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The Russian Federation in the new Middle East

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In mid-October of last year, President Trump’s order to leave the Syrian territory as quickly as possible led the Russian military to quickly filling the void left by the U.S. forces.

Certainly some U.S. special forces are still operational, but the strategic aim is obviously lacking.

On the edge of the 32kilometre corridor from the border line between Turkey and Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s army now controls Manbiji, at the beginning of the buffer area requested by Turkey, up to Ayn Issa, Tel Amer and Qamishli.

Below this line there are only the YPG and PKK Kurds, of whom it is difficult, in fact, to separate and distinguish the militancy.

 When Assad regained control of North-East Syria, with the decisive Russian help, President Putin was still on a diplomatic tour between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

To say the least, none of the US traditional Sunni allies has appreciated  the fast US acquiescence and Turkey’s unequal agreement with the United States. In fact, this is exactly the way in which the Syrian and Kurdish policy followed by the United States and Turkey has been interpreted by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

The Sunni powers regard Turkey as a dangerous side effect of the Muslim Brotherhood – and this holds true at least for Saudi Arabia – or also as a geopolitical wild card – and this applies to the Emirates.

This holds true also for the countries, like Qatar, which have always been interested friends of the Ikhwan, namely the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hostile to God and to his enemies – this is the future of the Turkish global strategy, rebus sic stantibus.  Either it binds itself to Russia, under its terms and conditions, or it remains alone in the new Greater Middle East, by now deprived of support from the United States.

 The Sunnis who count, namely those of the Arabian Peninsula, and Al Jazeera have understood the U.S. countermelody and are already looking for new allies. They cannot succeed on their own and hence Russia sets in.

 “Russia is my second home” – as Prince Mohammed bin Zayed from the dynasty ruling in Abu Dhabi has cleverly stated – but the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers ordered by President Trump is really a strategic, moral and historical turning point.

 The Kurds, betrayed in no time by the United States, have immediately negotiated and reached a good agreement with Assad, mediated only by Russia and organized above all by the Shiite factions of the Kurdish nation, present especially in Iraq and with excellent relations with Iran.

 Syria, i.e. the place where Turkey wants to enter so as to avoid the strategic link between Syrian Kurds, Anatolian Kurds and Iraqi Kurds – which would constitute a Kurdish State capable of annihilating the rest of the ethnically Turkish population – needs an ally that can “keep firm and alive” (as Machiavelli said with reference to France) Syria as a solid unitary entity, Kurds included.

President Putin still wants to stay in Syria, because he hopes that, in the future, Turkey will leave NATO and become a Russian peripheral ally. Is it an impossible dream? Not necessarily so.

Turkey may also adhere to Russia’s project: the Atlantic Alliance is now the wreck of a war which ended seventy years ago and which has never supported Turkey except in the long series of military coups in 1961, 1980 and again in 1997. Finally, in the changing of the guard that saw all the NATO Mediterranean countries oust their ruling classes, Turkey had to face the AKP, a party reborn from the ashes of an Islamist organization that had been banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court.

 The Muslim Brotherhood, acting as US agents – also when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State – to “bring democracy”, i.e. its own democracy,  throughout the Islamic world. A masterpiece in reverse.

 Currently, after the end of the “Cold War”, only those who can be blackmailed rise to power. Hence the transfer of power in Italy, in the Middle East, but also in Latin America and even in Asia.

Briefly President Putin currently wants Turkey to leave NATO to start  collaboration with Russia in Central Asia and, above all, in the great future business of pipelines from Asia to Europe.

The “Middle Corridor” – if organized by Turkey – favours the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

There is also the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway opened in October 2017, as well as Turkmenistan’s port on the Caspian Sea, built by Turkish companies closely linked to the Turkish Presidency, which has been  operational since 2018.

As early as 1992, the Western powers have conveyed the message to Turkey that it only needs to become the secular Sunni rampart against Iran.

In 1993 Turkey also founded the Alliance for Turkish Culture while, in 2009, the Turkish regime established the Cooperation Council of the Turkic Speaking States.

Now Turkey’s primary idea is to be a “central power” that, however, operates freely in Asia and, in any case, outside the interests of the Atlantic Alliance.

