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Yemen: Federalization as an Alternative to War

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In August 2019, the Yemen crises entered a new phase, essentially turning into a tripartite conflict. The forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) moved against the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in an effort to restore the independence of South Yemen. By August 10, the STC’s units had captured Aden, having essentially forced representatives of the internationally recognized government out of the city. Later, on August 15, the STC announced its plans to establish an independent federative state in the south of Yemen. This was accompanied by pogroms and persecutions of northerners in Aden. Such developments are fraught not only with the spiralling of the Yemen crisis, but also with a possible clash between the principal parties of the anti-Houthi coalition: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh is counting on Hadi as the leader of a united country, while Abu Dhabi uses its STC proxies to create the conditions for splitting up the country, thus weakening the position of the pro-Saudi President.

The events that took place in the south of Yemen this past August can be viewed as a local civil war. Having captured the capital, the STC attempted to take control of Abyan and Shabwah, the governorates adjacent to Aden. The STC succeeded in rapidly taking over the military bases in Abyan. In Shabwah, however, they encountered resistance from forces loyal to Hadi. On August 22–25, the separatists were routed by the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade and began to retreat. By late August, the government forces had advanced on Aden but failed to capture the city largely due to the interference of the United Arab Emirates, whose air forces bombed troops loyal to Hadi in the Aden and Abyan governorates on August 29. Relative calm on the new front has followed ever since.

The Virtual Split of the Arab Coalition

Regional observers believe that, after the failure of the advance toward Al Hudaydah in 2018, the United Arab Emirates abandoned its plans to defeat the Houthis and instead turned its attention to establishing control of the coast in southern Yemen. At the same time, the United Arab Emirates is counting on the local separatists, with the Salaphites being a prominent group among them. The Salaphites are relatively well organized and have extensive ties with southern tribes. Additionally, they share a common enemy with the United Arab Emirates: the al-Islah Islamic party on which Saudi Arabia relies.

In the summer of 2019, the United Arab Emirates began to pointedly reduce its military presence in Yemen. The south was transferred to the control of the pro-UAE STC. This allowed the United Arab Emirates to solve several problems with one move: first, it reduced tensions in the country’s relations with Iran, which finances the Houthis; and second, it relieved the United Arab Emirates of its responsibility for the civilian casualties inflicted by the coalition’s airstrikes. The leadership of the United Arab Emirates try to present these actions as part of a long-term strategic plan. They insist that their policies in Yemen have from the outset been intended to establish local structures capable of resisting the Houthis. The STC is considered to be such a structure, which means that Hadi’s recognized government now needs to negotiate with the South. The STC itself claims it pursues following goals: to unite the south of Yemen and establishing a secular democratic state there; to prevent radical forces from becoming more active; and removing various armed units from cities and stabilizing the situation.

The problem is that in stepping up its activities, the STC delivered a serious blow to Saudi Arabia’s interests in Yemen. On the one hand, the weakness of the anti-Houthi coalition became even more obvious, as a civil war in its own right is going on behind the coalition’s battle lines. On the other hand, during any future talks, the Houthis will demand the same concessions that the STC will obtain from the Hadi government (if any). Thus far, representatives of the Hadi government are expected to declare that secession of the South is impermissible and suggest talks on federalizing Yemen.

Riyadh is in no hurry to make any concessions to the United Arab Emirates’ proxies and is busy flexing its muscles. For instance, against the background of clashes in Aden in the first half of August, Saudi Arabia succeeded in ensuring the inviolability of the Central Bank of Yemen and in preventing the national currency from crashing. Saudi’s military and armored vehicles took the building of the bank under their protection and kept the STC’s forces out. Riyadh also provided the Hadi government with 285 million Saudi riyals in financial aid, which are required primarily to import fuel.

The coalition partners are attempting to coordinate their activities, but discontent is growing. During an urgent meeting in Mecca on August 12 attended by King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on the Saudi side, and Crown Prince Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed on the UAE side, the attendees called upon Hadi and the STC to engage in dialogue. The Saudi monarch, however, did not squander the opportunity to demonstrate his “extreme irritation” with the actions of the allies, which regional observers took to be a very bad sign.

