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Semiconductor War between Japan and South Korea

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Authors: Gleb Toropchin and Anastasia Tolstukhina

In the summer of 2019, a trade conflict broke out between Tokyo and Seoul and the matter is about more than the history between the two countries. The two developed economies have long been locked in a competition on the global cutting-edge technologies market. At the same time, they are links in the same technological chain.

At first glance, the exchange of trade restrictions that is taking place against the background of mutual accusations is nobody’s business but Tokyo and Seoul’s. Nonetheless, the consequences of the confrontation between the two countries have a global nature. The present article analyses the causes of the disagreements and looks at how the situation may develop

Introducing Restrictions and Removal from the “White List”

Despite the events of the colonial past [1], as well as the current territorial disputes that are so typical of Asia’s international politics [2], South Korea is one of Japan’s three largest trade partners. Japan exports into South Korea up to $54 billion in goodsThe key commodities include semiconductors and materials for their manufacture

The dependence of South Korean companies on imports of fluorinated polyimides and photoresists exceeds 90 percent, and their dependence on imports of hydrogen fluoride is around 44 percent (although this figure has fallen gradually from 72 percent in 2010)

However, on July 1, 2019, the Government of Japan announced restrictions on the export of commodities to South Korea that are of critical importance for microelectronics, and on July 4, the changes to the procedure came into force

Given the long-established delivery mechanism, such a political step was a surprise for many. The restrictions mainly affected three key materials for the microelectronics industry: fluorinated polyimides, hydrogen fluoride, and photoresists (these materials are used in the manufacturing of semiconductors and display panels). This measure does not mean that deliveries of these materials to South Korea have been completely stopped; however, from now on, it may take up to 90 days to approve transactions. Additionally, Japan said it would be taking South Korea off its “white list” of trade partners. The list includes states that are believed to be safe from the point of view of exporting strategic commodities and that are granted trade preferences

Let us try to understand why the Government of Japan took such steps

Pressure from Taiwanese and South Korean competitors

In 1986, an agreement was signed between Tokyo and Washington that prohibited Japan from undercutting global semiconductor prices. This step was initially intended to make the United States more competitive. However, even in those circumstances, Japan managed to take a significant chunk of the global semiconductor market from the United States in the late 20th century and retain its high positions until the 2010s. However, as early as 2012, experts noted that pressure from Taiwanese and South Korean competitors resulted in semiconductor sales of Japan’s four chip-makers, Toshiba, Renesas, Sony and Fujitsu taking a marked dip

Samsung Electronics succeeded in mastering the subtleties of developing technologies just at the right time, while Japan began to lag behind in R&D due to problems with formal education, and its revenues from global sales of microelectronics were falling against the backdrop of falling prices and the high exchange rate of the Japanese yen. Among other causes of this phenomenon, Japanese experts cite the desire to create hi-tech goods without account for high costs, and lack of innovative ideas

Today, South Korea is the leading manufacturer of memory microchips. Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix hold two-thirds of the global market. Additionally, both the United States’ Apple and China’s Huawei depend on the products produced by South Korean companies. Integrated circuit units account for 17 percent of South Korea’s exports (the entire microelectronics sector accounts for nearly a quarter of its exports), compared to less than 4 percent for Japan

An analysis of the global microelectronics market demonstrates that, currently, the market particularly values dynamic random-access memory semiconductors (DRAMS) that hold tremendous significance for such cutting-edge technologies as artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics. South Korea holds impressive positions in this area as well: Samsung and SK Hynix control 72.8 percent of the DRAMS market and 46.8 percent of the global flash memory market

Reasons for Introducing Restrictive Measures

The East Asia Forum reports that Japan’s strategy of opposing Seoul was developed jointly by the country’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The Cabinet of Ministers subsequently supported these measures, thereby making the key decision to transfer the issue into the political realm

It appears that Japan’s decision to impose restrictive measures was prompted by the fact that the country has clearly fallen behind technologically on the global microelectronic market, which negatively affects both the country’s economic indicators and its national security

According to the expert June Park, the Government of Japan decided to institute the restrictive measures out of concern for national security, since, in exporting rare materials to South Korea, Tokyo cannot be certain they will be used properly

The Japan Times notes that Tokyo justifies the introduction of increasingly strict export requirements by claiming that confidence in South Korea has been undermined. In particular, some media outlets report that between 2015 and March 2019, no fewer than 156 materials, including hydrogen fluoride, were smuggled out of South Korea. There were also reports of hydrogen fluoride being exported to countries that are under international sanctions (Iran, Syria and even North Korea). Another reason for the restrictions is Tokyo’s concerns that South Korea violates intellectual property rights

