The EAEU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement was signed at the EAEU summit in Yerevan on October 1, 2019. The document constituted the first step towards the creation of a comprehensive free trade zone between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Singapore and, in addition to trade in goods, it will also regulate trade in services and the terms of investment.
The agreement pays due consideration to the experience of working on previously signed documents and also covers possible trade risks in more detail. During the negotiations, particular emphasis was placed on goods that are sensitive for the EAEU market. EAEU Minister for Trade, Veronika Nikishina, stressed that goods such as “beef, cheese, spirits, baby food, dairy products, cars, planes – all these will be exempted from the agreement, we will not be reducing duties on these goods.”
The agreement with Singapore was the third such document the Eurasian Union has signed with third countries.
The Agreement with Vietnam
The EAEU signed its first ever free-trade area (FTA) agreement with Vietnam on May 29, 2015. The agreement entered into force on October 5, 2016. From the outset, the agreement was concluded in the FTA+ format, which stipulates both duty-free trade rules and other interaction formats. Simultaneously with this agreement, the bilateral Russia–Vietnam and Belarus–Vietnam intergovernmental protocols on supporting automotive manufacture in Vietnam entered into force. These agreements established a preferential regime for implementing investment projects for the industrial assembly of Belarusian and Russian automotive equipment in Vietnam.
Since the national economies of the EAEU states need to adapt to the free trade regime, transitional periods of five and ten years were stipulated for certain goods so that import customs duties could be gradually reduced.
According to Nikishina, the EAEU’s trade turnover with Vietnam has grown 40 per cent since the agreement went into force. “Some feared that our exports would remain the same, that we would not be able to take advantage of the Vietnamese market opening up to us; some feared that we would only open our market for Vietnam. These fears proved unfounded: our exports grew by 40 per cent, while imports from Vietnam grew by 34 per cent.” By 2025, duty-free imports of Vietnamese goods will account for 90 per cent of the EAEU’s Common Customs Tariff headings.
For Vietnam, the average customs duties on goods imported into EAEU member states are being reduced from 9.8 per cent to 2.5 per cent over 10 years. Additionally, there is a scale of duty rates for various goods. For instance, the duty on agricultural goods will be reduced from 9.9 per cent to 5.6 per cent, and the duty for industrial products will go down from 8.0 per cent to 1.2 per cent. By 2025, Vietnam’s average customs import duty for EAEU states will have been reduced from 10 per cent to 1 per cent. In particular, import duties on agricultural goods will have been reduced from 16 per cent to 0.2 per cent, and duties for industrial products will have dropped from 8.9 per cent to 0.1 per cent.
Vietnam’s trade with Russia and Kazakhstan is developing with particularly intensity. According to WTO data, the share of Russian exports into Vietnam has been growing dynamically over the past three years: +19.9 per cent in 2016, +34.0 per cent in 2017 and +12.9 per cent in 2018. This growth was due to a sharp increase in exports of grain, mineral resources, iron and steel, fish and seafood, as well as organic chemistry products. Kazakhstan significantly increased its exports to Vietnam in 2017–2018 by 39.0 per cent and 3.6 per cent, respectively. This is due in part to the fact that Kazakhstan started exporting iron and steel, grain, and lead and lead goods into Vietnam.
Vietnam’s exports to Russia grew at an even faster pace: by 53.2 per cent in 2016; 17.8 per cent in 2017; and 58.0 per cent in 2018. Vietnam mostly exported electrical and mechanical machinery and equipment, coffee and tea, shoes, textile goods, and fruits and nuts. Vietnam’s exports to Kazakhstan grew six-fold in 2016 before falling by 13.6 per cent in 2017 and then growing by 20 per cent in 2018. The growth was due to exports of electric machinery and equipment, fruits, nuts and dried fruit, and timber and timber goods.
At the same time, Vietnam would like to increase its trade with the EAEU. Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2019, Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam, Trịnh Dinh Dung, proposed a further reduction of customs barriers in order to improve the opportunities to realize his country’s economic potential.