Southern Passions Running High

The strengthening of the STC began in 2017 when it gradually took control of Aden, Yemen’s provisional capital. For a short time in January 2018, STC forces managed to take control of government agencies and even placed members of the government under house arrest. But the situation changed when Saudi Arabia got involved. Nevertheless, the course for secession had become obvious, especially since southerners had started to search actively for international support.

The STC was unable to achieve a quick triumph in August 2019 because the south of Yemen is, in fact, far from united. The differences go back to the times when that part of the country was independent and socialist. Back in 1980, the elites of the Lahij and Abyan governorates competed for control of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. That confrontation resulted in the short-lived South Yemen Civil War in 1986 and the massacre of Aden, where natives of the Abyan Governorate were defeated. Some of them fled North, to the city of Sanaa.

Currently, the STC relies on the natives of the Dhale and Lahij governorates, while the Abyan and Shabwah governorates support the Hadi government. The current president hails from Abyan, and the loyalty of the local tribes is unquestionable. Shabwah is not interested in the secession of the South, since its economy is oriented towards the “northern” Marib Governorate, as it hopes to receive dividends from the transit of oil and gas.

The Hadhramaut and Al Mahrah governorates are taking a “wait-and-see” attitude; however, the local elites are reportedly displeased with the claims of the United Arab Emirates and its proxies to dominance. Al Mahrah has rather strong pro-Saudi leanings, and in August, it openly called for the prevention of an invasion by STC forces.

The military capabilities of the STC are thus limited, and following the failure of the August blitzkrieg, the Council will most likely have to enter into talks with the Hadists. Saudi Arabia is already trying to set up a dialogue between the Hadi government and the STC. Media reports said that the first indirect contacts took place on September 4 in Jeddah.

The “Zero=Sum Game” is Over

While the Arab coalition is facing internal problems in the South, its Ansar Allah opponents (Houthis) have taken the opportunity to put additional pressure on their main adversary, Saudi Arabia. On September 14, with the help of drones and missiles, they delivered a strike against two large oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, which forced Riyadh to cut oil production by more than half – 5.7 million barrels per day fewer than the usual 9.8 million barrels.

Despite the wave of accusations against Iran following the strikes, there is reason to believe that the Houthis are capable of organizing such an attack all on their own since they had previously shown cruise missiles with the necessary range to the public. However, in all fairness, we should note that experts identified them as radically simplified knock-offs of Iranian cruise missiles. Debates about the military capabilities of the Houthis are likely to continue, but some conclusions can be drawn. The war in Yemen costs Saudi Arabia dearly, both economically and in terms of its public image. Saudi Arabia is also clearly vulnerable to new attacks, despite enormous military spending and assistance from the United States. The media has added fuel to the fire by suggesting that it will take Riyadh between several months and a year to bring oil production to its previous levels.

Consequently, while Saudi Arabia could previously afford to ignore the occasional missile and drone from Yemen and continue bombing the adversary using its own aviation, now, instead of a zero-sum game, it has an asymmetric conflict on its hands with very unpleasant consequences. However, there is a way out of this predicament. A week after the strike against the oil refinery, Houthis proposed a ceasefire of sorts to Riyadh: they would cease missile strikes in exchange for the Saudi’s stopping their air raids.

A New Scenario for the Yemeni Drama

There are three possible courses of action from the point of view of the general development of the Yemeni crisis. The first scenario involves acknowledging that a military solution is impossible and launching talks with Houthis. The second is to stop counting on Hadi and his ineffective government, which does not enjoy broad support in Yemen, and find a new force that can defeat the Houthis and the Islamists and unite Yemen. Finally, the third option is controlled chaos, that is, the continuation of the war against Ansar Allah while at the same time ensuring that the instability is contained to Yemen.