South Korea denies all accusations. Its arguments are logical: Iran and Syria are friends of North Korea, therefore, Seoul has no reasons to help their regimes. President of South Korea Moon Jae-in called for the differences to be resolved by diplomatic means. However, the talks held on July 12, 2019, in Tokyo did not yield any results. Consequently, Moon Jae-in instructed the relevant agencies to develop reciprocal measures. At about the same time, there were reports of South Korea possibly filing a grievance with the World Trade Organization. As a result, hearings on the issue were launched in Geneva on July 24, 2019

In late July 2019, news broke that Tokyo was considering further restrictions since Japan believes the re-selling of strategic materials by Seoul to be a violation of the non-proliferation regimes regarding both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. In this case, the restrictions would extend to other types of commodities and materials. On August 2, the Cabinet of Japan approved the decision to take South Korea off its “white list” (where the Republic of Korea was the only Asian state), thereby depriving it of trade preferences in regard to the materials mentioned above. The full list exceeds 1100 items

Despite these events, several deliveries of these materials from Japan to South Korea were made in August. However, they did not result in a thaw in bilateral relations. Seoul reciprocated by putting Japan on a restrictive trade list and terminating the military intelligence-sharing pact with Tokyo

“Wu Wei” American Style

China holds leading positions in deposits of rare-earth metals. Moreover, approximately 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth magnets are manufactured in China. Japanese companies use China’s raw materials to manufacture fluorinated polyimides, hydrogen fluoride and photoresists that are subsequently supplied to South Korea, Taiwan and other countries to be used in manufacturing chips, displays, etc. The circle is complete when these commodities go back to China to be used in the manufacture of finished products (such as smartphones and tablets), creating a sort of a closed-loop. Thus, the manufacture of competitive hi-tech products today is impossible within a single economy, and Chinese companies depend on parts coming from other Asian countries

Tracing the entire technological chain, we can assume that the Japan–South Korea conflict is closely linked to the trade war between China and the United States. South Korea’s Samsung Electronics is hindered by the restrictions on deliveries of Huawei memory chips since the latter is under U.S. sanctions. In turn, interrupting the chain of semiconductors delivery from South Korea will slow down the development of artificial intelligence in China. And who benefits from this? This is a rhetorical question

It would seem that the United States should be interested in cordial relations between their allies in the region, allies that form a sort of counterbalance to China and are ideological antagonists to North Korea. The White House, however, intentionally or unintentionally, demonstrates adherence to the Taoist principle of inaction, or “wu wei” (无为 in simplified Chinese), which entails a conscious refusal to act and the assumption of a contemplative stance. From the outset of the confrontation in July 2019, the United States announced it would not interfere in the conflict. Despite individual experts calling upon the United States to act as an intermediary between the two Asian states, Washington did not change its position

We should also note here that the Japanese company Toshiba announced the construction of a facility for the production of NAND-type (from the English NOT-AND, that is, a binary logical element) flash memory devices in Iwate Prefecture in cooperation with U.S. chip manufacturer Western Digital. We can cautiously assume that the United States and Japan are progressing toward a “technological union” in order to defeat China in the race for domination of the semiconductor industry

Public Opinion

Speaking of the impact that the conflict has on public opinion in both countries, we can quote a survey conducted by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun in mid-September 2019. Overall, slightly less than one third (29 per cent) of respondents admitted that they had a negative opinion of South Korea. This was far more pronounced among older people, which can be linked to their conservative views and the “proximity aberration” phenomenon (put simply, the older generations remember the events of the 20th century well)

As for South Korea, an anti-Japanese “grassroots” campaign has been launched in addition to the “top-down” process. In the second half of the summer of 2019, slogans『 가지않습니다 사지않습니다 』 (Korean for “Do not visit, do not buy”) calling for boycotting trips to Japan and Japanese goods spread on Korean social networks. And it looks like they were successful to a degree. For instance, the Yonhap News Agency reports that the number of South Koreans travelling to Japan in August fell by 60 per cent compared to the same period last year

In the run-up to the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo, the trade conflict has become a reason for manipulating public opinion in South Korea. Additionally, we cannot rule out the possibility that populists use the disagreements between Japan and South Korea to advance their domestic agenda on the eve of the elections to South Korea’s unicameral parliament scheduled for April 15, 2020

Forecast: Cloudy in the East

Losses from the Japan–South Korea trade war may exceed $80 billion. There has already been a drop in sales of South Korean semiconductors manufactured by Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. Moreover, the conflict threatens to disrupt the entire global technological production chain in microelectronics. The expert Robert Farley described this conflict (and the U.S.–China trade war) as “weaponizing interdependence.” One of the analysts with The Economist Intelligence Unit called this situation “mutually assured destruction.”

