Middle East

Yemen: Federalization as an Alternative to War

Published

2 years ago

October 7, 2019

In August 2019, the Yemen crises entered a new phase, essentially turning into a tripartite conflict. The forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) moved against the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in an effort to restore the independence of South Yemen. By August 10, the STC’s units had captured Aden, having essentially forced representatives of the internationally recognized government out of the city. Later, on August 15, the STC announced its plans to establish an independent federative state in the south of Yemen. This was accompanied by pogroms and persecutions of northerners in Aden. Such developments are fraught not only with the spiralling of the Yemen crisis, but also with a possible clash between the principal parties of the anti-Houthi coalition: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh is counting on Hadi as the leader of a united country, while Abu Dhabi uses its STC proxies to create the conditions for splitting up the country, thus weakening the position of the pro-Saudi President.

The events that took place in the south of Yemen this past August can be viewed as a local civil war. Having captured the capital, the STC attempted to take control of Abyan and Shabwah, the governorates adjacent to Aden. The STC succeeded in rapidly taking over the military bases in Abyan. In Shabwah, however, they encountered resistance from forces loyal to Hadi. On August 22–25, the separatists were routed by the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade and began to retreat. By late August, the government forces had advanced on Aden but failed to capture the city largely due to the interference of the United Arab Emirates, whose air forces bombed troops loyal to Hadi in the Aden and Abyan governorates on August 29. Relative calm on the new front has followed ever since.

The Virtual Split of the Arab Coalition

Regional observers believe that, after the failure of the advance toward Al Hudaydah in 2018, the United Arab Emirates abandoned its plans to defeat the Houthis and instead turned its attention to establishing control of the coast in southern Yemen. At the same time, the United Arab Emirates is counting on the local separatists, with the Salaphites being a prominent group among them. The Salaphites are relatively well organized and have extensive ties with southern tribes. Additionally, they share a common enemy with the United Arab Emirates: the al-Islah Islamic party on which Saudi Arabia relies.

In the summer of 2019, the United Arab Emirates began to pointedly reduce its military presence in Yemen. The south was transferred to the control of the pro-UAE STC. This allowed the United Arab Emirates to solve several problems with one move: first, it reduced tensions in the country’s relations with Iran, which finances the Houthis; and second, it relieved the United Arab Emirates of its responsibility for the civilian casualties inflicted by the coalition’s airstrikes. The leadership of the United Arab Emirates try to present these actions as part of a long-term strategic plan. They insist that their policies in Yemen have from the outset been intended to establish local structures capable of resisting the Houthis. The STC is considered to be such a structure, which means that Hadi’s recognized government now needs to negotiate with the South. The STC itself claims it pursues following goals: to unite the south of Yemen and establishing a secular democratic state there; to prevent radical forces from becoming more active; and removing various armed units from cities and stabilizing the situation.

The problem is that in stepping up its activities, the STC delivered a serious blow to Saudi Arabia’s interests in Yemen. On the one hand, the weakness of the anti-Houthi coalition became even more obvious, as a civil war in its own right is going on behind the coalition’s battle lines. On the other hand, during any future talks, the Houthis will demand the same concessions that the STC will obtain from the Hadi government (if any). Thus far, representatives of the Hadi government are expected to declare that secession of the South is impermissible and suggest talks on federalizing Yemen.

Riyadh is in no hurry to make any concessions to the United Arab Emirates’ proxies and is busy flexing its muscles. For instance, against the background of clashes in Aden in the first half of August, Saudi Arabia succeeded in ensuring the inviolability of the Central Bank of Yemen and in preventing the national currency from crashing. Saudi’s military and armored vehicles took the building of the bank under their protection and kept the STC’s forces out. Riyadh also provided the Hadi government with 285 million Saudi riyals in financial aid, which are required primarily to import fuel.

The coalition partners are attempting to coordinate their activities, but discontent is growing. During an urgent meeting in Mecca on August 12 attended by King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on the Saudi side, and Crown Prince Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed on the UAE side, the attendees called upon Hadi and the STC to engage in dialogue. The Saudi monarch, however, did not squander the opportunity to demonstrate his “extreme irritation” with the actions of the allies, which regional observers took to be a very bad sign.

