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A Europe whole and free: Utopia or, after all, a future?

Alexander Kramarenko

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In the euphoria of the peaceful fall of the Berlin Wall long 30 years ago quite a few hopeful predictions were made for restoration of political unity of Europe, for a Europe whole and free, practically as a matter of course. But all those hopes and pan-European enthusiasm, they generated were not to come true.

One has to admit, that European elites have proved themselves unprepared, both politically and intellectually, for the end of the Cold War. Instead of creative decisions, they chose business as usual, that is the status quo and preservation of the patchwork European security architecture in its entirety, without its radical reinvention within the framework of a formal peace settlement which used to bring all wars to end. The fact that the war wasn’t “hot” cannot justify this choice for, as at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, it was about integrating a former adversary into a single regional system, or as in Versailles, its exclusion from such a system of postwar relations.

The double enlargement, i.e. of the NATO and the EU, as well as incomplete, in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, institutionalization of the OSCE (as opposed, for example, to the African Union) have proved to be expressions of that policy. Russia has been invited to neither of them. In the case of NATO for the reason of her presumed capacity to challenge the American leadership which is a fundamental principle of the Alliance’s operation. As regards the EU, the references were made to Russia’s huge territory and lack of enthusiasm on sharing border with China. It was admitted, however, that such hedging against assumed return of an «aggressive Russia” could turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy to quote President Clinton who spoke at the NATO summit in Brussels in January, 1994.

So, the alienation between Russia and the West is what did happen in the final count. What is more, it was supposed to serve as basis of unity of the preserved Western alliance in its military and political and trade and economic dimensions. The politics of exclusion, if not disguised containment but by different means, couldn’t help producing its “fruits de mal”. On the one hand, it inevitably distorted Russia’s domestic development and made Moscow hedge in her turn in matters of foreign policy. On the other hand, anti-Russian politics, which in essence was anti-European, as is obvious now, distorted foreign policy priorities of the Western countries, where they couldn’t do without Russia, be it in European affairs proper or in the Middle East. And now Moscow is accused of interference in domestic politics of the US and Europe, which seems to be the way to deny the immanent nature of the current crisis of western societies, and equally, the right to vote to their electorate. Instead of a win-win situation we are facing a situation where every party loses in its own way and various degrees of obviousness and gravity of consequences.

It would be a much greater sin against European secular culture of rationalism to continue on that road, i.e. to wait for a “Russian aggression” five years after the Ukrainian crisis struck etc, instead of engaging collectively, with Russia, in fundamental reassessment of the situation that has undergone a fundamental change. Since both Russia and the West are in the midst of a crisis of development, in would be wise to have a joint analysis of the developmental experience in the Euro-Atlantic over the past 100 years. The enlargement of NATO and EU, thus, wouldn’t look like a “poisoned chalice” of the Russian transformation. The things that might fall in that category include the trap of consensus in both bodies; the paradox of the feeling of insecurity, say, in the indefensible militarily Baltic States, as a function of the temptation to undermine NATO’s credibility ascribed to Moscow; or differences of values within the EU as a result of the thawing of the elements of Eastern European’s consciousness, frozen by the Cold War and, thus, not entirely overcome.

In that case all talk of who lost whom and why would lose its relevance, and we could concentrate upon a positive, future-oriented agenda. One cannot deny that all the misunderstandings of European politics in the past 30 years (I am tempted to say a politics of neo-Versailles type) testify to the fact that the transfer of the security system that took shape in another era and lost its raison d’etre with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the collapse of the USSR, to the Twenty-First Century is fundamentally flawed. Should we be surprised if our continent together with the institutions has inherited their policies, including that of containment of not only Russia but Germany as well, as has become obvious under the Trump Administration? It is no accident that Richard Haass writes in the Foreign Affairs magazine on the Vienna vs. Versailles dilemma. Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2012 in his “Strategic Vision” wrote of the need “in the age of historical acceleration” for a “larger and more vital West” through closer embrace of Russia and Turkey. That is to say that the problem of vitality and sustainability of the Historical West and its present composition in the qualitatively new global competitive environment is not at all new.