From 2015 until now, the coalition has been pursuing the third course, that of controlled chaos. However, with the separatist movement stepping up its activities in the South (and the United Arab Emirates’ de facto withdrawal from the war) and the coalition’s increasingly obvious inability win a military victory over the Houthis may make other scenarios relevant as well.

As we have shown above, a compromise with Ansar Allah is the most apparent solution. In this case, further developments of the situation in Yemen will depend primarily on whether the dialogue between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is productive. The Houthis have long been trying to get Riyadh to enter into direct talks with them, and they have been pressuring Saudi Arabia into doing so by regularly attacking cities and infrastructure facilities in the country. Riyadh, however, is standing its ground and is not going agree to anything except the actual surrender of its opponents, which it believes to be puppets of Iran. If the Saudi leadership, as a matter of principle, decides to continue armed hostilities, then it may follow the course of forming another government to replace that of Hadi. However, it will then run into inevitable difficulties finding alternative leaders and ensuring their international recognition. This process will take a lot of time, which means that the war will go on.

The Yemen crisis is entering a new phase. There are three competing scenarios for the future of the country: a Houthi “Islamic republic”; splitting Yemen into North and South; and a federative state headed by a reshuffled government. The latter appears to be in the best interests of the Yemeni people, as it offers hope for a relatively quick settlement of the conflict and the preservation of a unified state. If Riyadh agrees to a constructive dialogue with the STC and Houthis, then federalization may have a chance. Thus far, however, the Saudi leadership has taken a tough stance and refuses to make significant concessions to either the Houthis in Ansar Allah or the southerners represented by the STC. If the current trend persists, the civil war should be expected to continue on several fronts at once, and Yemen will likely collapse slowly.

From our partner RIAC

PhD in political science, Associate Professor, Oriental Studies Department, MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, RIAC expert

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Suez Canal: Enhancing alignment between Belt and Road and Egypt Vision 2030

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The location of the Suez Canal Economic Zone plays an effective role at the heart of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, ensuring a permanent strategic partnership between the two sides, to enhance the concept of the role of economic corridors and ports in development for the benefit of all parties. This brings us to a fundamental point, which is the importance of integration between ports and industrial areas, such as the Suez Canal, as the most prominent model for this, as a model of cooperation that is the most distinguished in the entire world within the framework of the relationship between the Suez Canal corridor and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, in order to advance the development wheel for all its parties, and open endless horizons in front of various investments. We find that the Suez Canal is a major gateway for Chinese products to enter African, European, Arab, and American markets, due to its strategic location on the Red Bahrain and the Mediterranean, passing through the Suez Canal. Therefore, it serves the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and this will be greatly reflected after the completion of development work in the Port of Sokhna in Suez, which will become one of the pivotal ports in the Red Sea and a fulcrum for serving international trade within the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

  The Suez Canal is considered the main station and the main sea corridor for the sea route of the Belt and Road Initiative, which focuses on linking the continents of Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, in addition to the land link between China and Europe, given that the sea road of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative extends from the (South China to the Strait of Mule, the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, all the way to the Suez Canal).

   For this reason, the State of China, in light of the globalization system and the new global economic order that it is trying to strengthen to serve the interests of mainly African and developing countries, seeks to launch many global initiatives, the most important of which is the “Belt and Road Initiative”, which allows it to cooperate with its strategic partners within the framework of that. The initiative, led by Egypt, and within this framework, China officially signed a document of cooperation with the Suez Canal Economic Zone, and participation in the establishment of many industries and infrastructure projects cooperation between China and Egypt through the Egyptian Suez Canal corridor within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative does not only aim for the material part related to investments and projects, but also aims to build human values, which the initiative aims to build a better world that shares those values ​​and seeks to build international relations based on peace.  Achieving comprehensive development for all sectors, as well as working to bring peace instead of violence. As the world seeks to achieve comprehensive development, it either takes place within a framework of cooperation or pursues an aggressive policy that does not build but rather destroys entire civilizations.         