Southern Passions Running High

The strengthening of the STC began in 2017 when it gradually took control of Aden, Yemen’s provisional capital. For a short time in January 2018, STC forces managed to take control of government agencies and even placed members of the government under house arrest. But the situation changed when Saudi Arabia got involved. Nevertheless, the course for secession had become obvious, especially since southerners had started to search actively for international support.

The STC was unable to achieve a quick triumph in August 2019 because the south of Yemen is, in fact, far from united. The differences go back to the times when that part of the country was independent and socialist. Back in 1980, the elites of the Lahij and Abyan governorates competed for control of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. That confrontation resulted in the short-lived South Yemen Civil War in 1986 and the massacre of Aden, where natives of the Abyan Governorate were defeated. Some of them fled North, to the city of Sanaa.

Currently, the STC relies on the natives of the Dhale and Lahij governorates, while the Abyan and Shabwah governorates support the Hadi government. The current president hails from Abyan, and the loyalty of the local tribes is unquestionable. Shabwah is not interested in the secession of the South, since its economy is oriented towards the “northern” Marib Governorate, as it hopes to receive dividends from the transit of oil and gas.

The Hadhramaut and Al Mahrah governorates are taking a “wait-and-see” attitude; however, the local elites are reportedly displeased with the claims of the United Arab Emirates and its proxies to dominance. Al Mahrah has rather strong pro-Saudi leanings, and in August, it openly called for the prevention of an invasion by STC forces.

The military capabilities of the STC are thus limited, and following the failure of the August blitzkrieg, the Council will most likely have to enter into talks with the Hadists. Saudi Arabia is already trying to set up a dialogue between the Hadi government and the STC. Media reports said that the first indirect contacts took place on September 4 in Jeddah.

The “Zero=Sum Game” is Over

While the Arab coalition is facing internal problems in the South, its Ansar Allah opponents (Houthis) have taken the opportunity to put additional pressure on their main adversary, Saudi Arabia. On September 14, with the help of drones and missiles, they delivered a strike against two large oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, which forced Riyadh to cut oil production by more than half – 5.7 million barrels per day fewer than the usual 9.8 million barrels.

Despite the wave of accusations against Iran following the strikes, there is reason to believe that the Houthis are capable of organizing such an attack all on their own since they had previously shown cruise missiles with the necessary range to the public. However, in all fairness, we should note that experts identified them as radically simplified knock-offs of Iranian cruise missiles. Debates about the military capabilities of the Houthis are likely to continue, but some conclusions can be drawn. The war in Yemen costs Saudi Arabia dearly, both economically and in terms of its public image. Saudi Arabia is also clearly vulnerable to new attacks, despite enormous military spending and assistance from the United States. The media has added fuel to the fire by suggesting that it will take Riyadh between several months and a year to bring oil production to its previous levels.

Consequently, while Saudi Arabia could previously afford to ignore the occasional missile and drone from Yemen and continue bombing the adversary using its own aviation, now, instead of a zero-sum game, it has an asymmetric conflict on its hands with very unpleasant consequences. However, there is a way out of this predicament. A week after the strike against the oil refinery, Houthis proposed a ceasefire of sorts to Riyadh: they would cease missile strikes in exchange for the Saudi’s stopping their air raids.

A New Scenario for the Yemeni Drama

There are three possible courses of action from the point of view of the general development of the Yemeni crisis. The first scenario involves acknowledging that a military solution is impossible and launching talks with Houthis. The second is to stop counting on Hadi and his ineffective government, which does not enjoy broad support in Yemen, and find a new force that can defeat the Houthis and the Islamists and unite Yemen. Finally, the third option is controlled chaos, that is, the continuation of the war against Ansar Allah while at the same time ensuring that the instability is contained to Yemen.

From 2015 until now, the coalition has been pursuing the third course, that of controlled chaos. However, with the separatist movement stepping up its activities in the South (and the United Arab Emirates’ de facto withdrawal from the war) and the coalition’s increasingly obvious inability win a military victory over the Houthis may make other scenarios relevant as well.