It can be approached in various ways. As the past experience shows, the option of Russia joining the West, as if it were a matter of signing up for a kolkhoz in the Soviet Union, is a non-starter, all the more so that the collectivization commissar this time doesn’t have a gun on his table as a convincing argument (given the successful modernization of the Armed Forces that Russia had to undertake). It doesn’t matter how we call it, but at their press-conference in Bregancon President Putin spoke of the territory east of the Urals as a space of European culture (as is North America west of Lisbon), and President Macron uttered the seditious “Europe is not limited to the West”.

Ivan Krastev wrote recently in the “Russia in Global Affairs” magazine of similarities of the problems of Russia and the Western nations, sort of convergence between us at the level of problems in societal development. Fedor Tyutchev, who spent 20 years in Europe and whom, as Leo Tolstoy put it, “one cannot live without”, gave the following definition to the problem of separate existence of the West and Russia: “By the very fact of her existence Russia denies the West its future”. If the year of 1989 had its roots in the year of 1968 in Western Europe, then would it be right to say that the current crisis of the West could be traced to the year of 1991? Martin Wolf of the Financial Times writes in his blog: “The disappearance of the Soviet Union left a big hole”. Do we all need to fall into it together with Lewis Carroll’s Alice, or have we, indeed, have fallen into that hole and now is the time to get out of it?

Is it high time that we restore the political unity of Europe on the basis of pragmatism? It is for the Americans to decide whether they have overstayed their welcome in our continent, having turned the NATO into a business venture and closing down globalization in order to get in competitive shape at everybody else’s expense, and thus, ensure that they have an edge over others in a world of technological containment of China, a world with no universal rules, including those of the WTO, that apply to all. And then what are the ideological prejudices of the past worth, the ones annihilated completely by the Left political thought represented by the postmodernists? The latter’s categories perfectly describe the reality of the post-Cold War world falling apart. The future of the European integration depends entirely upon the EU member-states, but Russia’s potential of development could provide space for trade and economic “enlargement” of European countries under any circumstances, helping to prevent Weimarization of any part of a Europe already in a post-war mood.

Russia was on the right side of history in both world wars, when liberty in its most universal, existential sense was at stake, and no ideological differences could interfere with that in the former and the latter instances. Now that the US and Britain with their societies’ high threshold of tolerance for inequality, are resolutely choosing neoliberal economics, it is the future of the social state, paid for in blood in those wars, that is at stake in Europe. Russia ought to be on the side of this “contrat social” which guarantees peace in our continent and represents a mode of peaceful coexistence between capitalism and democracy according to Jurgen Habermas. We could, inter alia, in the spirit of constructive internationalism and by way of networking diplomacy and development pacts, jointly manage common risks, including climate change and transformation in the Middle East, where the Americans are leaving slow but steady. In that case Europe could guarantee itself strong positions, well in line with its values and traditions, in a globalised world of interdependence and cultural diversity, where development of all would ensure development of each nation.

France convened the Paris Peace Forum last year to mark the end of World War One. So far its results do not impress. Maybe, we could begin with an OSCE summit which has not been held ever since 2010? Holding any inclusive forum similar to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, would hugely contribute to putting in motion a process of taking European politics out of the past and drawing a line under it, at last. There is no need to start from scratch and try to apportion blame: it suffices that everybody is at fault. However, we’ll have to revisit the ground zero, i.e. the fall of the Berlin Wall and our expectations at the time. It is important to understand what went badly wrong in Europe and what avenues were closed or have been left unexplored – without that we won’t be able to reinvent the architecture of the EU-Russia relationship.

From our partner RIAC

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UK-US relations: Challenges ahead

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The past few days have been witness, to some important statements made in the context of the Joint Comprehensive Program for Action (JCPOA) — also referred to as the Iran Nuclear deal. US allies, including the UK and some EU member states do not seem to be in agreement with the US President’s Iran policy in general, and his inclination towards scrapping JCPOA altogether.

Boris Johnson’s interviews and his comments on the JCPOA

In an interview to the BBC on January 14, 2020, British PM, Boris Johnson stated, that the JCPOA, could be renegotiated, and seemed to be accommodative towards Trump. Said Johnson:

‘Let’s work together to replace the JCPOA and get the Trump deal instead’.