Provisional Agreement with Iran
The second agreement was signed with Iran in May 2018 and entered into force on October 27, 2019. This is a limited agreement valid for three years. One year after its entry into force, the parties will enter into talks on a full-fledged FTA. The agreement is limited due to a low level of liberalization. Reduced customs duties cover only 50 per cent of the total volume of trade between the two countries. In terms of goods, this translates into 502 HS codes for the Union and 360 HS codes for Iran.
The parties agreed to reduce average customs import duties on industrial goods (Iran undertook to reduce such duties from 22.4 per cent to 15.4 per cent, while the EAEU agreed to cut duties from 8 per cent to 4.7 per cent) and agricultural products (from 32.2 per cent to 13.2 per cent in the case of Iran, and from 9.6 per cent to 4.6 per cent in the case of the EAEU).
The tariff preferences granted to the EAEU by Iran extend to meat and fat-and-oil products, certain types of confectionery products and chocolate, mineral water, grains, tobacco, metals, cosmetics, timber, and individual types of electronic and mechanical equipment. Iran will be granted tariff preferences on many types of foods (including vegetables, fruits and dried fruit), as well as on construction materials, kitchenware, carpets and certain products made of non-ferrous metals.
Armenia stands to benefit most from trade with Iran, as the country is under the economic blockade of Turkey and Azerbaijan and has no common borders with EAEU member states.
The Armenian leadership considered building a third high-voltage power line between Iran and Armenia, as well as the North–South highway, the Meghri hydroelectric power station, and the Meghri Free Economic Zone as the main incentives for Armenia–Iran trade relations. But these projects have stalled in recent years due to economic and domestic political reasons.
Expanding trade and economic cooperation with Iran is also beneficial for Russia. Trade turnover between the two countries totalled USD 1.741 billion in 2018. Russian exports into Iran are estimated at USD 1.208 billion, while Iranian exports into Russia totalled USD 533 million. Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Kozak, estimates that Russian business will earn additional USD 150 million annually when the provisional agreement is ratified. Other Eurasian countries are also interested in expanding their trade and general economic cooperation with Iran. Given the upcoming signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in Transport in the Caspian Sea and the emergence of a major transportation and logistical hub there, trade with Iran may continue to grow.
At the same time, the agreement with Iran entails certain political risks. In September 2019, the United States imposed sanctions on the Central Bank Iran and 25 Iranian companies. The United States also demands that its allies and the entire global community accede to these sanctions. Mostly likely, sanctions against Tehran will continue to expand.
Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation with China
The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the People’s Republic of China was signed on 17 May 2018, and will enter into force in late October 2019. This is not an FTA agreement, but it does define a single format for trade cooperation between the EAEU and China. The agreement covers a broad range of issues, including simplified trade procedures (such as the availability of electronic customs declarations, clearing goods within the shortest possible time), which accords with changes enshrined in the EAEU’s new Customs Code: increasing transparency and working on the mutual recognition of standards, technical regulations and compliance assessment procedures; regulating e-commerce; and cooperation in public procurement.
The most important export items in the EAEU’s trade with China are crude oil, including natural-gas condensate (18.6 per cent of the EAEU’s exports), rip-sawn timber (48.3 per cent), coal (12.7 per cent), refined copper and copper alloys (26.3 per cent), turbojet and turbo-propeller engines, gas turbines (62.5 per cent), unprocessed timber (76.4 per cent), and ores and copper concentrates (68.6 per cent). The most significant imports include communications equipment and spare parts for such equipment (China accounts for 64.5 per cent of the imports of EAEU states), computers for automatic information processing (63.4 per cent), equipment for the thermal treatment of materials (47.6 per cent), car and tractor parts and accessories (15.3 per cent), toys (80.3 per cent), and shoes with rubber or plastic sole and top (84.9 per cent).
We can see that EAEU export to China is dominated by natural resources. Consequently, the EAEU as a whole faces the task of both increasing and diversifying the trade turnover. The only way that this can happen is if the production of high value-added products is increased and mechanisms of introducing them to China’s market are found. Connecting the EAEU and China’s “One Belt – One Road” programme should promote economic cooperation.