As we have shown above, a compromise with Ansar Allah is the most apparent solution. In this case, further developments of the situation in Yemen will depend primarily on whether the dialogue between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is productive. The Houthis have long been trying to get Riyadh to enter into direct talks with them, and they have been pressuring Saudi Arabia into doing so by regularly attacking cities and infrastructure facilities in the country. Riyadh, however, is standing its ground and is not going agree to anything except the actual surrender of its opponents, which it believes to be puppets of Iran. If the Saudi leadership, as a matter of principle, decides to continue armed hostilities, then it may follow the course of forming another government to replace that of Hadi. However, it will then run into inevitable difficulties finding alternative leaders and ensuring their international recognition. This process will take a lot of time, which means that the war will go on.

The Yemen crisis is entering a new phase. There are three competing scenarios for the future of the country: a Houthi “Islamic republic”; splitting Yemen into North and South; and a federative state headed by a reshuffled government. The latter appears to be in the best interests of the Yemeni people, as it offers hope for a relatively quick settlement of the conflict and the preservation of a unified state. If Riyadh agrees to a constructive dialogue with the STC and Houthis, then federalization may have a chance. Thus far, however, the Saudi leadership has taken a tough stance and refuses to make significant concessions to either the Houthis in Ansar Allah or the southerners represented by the STC. If the current trend persists, the civil war should be expected to continue on several fronts at once, and Yemen will likely collapse slowly.

From our partner RIAC

Middle East

Tensions rise in Libya as risk of ‘parallel governments’ grows

Published

22 hours ago

March 21, 2022

Newsroom

The old city centre destroyed by bombs and fighting, in Benghazi, Libya. © UN Photo/Abel Kavanagh

Amid a political impasse that threatens to see Libya fractured again by two parallel governments, the priority must be maintaining hard-won gains and fulfilling the electoral aspirations of nearly three million registered voters, the UN political affairs chief told the Security Council on Wednesday.

Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, also spotlighted an increase in reported human rights violations, hate speech, defamation and threats, as well as violence against activists, journalists and political actors.

“Libya is now facing a new phase of political polarization, which risks dividing its institutions once again and reversing the gains achieved over the past two years,” she warned.

Political impasse

Outlining recent developments, the Under-Secretary-General recalled that Libya’s last planned elections — scheduled for December 2021 — were postponed, with the country’s National Elections Commission citing inadequacies in electoral legislation and challenges related to candidates’ eligibility.

In February, the country’s eastern-based House of Representatives voted to designate a new Prime Minister and government, over the objections of the internationally recognized Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeiba, who refused to step down.

Nevertheless, the House of Representatives went forward with the formation of a new government, designating Fathi Bashagha, a former Minister of Interior, as the new Prime Minister.

On 24 February, the High State Council – based in the internationally recognized administration’s centre of government in Tripoli and born out of the UN-supported Libyan Political Agreement of 2015 – rejected the parliamentary declaration, setting up a serious impasse that is now once again ramping up tensions in the conflict-wrought nation.

East v West: ‘joint committee’ proposal

On 3 March, members of Mr. Bashagha’s cabinet were sworn in by the House of Representatives.

While the situation on the ground remains relatively calm, reports are emerging of threatening rhetoric, rising political tensions and divided loyalties among the armed groups in western Libya.

“Our priority is to focus on fulfilling the aspirations of the more than 2.8 million Libyans who have registered to vote,” Ms. DiCarlo told the Security Council.

She added: “They should be able to choose their leaders through credible, transparent, and inclusive elections according to an agreed upon constitutional and legal framework.”

Against that backdrop, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Stephanie Williams, has proposed the formation of a joint committee comprising members of the House of Representatives and the High State Council, with the goal of reaching agreement on a constitutional basis that would lead to elections in 2022.

Ms. Williams also continues to pursue consultations with a broad cross section of Libya’s political and security actors and civil society, and has offered her good offices to mediate between Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and Mr. Bashagha.

Economic, human rights challenges

Ms. DiCarlo also briefed the Council on Libya’s ongoing security, economic and human rights challenges, warning that the latter have seen a spike as tensions rise across the country.

