The return to an outright deterrence relationship between NATO and Russia involves the danger of an arms race and a number of military risks, particularly in the NATO-Russia contact zones. These risks can be contained by means of sub-regional arms control. Approaches of this kind should comprise sub-regional force limitations, limitations of military exercises, transparency and inspection rules for rapid deployment and long-range strike capabilities outside the zone of limitations, as well as a strict verification regime. Measures should be based on existing agreements rather than negotiating a new treaty.
Currently, there is a little scholarly discussion on new initiatives or innovative approaches to conventional arms control (CAC) in Europe. A diligent study by Peter van Ham from the Dutch Clingendael Institute — “Modernizing conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region” — discusses the merits of different approaches. A very critical report by the Swedish FOI Institute — “Conventional Arms Control. A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?” — , edited by Johan Engvall and Gudrun Persson, focuses more on the question as to why German Social Democrats, in the wake of the 2016 Steinmeier initiative, are focusing so much on CAC than on the issue itself. And finally, in the framework of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, a group of authors from Germany, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US presented a concrete proposal for sub-regional arms control in the Baltic region — “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence. Arms Control in the NATO-Russia Contact Zones”.
There are many, to some extent, reasonable arguments questioning new efforts for CAC. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is politically dead, the modernization of the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 2011 (VD11) is blocked. Why should any new initiative for CAC fly? In a broader sense, it is argued that, with the failure of the INF Treaty, the termination of the Iran nuclear agreement by the US and the uncertain future of the New START Treaty arms control, in general, has become almost unachievable. There is deep mistrust on all sides. Western governments argue that there cannot be business as usual (including arms control) with Russia as long as the Russian government is backing secessionist forces in Eastern Ukraine, while the Russian side is arguing that arms control is blocked by NATO’s ambitions for military superiority.
The Return of Deterrence
What unites most governments in Europe is the conviction that strengthening one’s own military capabilities is more important than cooperative security approaches. We are seeing the return of a mutual deterrence scenario coupled with the progressive erosion of cooperative security policies that were pursued until the early 2000s. To be sure: We never had a pure cooperative security scenario, but rather a hybrid mix of cooperative and deterrence elements. But even this led to an unprecedented reduction of conventional and nuclear weapons in Europe.
Currently, we are experiencing a quick reversal of this positive trend at all levels: We are witnessing the re-emergence of strong threat perceptions that are directly contrary to one another and mutually exclusive. Military exercises on both sides are approaching the levels reached in the Cold War. And we see hardening military postures, states investing more, modernizing and in some cases enlarging their armed forces. Although we have not yet reached a full arms race, we are on the brink of one. In terms of military options, the issue at stake is no longer “large-scale offensive options” of a continental-size in the sense of the preamble of the CFE Treaty, but the perception of emerging options for a surprise attack in the contact regions between NATO and Russia, particularly in the Baltic and the Black Sea regions.
The Risks of Deterrence
Any military deterrence relationship necessarily involves risks and inherently drives escalation. The three most important drivers of escalation are uncertainty, sub-regional conflicts, and the nuclear dimension. Uncertainty and the lack of military transparency are driving the two sides into a security dilemma with inherent worst-case thinking. Sub-regional conflicts — just imagine a re-escalation of hostilities in Ukraine — can be a powerful factor in raising the level of tensions in Europe. And finally, the failure of the INF Treaty will most probably have a destabilizing impact on the deterrence relationship in Europe.
These military risks in a narrower sense are aggravated by two broader global trends: With the rise of China and other emerging powers, we are passing through a period of hegemonic change that is characterized by a maximum of uncertainty and volatility. And we are passing through the two or three and not many more decades that are critical for stopping a global climate disaster. Both lines of risk, the more narrow military one as well as the broader global dimension, make it imperative to avoid a new arms race in Europe (and elsewhere) that would spoil scarce resources and attract the political attention that we urgently need to address global problems.
Options for Conventional Arms Control in Europe
Against this background, there are basically three options of addressing risks ensuing from a deterrence scenario dominated by conventional armed forces. The first is traditional measures of risk reduction, bilateral or multilateral agreements on the avoidance of incidents and accidents, possibly augmented by transparency measures. A good example is the Baltic Sea Project Team. Measures of this kind are considered by most governments, at least in principle. They are urgently needed, but clearly insufficient in view of the present and future risks.