Johnson’s remarks came a day after UK, Germany and France had issued a joint statement, stating that all three countries were totally in favor of keeping the JCPOA alive.UK Germany and France had also said, that they were keen to ensure, that the nuclear non -proliferation regime is kept intact, and Iran is prevented from developing nuclear weapons.

Earlier, in a telephonic conversation, last week, with the UK PM, US President Donald Trump, had told Johnson, that the deal was ‘foolish’, and other signatories should also walk out of it.

During the course of his interview with the BBC, which happened to be the first interview with the media, after the victory of the Conservative Party in the recent general elections. Johnson, while having a dig at Trump, said that the US President thought himself of as a good negotiator, as did many others.

Johnson also made the point, that the current deal, had been negotiated by Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, and alluded to the point, that this was one of the key reasons, why Trump wanted to renegotiate the JCPOA.

Members of Johnson’s cabinet and their comments on the Iran deal

UK Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, while criticizing Iran for failing to meet with the compliances related to the JCPOA, also stated, that the UK is keen to keep the deal intact.

Before Raab, another member of Johnson’s cabinet, the British Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace had also indulged in some straight talk, lambasting the Trump administration for its increasingly isolationist approach towards global issues, and Trump’s tendency of taking Washington’s allies for granted. Wallace had also stated, that US support for UK’s coalition should not be taken for granted.

Responses of Trump and Rouhani to Johnson’s remarks

US President, Donald Trump’s response, to Johnson’s suggestion, regarding a fresh JCPOA was predictable, and welcomed the British PM’s proposal.

In the meanwhile, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in an aggressive address, on January 15, 2020,  where he lashed out at the EU and UK, said, that all Trump knew, was violation of contracts, so there was no question of a new Iran deal.

UK-US relations

Interestingly, Johnson in his interview to the BBC, had also said, that there was no real need for the UK to have been informed in advance by the US, with regard to the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. It would be pertinent to point out, that not just members of the Labor Party, but even a senior Tory MP Tom Tugendhat, also a former chairman of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, criticized the US for not consulting the UK.

This brings us, to another important point. While Johnson’s main challenge is perceived to be the withdrawal of UK, from the EU by January 31, 2020. There are likely to be important differences between Washington and London over dealing with Iran. A close advisor of US President Donald Trump, has already stated, that if Johnson wants a UK-US Free Trade deal, UK should immediately pull out of the Iran deal. Richard Goldberg, who until recently was a member of the White House national security council (NSC) expressed these views while speaking to BBC.

US-UK FTA and Trump’s support for the same

Trump has been in favor of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with UK (which happens to be the 5th largest trading partner of the US) for some time. In fact, in his congratulatory tweet to Boris Johnson after his victory in December 2019, Trump had said that Britain and the U.S. will now be able to forge a significant new Trade Deal after Brexit.

At the G7 Summit in 2019, Trump had spoken about how the US would sign a path breaking trade deal with the UK, post Brexit. It has been argued, that while the Conservative lobby, in the US-UK, which has been in favor of  bilateral FTA, there are lobbies in both countries, which are fervently opposed to such an idea.

It also remains to be seen, whether the Trump Administration is serious, about imposing conditionalities on UK regarding the FTA — such as, supporting the US stance vis-à-vis Iran. Given the reactions by some members of Boris Johnson’s cabinet (to Trump’s handling of the Iran issue), it is tough to really predict the UK’s reaction.

Not just Iran, US-UK also differ over Huawei

Apart from the Iran issue, one issue which could act as an impediment to further consolidating economic and strategic relations between US and UK could be use of equipment of Chinese tech giant, Huawei, by UK for the development of next-generation 5G wireless networks. 

Johnson’s predecessor, Theresa May had stated, that non-core technology of 5G were acceptable, while core parts would be banned. At a meeting of the National Security council (NSC) in 2019, some of May’s colleagues including — Jeremy Hunt, then Foreign secretary, Sajid Javid, then Home Secretary (now treasury secretary), Gavin Williamson, then Defense Secretary, and Penny Mordaunt, then international development secretary — had opposed May’s decision. Interestingly, Williamson had been sacked for allegedly leaking the proceedings of the meeting.