The agreement exceeds the scope of a mere trade arrangement. It also defines promising areas for developing cooperation, such as agriculture, energy, transportation, industrial cooperation, information and communications infrastructure, technologies and innovations, finance and the environment.
The issue of establishing an FTA with China has been discussed for many years, since 2006, when Beijing first proposed it to SCO states. The EAEU has adopted a cautious stance, since “the principal risk lies in the fact that China’s economic power will make China the main beneficiary of reduced duties; therefore, we want to see how non-preferential agreement will work first.”
The Prospects of Developing the FTA Format with other States
Negotiations are currently are underway on the establishment of FTAs with several states. Serbia will be the next country to sign an FTA agreement with the EAEU (the FTA Agreement was signed on October 25, 2019 – Ed.). Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and the Minister of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications, Rasim Ljajić, said that the EAEU–Serbia Free Trade Agreement is scheduled to be signed in Moscow in late October 2019. In May 2019, the Supreme Council of the EAEU issued the mandate to sign the agreement.
Nikishina also commented on negotiations with Egypt, which were launched in 2019 and are nearing the final stage.
Talks with Israel are progressing at a slower pace. The first round of negotiations was held in late 2018. It focused on trade protection measures, the rules for determining the origin of goods, customs cooperation, dispute resolution, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary norms, public procurement and commodity trading issues. The main problem is reconciling the positions of the parties. The political differences with Tehran, which already has an agreement with the Eurasian Union, have not significantly affected the course of the talks.
We can thus see that the Eurasian Union is working diligently to sign FTA agreements with interested countries. Such agreements bolster the EAEU’s positions in the regional and global economy and are conducive to expanding the markets for national economies. However, signing such documents is not the EAEU’s goal as such. The point is that they provide mutual advantages. The experience that the Eurasian Commission has gradually accumulated allows it to articulate the interests of its member states more clearly and neutralize the risks for national manufacturers when signing preferential trade agreements. This practice will continue.
From our partner RIAC
US Economic Turmoil: The Paradox of Recovery and Inflation
The US economy has been a rollercoaster since the pandemic cinched the world last year. As lockdowns turned into routine and the buzz of a bustling life came to a sudden halt, a problem manifested itself to the US regime. The problem of sustaining economic activity while simultaneously fighting the virus. It was the intent of ‘The American Rescue Plan’ to provide aid to the US citizens, expand healthcare, and help buoy the population as the recession was all but imminent. Now as the global economy starts to rebound in apparent post-pandemic reality, the US regime faces a dilemma. Either tighten the screws on the overheating economy and risk putting an early break on recovery or let the economy expand and face a prospect of unrelenting inflation for years to follow.
The Consumer Price Index, the core measure of inflation, has been off the radar over the past few months. The CPI remained largely over the 4% mark in the second quarter, clocking a colossal figure of 5.4% last month. While the inflation is deemed transitionary, heated by supply bottlenecks coinciding with swelling demand, the pandemic-related causes only explain a partial reality of the blooming clout of prices. Bloomberg data shows that transitory factors pushing the prices haywire account for hotel fares, airline costs, and rentals. Industries facing an offshoot surge in prices include the automobile industry and the Real estate market. However, the main factors driving the prices are shortages of core raw materials like computer chips and timber (essential to the efficient supply functions of the respective industries). Despite accounting for the temporal effect of certain factors, however, the inflation seems hardly controlled; perverse to the position opined by Fed Chair Jerome Powell.
The Fed already insinuated earlier that the economy recovered sooner than originally expected, making it worthwhile to ponder over pulling the plug on the doveish leverage that allowed the economy to persevere through the pandemic. The main cause was the rampant inflation – way off the 2% targetted inflation level. However, the alluded remarks were deftly handled to avoid a panic in an already fragile road to recovery. The economic figures shed some light on the true nature of the US economy which baffled the Fed. The consumer expectations, as per Bloomberg’s data, show that prices are to inflate further by 4.8% over the course of the following 12 months. Moreover, the data shows that the investor sentiment gauged from the bond market rally is also up to 2.5% expected inflation over the corresponding period. Furthermore, a survey from the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) suggested that net 47 companies have raised their average prices since May by seven percentage points; the largest surge in four decades. It is all too much to overwhelm any reader that the data shows the economy is reeling with inflation – and the Fed is not clear whether it is transitionary or would outlast the pandemic itself.