On the economic front, she highlighted a lack of oversight and clarity on public spending, noting that no national budget was approved in 2021 and a roiling controversy over budgetary payments is hampering the functioning of Libya’s National Oil Corporation.

She pointed to rise in hate speech, defamation and threats, as well as incitement to violence and acts of violence against activists, journalists and political actors, including women.

Both State and non-State actors arbitrarily arrest and detain human rights activists, and migrants and refugees at sea continue to be intercepted by Libya’s authorities and transferred to detention centres where they reportedly suffer serious human rights violations.

Citing reports of torture, starvation, extortion and deaths in custody, she nevertheless said the UN recorded a decrease in the number of internally displaced persons across Libya, between the end of 2021 and 5 March.

Middle East

Rail Diplomacy between Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran

Published

4 days ago

March 18, 2022

Dr. Imran Ali Sandano

In a world of interdependence, geo-economics has become the essential thing for extending cooperation. Most of the countries have started to use nontraditional types of diplomacy to enhance their relations for achieving economic access and other goals. ‘Railway Diplomacy’ is one the interesting forms of nontraditional diplomacy.

Railway diplomacy is a method for supporting the economic priorities of any country within its foreign policy. In this diplomatic approach of state(s) can develop good relations with another by creating a huge network of railroads for gaining collective or mutual economic benefits.

Rail diplomacy shows solid geo-economic and geo-strategic signals. Rail is a very resourceful means of land transportation which can ensure subsequent economic opportunities.

Rail diplomacy is not a new phenomenon, it has been operationalized in different regions of the world. It has further pushed international connections and has become an increasingly important factor in foreign policy. Recently three countries – Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey – resumed the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul (ITI) container rail service is the latest example of ‘rail diplomacy’.

The ITI container rail service launched in 2009, but was suspended in 2011 due to flooding in Pakistan. The decision to resume the ITI container rail service was taken at a ministerial meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 2020.

Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran are founders of the ECO regional cooperation bloc that was established in 1964 as the Regional Cooperation for Development and renamed ECO in 1985. It is an ad-hoc organization under the UN Charter, with an objective to develop a single market for services and goods.

The ITI container rail aims to increase trade between Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. The journey on this railroad can be completed in about 13 days, which is much faster and less expensive than the alternative sea route between Pakistan and Turkey, which takes 35 days.

Operationalization of the ITI container rail from Pakistan to Turkey through Iran in December 2021 is a great achievement of regional connectivity along the ECO corridor.

The Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul container rail is a new railway corridor for Turkey to reach in the South of Asia – which has the highest population density globally. In the same way, Pakistan will get an opportunity to further increase its exports and support its connectivity with international markets, especially Europe.

Iran’s position has turned the country into a transit route as it plays an important role in trade between the West and East. On the other hand, it is helping Iran move around the US sanctions. This is a desirable alternative trade route for Tehran because trade between the ECO countries happens in local currencies and not the US dollar.

Along with the ITI container rail route, Iran has recently witnessed important developments and signed a tripartite railway freight corridor with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan as the “Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran” (KTI) Corridors. This move will defiantly witness a new change in the region and create mutually beneficial arrangements for businesspeople and industrialists of ECO countries.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, in media talk said that like ITI container rail, the three countries could also launch ITI passenger trains along the same route for further enhancing regional connectivity and economic integration.

Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey have been intensely engaged with China’s Belt and Road Initiative – a multibillion-dollar infrastructure and investment program. There are chances that China may join ‘rail diplomacy’ by connecting with the ITI transnational line. Pakistan is in discussions with China to connect Islamabad with Kashgar (in Southern Xinjiang Province) by rail, a route at present served by the Karakorum Highway.

China believes rail connections as a major pillar of the BRI. If China joins the ITI railroad, it will further boost the BRI connectivity, and interlink the economies and infrastructure of countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul container rails are at full zeal, and continue marking successful operation. It is a long term project which will improve bilateral cooperation and bolster commercial and economic exchanges between the three countries.

In the coming future rail diplomacy may flourish further. The ITI container rail is just a beginning which would play a significant role in enhancing regional connectivity and promotion of commercial and economic activities in the ECO region.