Johnson’s approach towards Huawei

In the interview to BBC, Johnson stated, that he did not want to jeopardize cooperation with any of the other “5 Eyes Intelligence alliance partners” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US are the other members of this network, apart from the US). While hinting at the US stand on Huawei, Johnson said, that those criticizing one technology also needed to provide an alternative.

Differences between US and other allies over other crucial economic and strategic issues

It is not just UK, but other allies like India which would be closely watching Trumps approach on crucial geo-political issues. For instance, while earlier US had stated, that it would get a waiver from CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), even if it went ahead with the purchase of S400 Missiles from Russia (India and Russia had signed an agreement in October 2018 during Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s . Only recently, a State Department Spokesman while commenting on the waiver to India stated that there was no blanket waiver from the side of the US Administration. Of course later, the State Department Spokesperson did clarify, that US views these issues on a case by case basis.

Conclusion

If one were to look at the scenario for bilateral relations between UK and US (defined as a ‘special relationship’ first by Winston Churchill in 1946) there are numerous challenges.

There is a tendency, to oversimplify bilateral relationships to personal chemistry of leaders, and ideological inclinations as in the case of Johnson and Trump. There are likely, to be a number of obstacles which may come in the way of the bilateral relationship (differences over crucial geo-political and economic issues as discussed above). In addition to this, there is a note of caution for other allies like EU member states (especially Germany and France), Canada, Japan which have already born the brunt of Trump’s insular economic policies, and his myopic and transaction approach towards complex geo-political issues.

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Why Warsaw denies historical facts about World War II

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Polish boy in the ruins of Warsaw September 1939. Julien Bryan caption of the image from 1958. Source: Wikimedia Commons

The painful and conflicting reaction on the part of Warsaw following President Vladimir Putin’s statement that Poland bears partial responsibility for inciting the Second World War can be explained not only by following the policy adopted by post-Socialist Poland as an ideological weapon.

The practical implementation of historical policy is the responsibility of the Polish Institute of National Memory (PINM), which followed the Polish Foreign Ministry in voicing a protest against the well-grounded accusations against Poland. What is behind Warsaw’s denial of historical facts?

In recent years PINM has built a weighty and largely unrealistic ideology of Poland making numerous sacrifices in the years of the Second World War. This ideology is currently used to shape Warsaw’s foreign policy. The geographical and historical position of Poland, located between Germany and the Russian Empire / Soviet Union / Russian Federation, is the subject of many works by the founders  of “Polish geopolitics” and political publicists (Adolf Bochensky, Vladislav Gizbert-Studnitsky, Stanislav Tsat-Matskevich, etc.).

Warsaw uses the idea of its special relations with Berlin and Moscow to secure the intransient unilateral right to represent the interests of collective West, thereby  remaining in the diplomatic game. Relying on the fictional cult of its sacrifice, Poland sort of emphasizes what it sees as the political insight in its relations with Germany and Russia. What for?

The role of a World War II victim makes it easier for Poland to claim its share of influence in the post-Soviet space than if it was a culprit. Poland’s debate about the causes and circumstances of World War II has nothing to do with official statements compared to historical facts – it’s a kind of struggle for its international status, which Poland can strengthen only by narrowing the world-wide tragedy of World War II to the level of its own national tragedy the blame for which is put on the Soviet Union in connection with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. And the political game does not end here.

“… Polish attempts to strike at the foundations of the national and historical identity of the Russian Federation are an element of aggression in the symbolic sphere – this is how Moscow can interpret them. Tolerance and stamina demonstrated by the Russian Federation in the face of provocative moves taken by the incumbent Polish leadership are truly impressive,” – said Andrzej Walicki, a leading Polish expert on Russia.