A second option would be a comprehensive, pan-European post-CFE agreement that also involves new military options and types of equipment. The 2016 Steinmeier initiative for reviving arms control in Europe comes closest to this option. Despite discussions in a German-led Like-Minded Group this option seems to be far too ambitious under the current conditions. It would rather fit a cooperative security policy scenario that is beyond reach at the moment.
The third option consists of using arms control instruments for stabilizing the given deterrence relationship focusing on those areas where the danger of destabilization is most imminent, that is the contact zones between NATO and Russia. This option remains within the scope of mainstream deterrence thinking. It requires an approach of sub-regional arms control.
Problems of Sub-regional Arms Control
Sub-regional arms control is disputed by many for three main reasons. Some are afraid of the political singularization of those who would fall under a sub-regional arms control regime contrary to others who would not. Second, some governments are afraid that sub-regional or any kind of arms control would divert attention from necessary defense measures. And finally there is concern that sub-regional arms control might not be feasible in operational terms in the sense that there is always an impact from outside into the zone covered by a sub-regional arms control regime.
However, sub-regional approaches have been considered time and again. The negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR, 1973-1989), the predecessor negotiations of the CFE talks, dealt solely with sub-regional approaches. And Chapter X of the VD11 explicitly addresses “Regional Measures.” If the three arguments quoted above are taken seriously, it is possible to establish valid sub-regional arms control regimes. The three key factors are an arms control zone large enough to dispel singularization fears and to limit properly the sides’ forces in an equal manner; sufficient regulations for armed forces outside the zone; and a thorough transparency and verification regime.
A Model for Sub-regional Arms Control in Europe
The authors of the Risk Study elaborated a model for sub-regional arms control taking the Baltic Contact Zone as an example. This zone would comprise Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Eastern part of Germany covered by the 2 plus 4 Treaty, Belarus, and parts of the Western Military District of Russia. The zone is large enough to dispel fears of singularization as it covers parts of Germany and Russia. And it is also large enough to cover a substantial part of the sides’ forces. The Baltic arms control regime would be equipped with the following main features:
No permanent deployment of additional substantial combat forces would be allowed in the Baltic Contact Zone. This builds on the obligation of NATO in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to avoid “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in the newly admitted NATO states and the corresponding obligation of Russia in the 1999 CFE Final Act not “to station substantial additional combat forces” in the Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts. Although there is no shared definition of the term “substantial combat forces,” there is wide-shared agreement that these two obligations are still valid and have not been broken. To make them operational for a sub-regional arms control regime, it would only be necessary to agree on a definition of “substantial combat forces” and to recommit to these obligations. The commitment not to increase combat forces in the contact zone would represent the key element of the sub-regional arms control regime.
In addition, military exercises in the contact zone would be limited in size, frequency, duration and geographical proximity to borders. Such an agreement could be regarded as a measure under Chapter X of the VD11.
As a complementary measure, rapid deployment and long-range strike capabilities deployed beyond the contact zone should be subject to a notification and observation regime.
All measures agreed would be subject to sufficiently strict transparency and verification regime that could also be established in the frame of the VD11. Certainly, additional quota for inspections and evaluation visits would become necessary.
Is Sub-regional Arms Control in Europe Possible?
Such a regime would have two important advantages: It would address the real risks, namely sub-regional offensive options, and it would build on the adaptation of existing agreements, the VD11, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the CFE Final Act, rather than negotiating a completely new treaty. A sub-regional arms control regime of this kind is modest in the sense that it remains within the framework of a mutual deterrence relationship. However, it is bold in that it would introduce effective steps for stabilizing this relationship.
Is such an approach to conventional arms control in Europe feasible under the current conditions? Certainly not, if we continue to exchange almost ritualized mutual accusations. And it will become possible only when we recognize that extraordinary circumstances require special measures.
It will certainly not be possible if talks on conventional arms control are conducted predominantly at expert levels. These issues must be dealt with at the higher political levels, including heads of state and government, and ideally embedded in a broader approach of pragmatic cooperation.
