Connect with us

Russia

G7: Feeling lonely without Russia?

Published

on

A discussion of Russia’s return to the G8, initiated by the French President Emmanuel Macron and quickly supported by his US counterpart Donald Trump, has intensified in the West. Even though Germany, and especially Britain, appear less enthusiastic about the prospect, the whole debate means that all attempts to “isolate” Russia in the world have fallen flat.  Moreover, as the developments of the past few years show, no key international problems, from strategic stability to regional conflicts (above all in Syria) can possibly be solved without full-fledged Russian participation.

According to US media reports, in a recent telephone linkup, the French and American presidents both agreed that Russia should be invited to next year’s G7 summit, slated to be held in the United States. The CNN journalist Kylie Atwood wrote, citing senior sources in the US administration, that the idea to invite Russia had been pitched by President Macron. Donald Trump, for his part, briefing reporters in the White House, emphasized that it was his predecessor, Barack Obama, who wanted Russia out of the G8.

“But I think it’s much more appropriate to have Russia in. It should be the G8 because a lot of the things we talk about have to do with Russia,” Trump said. Trump and Macron agreed to discuss this issue in greater detail with their colleagues from Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan at the upcoming G7 summit to be held in Biarritz, France, on August 24-26.

Donald Trump first said that Russia should take part in the G7 summit, back in June 2018, but the only voice of support he got then came from Giuseppe Conte, who resigned from his post as Italy’s prime minister earlier this week amid a coalition row.

The August 19 meeting in France by Presidents Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin were another sign of the changing mood about Russia’s participation in the Group of Seven. During that meeting President Putin said that any contacts with the G7 countries were “useful” and did not rule out the resumption of the G8 format.

President Macron, in turn, stressed that he views Russia as “a part of Europe,” and is going to facilitate Moscow’s closer and meaningful dialogue with the West. According to diplomatic sources in Paris, Macron’s position depends on how the situation in Ukraine will be developing.

Russia’s participation in the G8/G7 will depend on the situation in Ukraine, Reuters reported, citing sources in the French Foreign Ministry.

Britain’s reaction to Macron’s idea was predictably tough, with Prime Minister Boris Johnson reiterating allegations about Russian “provocations.” During a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin, he said that he was “aware of the moves to reintegrate Russia into the G7.” 
“Given what happened in Salisbury in Wiltshire, given the use of chemical weapons on British soil, given the continuing instability, civil war, the war in Ukraine, given Russia’s provocations, not just in Ukraine but many other places, I must say … that the case has yet to be made out for Russia to return to the G7,” Johnson added.

Angela Merkel was more reserved, saying that the situation about Russia’s participation in the G7 could change if serious progress is made concerning the implementation of the Minsk accords on southeastern Ukraine.

German government representative, Steffen Seibert, was quoted by the local Handelszeitung newspaper as saying that the issue of reviving the G8 format with Russia’s participation could be discussed, but there were no prerequisites for that yet. He said that Russia was expelled from the G8 following the events of 2014 – the war in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea. “Both situations persist,” Seibert noted, adding that Moscow’s more active participation in the G7 was possible only after this situation has changed.

Statements to this effect coming from the European Union’s headquarters in Brussels were very much in the same vein. According to a senior source in the EU, Russia’s rejoining the G7 group before Moscow has fulfilled a number of conditions would be seen as a “sign of weakness.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry made it clear that Moscow is ready to consider restoring the G8 format if the G7 participants verbalize their proposal.

The Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, noted, without making any official comments, that it was “difficult to understand what is being said,” while President Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov suggested waiting for clear-cut statements from all members of the G7.

“President Putin said that Russia does not refuse to communicate in any format. However, Russia’s return to the G7 and the former G8 is not an end in itself,” Peskov emphasized.

The decision to reintegrate Russia into the G8 can be made only on the basis of a consensus of all participating countries … some of which conditionally support Russia (Japan, Italy and, to a certain extent, Germany), and some criticize it (Britain, Canada),” Andrei Kortunov, Director General of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs, noted. He described as “an additional factor of uncertainty” the position of Donald Trump whose repeated calls to bring back the G8 format have several reasons.

“First, he does not attach much importance to the G7 as a group of Western democracies. Secondly, being a pragmatically-minded person, he feels that the G7’s center of gravity is gravitating towards security and crisis response, which is hard to achieve without Russia. And, finally, this is also about Trump’s predilection for shocking people,” Kortunov added.  