Economists, however, have shown faith in the tools and nerves of the Federal Reserve. Even the IMF commended the Fed’s response and tactical strategies implemented to trestle the battered economy. However, much averse to the celebration of a win over the pandemic, the fight is still not through the trough. As the Delta variant continues to amass cases in the United States, the championed vaccinations are being questioned. While it is explicable that the surge is almost distinctly in the unvaccinated or low-vaccinated states, the threat is all that is enough to drive fear and speculation throughout the country. The effects are showing as, despite a lucrative economic rebound, over 9 million positions lay vacant for employment. The prices are billowing yet the growth is stagnating as supply is still lukewarm and people are still wary of returning to work. The job market casts a recession-like scenario while the demand is strong which in turn is driving the wages into the competitive territory. This wage-price spiral would fuel inflation, presumably for years as embedded expectations of employees would be hard to nudge lower. Remember prices and wages are always sticky downwards!
Now the paradox stands. As Congress is allegedly embarking on signing a $4 trillion economic plan, presented by president Joe Bidden, the matters are to turn all the more complex and difficult to follow. While the infrastructure bill would not be a hard press on short-term inflation, the iteration of tax credits and social spending programs would most likely fuel the inflation further. It is true that if the virus resurges, there won’t be any other option to keep the economy afloat. However, a bustling inflationary environment would eventually push the Fed to put the brakes on by either raising the interest rates or by gradually ceasing its Asset Purchase Program. Both the tools, however, would risk a premature contraction which could pull the United States into an economic spiral quite similar to that of the deflating Japanese economy. It is, therefore, a tough stance to take whether a whiff of stagflation today is merely provisional or are these some insidious early signs to be heeded in a deliberate fashion and rectified immediately.
Carbon Market Could Drive Climate Action
Authors: Martin Raiser, Sebastian Eckardt, Giovanni Ruta*
Trading commenced on China’s national emissions trading system (ETS) on Friday. With a trading volume of about 4 billion tons of carbon dioxide or roughly 12 percent of the total global CO2 emissions, the ETS is now the world’s largest carbon market.
While the traded emission volume is large, the first trading day opened, as expected, with a relatively modest price of 48 yuan ($7.4) per ton of CO2. Though this is higher than the global average, which is about $2 per ton, it is much lower than carbon prices in the European Union market where the cost per ton of CO2 recently exceeded $50.
Large volume but low price
The ETS has the potential to play an important role in achieving, and accelerating China’s long-term climate goals — of peaking emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060. Under the plan, about 2,200 of China’s largest coal and gas-fired power plants have been allocated free emission rights based on their historical emissions, power output and carbon intensity.
Facilities that cut emissions quickly will be able to sell excess allowances for a profit, while those that exceed their initial allowance will have to pay to purchase additional emission rights or pay a fine. Putting a price tag on CO2 emissions will promote investment in low-carbon technologies and equipment, while carbon trading will ensure emissions are first cut where it is least costly, minimizing abatement costs. This sounds plain and simple, but it will take time for the market to develop and meaningfully contribute to emission reductions.
The initial phase of market development is focused on building credible emissions disclosure and verification systems — the basic infrastructure of any functioning carbon market — encouraging facilities to accurately monitor and report their emissions rather than constraining them. Consequently, allocations given to power companies have been relatively generous, and are tied to power output rather than being set at absolute levels.
Also, the requirements of each individual facility to obtain additional emission rights are capped at 20 percent above the initial allowance and fines for non-compliance are relatively low. This means carbon prices initially are likely to remain relatively low, mitigating the immediate financial impact on power producers and giving them time to adjust.