The Yonhap News reports that the consequences of the trade conflict have had greater negative effect on the Japanese economy than on the South Korean economy. For instance, in July–August, South Korean exports to Japan have fallen by 3.5 per cent, while Japanese exports to South Korea have dropped 8.1 per cent

The South Korean economy has also suffered against the backdrop of these events. Here, Seoul has only two ways out of this predicament:

-Transitioning to domestic analogues, which LG Display and Samsung Electronics already did in September of this year. Additionally, the country earmarked 2.1 trillion South Korean won in the 2020 budget to overcome the dependence on the export of rare materials from Japan

-Searching for alternative sources of hydrogen fluoride and other rare materials for microelectronics. Media outlets have reported that Russia might be a potential supplier of high-purity hydrogen fluoride. The head of the Korea International Trade Association said that Moscow had offered to supply hydrogen fluoride to Seoul. However, it is not easy for South Korean companies to transition to Russian imports of this and other materials for microelectronics. The physical and chemical properties of the products must be tested for a rather lengthy period of time (upwards of six months)

Apparently, the status quo on the microelectronic market will continue in the short-term, and both parties will seek ways to minimize losses. And we can already see evidence of this. In September and October, the Government of Japan approved deliveries of hydrogen fluoride to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix

At the same time, if Tokyo and Seoul fail to find common ground in the medium and long term, then the current global technological chain in microelectronics may be dismantled, which will, of course, negatively affect the growth rate of the global economy. However, so as not to end our study on a pessimistic note, let us note that, under the current circumstances, many hi-tech companies around the world, including those in Russia, now have the chance to become new links in the value chain and occupy its niche in microelectronics

From our partner RIAC

[1] In 1910, the Empire of Japan annexed the entire Korean peninsula. Korea essentially became a Japanese colony. The Japanese language and culture were forced onto the Korean people. Up to 200,000 ethnic Koreans served in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II (including future president of South Korea and “father of the economic miracle” Park Chung-hee). Today, Japanese war crimes are a subject of talks between South Korea and Japan. In 2015, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Fumio Kishida promised 1 billion yen to the victims of violence in compensation, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe offered a public apology for Japan’s actions during the war.

[2] The dispute concerns the Liancourt Rocks, a group of small islets that the Koreans call Dokdo (“Solitary Islands”) and the Japanese call Takeshima (“Bamboo Islands”). Back in the early 20th century, Japan claimed sovereignty over these islands; however, following its defeat in World War II, it was forced to abandon its colonial acquisitions. On the other hand, the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco does not mention this territory, which gives Japan formal grounds to dispute the sovereignty of the islands where South Korea maintains military and civil infrastructure.

Ph.D. in History, Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Novosibirsk State Technical University; Associate Professor, Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management; RIAC expert

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East Asia

Taiwan: The First and Oldest ‘Thorn’ between China and the West

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Over three hundred and fifty years ago, when the West lost its first war with China over Taiwan, the technological level between the two sides was fairly even. But the Dutch, then the most dynamic colonial power, paid a heavy price for misbelieving “China might have invented gunpowder but we possess superior guns.” Today, the world is witnessing China’s rapid rise and the US is in decline. The question is, will Taiwan once again bust the Western (aka US) superiority myth?                                                                         

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In 1662, the West fought its first war with China and lost. The Sino-Dutch War, as it is called now, was fought when a Chinese admiral dared the Dutch East India Company to give up its little under half century ‘rule’ over Taiwan. The defeat resulted in the island falling under Chinese rule for the first time in history. It is not so important to know it was China’s first great victory over Europe’s most dynamic colonial power. In the words of the Dutch historian, Tonio Andrade, what is more significant is the first Chinese victory over the West broke the myth of Western superiority as it had been achieved on the basis of “Chinese advantage in strategic and tactical culture.” (Emphasis added) The Chinese victory also broke another myth which the Western historians held on to until as recently as in 1970s, i.e., the Chinese might have invented the gunpowder but didn’t know how to use it as weapon, Andrade, the author  went on to add.