Not long ago, there appeared US Congress Resolution No. 447, which is relative to the role of Poland in World War II. This draft law empowers victims of the Holocaust to claim compensation for property they lost during the war on the territory of Poland and enables the U.S. State Department to support non-governmental organizations involved in the restitution of lost Jewish property. Naturally, Warsaw is not happy about the decision, which it sees as a precedent that will require the Poles to compensate the Jews for property damage. In addition to financial problems (the total value of property subject to Resolution   No. 447 is $ 230 billion), this measure by the US Congress, if implemented, will entail the same ideological problems making Poland one of the culprits of World War II. The amendments to the PINM law adopted in Poland on January 26, 2018 envisage punishment for claiming that the Poles assisted in the Holocaust. They thus aim to suppress a possible wave of accusations and prohibit any attempts to compare the past acts of Poland with crimes of the Third Reich.

Both Res. No. 447 and the amendments to the PINM Law have a moral aspect to reckon with. Warsaw is fully aware that the position of Poland in Central and Eastern Europe and its image in the world depend on this issue. Despite Poland’s long-standing pro-American policy in Europe, the ruling Law and Justice Party (LJP) has pronounced Res. 447 a mechanism of political pressure from Washington to secure certain concessions from Warsaw.

The law had a certain impact on domestic politics, triggering criticism of the LJP from opposition parties. The rating of the Law and Justice Party was saved thanks to a powerful informational counterattack performed by the PINM, which was aimed at the Polish consumer in the first place.

What Warsaw fears most is that random discussions about Poland’s involvement in the fueling of World War II will turn into a systematic long-term information campaign in which Res. No. 447 and facts from the past, so unwelcome for Poland, will complement each other.

Ideologically, the Polish political history is far from flawless and is in an active phase due to lack of information influence from the outside. Under certain circumstances, it can be assumed that the discourse over the Second World War may form an ideological configuration disadvantageous for Warsaw. And this is what causes such a controversial and cynical reaction from Warsaw.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova says that by adopting a resolution on Germany and the USSR sharing responsibility for the outbreak of the war, the Polish Sejm demonstrates how ideology is put above the truth. Zakharova also made it clear that the truth was recorded in the documents of the Nuremberg Tribunal. If the Polish Sejm doubts the decisions of the tribunal, she said, they must make a statement to this effect. In this case, it will be considered an attempt to review the results of the Second World War.

From our partner International Affairs

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De-evolution of Europe: The equation of Communism with Nazism

Anis H. Bajrektarevic

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It was indeed cynical and out-of-touch for the EU (Parliament) to suddenly blame, after 80 years, the Soviet Union for triggering WWII. It is unwise (to say least) to resurrect the arguments surrounding the circumstances of the start of World War II. The historians have agreed, the history has been written and well documented, and is in our books already for many decades.

There is no point in contemporary politicians of eastern flank of the EU (with a striking but complicit silence from the central Europe) pushing up the facts regarding who was to blame. There are neither mandated, nor qualified or even expected to do so.

Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Mussolini ‘s Italy and its satellites (helped by the ring of Useful Idiots, then called Quislings) were the culprits and that is universally accepted with no exception. It is now all in the past. Let us leave it there and not in the 21st century which has severe multiplying challenges, especially for the EU, that are still waiting to be tackled. 

Enveloped in its own myopia of economic egoism and überfremdung phobia, Europeans are in fact digging and perpetuating defensive self-isolation. While falling short to constructively engage its neighborhood (but not conveniently protected by oceans for it like some other emigrant-receiving countries), Europeans constantly attract unskilled migrants from that way destabilized near abroad. The US, GCC, Far East, Australia, Singapore, lately even Brazil, India, or Angola – all have enormously profited from the skilled newcomers. Europe is unable to recognize, preserve, protect and promote its skilled migrants.

Simply, European history of tolerance of otherness is far too short for it, while the legacies of residual fears are deep, lasting and wide. Destructive efforts towards neighbors and accelatered hatreds for at home are perpetually reinforcing themselves. That turns Europe into a cluster of sharply polarized and fragmented societies, seemingly over history and identity, but essentially over the generational and technological gap, vision and forward esteem.

One of the latest episodes comes from a recent political,and highly ahistorical,initiative to make an equation of communism with Nazism. Driven by the obsessive Russophobe notion, this myopic short-term calculusmay bring disastrous long-term consequences – first and most of all for the Slavic Eastern/southeastern Europe, as well as to the absent-minded Scandinavian Europe, or cynically silent Central Europe.

