not be as easy as it may look. More than anything else, this would require political will, courage and determination. The former President Mustafa Akıncı, a devoted supporter of a federal solution and the EU, had set an ambitious target of the euro going into circulation “from the first day” in the case of a reunification. However with the failure of the last reunification talks in 2017 in Crans Montana, Switzerland, political conditions have changed dramatically. The current President Ersin Tatar who is a very passionate proponent of the two-state solution is wholeheartedly against the EU and the euro. Therefore, the general stance towards the adoption of the euro in the northern part of the island remains fragmented. Given these circumstances, adoption of the euro in north Cyprus seems a distant prospect.

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