  This is exactly what Vladimir Putin likes about it.

The Turkish energy mix, however, is linked to natural gas. Turkey imports it from Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran.

 If the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) is implemented, Turkey’s energy connection from Central Asian countries would be objectively more important than the old link with the USA and NATO.

Hence Russia could be a real trump card for Turkey.

President Putin, however, has favoured the connection and operational communication between Assad’s forces and the “Turkmen” militias linked to Turkey.

 There is no channel of communication that Russia does not control in the Greater Middle East.

After all, if you wage war in the Middle East against a Western-style  “villain” typical of comics, the only possible result is that your work is done by the old enemy.

 There is also the Iraqi insurgency which concerns corruption, inefficiency and government irrelevance.

 So far the toll has been 200 victims, with at least 6,000 injured people.

It is said that Iran has supplied snipers to hit the crowd, but there is no evidence about it.

 The Asaib ahl-Al haq militia, i.e. the Shiite network of Al Ghazali that  has already operated in Syria, was seen operating also in Iraq and often had to face strong negative reactions from the local population.

 Meanwhile, Russia is reaching agreements with all Middle East countries obviously focusing on energy, but also on the media – and above all TV–as well as on infrastructure and the Armed Forces.

In January 2019 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov hosted his Iraqi counterpart, Mohammed Alì al-Hakim.

Russian investment in Iraq has recently exceeded 10 billion US dollars, while Russia has cancelled an old Iraqi debt of 12.2 billion US dollars in exchange for a new 4 billion US dollar oil contract, which provides  Russia with the opportunity of starting to exploit West-Qurna 2, one of the largest oil fields in the world.

Lukoil and Gazprom Neft officially entered the Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil market in 2012, thus paving the way for many new contracts.

Russia has also directly funded Kurdistan’s government, with a 3.5 billion US dollar loan, which will be repaid with the oil sold to Russia’s Rosneft as soon as possible.

 In October 2013 Russia sold to the Kurdish world in Iraq and Syria 4.3 billion US dollars in weapons to replace the Iraqi ones. These funds make the Kurdish Rojava autonomous from Iraq, even strategically.

 The old intelligence operational centre between Russia, Iran and Syria -opened by Russia in Iraq – is still very active.

Now it also carries out geoeconomic operations.

 In September 2018, also the Iraqi-Russian Cultural Centre in Baghdad –  closed down in 2003 – was reopened.

In Iraq, however, Russia never wants to compete with Iran. Moreover,Iran and Iraq work very well also with China.

 There are 1.7 billion dollars of trade between Iraq and the Russian Federation, which cover the 30 million US dollars of debt that Iraq still holds with China.

 On October 21, 2019, President Putin received Erdogan in Sochi and, after seven hours of discussion, the Turkish-Russian bilateral plan has been such as to further diminish the U.S. role, while the Russian one is increasing significantly.

All this is a continuation of the meeting between Russia, Turkey and Iran held  in Astana on September 16 last.

Russia wants to weaken the Iranian security forces still present in Syria, by using both Iranian coldness about the Syrian conquest of Idlib and Iran’s traditional tendency to remain – with its forces – on the border between Iran and Syria and to operate, above all, in favour of the corridor between the Iranian Shiite capital and Southern Lebanon.

Russia has not much interest in it.

 Moreover, the Russian Federation wants Turkey to quickly disarm its jihadist militias in Idlib, particularly Hayat Ahrir al-Sham, so as to make its ally Bashar al-Assad achieve full controlof the Afrin area, the key point of the North Syrian border and, above all, of the military relationship between Turkey and Syria.

With a view to counterbalancing this disagreement with Turkey, Iraq and possibly Iran, Russia is working on agreements with the most important Sunni leadership.

 The issue is much wider: since early August 2019 the Lebanon and Iraq have been an integral part of the “Astana process”.

Russia has also proposed a tripartite agreement between the Lebanon, Syria and Russia for the sole repatriation of Syrian refugees. If Iraq manages to carve out a credible role as mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Russia could create a future duopoly with Iraq in Syria, so as to avoid the Iranian “mortmain” and the jihadist and Sunni pressure on the borders of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

It should not seem strange that the other trump card of the Russian Federation is Egypt and the Emirates.