Fast forward to the present-day tensions in the Taiwan Strait. As China embarked on the path of Reform and Opening-up, relations between Beijing and Taipei too started improving in the early 1980s. Seen as a remarkable political development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait in 45 years, the KMT government in Taipei declared in 1991 “an end to the war with the People’s Republic of China on the mainland.” However, since the election of Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000, political headwinds in Taiwan have been moving in the opposite direction to Beijing. Alarmed by Chen’s backing of demands for Taiwan’s independence, Beijing was quick to pass anti-secession law a year after Chen was reelected in 2004.

In 2016, following Donald Trump’s victory in US and the victory of Ms. Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president respectively, Beijing’s fear of Taiwan declaring itself an independent country has reached unprecedented levels. In fact, Beijing is feeling seriously threatened by the US role in creating conditions for Taiwan to declare independence. Immediately upon assuming office, President Trump held telephone conversation with the Taiwan president – something which no other US had done in the preceding forty years. This was the beginning of a new trend in US-China relations and which grossly undermined the “One China” policy.

During the past decade (between 2007 and 2019), the US warships made over one hundred trips through the Taiwan Strait. No wonder Beijing has been describing Taiwan as “the most important sensitive issue in Sino-US relations.” According to New Strait Times, in 2020, the year of Coronavirus pandemic, the cross-strait faced its worst crisis in the past two decades. Without denying that the PLA fighter planes crossed maritime border with Taiwan, China however dismissed Taipei’s claims of “incursions” by the mainland. Beijing even maintained its warplanes, bombers and anti-submarine aircrafts “conducted normal exercises on September 18 and 19 respectively and that the median line never existed.”

However, according to experts, the median line is the unofficial airspace boundary between Taiwan and China, and was demarcated by US Air Force General Benjamin Davis Jr. in 1955, before the US pressured both sides to enter into a tacit agreement not to cross it. Media reports originating from Taipei, Hong Kong and Singapore claimed the forty or more PLA incursions last October, were prompted by two US top officials visiting Taipei during August-September period last year. “U.S. Under Secretary of State Keith Krach arrived in Taiwan on Thursday for the second visit by a high-level American official in two months. The first visit was by the US Health Secretary Alex Azar in August 2020.” The visits by Krach and Azar respectively were first highest-level US Cabinet visits to Taiwan – in gross violation of the US commitments to China – since the US switched formal relations from Taiwan to Beijing in 1979.

This year, especially within hours following President entered the White House, the new US administration lost no time in announcing “our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid.” Two days earlier, the State Department invited and officially received Taiwan’s unofficial ambassador in Washington to Biden’s inauguration – the first envoy from the island present at a presidential swearing-in since 1979. Both the statement of commitment to Taiwan and the presence of Taiwanese envoy at the presidential inauguration respectively were interpreted by strategic affairs experts in Washington and Beijing as moves to provoke China towards making a strategic mistake leading to military conflict.

Further, Taiwan has returned as “thorniest” issue in US-China relations under President Biden – since perhaps it is easier to violate “One China” policy than to either rally European allies against China or to announce a decisive Washington position toward Beijing. As President Biden gears up to embark on his maiden in-person visit to shake hands or bump elbows with his European allies, the US administration has further escalated tensions over Taiwan. Last Sunday, a bipartisan contingent of three US Senators – Tammy Duckworth and Christopher Coons, both Democrats, and Dan Sullivan, a Republican – briefly visited Taiwan on a US military aircraft.  According to media reports, the Chinese Defense Ministry described the visit as “extremely vile provocation.” Reuters citing Chinese sources said China believes that “Biden administration is challenging one-China principle and trying to achieve the so-called goal of ‘using Taiwan to control’ China.” 

Experts in Beijing point out, Biden is accelerating the pitch of what started under Obama and was intensified by Trump, i.e., to use “the US economic and military might to pressure Beijing and force it to accept US hegemony in the region.” Elsewhere, first the joint statement following Biden-Suga summit in April and then in late May the statement released after the summit meeting between European leaders and Japan’s Prime Minister Suga, are being interpreted as “belligerent stances towards Beijing initiated and encouraged by President Biden.” The EU-Japan post-summit statement called for “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” Similar to several moves initiated by Trump and Biden challenging one-China policy, the EU-Suga joint statement too is the first time that Taiwan has been included in such a statement. 