  The Egyptian Suez Canal plays a major role in increasing cooperation in the areas of trade exchange, localization of industry, and the transfer of Chinese technology and energy to Egypt.  As the main goal of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is to support the economy and intra-state trade between countries, facilitate trade, and extend communications lines, stressing that the initiative includes extending cable, communications, Internet, and maritime digitization lines, explaining that Egypt is one of the countries in the world through which most submarine cables, digitization, and digital pass. Egypt represents a very important number and has its weight in the initiative, taking into account the Suez Canal, and the importance of the geographical location, as it connects the east to the west and the north to the south, in addition to the Suez Canal axis, as it represents an added value to the Suez Canal as well as the initiative, which relies heavily on the Suez Canal, in addition to  Establishment of the Chinese industrial zone and the Russian economic zone in the Suez Canal. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative relies primarily on the concept of economic corridors for development, given that the Suez Canal is the most important and prominent international shipping corridor that directly links the three continents to which the initiative countries belong the economic zone surrounding the Suez Canal has been planned according to a future vision that takes into account  Taking into account the various dimensions of the expected future development in maritime transport traffic and rates of international trade.

   Here, Egypt and China can cooperate on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in many ways. The Belt and Road Initiative differs from other economic blocs in that it is the first of its kind to link trade with development.  Egypt is also an important partner in building the Belt and Road. The Chinese side is keen to enhance the alignment between the Belt and Road Initiative and Egypt’s Vision 2030. China supports the Egyptian side in advancing the pace of industrialization, enhancing scientific and technological capacity, and raising the level of development, in addition to deepening cooperation in the field of security and law enforcement between the two countries, in a way that maintains the common security to them. The Chinese side is also keen to enhance coordination and cooperation with the Egyptian side in international affairs to work together to support and implement multilateralism, reject the tendency of unilateralism and bullying, and ensure the correct direction of global governance reforms. The Egyptian side plays an effective role within the framework of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum and the China-Africa Cooperation Forum.

  The list of Chinese companies investing in Egypt includes Sino Tharwa Drilling, Shamal International Petroleum, TEDA Investment, Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Manufacturing, Huawei Technology, and Conco Technology. In addition to a large number of projects implemented by some Chinese companies under the direct contracting system, among the most prominent Chinese projects being implemented are: the Financial and Business District project in the New Administrative Capital, The TEDA-Suez zone for Chinese-Egyptian economic cooperation and the electric train project in 10th of Ramadan City. In addition to financing (Exim Bank of China) the implementation of a railway project to connect Cairo to the New Administrative Capital at a cost of more than one and a half billion dollars.

  Therefore, China seeks to expand its investments in the Suez Canal region, especially as an important axis of development. The region also represents an important link and plays a prominent role in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, especially in light of the implementation of the ambitious development plan aimed at establishing development projects in the Suez Canal axis, including logistical services in a way that represents a good opportunity for cooperation between the two sides in many fields, especially technology and infrastructure in approximately 6 ports and two integrated regions, in addition to the role of the Suez Canal axis in enhancing Chinese-Egyptian economic cooperation, and making Egypt a starting point for the Arab and African markets, by virtue of Egypt’s membership in the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement and the COMESA Economic Community of Eastern and Southern African Countries.

 The Suez Canal axis has special importance within the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, especially in light of the services provided by the Suez Canal Economic Zone, to support global trade movement through its ports, most notably ship bunkering services with green fuel, in addition to the role of Chinese companies in the region’s ports and the Suez Canal,  such as: (Hutchison, COSCO and CMA Alliance), which is responsible for managing and operating one of the berths in the port of Ain Sokhna in the Suez Canal axis, with investments estimated at more than 600 million dollars, within the framework of the effective role that the Suez Canal plays in attracting Chinese investments in the sectors of financial services, logistics, and ports.  Therefore, cooperation between many Chinese provinces and cities and the Suez Canal Economic Zone has been strengthened in this context. The Chinese company TEDA aims to promote its industrial zone in Ain Sokhna, in addition to investment opportunities in the Suez Canal Economic Zone to various Chinese companies, and to enhance cooperation with the Suez Canal Economic Zone in Egypt as an economic ally of great importance to Chinese investments.