For Russia itself the restoration of the G8 format is not an end in itself, even less so if it is done at the cost of concessions demanded from it by the West.  

“Russia did not feel itself a fully-fledged member of the G8, always having to prove something and being lectured by the rest,” the Valdai Club’s program director Andrei Sushentsov noted.

“Moscow would not like to emphasize that it wants the club of leading Western countries to resume its work, showing that the world has become more complex and less Western-centric,” Shushentsov noted, adding that, apart from the idea of Western solidarity, the G7 enjoys little support. Some of its members are at loggerheads with each other: the departing British have spoiled their relations with the EU countries; Japan has its own interests in East Asia, which it is primarily realizing through cooperation with the United States. Moscow’s reintegration into the G7 could give the impression that Russia is returning to the West, thus underscoring the West’s leadership in the modern world.”

Many in the Russian political establishment are equally skeptical about the prospects of reviving the G8 format. Alexei Pushkov, a member of the Federation Council – the upper house of parliament, has dismissed the conditions set out for Russia’s return to the G7 as a bad policy. He describes attempts to dictate to Moscow the conditions for joining the G8 as illegal, adding that if the G7 countries want to stay in their present format, without Russia and China, so be it.

One theoretical solution to the problem of Russia’s rejoining the G7 could be a further expansion of this format with the possible inclusion of, say, India and China in order to “dilute” the group’s Western-centric slant. This, however, could stoke up discussions (primarily in Washington) that would be even more heated than the debate, which is currently going on about how best to restore cooperation between Russia and the West. 

From our partner International Affairs

Peter Iskenderov, senior research assistant at RAS Slavic Studies Institute, candidate of historical sciences

Russia

Putin’s post-Soviet world remains a work in progress, but Africa already looms

Published

on

Russian civilisationalism is proving handy as President Vladimir Putin seeks to expand the imaginary boundaries of his Russian World, whose frontiers are defined by Russian speakers and adherents to Russian culture rather than international law and/or ethnicity.

Mr. Putin’s disruptive and expansive nationalist ideology has underpinned his aggressive

 approach to Ukraine since 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the stoking of insurgencies in the east of the country. It also underwrites this month’s brief intervention in Kazakhstan, even if it was in contrast to Ukraine at the invitation of the Kazakh government.

Mr. Putin’s nationalist push in territories that were once part of the Soviet Union may be par for the course even if it threatens to rupture relations between Russia and the West and potentially spark a war. It helps Russia compensate for the strategic depth it lost with the demise of communism in Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, equally alarmingly, Mr. Putin appears to be putting building blocks in place that would justify expanding his Russian World in one form or another beyond the boundaries of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

In doing so, he demonstrates the utility of employing plausibly deniable mercenaries not only for military and geopolitical but also ideological purposes.

Standing first in line is the Central African Republic. A resource-rich but failed state that has seen its share of genocidal violence and is situated far from even the most expansive historical borders of the Russian empire, the republic could eventually qualify to be part of the Russian world, according to Mr. Putin’s linguistic and cultural criteria.

Small units of the Wagner Group, a private military company owned by one of Mr. Putin’s close associates, entered the Centra African Republic once departing French troops handed over to a United Nations peacekeeping force in 2016. Five years later, Wagner has rights to mine the country’s gold and diamond deposits.

Perhaps surprisingly, the Russian mercenary presence persuaded President Faustin-Archange Touadera that the African republic should embrace Russian culture.

As a result, university students have been obliged to follow Russian-language classes starting as undergraduates in their first year until their second year of post-graduate studies. The mandate followed the introduction of Russian in the republic’s secondary school curriculum in 2019.

Mr. Touadera is expected to ask Mr. Putin for Russian-language instructors during a forthcoming visit to Moscow to assist in the rollout.

Neighbouring Mali could be next in line to follow in Mr. Touadera’s footsteps.

Last month, units of the Wagner Group moved into the Sahel nation at the request of a government led by army generals who have engineered two coups in nine months. The generals face African and Western sanctions that could make incorporating what bits of the country they control into the Russian world an attractive proposition.

While it is unlikely that Mr. Putin would want to formally welcome sub-Saharan and Sahel states into his Russian world, it illustrates the pitfalls of a redefinition of internationally recognised borders as civilisational and fluid rather than national, fixed, and legally enshrined.