A scholar in Tianjin, who writes a column for ftchinese.com, the daily online Mandarin version of the Financial Times, thinks Biden has intensified the so-called Thucydides trap. In a recent article, he has actually put forward a solution for Beijing to not only avoid falling into the trap, but also steer clear of having to choose between using force to reunify with Taiwan and being forced into military conflict with the US by striking first. To sum up Li Yongning’s rather long thesis, he prescribes that China fight out Thucydides trap with economic growth and people’s prosperity. To prove his point, Li flashes the example of de-escalation of hostility between China and Japan. Remember until a few years ago, heightened tensions between the two over Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. Of late, especially since the middle of Xi Jinping’s first five year tenure, belligerent provocations between Beijing and Tokyo have almost ceased.

How did China under Xi achieve this? According to Li, Xi’s strategy to strike peace and tranquility with Japan was simple and practical. “China’s GDP exceeded Japan’s in 2010 and by 2019 it became 2.8 times more than Japan’s, which put an end to Sino-Japan competitiveness. Likewise, once China achieves one and a half times or twice bigger GDP of the USA, the China-US competitiveness will be rendered as joke,” Li contended. In 2017, in PPP terms China had already exceeded the US economy. Li cited a Brookings Institution report which predicted China’s GDP will cross America’s in 2028. “Once China reaches there, higher GDP will act as shock absorber for all Sino-US conflicts,” Li wrote.

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China’s know-how on becoming the oldest society in the world

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china bicycle

For decades, China had a “one-child policy” that permitted families to have only one child. A few years ago, this restriction was changed to a “two-child policy”, and now the Chinese government has allowed the Chinese people to give birth to three children.

The main reason for this is the concerningly low birth rate and the impending demographic crisis. China is still the country with the largest population (1.41 billion), but UN forecasts indicate that India will soon surpass it, since India has a much higher birth rate.

Statistics show that last year approximately 12 million babies were born in China, which is the lowest birth rate China has had in many years. For instance, in 2016 when the “two-child policy” was implemented, the number of newborns reached 18 million.

Chinese demographers argue that it will be difficult for China to boost birth rate in the near future because the number of women in the reproductive age is decreasing. This was caused by China’s “one-child policy” that was in force from 1979 to 2015.

Chinese families could give birth only to one child, and many families chose to “spend” this quota on a boy, since in China boys have traditionally been valued more than girls. If a family were told they were expecting a girl, the mother would often decide to have an abortion.

This caused an unexpected outcome – the number of men exceeded the number of women. Although it was not allowed to find out the sex of the baby during pregnancy, there were several ways to do so which lead to numerous late abortions. That is why currently there is a disproportion between the number of men and women in the Chinese society.

As a result, modern China is overproducing men and is in a grave lack of women. Statistics indicate that there are 35 million more men than women – leaving many men with no chances of finding a spouse.

Moreover, the beliefs and values of the Chinese people have also changed over the years, i.e. many women wish to pursue a career first and only then to establish a family. The recent years have seen a rapid decline in marriages in China.

These trends are particularly prevalent in Chinese cities, leading demographers to predict that the gap between the situation in cities and the situation in the countryside will only widen in the future – people in the countryside still prefer larger families, while city dwellers have a hard time giving birth to a single child.

“Now, we are allowed to have three children. The problem, however, is that I don’t even want one child,” a user of the Chinese social media network Weibo wrote in his account.

Many are asking the question – will the “three-child policy” change anything if the “two-child policy” wasn’t able to do so? That’s why people are happy about the government’s decision to provide other incentives and motivations in this regard.

For example, education costs – which were twice as high in two-children families – will be cut, people will see additional support on tax and housing issues and working women will be granted more rights. In addition, the government also has plans to educate young Chinese people on the issues of marriage and love – now, state propaganda will not only deal with shaming the West, but also teach people how to love correctly and “make children”.

This leads to believe that the Chinese government has taken quite a peculiar approach to identifying mistakes in their previous policies, but it isn’t truly admitting these mistakes – as is the case in all authoritarian regimes. If the previous plan fails, simply improve it a bit and relaunch it anew.

The “one-child policy” has led to one-and-a-half generation where there are six people from the non-working population for each person in the working population, i.e. the person’s parents and two sets of grandparents. This is the Chinese Communist Party’s know-how.