   In order to strengthen Chinese-Egyptian cooperation within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to expand the base of cooperation with Egypt, so that it will be a starting point for Chinese-African cooperation, and Chinese participation in enhancing the economic development and political stability of the countries of the continent, especially in light of the material globalization system and the inability of the peoples.  Which is still at the beginning of the development process of keeping pace with the global movement and the rapid transition towards globalization, and therefore the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative targets developing countries in order to work to enhance their economic cooperation and raise the standard of living for the peoples of those regions.

   Accordingly, we find that all the elements of success are available for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, as it started from a comprehensive development concept that addresses emerging and emerging economies, and aims to enhance cooperation with many international financial institutions, as well as economic blocs and organizations, such as: (ASEAN, BRICS, the European Union, the World Trade Organization), and others.

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The Meeting of Sisi with Li Shi

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Image source: dailynewsegypt.com

The meeting between Egyptian President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi” and a high-level Chinese delegation, headed by Li Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, came as a confirmation of the Chinese-Egyptian efforts to work together within the framework of the principle of mutual benefit between the two parties and the common destiny of humanity established by the Chinese President “Xi Jinping”.  The importance of the visit of the senior Chinese official in the Communist Party “Li Shi” comes to present the Chinese side’s point of view to Egyptian President “El-Sisi” regarding the joint agreement between China and Egypt to contribute positively to confronting the challenges facing the international community, especially developing and African countries, and to enhance joint international collective action towards a shift to international multipolarity away from the concept of American hegemony, in a way that preserves international peace and stability, and pushes towards reforming the international financial governance system.

  Also, the significance and timing of this visit by the Chinese official, Li Shi, and his meeting with President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi” prior to President El-Sisi’s participation in the “Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation” summit in the capital (Beijing) at the end of October 2023, it carries more than one political connotation, whether at the bilateral Egyptian-Chinese level, or for this summit in which hundreds of heads of state and government around the world participate. Therefore, this visit by “Li Qi” comes in preparation for the participation of Egypt and President “El-Sisi” in the Chinese international Belt and Road Conference, including… It has positive effects and great gains for the benefit of Cairo and Beijing in various fields, especially the economic field.

 During his visit to Cairo and his meeting with President “El-Sisi”, Chinese Communist Party official “Li Shi” confirmed the readiness of the Chinese side to work with the Egyptian side in order to implement the agreements reached by the presidents of the two countries (El- Sisi and Xi Jinping) in a good way, and to consolidate mutual trust at the political level and enhance  Aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with Egypt’s Vision 2030, expanding practical cooperation, intensifying communication, cooperation and coordination in international and regional affairs, and working together to defend the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and advancing the democratization of international relations.  Especially with China’s full understanding of the situation in the Middle East with the complex changes and turmoil it is witnessing, which has negatively affected security and development in the Middle East region, hence China’s keenness to launch (the five-point initiative on achieving security and stability in the Middle East), which is an initiative that focuses on maintaining stability and bringing peace to the region.       

  Here, the visit of Chinese official “Li Shi” to Cairo comes as a culmination of the joint Chinese-Egyptian efforts to achieve many positive results regarding the joint construction of the Belt and Road.  Especially since Chinese-Egyptian relations have become a model of solidarity, cooperation, mutual benefit and mutual gain between China and Egypt and between Arab and African countries and developing countries under the leadership of the presidents of the two countries.  The Chinese side also confirmed China’s readiness to work with the Egyptian side to implement the agreements reached by the presidents of the two countries (El-Sisi and Xi Jinping) in a good manner, consolidate mutual trust at the political level, and enhance the alignment between the Belt and Road Initiative and Egypt’s Vision 2030 to expand practical cooperation and intensifying communication, cooperation and coordination in international and regional affairs, and working together to defend the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and advancing the democratization of international relations, by emphasizing that China’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and its being the largest developing country in the world serves Egyptian goals and interests.  Egypt is also a large Arab and African country and an important emerging economy, so under the current circumstances, the strategic and comprehensive nature of Chinese-Egyptian relations is highlighted.