It is by no mere coincidence that all these countries have reopened  diplomatic channels with Syria.

Russia views Egypt as a reliable partner in Syria, also considering the  long-standing support provided by Egypt to Assad.

  There is also the “Dialogue two plus two” between Egypt and Russia, an agreement between both countries’ Defence and Foreign Ministries.

 Incidentally, this agreement is obviously as valid for Syria as it is for Libya.

In the near future, Egypt will directly support the Russian contractors recently made operational in Cirenaica and in the Libyan Fezzan.

 In the meantime, the West is sadly counting the many useless ceasefires.

 In December 2018, the Emirates reopened their Embassy in Damascus.

 Meanwhile, Russia is always selling advanced weapons to Iran.

It cannot be ruled out that, considering that now the United States is  no longer in Syria except for “showing the flag”, Iraq officially asks Russia   to organize air raids on the ISIS networks currently present between Syria and Iraq, still largely operating outside the old “Islamic State”.

President Putin, however, will favour Iran’s access to the “Eurasian Union”, while Russia will do its utmost to minimize the risks connected both to Iran’s geopolitics and to the global energy market.

 This means that the Russian leader will avoid lowering prices even faced with a rather rhapsodic market of Canadian and U.S. shale oil and gas.

Furthermore, Russia also want to normalize relations with the United States and its mediation between Iran and the United States is important, as well as the idea that each energy production area has and can maintain its optimal market without excessive overlapping between sellers.

Hence President Putin will mediate between all players in the Greater Middle East, by trying to focus both on investment in Syria’s reconstruction and in the new routes of the oil and gas market in Europe. Moreover, Russia will create ad hoc alliances to limit the use of weapons in the region and will finally try to protect Israel – its future pivot in the region – by finding a balance between Sunnis and Shiites and playing the Syrian card as the basis of economic communication between all of them.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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The 25-year China-Iran agreement

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On March 27, 2021, a document entitled “Comprehensive Document of Iran-China Cooperation” was signed by Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, and his Chinese counterpart. The Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had previously called “the agreement between the presidents of Iran and China correct and wise.” However, the Iranian people have widely criticized it as entirely against their national interests. Iranian officials have not even publicized the document’s contents yet probably because it is highly contentious.

In 2019, excerpts from this document were revealed by the Economist Petroleum news site. The details included:

  • China invests $460 billion in Iranian oil and transportation sectors. China will get its investment back from the sale of Iranian crude during the first five years.
  • China buys Iranian petroleum products at least 32% cheaper.
  • The Chinese can decide before other companies whether to participate in completing all or part of a petrochemical project.
  • 50,000 Chinese security personnel will be deployed to protect Chinese projects in Iran.
  • China has the right to delay the repayment of its debts for up to two years in exchange for Iranian products’ purchase.
  • At least one Russian company will be allowed to participate in the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline design together with the Chinese operator.
  • Every year, 110 senior Revolutionary Guards officers travel to China and Russia for military training. 110 Chinese and Russian advisers will be stationed in Iran to train Revolutionary Guards officers.
  • Development of Iranian military equipment and facilities will be outsourced to China, and Chinese and Russian military aircraft and ships will operate the developed facilities.

Even some circles within the regime have criticized the agreement. The state-run Arman newspaper wrote, “China has a 25-year contract with Iran and is investing $460 billion in Iran. It is somewhat ambiguous. Presently, China is holding the money it owes us and blames it on the U.S. sanctions. How can we trust this country to invest $460 billion in Iran?”

Last year, Iran and China had the lowest trade in the previous 16 years, and according to statistics, by the end of 2020, the volume of trade between Iran and China was about $16 billion, which, including undocumented oil sales, still does not reach $20 billion.

Jalal Mirzaei, a former member of Iran’s parliament, said: “If in the future the tensions between Tehran and Washington are moderated, and we see the lifting of some of the sanctions, China can also provide the basis for implementing the provisions of this document, but if the situation continues like today, Beijing will not make any effort to implement the document, as it is essentially unable to take concrete action on the ground because of the sanctions.”