For now, African states do not fit Mr. Putin’s bill of one nation as applied to Ukraine or Belarus. However, using linguistics as a monkey wrench, he could, overtime or whenever convenient, claim them as part of the Russian world based on an acquired language and cultural affinity.

Mr. Putin’s definition of a Russian world further opens the door to a world in which the principle of might is right runs even more rampant with the removal of whatever flimsy guard rails existed.

To accommodate the notion of a Russian world, Russian leaders, going back more than a decade, have redefined Russian civilisation as multi-ethnic rather than ethically Russia.

The Central African Republic’s stress on Russian-language education constitutes the first indication in more than a decade that Mr. Putin and some of his foreign allies may expand the Russian world’s civilisational aspects beyond the erstwhile Soviet Union.

Some critics of Mr. Putin’s concept of a Russian world note that Western wars allegedly waged out of self-defense and concern for human rights were also about power and geopolitical advantage.

For example, pundit Peter Beinart notes that NATO-led wars in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya “also extended American power and smashed Russian allies at the point of a gun.”

The criticism doesn’t weaken the legitimacy of the US and Western rejection of Russian civilisationalism. However, it does undermine the United States’ ability to claim the moral high ground.

It further constrains Western efforts to prevent the emergence of a world in which violation rather than the inviolability of national borders become the accepted norm.

If Russian interventionism aims to change borders, US interventionism often sought to change regimes. That is one driver of vastly different perceptions of the US role in the world, including Russian distrust of the post-Soviet NATO drive into Eastern Europe and independent former Soviet states such as Ukraine.

“People with more experience of the dark side of American power—people whose families hail from Guatemala, Chile, Brazil, Haiti, or Mexico, where US guns have sabotaged democracy rather than defended it—might find it easier to understand Russian suspicions. But those Americans tend not to shape US policy towards places like Ukraine,” Mr. Beinart said.

Continue Reading

Russia

Neighbours and Crises: New Challenges for Russia

Published

on

Through all the discussions that accompanied the preparation of the Valdai Club report “Space Without Borders: Russia and Its Neighbours”, the most clear question was whether Russia should or should not avoid repeating the historical experience of relations with its near abroad. This experience, in the most general terms, is that after Russia pacifies its western border with its foreign policy, the Russian state inevitably must turn to issues related to the existence of its immediate neighbourhood. With a high degree of probability, it will be forced to turn to its centuries-old method for solving problems that arise there: expansion for the sake of ensuring security.

Now Russia’s near abroad consists of a community of independent states that cannot ensure their own security and survival by relying only on their own forces; we cannot be completely sure of their stability. From Estonia in the west to Kyrgyzstan in the east, the existence of these countries in a competitive international environment is ensured by their link with one of the nuclear superpowers. Moreover, such connections can only complement each other with great difficulty. As the recent developments in Kazakhstan have demonstrated, they are not limited to the threat of an external invasion; even internal circumstances can become deadly.

The dramatic events in that country were intensified by external interference from the geostrategic opponents of Russia, as well as international terrorists, but it would be disingenuous to argue that their most important causes are not exclusively internal and man-made. We cannot and should not judge whether the internal arrangements of our neighbours are good or bad, since we ourselves do not have ideal recipes or examples. However, when dealing with the consequences, it is rational to fear that their statehood will either be unable to survive, or that their existence will take place in forms that create dangers which Russia cannot ignore.

In turn, the events experienced now in relations between Russia and the West, if we resort to historical analogies, look like a redux of the Northern War. The Great Northern War arose at the beginning of the 18th century as the result of the restoration of Russia’s power capabilities; the West had made great progress in approaching the heart of its territory. Within the framework of this logic, victory, even tactical victory, in the most important (Western) direction will inevitably force Russia to turn to its borders. Moreover, the reasons for paying more attention to them are obvious. This will present Russia with the need to decide on how much it is willing to participate in the development of its neighbours.

The developments in Kazakhstan in early January 2022 showed the objective limits of the possibilities of building a European-style sovereign state amid new, historical, and completely different geopolitical circumstances. More or less all the countries of the space that surrounds Russia, from the Baltic to the Pamir, are unique experiments that arose amid the truly phenomenal orderliness of conditions after the end of the Cold War. In that historical era, the world really developed under conditions where a general confidence prevailed that the absolute dominance of one power and a group of its allies creates conditions for the survival of small and medium-sized states, even in the absence of objective reasons for this.