 It is necessary to analyze the temporal context of the visit of Chinese official “Li Shi” to Cairo, which stems from China’s understanding of the Egyptian role in networking the issues of the African continent and regional and international powers, with China’s view of Egypt as China’s gateway to the African continent, and this view is a constant feature in Chinese political discourse in  In light of the fact that Egypt was one of the first African countries to recognize China.  Egypt also adopts an integrated strategy for development and regional integration of the African continent, in addition to maintaining fruitful and close cooperation relations with all international partners, including China, in a way that serves this Egyptian strategy, especially in the fields of transportation and infrastructure within the framework of its projects with the Chinese side in the Suez Canal axis and the New Administrative Capital.

  Here, President “El-Sisi” always affirms Egypt’s desire to learn from China’s successful experience in development, align its development plan with the Belt and Road Initiative, and deepen bilateral cooperation in a wide range of fields.  In addition to President El-Sisi’s keenness to attend Belt and Road forums for international cooperation, which reflects Egypt’s desire to actively participate in the joint construction of the Belt and Road, which also represents a common voice for African countries to achieve mutual benefit and common development.  Egypt and China succeeded in integrating the Egyptian road and port network within the Belt and Road Initiative, which prompted the development and operation of the industrial zone in Ain Sokhna near the Suez Canal, called the TEDA Chinese Industrial Zone.    

  The joint meetings between high-level delegations between Egypt and China stem from Egypt’s interest in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its projects in Cairo, as the Chinese initiative addresses vital sectors and areas of priority for Egypt within the framework of Egypt’s Vision 2030. Therefore, President Sisi’s visits to China, which reached six visits to China in five years, indicate the tireless effort of President “El-Sisi” and the practical and presidential diplomacy of Egypt, as President “El-Sisi” has become a friend of the Chinese people in a short time as he seeks to create a new and better future for Egypt within the framework of its relationship with China.

  Here we can reach the conclusion that the tireless efforts of the Chinese and Egyptian sides within the framework of joint construction of the Belt and Road strengthen the rapprochement, understanding and mutual benefit of the two open and peace-loving countries.  For example, the Suez Zone for economic and trade cooperation between China and Egypt has reaped great benefits, as it has hosted more than 77 companies with huge investments exceeding one billion dollars.  The zone established by the Chinese TEDA company also contributed to creating more than 30,000 job opportunities for the Egyptian side, in addition to achieving tax revenues worth one billion Egyptian pounds for the Egyptian side.  In addition to China’s major role in the construction projects of the New Administrative Capital and the launch of major infrastructure projects in Egypt, where Chinese companies always play a distinguished role, as a result of the mutual trust between the two countries. Therefore, Chinese President “Xi Jinping” is always keen to invite President “El-Sisi” to attend the international summits hosted by Beijing, such as the BRICS summit and the G20 summit, in addition to the China-Africa summit, based on China’s appreciation of the regional and international standing it enjoys.  Egypt, as well as Egyptian interest in relations with Beijing, in light of Egypt’s trend towards strengthening its relations with important powers in East Asia, especially China.

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Behind Closed Doors: The Startling Repercussion of Saudi-Israeli Alliance

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The media is fervently fueling the narrative that Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the brink of normalizing relations, a development that the United States is investing tremendous resources to realize. However, the certainty of this deal coming to fruition remains in the hands of time. Nevertheless, any such shift will undoubtedly send shockwaves throughout the region. Advocates worldwide argue that this potential alliance could usher in a new era of coherence and peace in the Middle East. Yet, the looming consequences of such a deal could cast a dark shadow over the region, hinting at turbulent times ahead.