China’s objectives

Iran is vital to China in two ways, through its geopolitical location and its geo-economic importance. China knows that it does not have enough natural resources and is currently having a hard time supplying them from Russia and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supplies its energy needs from oil giant Aramco, half of which is owned by the United States. That is why China is looking for a safe alternative that the United States will not influence, and the only option is Iran. They may also have a two-pronged plan in Iran, which involves using Iran’s profitable market and making Iran into a lever of pressure against the United States for additional concessions.

The Iranian regime’s objectives

The deal could deepen China’s influence in the Middle East and undermine U.S. efforts to isolate the Iranian regime. While the international dispute over the Iranian regime’s nuclear program has not been resolved, it is unclear how much this agreement could be implemented. The regime intends to make it a bargaining chip in possible future nuclear negotiations. However, some of Iran’s top authorities believe that China and Russia cannot be trusted 100 percent.

Due to the sanctions, the regime has a tough time to continue providing financial support to its proxy militias in the region. The regime also faced two major domestic uprisings in 2017 and 2019. Khamenei’s regime survived the widespread uprisings by committing a massacre, killing 1,500 young protesters in the 2019 uprising alone, according to the Iranian opposition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and later confirmed by the Iranian regime’s Interior Ministry officials. Now with the coronavirus pandemic, Khamenei has been able to delay another major uprising.

Iran’s economy is on the verge of collapse. Khamenei must bow to western countries’ demands regarding the nuclear issue, including an end to its regional interventions and its ballistic missile program. Khamenei will struggle to save his regime from s imminent uprisings and a deteriorating economy that will undoubtedly facilitate more protests by the army of the unemployed and the hungry at any moment.

Unlike the 2015 JCPOA, the Iranian regime in 2021 is in a much weaker position. In fact, by many accounts, it is the weakest in its 40-year history. By signing the recent Iran-China agreement and auctioning Iranian resources, Khamenei wants to pressure the United States to surrender and restore the 2015 JCPOA as quickly as possible. But in the end, this pivot will not counteract domestic pressures that target the regime’s very existence.

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China-Arab Relations: From Silk to Friendship

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China and the Arabs have a long and rich economic and cultural history, and this distinguished relationship still exists today, with a promising future. This bilateral relationship between the two nations is based on the principles of respect and non-interference in internal affairs or foreign policies. Therefore, China’s relationship with the Arabs as well as with other nations is unique and a model to be followed. If you meet a Chinese person, the first phrase will be “Alabo” or an Arab in Mandarin, and he/she will welcome you. The Chinese state’s dealings with its counterparts can be measured based on the model of this Chinese citizen. China deals with the Arabs on the basis of friendship and historical ties.

The history of Sino-Arab relations goes back to the Tang Dynasty, and these relations developed with the flourishing of trade between the two nations. Since China was famous for its high quality silk, this trade route was called the “Silk Road”. Baron Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen, better known in English as Baron von Richthofen, was a German traveller, geographer, and scientist. He is noted for coining the terms “Seidenstraße” and “Seidenstraßen” = “Silk Road” or “Silk Route” in 1877.

Chinese-Arab relations have developed in contemporary history. In 1930, China established official relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A library in China was named the “Fouad Islamic Library”, after the late Egyptian king, “Fuad the First”. In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser cut ties with China and established relations with the Communist People’s Republic of China and inaugurated an embassy in Egypt. In the same year, the Arab League established relations with the People’s Republic of China. By the year 1990, all Arab countries cut their relations with the Republic of China and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

In 2004, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum was established, and today it is considered a milestone for the Sino-Arab relationship. At its inauguration, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing delivered a speech stating:“The Arab world is an important force on the international scene, and that China and the Arab countries have enjoyed a long friendship. Our similar history, our common goals and our broad interests have been credited with enhancing cooperation between the two sides; no matter how the international situation changes, China has always been the sincere friend of the Arab world”. The China-Arab Cooperation Forum was officially established during the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the headquarters of the League of Arab States in January of 2004.