For carbon trading to develop into a significant policy tool, total emissions and individual allowances will need to tighten over time. Estimates by Tsinghua University suggest that carbon prices will need to be raised to $300-$350 per ton by 2060 to achieve carbon neutrality. And our research at the World Bank suggest a broadly applied carbon price of $50 could help reduce China’s CO2 emissions by almost 25 percent compared with business as usual over the coming decade, while also significantly contributing to reduced air pollution.
Communicating a predictable path for annual emission cap reductions will allow power producers to factor future carbon price increases into their investment decisions today. In addition, experience from the longest-established EU market shows that there are benefits to smoothing out cyclical fluctuations in demand.
For example, carbon emissions naturally decline during periods of lower economic activity. In order to prevent this from affecting carbon prices, the EU introduced a stability reserve mechanism in 2019 to reduce the surplus of allowances and stabilize prices in the market.
Besides, to facilitate the energy transition away from coal, allowances would eventually need to be set at an absolute, mass-based level, which is applied uniformly to all types of power plants — as is done in the EU and other carbon markets.
The current carbon-intensity based allocation mechanism encourages improving efficiency in existing coal power plants and is intended to safeguard reliable energy supply, but it creates few incentives for power producers to divest away from coal.
The effectiveness of the ETS in creating appropriate price incentives would be further enhanced if combined with deeper structural reforms in power markets to allow competitive renewable energy to gain market share.
As the market develops, carbon pricing should become an economy-wide instrument. The power sector accounts for about 30 percent of carbon emissions, but to meet China’s climate goals, mitigation actions are needed in all sectors of the economy. Indeed, the authorities plan to expand the ETS to petro-chemicals, steel and other heavy industries over time.
In other carbon intensive sectors, such as transport, agriculture and construction, emissions trading will be technically challenging because monitoring and verification of emissions is difficult. Faced with similar challenges, several EU member states have introduced complementary carbon taxes applied to sectors not covered by an ETS. Such carbon excise taxes are a relatively simple and efficient instrument, charged in proportion to the carbon content of fuel and a set carbon price.
Finally, while free allowances are still given to some sectors in the EU and other more mature national carbon markets, the majority of initial annual emission rights are auctioned off. This not only ensures consistent market-based price signals, but generates public revenue that can be recycled back into the economy to subsidize abatement costs, offset negative social impacts or rebalance the tax mix by cutting taxes on labor, general consumption or profits.
So far, China’s carbon reduction efforts have relied largely on regulations and administrative targets. Friday’s launch of the national ETS has laid the foundation for a more market-based policy approach. If deployed effectively, China’s carbon market will create powerful incentives to stimulate investment and innovation, accelerate the retirement of less-efficient coal-fired plants, drive down the cost of emission reduction, while generating resources to finance the transition to a low-carbon economy.
(Martin Raiser is the World Bank country director for China, Sebastian Eckardt is the World Bank’s lead economist for China, and Giovanni Ruta is a lead environmental economist of the World Bank.)
(first published on China Daily via World Bank)
The EU wants to cut emissions, Bulgaria and Eastern Europe will bear the price
In the last few years, the European Union has been going above and beyond in dealing with climate change. Clearly, this is far from being a case of disinterested endeavour to safeguard the planet and the environment. On the contrary, the EU’s efforts aim at reinforcing its “normative power”. In effect, the EU has gained some clout on the international stage, even vis-à-vis faraway countries like Vietnam and China. Yet, in doing so the Union embroiled in the apparent rush for more and more ambitious climate standards and targets. Therefore, Brussels needs to start acting and deliver on its promises to keep staying ahead of the pack. Even more so given US President Biden’s strengthened engagement with friends and foes alike on the climate and human rights.
Last week, the European Commission manifested its acknowledgment of this need by unveiling the Fit for 55 (FF55) growth strategy. Overall, this new, beefed-up Green Deal should reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 55% of their 1990 level by 2030. In some analysts’ view, the FF55 plan is a game changer in the long-term race towards climate neutrality alas. In fact, it could “both deepen and broaden the decarbonisation of Europe’s economy to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.” Moreover, they expect the FF55’s 13 measures to generate a number of positive ripple effects across EU economies.