To delve deeper into the complexities of the Middle East, it’s crucial to understand the historical penetration and influence of the US and Israel in the region. This background provides a critical context for interpreting current events and potential development. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter embarked on a mission to underscore the Unites State’s immense influence in the Middle East. He saw Israel and Egypt as instrumental to his objectives and invited their leaders to establish normalized relations through a series of agreements that would later be known as the Camp David Accords. The underlying premise of these accords was to restore peace and stability in the region, address the Palestinian issues, and foster harmonious relations between Israel and the Arab states. However, instead of ushering in an era of tranquility and stability, the Middle East was plunged into a vortex of instability and war following this penetration.

The Iran-Iraq war, the US invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent instability that has plagued the region can largely be traced back to the deep-seated influence and intervention of the US and Israel. This penetration, characterized by strategic alliances and political maneuvering, has left indelible marks on the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The ripple effects of these actions have not only sparked conflicts but also contributed to a climate of uncertainty and volatility. This complex web of relations and its repercussions continue to shape the region’s dynamics, underscoring the far-reaching impact of foreign intervention.

Yet, this penetration also unleashed a cascade of complications. These included the exacerbation of sectarian tension, the rise of terrorism, the onset of revolts, rampant corruption, widespread violations of human rights, and regional instability. These multifaceted issues underscore the intricate dynamics at play in the Middle East.

When examining the annals of history, we find that the narrative of the US and Israel are marred by bloodshed, occupation, and intervention. Given this backdrop, one might question how normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia could possibly transform the region’s longstanding instability from a conflict formation to a security regime. Can the myriad of problems that have plagued the region for decades simply vanish overnight? That is to say; even if the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is seen as inevitable, it does not necessarily promise peace and stability in the region. On the contrary, it could potentially exacerbate sectarian divisions and fuel proxy wars. The complexities of regional politics and longstanding religious and ethnic tensions mean that any shift in alliances or partnerships could have unpredictable consequences.

Moreover, the proposed deal to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is steeped in controversy. While there is a possibility that the agreement may come to fruition, it is expected to include a mutual defense treaty, a security guarantee, assistance in developing Saudi Arabia’s own civilian nuclear program, and decreased restrictions on US arms sales to Saudi Arabia. This could potentially include lifting the ban on selling F-35 fighter jets or other advanced weapons.

However, if Saudi Arabia acquires such advanced weaponry and nuclear capabilities, will it truly foster peace and stability? Or did it instead destabilize the region in unprecedented ways? Or could it be that the potential deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia hinges solely on the exchange of weaponry? Regardless of the underlying motivations, the transfer of nuclear capabilities from the US to Saudi Arabia could potentially perpetuate the cycle of militarization rather than offering solutions to the region’s longstanding rivalry.

The recent reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated by China, could be undermined by the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. It was hoped that the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia would transform the region’s security architecture (a change that has been broadly felt across the region). However, this progress could be jeopardized and provoke a more potent reaction from Iran. Iran has explicitly stated that the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is not only a betrayal of Palestinian causes but also a catalyst for regional instability.

Thus, Saudi Arabia stands at a crossroads, with the weight of a monumental decision pressing heavily upon its shoulders. The whisper of the populace echoes through the Kingdom, with reports indicating that over 60% of Saudis are against the idea of normalizing relations with Israel; their voices, filled with apprehension and uncertainty, cannot be ignored.

As a beacon of power in the region, Saudi Arabia’s actions could sway its allies, potentially coercing them into a similar normalization with Israel. This could send ripples through the delicate balance of regional stability, especially given Iran’s vehement opposition to any country in the region forging ties with Israel.

The Middle East, once a simmering cauldron of proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia, had restored some semblance of control with the resumption of ties between these two countries. However, if Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel, we will witness a chilling new conflict. A solitary Iran pitted against an alliance of Israel and Saudi Arabia could ignite a firestorm that engulfs the region. The potential consequences are dire and could cast a long, unending shadow over the region, plunging it into an abyss from which recovery may be impossible. The specters of such a future are a poignant reminder of the high stakes involved and the careful consideration required before taking such a step.

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