Needleless to say, consensus that today’s Europe firmly rests upon is built on antifascism. This legacy brought about prosperity and tranquility to Europe unprecedented all throughout its history. Sudden equation of communism with Nazism is the best and fastest way to destroy very fundaments of Europe once for good.

One is certain, the EU-led Europe is in a serious moral and political crisis of rapid de-evolution. Let’s have a closer look.

Una hysteria importante

History of Europe is the story of small hysteric/xenophobic nations, traditionally sensitive to the issue of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and behavioristic otherness. If this statement holds the truth, then we refer to events before and after the Thirty Years’ War in general and to the post-Napoleonic Europe in particular. Political landscape of today’s Europe had been actually conceived in the late 14th century, gradually evolving to its present shape.

At first, the unquestioned and unchallenged pre-Westphalian order of Catholicism enabled the consolidation and standardization of the feudal socio-economic and politico-military system all over the Europe. However at its matured stage, such a universalistic world of Holy Roman Empire and Papacy (Caesaropapism) is steadily contested by the explicitly confrontational or implicitly dismissive political entities, be it ideologically (the Thirty Years’ War culminating with the Peace of Westphalia) or geopolitically (Grand Discoveries and the shift of the gravity center westwards). The early round of colonizers, the two Iberian empires of Spain and Portugal, are the first entities that emerged, followed by France, Holland, England and Denmark. (Belgium too, although it appeared as a buffer zone at first – being a strategic depth, a continental prolongation of England for containment of Central Europeans, of Dutch and Scandinavians from the open sea, while later on also becoming a strategic depth of France for balancing Britain and containment of Denmark and Prussia.)

Engulfed with the quest of the brewing French revolution for the creation of a nation state, these colonizers, all of them situated on the Atlantic flank of Europe, have successfully adjusted to the nation-state concept. Importantly, the very process of creation/formation of the nation-state has been conducted primarily on linguistic grounds since religious grounds were historically defeated once and for all by the Westphalia.[1] All peoples talking the Portugophone dialects in one state, all Hispanophone dialects in another state, all Francophone dialects in the third state, etc.[2] This was an easy cut for peripheral Europe, the so-called old colonizers on the Atlantic flank of Europe, notably for Portugal, Spain, France, England, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

Although geopolitically defeated at home, in France, and ideologically contained by the Vienna Congress and its instrument – the Holy Alliance of Eastern Conservative Courts, the very idea of a nation-state remained appealing. Both of that-time federations of theocracies (the non-territorial principle-based Habsburg and the Ottoman empires) were inevitably corroding by two ‘chemical’ precursors: secularism (enlightenment) and territoriality. Once the revolutionary 1848 ousted the principal guardian of feudalism and Rimo-Christian orthodoxy in Europe, Metternich, the suppressed concept got further impetus. And, the revolutionary romance went on…

Interestingly, the very creation of Central Europe’s nation-states was actually enhanced by Napoleon III. The unification of Italophones was his, nearly obsessive, intentional deed (as he grew up in Nice with Italian Carbonari revolutionaries who were fighting papal and Habsburg’s control over the northern portions of today’s Italy). Conversely, the very unification of Germanophones under the Greater Prussia was his non-intentional mis-chief, with the two subsequently emerging ‘by-products’; modern Austria (German-speaking core assembled on the ruins of mighty multinational and multi-lingual empire) and modern Turkey (Turkophone core on the ruins of mighty multiracial and multi-linguistic empire).

Despite being geographically in the heart of Europe, Switzerland remained a remarkably stable buffer zone: Highly militarized but defensive and obsessively neutral, economically omnipresent yet financially secretive, it represents one confederated state of two confronting versions of western Christianity, of three ethnicities and of four languages. Absent from most of the modern European politico-military events – Switzerland, in short – is terra incognita.