From our partner RIAC
Test of Agni Prime Missile and India’s Counterforce Temptations
South Asia is widely regarded as one of the most hostile regions of the world primarily because of the troubled relations between the two nuclear arch-rivals India and Pakistan. The complex security dynamics have compelled both the countries to maintain nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis each other. India is pursuing an extensive and all-encompassing military modernization at the strategic and operational level. In this regard, India has been involved in the development of advanced missiles as delivery systems and improvement in the existing delivery systems as well. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and delivery systems are solely aimed at India; however, India aspires to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China. Therefore, the size and capability of its nuclear deterrent and delivery systems are aimed at countering both threats. However, most of the recent missile delivery systems made by India appear to be more Pakistan-centric. One recent example in this regard is the recently tested nuclear-capable cannisterized ballistic missile Agni Prime, which is insinuated as Pakistan-centric. These developments would likely further provoke an action-reaction spiral and would increase the pace of conflict in South Asia, which ultimately could result in the intensification of the missile arms race.
Just quite recently, on 28th June 2021, India has successfully tested an advanced variant of its Agni missile series, namely Agni Prime or Agni (P). The missile has a range between 1000-2000 kilometers. Agni Prime is a new missile in the Agni missiles series, with improved accuracy and less weight than Agni 1, 2, and 3 missiles. It has been said that the Agni-P weighs 50 % less than the Agni-3 missile. As per the various media reports, this missile would take the place of Agni 1 and 2 and Prithvi missiles, however officially no such information is available. This new missile and whole Agni series is developed as part of the missile modernization program under the Defence Research and Development Organization’s (DRDO) integrated guided missile development program.
Agni-P is a short missile with less weight and ballistic trajectory, the missile has a rocket-propelled, self-guided strategic weapons system capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Moreover, the missile is cannisterized with the ability to be launched from road and rail. The DRDO claimed that the test flight of the missile was monitored by the telemetry radar stations and its trajectory met all the objectives of the mission successfully with high level of accuracy. Agni-P missile because of its range of 1000 to 2000 km is considered a weapon against Pakistan because within this range it cannot target China. Although, India already has different missiles in its inventory with the same range as the newly developed and tested Agni-P missile, so the question arises what this missile would achieve.
Since the last few years, it has been deliberated within the international security discourse that India’s force posture is actually more geared towards counterforce options rather than counter-value options. Although, India’s nuclear doctrine after its operationalization in 2003, claims “massive retaliation” and “nfu” but in reality with developing cannisterized weapons like Agni-P, Agni 5, and testing of hypersonic demonstrative vehicles, India actually is building its capability of “counterforce targeting” or “splendid first strike”. This reflects that India’s nuclear doctrine is just a façade and has no real implication on India’s force modernization.
These developments by India where it is rapidly developing offensive technologies put the regional deterrence equation under stress by increasing ambiguity. In a region like South Asia, where both nuclear rivals are neighbors and distance between both capitals are few thousand kilometers and missile launch from one side would take only a few minutes in reaching its target, ambiguity would increase the fog of war and put other actors, in this case, Pakistan in “use it or lose it” situation, as its nuclear deterrent would be under threat.
In such a situation, where Pakistan maintains that nuclear weapons are its weapons of last resort and to counter threats emerging from India, its nuclear deterrence has to hold the burden of covering all spectrums of threat. It might be left with no choice but to go for the development of a new kind of missile delivery system, probably the cannisterized missile systems as an appropriate response option. However, as Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is based on principle of “CMD” which allow Pakistan to seek deterrence in a cost-effective manner and also by not indulging in an arms race. Therefore, other than the threat of action-reaction dynamic developments like Agni P by India, would make weapons more accurate and lethal, subsequently conflict would be faster, ambiguous, and with less time to think. In such a scenario, as chances of miscalculation increase, the escalation dynamics would become more complex; thus, further undermining the deterrence stability in South Asia.
India’s counter-force temptations and development of offensive weapons are affecting the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia. The deterrence equation is not getting affected just because India is going ahead with the development of offensive technologies but because of its continuous attempts of negating the presence of mutual vulnerability between both countries. Acknowledgement of existence of mutual vulnerability would strengthen the deterrence equation in the region and help both countries to move forward from the action-reaction spiral and arms race. The notions such as the development of offensive or counterforce technology or exploiting the levels below the nuclear threshold to fight a war would not be fruitful in presence of nuclear weapons. As nuclear weapons are weapons to avert the war and not to fight the war.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems & The Annihilistic Future
The unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly known as drones were introduced as a useful means to military, commercial, civilian and humanitarian activities but yet it ends up in news for none of its original purposes. Drones have rather resulted as a means of mass destruction.