The idea of the “end of history” was so convincing that we could accept it as a structural factor, so powerful that it would allow us to overcome even the most severe objective circumstances.

The Cold War era created the experience of the emergence and development of new countries, which until quite recently had been European colonies. Despite the fact that there are a few “success stories” among the countries that emerged after 1945, few have been able to get out of the catch-up development paradigm. However, it was precisely 30 years ago that there really was a possibility that a unipolar world would be so stable that it would allow the experiment to come to fruition. The visible recipes of the new states being built were ideal from an abstract point of view, just as Victor Frankenstein was guided by a desire for the ideal.

Let us recall that the main idea of our report was that Russia needs to preserve the independence of the states surrounding it and direct all its efforts to ensure that they become effective powers, eager to survive. This desire for survival is seen as the main condition for rational behaviour, i.e. creating a foreign policy, which takes into account the geopolitical conditions and the power composition of Eurasia. In other words, we believe that Russia is interested in the experiment that emerged within the framework of the Liberal World Order taking place under new conditions, since its own development goals dictate that it avoid repeating its past experience of full control over its neighbours, with which it shares a single geopolitical space.

This idea, let’s not hide it, prompted quite convincing criticism, based on the belief that the modern world does not create conditions for the emergence of states where such an experience is absent in more or less convincing forms. For Russia, the challenge is that even if it is technically capable of ensuring the immediate security of its national territory, the spread of the “grey zone” around its borders will inevitably bring problems that the neighbours themselves are not able to solve.

The striking analogy proposed by one colleague was the “hallway of hell” that Russia may soon face on its southern borders, making us raise the question that the absence of topographic boundaries within this space makes it necessary to create artificial political or even civilisational lines, the protection of which in any case will be entrusted to the Russian soldier. This January we had the opportunity to look into this “hallway of hell”. There is no certainty that the instant collapse of a state close to Russia in the darkest periods of its political history should be viewed as a failure in development, rather than a systemic breakdown of the entire trajectory, inevitable because it took shape amid completely different conditions.

Therefore, now Russia should not try to understand what its further strategy might be; in any case, particular behaviour will be determined by circumstances. Our task is to explore the surrounding space in order to understand where Russia can stop if it does not want to resort to the historical paradigm of its behaviour. The developments in Kazakhstan, in their modern form, do not create any grounds for optimism or hopes for a return to an inertial path of development. Other states may follow Ukraine and Kazakhstan even if they now look quite confident. There are no guarantees — and it would be too great a luxury for Russia to accept such a fate.

This is primarily because the Russian state will inevitably face a choice between being ready for several decades of interaction with a huge “grey zone” along the perimeter of its borders and more energetic efforts to prevent its emergence. It is unlikely that Moscow would simply observe the processes taking place on its immediate periphery. This is not a hypothetical invasion of third forces — that does not pose any significant threat to Russia. The real challenge may be that in a few decades, or sooner, Moscow will have to take on an even greater responsibility, which Russia got rid of in 1991. Even now, there seems to be a reason to believe that thirty years of independence have made it possible to create elements of statehood that can be preserved and developed with the help of Russia.

from our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Russia

Do as You’re Told, Russia Tells the Neighborhood

Published

on

The Kremlin has always argued that it has special interests and ties to what once constituted the Soviet space. Yet it struggled to produce a smooth mechanism for dealing with the neighborhood, where revolutionary movements toppled Soviet and post-Soviet era political elites. Popular movements in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and most recently Kazakhstan have flowered and sometimes triumphed despite the Kremlin’s rage.

Russia’s responses have differed in each case, although it has tended to foster separatism in neighboring states to preclude their westward aspirations. As a policy, this was extreme and rarely generated support for its actions, even from allies and partners. The resultant tensions underlined the lack of legitimacy and generated acute fear even in friendlier states that Russia one day could turn against them.

But with the activation of the hitherto largely moribund six-nation Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Kazakhstan seems to be an entirely different matter. Here, for the first time since its Warsaw Pact invasions, Russia employed an element of multilateralism. This was designed to show that the intervention was an allied effort, though it was Russia that pulled the strings and contributed most of the military force.