Middle East

Putin hums ‘Georgia on my mind’

Published

7 days ago

March 15, 2022

Dr. James M. Dorsey

A tower block lies in ruins in Gaza city following an Israeli air strike. © UNRWA/Mohamed Hinnawi

What did Russian President Vladimir Putin think when he ordered his troops into Ukraine? Ray Charles’ ‘Georgia on mind’ must have been humming in his head.

A slightly altered version, ‘Palestine on my mind,’ was undoubtedly on Egyptian athlete Ali Farag’s mind when he condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Sunday as he won Britain’s Optacia squash championship.

“We’ve never been allowed to speak about politics in sports, but all of a sudden, it’s allowed. I hope people look at oppression everywhere around the world. Palestinians have been going through that for the past 74 years,” Mr. Farag, the world’s number two player, said in his acceptance remarks.

It was Yemen that New York Times sports reporter Tariq Panja thought of when he tweeted as British Prime Minister Boris Johnson prepared to visit Saudi Arabia. Mr. Johnson hopes to persuade the kingdom to increase its oil production to compensate for a loss of access to Russian energy due to the Ukraine crisis.

“We are now in a situation where the British PM is heading over to Saudi to plead for oil from an autocrat that is dropping bombs on his neighbour because a different autocrat is dropping bombs on his neighbour,” Mr. Panja said.

Invariably, comparisons hink. To be sure, unlike Russia, Saudi Arabia was invited by the internationally recognised government of Yemen even if that was more of a formality and changes little on the ground while Israel’s conquest of the West Bank was not, like Ukraine, an unprovoked attack.

Nevertheless, Messrs. Farag and Panja make a valid point.

Like the 1990 Kuwaiti invasion of Iraq, Ukraine has provoked widespread international condemnation.

Yet, the international community’s response to Saudi Arabia’s seven-year-old invasion of Yemen, sparking one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, and Israel’s 55-year long occupation of the West Bank’s, the world’s longest of neighboring lands, as well as its blockade of Gaza, has been far more muted, if not supportive.

Messrs. Farag and Panja’s point takes of added relevance given the fact that Mr. Putin has given a new lease on life to those that identify with the construct of the values of the West.

Yet, Saudi Arabia and Israel, just like Poland, Hungary, and Turkey, troubled democracies with tarnished rights records that nonetheless support Ukraine, show that the application of those principles and values will inevitably be spotty and contradictory and involve uncomfortable and glaring compromises.

None of that legitimises the actions of those who opportunistically are left off the hook.

Mr. Panja correctly highlights the irony that autocratic Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who ordered the invasion of Yemen shortly after coming to office in 2015, is being asked to help clean up a mess created by an invasion launched by another autocrat Mr. Putin.

To drive home the point of messy and questionable compromises, Saudi Arabia executed days before Mr. Johnson’s expected arrival 81 people convicted of a variety of crimes, including murder and membership of a militant group. Those executed also included a fair number of Shiite activists. It was the largest mass execution in the kingdom’s modern history.

Similarly, Mr. Farag raised a valid point even if his statement was problematic. Rather than referring to continuous violations of international law associated with Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza, Mr. Farag equated the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 with the Russian invasion. In doing so, he questioned Israel’s right to exist rather than its continued control of lands designated as occupied and Palestinian in the international community’s mind.

Mr. Farag’s statement and the refusal by international sports associations, national leagues, clubs, and event organizers to allow Russian and Belarus athletes and teams to compete under their national flags laid bare hypocrisy and deliberately maintained fictions in the sports world.

Few will take issue with the rejection, yet it blasts a crater into the sports world’s fictional insistence that sport and politics are separate and never should the two intertwine. If anything, Ukraine put that fiction to bed.

Mr. Farag noted as much when he said that his statement was possible because the ban on athletes expressing themselves politically during sporting events was effectively lifted when it comes to Ukraine.

That leaves the question of why Ukraine but not Yemen or Palestine or, for that matter, the brutal repression of Turkic Muslims in China.

It comes as little surprise then that Mr. Putin may hum ‘Georgia, on my mind’ while others hum ‘Yemen and Palestine on my mind.’