The recent attacks on the technical area of the Jammu Air Force Station highlights the same. This was a first-of-its-kind terror attack on IAF station rather the Indian defence forces that shook the National Investigation Agency to National Security Guard. The initial probe into the attacks directs to involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group based out of Pakistan, in the drone attacks as the aerial distance from the point of attack was just 14 kilometers. The attacks took place via an Electric multi-rotor type drone between 11:30 P.M to 1:30 A.M on 27th June, 2021.
The above incident clearly points out the security issues that lie ahead of India in face to the asymmetrical warfare as a result of drones. The Indian Government after looking at the misuse of drones during the first wave of the pandemic realised that its drone regulations were nowhere sufficient and accountable and hence passed the Unmmaned Aircraft Rules, 2021. These rules imposed stricter requirement for obtaining license and authorisations by remote pilots, operators, manufacturers or importers, training organisations and R&D organisations, thereby placing a significantly high burden on the applicants but at the same time they also permit UAS operations beyond visual sight of line and allowing student remote pilots to operate UAS.
But these rules still don’t have any control on the deadly use of drones because multi-rotor drones are very cheap and readily available and what makes them lethal is their ability to be easily detected, additionally the night time makes it even worse. Their small size grants them weak radar, thermal, and aural signatures, albeit varying based on the materials used in their construction.
The pertinent issue to be understood here is that these rules can never ensure safety and security as they cannot control the purpose for which these drones maybe used. There are certain factors that are to be accounted to actually be receptive to such imminent and dangerous threats. Firstly, significantly increasing urban encroachments in areas around defence establishments, particularly air bases, has proved to be fatal. If frontline bases like Jammu or be it any other base when surrounded by unbuffered civilization poses two pronged problems, first it acts as high chances of being a vantage point for possible attackers and second, it also hampering the defence mechanism to come to an action. It is not limited to drone concerns but there have been cases of increased bird activity that has once resulted in engine failure of an IAF Jaguar and has caused similar problems all along.
Another important factor is that of intelligence. The Anti-drone systems will take their time to be in place and it is still a distant call to ascertain how effective will these systems be, so in the time being it is pertinent to focus on intelligence which may include sales and transfers of commercial drone, or the hardware that is required to build a basic multi-rotor drone. These are not something extraordinary because it is even in news when Pakistani drones were being used to supply weapons and ammunition to terror networks on Indian soil. Also, the past experience in handling ISIS have shown the weightage of intelligence over defensive nets.
Intelligence is no doubt a crucial factor in anticipation of drone attacks but what cannot be done away with is the defense mechanism. Efficient counter-drone technology is the need of the hour. DRDO has developed such technology that could provide the armed forces with the capability to swiftly detect, intercept and destroy small drones that pose a security threat. It is claimed that solution consists of a radar system that offers 360-degree coverage with detection of micro drones when they are 4km away, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors for detection of micro drones up to 2 km and a radio frequency (RF) detector to detect RF communication up to 3 km and is equipped for both soft kills as well as hard kills.
Hence, the above analysis brings out the need of the application of an international instrument because the technology used in such drone attacks is at an evolving stage and the natural barriers still have an upper hand over be it either flying a pre-programmed path aided by satellite navigation and inertial measurement units (IMUs), or hand controlled to the point of release or impact, both methods have significant limitations as satellite and IMU navigation is prone to errors even when it comes to moderate flight ranges while manual control is subject to the human limitations such as line of sight, visibility as well as technical limitations such as distance estimation of the target, and weak radio links. An example of this could be the Turkish-made Kargu-2 model of killer drone can allegedly autonomously track and kill specific targets on the basis of facial recognition and Artificial Intelligence (AI). As the AI becomes better and better, these drone attacks become more and more terminal.
The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an eye opener for India as well as the world as none of the countries considered the possibility of bio-defenses or made a heavy investment in it even when there was awareness about lethal effects of genetic engineering. Hence, it should be the priority of the government to invest heavily in research and make the development of defensive technologies a national priority else the result of artificially intelligent killer drones would be much more catastrophic.
Russia’s National Security Strategy: A Manifesto for a New Era
The central feature of the new strategy is its focus on Russia itself. The Russian leadership has every reason right now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country’s internal situation.