Hu Jintao indicated at that time that the formation of the forum is a continuation of the traditional friendship between China and the Arab world. The Chinese president said at the time, “The establishment of the forum is conducive to expanding mutual cooperation in a variety of fields. He added that China had made four proposals; First, maintaining mutual respect, fair treatment and sincere cooperation at the political level. Second, strengthening economic and trade relations through cooperation in the fields of investment and trade, contracted projects, labor services, energy, transportation, communications, agriculture, environmental protection and information. Third, expand cultural exchanges. Finally, conducting training for the employees.”

During the second session of the forum in Beijing in 2006, China showed its sympathy for the issues of the Arab world and its interest in the peace process between Palestine and Israel, since China is a peace-loving country; it presented the idea of “a nuclear-free Middle East”. China is the best friend of the Arab countries today. Although some Arab countries have strong relations with the West whose policy does not match the Chinese policy, but all Arab countries agree on friendly and good relations with the People’s Republic of China.

The Arab citizen is not interested today in the foreign policy of the US, the deadly weapons of the US and Russia, or European culture, but rather the livelihood and economy, and this is what China provides through its wise economic policy. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative, or New Silk Road, which will restore glow to China-Arab relations; as the Arab world is in a strategic location on the initiative map. Thus, the Arab countries are an important partner for China in the initiative. Although the volume of trade exchanges between China and the Arab countries exceeded 200 billion US dollars, which increased 10 times over the past decade, there was no commercial and institutional arrangement to facilitate trade between the two sides.

China, as a peaceful and non-invasive country, aims to promote economic cooperation with Arab region on an equal basis because it considers the Arab world a historic partner. The historical experience of the Arabs with the Chinese through the Silk Road has confirmed that China differs from the nations of colonialism and imperialism, which consider the Arab region a place rich in natural resources only. In his historic speech at the Arab League, Chinese President Xi stressed that China will not seek to extend influence and search for proxies in the Middle East. The Chinese initiatives will contribute to establishing security and stability through economic development and improving the people’s livelihood, in line with the post-2015 development agenda and the aspirations of the Arab people for a better life, as the Chinese experience proves that development is the key to digging out the roots of conflicts and extremism in all its forms.

China is a neutral country and does not favor the use of violence. During the Syrian crisis, for example, the Chinese envoy to the Security Council raised his hand three times, meaning that China, with its wise diplomacy, supported the Syrian regime without entering the military war. During the recent Chinese military parade, Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed some Chinese military capabilities and thus sent a message to the enemies that China will always be ready if a war is imposed on it, and a message of support to China’s allies. The Arab region today needs a real partner who possesses economic and military power and international political influence, such as China; to ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, and to consolidate the China-Arab relations and raise it to the level of a strategic alliance.

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The analysis of developments in relations between Turkey and Israel

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The fear of Biden’s Administration, the concern over the Abraham Accords (see below), the positioning of the geopolitical status in the Middle East, and the safeguarding of interests in Israel are the main factors through which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to improve relations with Israel which, however, he connects to the Palestinians.

The statements made by Turkish President Erdoğan’s on developments in relations with Israel have confirmed media reports of his repeated attempts to reach an understanding on several controversial issues, as well as paving the way for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The statements made by President Erdoğan, as well as other Turkish officials, have stressed the connection between the change in Turkish-Israeli relations and Israel’s policy towards the Palestinian issue.

The “linking principle” connecting the two issues has been a key factor in Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s, and it operates in the range between words and deeds, which at times have also led to severe crises in the relations between the two countries.

At the time Turkey opposed the partition plan, but recognised Israel and maintained diplomatic relations with it. Relations were suspended after the second Arab-Israeli war in 1956, when Turkey recalled its diplomatic representative from Tel Aviv, announcing he would not return there “until a just solution to the Palestinian issue was found in accordance with UN Resolutions”.

After rising to power, President Erdoğan has developed the aforementioned “linking principle”. Against the backdrop of Israel’s actions with the Palestinians, Turkey has increased its political and economic support for its Muslim brethren and caused crises.

President Erdoğan’s recent statements have been made against the backdrop of this policy: on the one hand, the Turkish President has expressed his country’s desire to improve relations with Israel and continue intelligence cooperation; on the other hand, he has maintained that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is “unacceptable”.