True, wanting to reduce greenhouse gases significantly by 2030 and reaching net-zero-emission by 2050 goal is commendable under many regards. Still, the FF55 includes a number of measures that could impact ordinary people’s life massively across Europe. Nevertheless, the 27 Member States of the EU are responsible for as little as 8% of global emissions. As such, it is necessary to take a deeper look at how the FF55 will affect different countries and demographics.
The transition’s social cost
The realisation that reduction of capitalism’s dependence on fossil fuels will have serious socio-economic consequences is not at all new. Contrariwise, scholars and politicians have been outspoken about an indisputable “conflict between jobs and the environment”, since the early 1990s. Together, the pandemic-induced recession and the signing of the Paris Accord have brought the notion back on the centre stage.
Factually, pushing the energy transition entails facing mass lay-offs, generalised workforce retraining and taxes hikes on ordinary consumers. For instance, these hardships’ seriousness is evident in the progressive abandonment of coal mining for energy generation in the US. Moreover, the energy transition requires strong popular backing in order to be effective. Yet, measures pursued to achieve environmentally friendly growth tend to generate strong, grassroot opposition. Most recently, France’s gilets jaunes protests shows that environmental policies generate social discontent by disfavouring middle and lower classes disproportionately.
The poorest families and countries will bear the costs
One of the FF55’s main policy innovation regards the creation of a carbon trading market for previously exempt sectors. Namely, companies working int the transport and buildings sectors, be they public or private, will have to follow new rules. As it happened in the energy industry before, each company will have to respect a “carbon allowance”. Basically, it is an ‘authorisation to pollute’ which companies can buy from each other — but the total cannot increase. Despite all claims of just transition, this and other measures will have a gigantic, re-distributional effect within and between countries. And it will be of markedly regressive character, meaning that poorer families and countries will pay more.
Taxing transport emission is regressive
Historically, these sectors were trailing behind most others when it comes to decarbonisation for a variety of reasons. First of all, the previous emission trading system did not include them. Moreover, these are far from being well-functioning markets. As a result, even if the cost of emissions was to rise, enterprises and consumer will not react as expected.
Thus, even as they face higher costs, companies will keep utilising older, traditional vehicle and construction technologies. With taunting reverberations on those poorer consumers, who cannot afford to buy an electric car or stop using public transport. Hence, they “will face a higher carbon price while locked into fossil-fuel-based systems with limited alternatives.” Moreover, the EU could worsen these effects by trying to reduce the emission fees on truck-transported goods. Indeed, the commission is proposing a weight-based emission standard that would collaterally favour SUVs over smaller combustion-engine car and motorbikes.
In a nutshell, higher taxes and fee will strike lower-class consumers, who spend more of their incomes for transportation. Even assuming these households would like to switch to low-emission cars and buildings, current market prices will make it impossible. In fact, all these technologies ten to have low usage costs, but very high costs of acquisition. For instance, the cheapest Tesla sells at over €95,000, whereas a Dacia Sandero “starts at just under €7,000.”
Eastern Europe may not be willing to pay
At this point, it is clear that the FF55 plan will deal a blow to ongoing efforts to reduce inequalities. In addition, one should not forget that EU Member States are as different amongst them as they are within themselves. Yet, the EU is not simply going to tax carbon in sectors that inevitably expose poorer consumers the most. But in doing so it would impose a single price on 27 very diverse societies and economies. Thus, the paradox of having the poorest countries in the EU (i.e., Central- and South-Eastern Europe) pay the FF55’s bill.
To substantiate this claim, one needs to look no further than at a few publicly available data. First, as Figure 2 shows, there is an inverse relation between a country’s wealth and consumers’ expenditures on transport services. Thus, not only do poorer people across the EU spend more on transport, poorer countries do as well. Hence, under the FF55, Bulgarians, Croatians, Romanians and Poles will pay most of the fees and taxes on carbon emission.