Russia’s new, forty-four-page National Security Strategy signed by President Vladimir Putin on July 2 is a remarkable document. It is much more than an update of the previous paper, adopted in 2015. Back then, relations with the West had already sharply deteriorated as a result of the Ukraine crisis, but were still considered salvageable; much of the liberal phraseology inherited from the 1990s was still in use; and the world still looked more or less unified. The current version of arguably the most important Kremlin strategy statement—covering not only national security issues, but a whole range of others, from the economy to the environment, and values to defense—is a manifesto for a different era: one defined by the increasingly intense confrontation with the United States and its allies; a return to traditional Russian values; and the critical importance for Russia’s future of such issues as technology and climate.
The strategy lays out a view of a world undergoing transformation and turmoil. The hegemony of the West, it concludes, is on the way out, but that is leading to more conflicts, and more serious ones at that. This combination of historical optimism (the imminent end of Western hegemony) and deep concern (as it is losing, the West will fight back with even more ferocity) is vaguely reminiscent of Stalin’s famous dictum of the sharpening of the class struggle along the road to socialism. Economically, Russia faces unfair competition in the form of various restrictions designed to damage it and hold it back; in terms of security, the use of force is a growing threat; in the realm of ethics, Russia’s traditional values and historical legacy are under attack; in domestic politics, Russia has to deal with foreign machinations aimed at provoking long-term instability in the country. This external environment fraught with mounting threats and insecurities is regarded as an epoch, rather than an episode.
Against this sobering background, the central feature of the strategy is its focus on Russia itself: its demographics, its political stability and sovereignty, national accord and harmony, economic development on the basis of new technologies, protection of the environment and adaptation to climate change, and—last but not least—the nation’s spiritual and moral climate. This inward focus is informed by history. Exactly thirty years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed just as its military power was at its peak, and not as a result of a foreign invasion. Having recently regained the country’s great power status and successfully reformed and rearmed its military, the Russian leadership has every reason now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country’s internal situation.
The paper outlines a lengthy series of measures for dealing with a host of domestic issues, from rising poverty and continued critical dependence on imported technology to the advent of green energy and the loss of the Soviet-era technological and educational edge. This certainly makes sense. Indeed, the recent Kremlin discovery of climate change as a top-tier issue is a hopeful sign that Russia is overcoming its former denial of the problem, along with inordinately exuberant expectations of the promise of global warming for a predominantly cold country. After all, the Kremlin’s earlier embrace of digitalization has given a major push to the spread of digital services across Russia.
The strategy does not ignore the moral and ethical aspects of national security. It provides a list of traditional Russian values and discusses them at length. It sees these values as being under attack through Westernization, which threatens to rob the Russians of their cultural sovereignty, and through attempts to vilify Russia by rewriting history. In sum, the paper marks an important milestone in Russia’s official abandonment of the liberal phraseology of the 1990s and its replacement with a moral code rooted in the country’s own traditions. Yet here, the strategy misses a key point at the root of Russia’s many economic and social problems: the widespread absence of any values, other than purely materialistic ones, among much of the country’s ruling elite. The paper mentions in passing the need to root out corruption, but the real issue is bigger by an order of magnitude. As each of President Putin’s annual phone-in sessions with the Russian people demonstrates—including the most recent one on June 30—Russia is governed by a class of people who are, for the most part, self-serving, and do not care at all for ordinary people or the country, instead focusing single-mindedly on making themselves rich on the job. Money—or rather Big Money—has become that group’s top value, and the most corrosive element in today’s Russia. Therein lies perhaps the biggest vulnerability of modern Russia.
On foreign policy, the strategy is fairly elliptic, but it gives a hint of what the upcoming Foreign Policy Concept might include. The United States and some of its NATO allies are now officially branded unfriendly states. Relations with the West are de-prioritized and those countries ranked last in terms of closeness, behind former Soviet countries; the strategic partners China and India; non-Western institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Russia-India-China trio; and other Asian, Latin American, and African countries. In addition to U.S. military deployments and its system of alliances, U.S.-based internet giants with their virtual monopoly in the information sphere, and the U.S. dollar that dominates global finances are also seen as instruments of containing Russia.
Overall, the 2021 Russian National Security Strategy seeks to adapt the country to a still interconnected world of fragmentation and sharpening divisions, in which the main battle lines are drawn not only—and not even mostly—between countries, but within them. Victories will be won and defeats suffered largely on domestic turf. Accordingly, it is the Home Front that presents the greatest challenges, and it is there that the main thrust of government policies must be directed.
From our partner RIAC
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