It is important to note that Turkey will not relinquish the “linking principle”, which differs from the principle of the new Arab normalisation, based on the separation between the Palestinian issue and relations with Israel. The so-called Abraham Accords, such as the recognition of the State of Israel by the United Arab Emirates in September last year: the third Arab country to formally recognise Israel, after Egypt and Jordan; the fourth one if we considers Mauritania’s “frozen” recognition.

The policy implemented by President Erdoğan is not only shaped by foreign relations, but is also a Turkish internal issue in which public opinion plays a key role. It seems that until elections are held in Turkey (scheduled for June 25, 2023), there will be no complete normalisation with Israel. The majority of the Turkish population supports the Palestinians and their rights, feels full solidarity for them and opposes the Israeli presence.

Moreover, President Erdoğan regards the Palestinian issue as an important factor in building a renewed Turkish Muslim national identity. These stances increase his popularity and strengthen people’s support for him and his party, as well as his authority and prestige in the Muslim world.

At the same time, however, this policy also has pragmatic implications: President Erdoğan is not severing ties with Israel, but merely creating actions that lead to symptoms of “diplomatic” crises.

Despite this wait-and-see attitude, economic ties between Turkey and Israel are flourishing. According to official data, in 2018 exports from Turkey to Israel were worth 6.5 billion dollars and imports 1.9 billion dollars (excluding diamond trade and tourism).

Following the crisis in relations and the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador from Turkey (May 2018), exports had fallen to 4 billion dollars in 2019 and imports to 1.7 billion dollars. Although declining, there are still deep economic ties.

Trade relations, however, are not the decisive factor in determining the nature of Turkey-Israel relations. There are four issues that are believed to have led Turkey to review its relations with Israel:

1. Turkey has welcome the new U.S. President, Joe Biden, with caution and fear that he will oppose Turkish activities in the region. The U.S. leader may also be very tough on security, armaments and minority rights in Turkey. Some believe that improved relations with Israel will calm down the situation with President Biden, and the U.S. Congress and the Zionist lobby will be able to contribute to this result. It is not known, however, whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be as good a mediator with Biden as he was with Donald Trump.

2. Turkey is seeking to remove the isolation imposed on it due to the distribution of marine economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean area, and is trying to bring Israel on its side to develop a joint stance and oppose such subdivisions. According to Israeli sources, Turkey has made Israel a generous offer to expand its area of control over the marine economic zones, in exchange for Turkey’ siding with Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. Israel has reacted cautiously, both because it much weighs President Erdoğan’s intentions and because it is actually interested in strengthening its relations with the above stated countries.

3. Turkey is worried about the Abraham Accords for normalisation with Israel, particularly the aforementioned one with the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey aims at limiting their influence and status as a further “undertaking” of Arab rivals. Turkey endeavours to dismantle a rising alliance between the Arab countries and Israel. After all, we wonder why Turkey is not instead trying to improve its ties with Arab countries to achieve the same goal. Could it still be because of history and traditional mutual dislike?

4. Turkey is trying to relieve the pressure on its activities in Israel and Palestine as a result of the possible improvement in relations with Israel. Turkey funds important projects in Jerusalem and Israel is trying to contain and restrain it. Conversely, an improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations could release the Israeli brake.

To date, no official Israeli response has been provided to Turkish statements. Israel’s media speak of suspicion and coldness in response to the Turkish rapprochement, with fears that President Erdoğan is preparing a ploy, a trick aimed not at improving his relations with Israel, but at sabotaging Israel’s relations and contacts with other countries.

However, leaks from senior Israeli officials indicate that their country has set conditions for restoring relations, which include ending Turkey’s ties with Hamas and transferring Turkish projects to Jerusalem through Israeli channels, as well as abstaining from voting against Israel in international organisations and adopting a balanced position between Israel and the Palestinians.

It is not yet clear what the fate of Turkey-Israel relations will be in the coming months, with President Biden in the White House and after the Israeli elections held on March 23, 2021. It is important to note, however, that Turkey will not give up the “linking principle”, which differs from the new principle of Arab normalisation, based on the separation between the Palestinian issue and relations with Israel.

The Turkish “linking principle” is a real need for Turkey- hence the Palestinian leadership must work with Turkey to maximise common goals, especially with regard to Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Gaza.

Not easy steps to make, but not impossible either.

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