Additionally, one should consider that there is also a strict inverse relation between carbon emissions and the minimum national wage. In fact, looking at Figure 3 one sees that countries with lower minimum wages tend to emit more carbon dioxide. On average, countries with a minimum salary of €1 lower emit almost 4.5mln tonnes of carbon dioxide more. But differences in statutory national wages explain almost 32% of the cross-country variation in emissions. So, 1.5 of those extra tonnes are somehow related to lower minimum salaries and, therefore, lower living standards.
The EU’s quest for a just transition: Redistribution or trickle down?
Hence, the pursual of a ‘just’ transitionhas come to mean ensuring quality jobs emerge from these economic changes. However, many of the FF55’s 13 initiatives may worsen disparities both within countries and, more importantly, between them. Thus, the EU has been trying to pre-empt the social losses that would inevitably come about.
From the Just Transition Fund to the Climate Social Fund
In this regard, the European Union went a step forward most countries by creating the Just Transition Fund in May. That is, the EU decided to finance a mix of grants and public-sector loans which aims to provide support to territories facing serious socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards climate neutrality [… and] facilitate the implementation of the European Green Deal, which aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050.
Along these lines, the FF55 introduces a Climate Social Fund (CSF) that will provide “funding […] to support vulnerable European citizens.” The fund will provide over €70bln to support energy investments, and provide direct income support for vulnerable households. The revenues from the selling of carbon allowances to the transport and building sectors should fund most of the CSF. If necessary, the Member States will provide the missing portion.
The EU Commission may give the impression of having design the CSF to favour poorer households and countries. However, it may actually be a false impression. In fact, it is clear that the entire carbon pricing initiative will impact poorer household and countries more strongly. However, only a fourth of the carbon pricing system’s revenues will go to fund the CSF. The remaining portion will finance other FF55 programmes, most of which have a negative impact on poorer communities. Thus, despite the CSF, the final effect of the entire FF55 will be a net redistribution upwards.
Stopping a redistribution to the top
Nevertheless, there is a way to fix the FF55 so that it can work for poorer households and lower-income countries. Given that the CSF is too small for the challenge it should overcome, its total amount should be increased. In fact, the purpose of higher carbon pricing is in any event not to raise revenue but to direct market behaviour towards low-carbon technologies—there is thus a strong argument for redistributing fully the additional revenues.
Hence, the largest, politically sustainable share of carbon-pricing revenues from transportation and housing should ideally go to the CSF. In addition, the Commission should remove all the proposed provision that divert CSF money away from social compensation scheme. In fact, poorer families will not gain enough from subsidies to electric car, charging stations and the decarbonisation of housing. One contrary, “using the fund to support electric vehicles would disproportionally favour rich households.”
Finally, the allocation of CSF money to various member states should follow rather different criteria from the current ones. In fact, the Commission already intends to consider a number of important such as: total population and its non-urban share; per capita, gross, national income; share of vulnerable households; and emissions due to fuel combustion per household. But these efforts to look out for the weakest strata in each country could backfire. In fact, according to some calculations, a Member State with lower average wealth and lower “within-country inequality could end up benefiting less than a rich member state with high inequality.”
A number of well-known, respected economist have been arguing that environmental policies should account for social fallouts attentively. Goals such as emission reduction and net-zero economies require strong popular support in order for the transformation to succeed. Or at least, the acquiescence of a majority of the public. Otherwise, the plans of well-intentioned and opportunistic governments alike will derail. After all, this is the main lesson of the currently widespread protest against the mandating of ‘Covid passes’ and vaccines.
If the FF55 will deal poorer households a devastating blow, social unrest may worsen — fast. But as long as it will also hurt Eastern European countries as a whole, there is a chance. Hopefully, European parliamentarians from riotous Hungary or Poland will oppose the FF55 in its current shape. Perhaps, in a few years everyone will be thankful for these two countries strenuous resistance to EU bureaucracy. Or else, richer countries may force Central- and South-Eastern Europe to swallow a bitter medicine. Even though, whatever happens, Europe alone cannot and will not save the planet.
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