CSTO activation is also about something else. It blurred the boundaries between Russia’s security and the security of neighboring states. President Vladimir Putin recently stated the situation in Kazakhstan concerned “us all,” thereby ditching the much-cherished “Westphalian principles” of non-intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states. The decision was also warmly welcomed by China, another Westphalia enthusiast.

In many ways, Russia always wanted to imitate the US, which in its unipolar moment used military power to topple regimes (in Afghanistan and Iraq) and to restore sovereignty (in Kuwait.) Liberal internationalism with an emphasis on human rights allowed America and its allies to operate with a certain level of legitimacy and to assert (a not always accepted) moral imperative. Russia had no broader ideas to cite. Until now. Upholding security and supporting conservative regimes has now become an official foreign policy tool. Protests in Belarus and Kazakhstan helped the Kremlin streamline this vision.

Since Russia considers its neighbors unstable (something it often helps to bring about), the need for intervention when security is threatened will now serve as a new dogma, though this does not necessarily mean that CSTO will now exclusively serve as the spearhead of Russian interventionist policy in crises along its borders. On the contrary, Russia will try to retain maneuverability and versatility. The CSTO option will be one weapon in the Kremlin’s neighborhood pacification armory.

Another critical element is the notion of “limited sovereignty,” whereby Russia allows its neighbors to exercise only limited freedom in foreign policy. This is a logical corollary, since maneuverability in their relations with other countries might lead to what the Kremlin considers incorrect choices, like joining Western military or economic groupings.

More importantly, the events in Kazakhstan also showed that Russia is now officially intent on upholding the conservative-authoritarian regimes. This fits into a broader phenomenon of authoritarians helping other authoritarians. Russia is essentially exporting its own model abroad. The export includes essential military and economic help to shore up faltering regimes.

The result is a virtuous circle, in the Kremlin’s eyes. Not only can it crush less than friendly governments in its borderlands but it also wins extensive influence, including strategic and economic benefits. Take for instance Belarus, where with Russian help, the dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka managed to maintain his position after 2020’s elections through brutality and vote-rigging. The end result is that the regime is ever-more beholden to Russia, abandoning remnants of its multi-vector foreign policy and being forced to make financial and economic concessions of defense and economics to its new master. Russia is pressing hard for a major new airbase.

A similar scenario is now opening up in Kazakhstan. The country which famously managed to strike a balance between Russia and China and even work with the US, while luring multiple foreign investors, will now have to accept a new relationship with Russia. It will be similar to Belarus, short of integration talks.

Russia fears crises, but it has also learned to exploit them. Its new approach is a very striking evolution from the manner in which it handled Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014, through the Belarus and Armenia-Azerbaijan crises in 2020 to the Kazakh uprising of 2022.

Russia has a new vision for its neighborhood. It is in essence a concept of hierarchical order with Russia at the top of the pyramid. The neighbors have to abide by the rules. Failure to do so would produce a concerted military response.

Author’s note: first published in cepa

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Middle East2 hours ago

“Kurdish Spring”: drawing to a close?

For decades, the Kurdish problem was overshadowed by the Palestinian one, occasionally popping up in international media reports following the...

Central Asia4 hours ago

Great powers rivalry in Central Asia: New strategy, old game

In international politics, interstate rivalry involves conflicting relations between two international rivalries that are nation states. A fundamental feature of...

Environment10 hours ago

How UNEP is helping education systems go green

The world is facing a three-pronged environmental crisis of climate change, nature and biodiversity loss, and pollution and waste. To...

Africa Today16 hours ago

South Africa’s Covid-19 Response Gets a $750 Million Boost

The World Bank Group Board of Executive Directors today approved South Africa’s request for a $750 million development policy loan...

Human Rights18 hours ago

Urgent action needed to protect Vietnamese workers trafficked to Serbia

Urgent action is required to assist and protect some 400 Vietnamese migrant workers who were allegedly trafficked to Serbia, experts...

Green Planet20 hours ago

Introducing India’s first ever diving grant

Mumbai-based Vidhi Bubna, the founder of ‘Coral Warriors’, India’s first ever diving grant, is a keen humanitarian and is passionate...

Europe22 hours ago

Tactical Retreat: Madrid Makes Concessions to Catalonia and the Basque Country

The November 2019 general parliamentary elections in Spain resulted in none of the parties getting an absolute majority needed to...

Trending