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Global Health & Health Silk Road: The Other Side Of Picture

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The new world order is a twisted maze of political, economic and cultural ambitions. China’s obscure political economy presents an unparalleled challenge to those unfamiliar with the cultural and historical undercurrents driving Beijing’s global movements. Following the onset of the CoVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the global society observed one of the hasty economic convulsion since World War II. Nearly all nation states sealed their borders and placed global supply chain and trade in limbo as the spread of the virus continued unabated. As Beijing’s flagship investment project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was similarly disrupted. The BRI initiative has formed the cornerstone of President Xi’s approach to strategic diplomacy and challenged the traditional concept of development. Key rhetoric underlying the initiative, such as “the community of common destiny for mankind”.

Nevertheless, there is a “Digital Silk Road”, and “Space Silk Road”, so it should come as no bombshell that China is also building a “Health Silk Road”. China’s HSR first appeared in a speech given by President Xi in 2016. At the first BRI Forum 2017, a Beijing Communique of Belt and Road Health Cooperation and Health Silk Road was signed by China, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNAIDS, OECD, GAVI and other participating countries. Since then, China made a significant move towards the consolidation of its role as a major player in global health. Similarly, it is no secret that China is making a boost for global health leadership during CoVID-19 pandemic. As the pandemic spread across the world, China sought to provide aid packages and medical assistance to partner states within the BRI under the name of “Health Silk Road”. The ongoing CoVID-19 pandemic is not only going to fundamentally transform the global politics, but also the foreign policy priorities of many countries. Since the outbreak, the CoVID-19 pandemic has exposed the significant weakness of public health infrastructure of developed and developing countries alike.

There is widespread understanding among scientists, heritage and history writers that one of the most devastating pandemics in human history, black death, originated in China and spread along the old silk road to central Asia, northern India and Europe. It exhibited a blueprint that is as old as human history, – when people and goods travel, so do viruses and bacteria. Today, there is some speculation about whether CoVID-19 circulated along the “new silk road”, and it has been criticized that the BRI contributed to the spread of the virus. These kinds of debates are pointless because, even without modern means of transport like trains, cargo-ships, and planes, the plague can reach the most remote places in the world and kill a large portion of the global population. Highly criticized for covering up and not preventing the virus from turning into a global pandemic, China is making an efforts to reinstate its persona as a symbol of support, strength and leadership. Opponents have also alleged that Beijing rationalized itself as a global health champion at a time when Washington had abdicated its responsibilities.

Regardless of misgivings, China has been promoting the institutionalization of health cooperation within HSR framework by organizing and sponsoring a number of health-themed forums. For example, the Silk Road Health Forum, China-Central and Eastern European Countries Health Ministers Forum, China-ASEAN Health Forum, and the China-Arab States Health Forum. Beijing also initiated a series of supportive programs on disease control and prevention in alliance with its neighbors in Central Asia. All these efforts were made as part of China’s broader global health diplomacy and leadership before the CoVID-19 pandemic hit the world. With the spread of  CoVID-19 across the world, the Chinese government extended support to countries from East Asia to Europe. It has given 20 million dollars to the World Health Organization (WHO) for assisting developing countries in coping with the pandemic, build up their epidemic-prevention abilities, and building a stronger public health system. China also handed out concessionary loans and played a coordinating role in multilaterals like G-20, ASEAN, the SCO and the African Union, established itself in a leadership position by promptly responding to the crises and catering to the needs of the countries all over.

In contrast with the advance economics, what China has contributed to the global pandemic combat becomes even more admirable. Statistics show that China has provided considerable amount of medical assistance to the rest of world, including approximately 70.6 billion face masks, 225 million test kits, 115 million pairs of goggles, 340 million protective suits, 96,700 ventilators, and 40.29 million infrared thermometers to 200 countries and regions in 2020. China’s medical professionals have also played a vital role in the global pandemic battle by contributing their knowledge and experience on the frontlines in many virus-impacted countries. China has shared medical best practices with a multitude of international organizations, including the ASEAN, EU, African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Caribbean, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as some of the hardest-hit countries such as South Korea, Japan, Russia, the United States, and Germany.

Concisely, with all these notable endeavors and substantial contributions, is it still premature to presume that China has taken over the leadership role in terms of global health? China’s engagement in global health, especially during CoVID-19, has positioned itself as a johnny on the spot in global health leadership. The HSR undoubtedly will allow China to re-establish its national repute on the international stage, in particular by contrasting it with the inelegant responses of the United States and other European nations. China’s global aspirations, efforts to present itself as a global health leader should not be considered as surprise. It is still too early to tell the magnitude to which China’s global health sprint will transform its international profile, but there is no reason to be cynical that it will be revolutionary. As an old Chinese saying goes, it takes a good blacksmith to make good steel.

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