Historically speaking, the process of Christianization of Europe that was used as the justification tool to (either intimidate or corrupt, so to say to) pacify the invading tribes, which demolished the Roman Empire and brought to an end the Antique age, was running parallel on two tracks. The Roman Curia/Vatican conducted one of them by its hammer: the Holy Roman Empire. The second was run by the cluster of Rusophone Slavic Kaganates, who receiving (the orthodox or true/authentic, so-called Eastern version of) Christianity from Byzantium, and past its collapse, have taken over a mission of Christianization, while forming its first state of Kiev Russia (and thereafter, its first historic empire). Thus, to the eastern edge of Europe, Russophones have lived in an intact, nearly a hermetic world of universalism for centuries: one empire, one Tsar, one religion and one language.[3]

Everything in between Central Europe and Russia is Eastern Europe, rather a historic novelty on the political map of Europe. Very formation of the Atlantic Europe’s present shape dates back to 14th–15th century, of Central Europe to the mid-late 19th century, while a contemporary Eastern Europe only started emerging between the end of WWI and the collapse of the Soviet Union – meaning, less than 100 years at best, slightly over two decades in the most cases. No wonder that the dominant political culture of the Eastern Europeans resonates residual fears and reflects deeply insecure small nations. Captive and restive, they are short in territorial depth, in demographic projection, in natural resources and in a direct access to open (warm) seas. After all, these are short in historio-cultural verticals, and in the bigger picture-driven long-term policies. Eastern Europeans are exercising the nationhood and sovereignty from quite a recently, thus, too often uncertain over the side and page of history. Therefore, they are often dismissive, hectic and suspectful, nearly neuralgic and xenophobic, with frequent overtones.

The creation of a nation-state (on linguistic grounds) in the peripheral, Atlantic and Scandinavian, as well as Central Europe was relatively a success-story. However, in Eastern Europe it repeatedly suffered setbacks, culminating in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. The same calamity also remained in the central or Baltic part of Eastern Europe.[4]

Keeping the center soft

Ever since Westphalia, Europe maintained the inner balance of powers by keeping its core section soft. Peripheral powers like England, France, Denmark, (early Sweden and Poland to be later replaced by) Prussia and Habsburgs, and finally the Ottomans and Russia have pressed on and preserved the center of continental Europe as their own playground. At the same time, they kept extending their possessions overseas or, like Russia and the Ottomans, over the land corridors deeper into Asian and MENA proper. Once Royal Italy and Imperial Germany had appeared, the geographic core ‘hardened’ and for the first time started to politico-militarily press onto peripheries. This new geopolitical reality caused a big security dilemma. That dilemma lasted from the 1814 Vienna congress up to Potsdam conference of 1945, being re-actualized again with the Berlin Wall destruction: How many Germanies and Italies should Europe have to preserve its inner balance and peace?[5]As the latecomers, the Central Europeans have faced the overseas world out of their reach, as clearly divided into spheres of influence solely among the Atlantic Europeans (and Russians).

In rather simplified terms, one can say that from the perspective of European belligerent parties, both world wars were fought between the forces of status quo and the challengers to this status quo. The final epilogue in both wars was that Atlantic Europe has managed to divert the attention of Central Europeans from itself and its vast overseas possessions onto Eastern Europe, and finally towards Russia.[6]

Just to give the most illustrative of many examples; the Imperial post-Bismarck Germany has carefully planned and ambitiously grouped its troops on the border with France. After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo (28 June 1914), Europe was technically having a casus belli – as the subsequent mutually declared war between all parties quickly followed this assassination episode and the immediate Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. However, the first armed engagement was not taking place on the southeastern front, as expected – between the Eastern belligerent parties such as Austria, Serbia, Russia, the Ottomans, Greece, Bulgaria, etc. The first military operations of WWI were actually taking place in the opposite, northwest corner of Europe – something that came only two months past the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. It was German penetration of Belgian Ardennes.

Still, the very epilogue of la Grande Guerra was such that a single significant territorial gain of Germany was achieved only in Eastern Europe. Despite a colossal 4-years long military effort, the German western border remained nearly unchanged.

The end of WWI did not bring much of a difference. The accords de paix – Versailles treaty was an Anglo-French triumph. These principal Treaty powers, meaning: Atlantic Europe, invited Germany to finally join the League of Nations in 1926, based on the 1925 Treaty of Locarno. By the letter of this treaty, Germany obliged itself to fully respect its frontiers with Belgium and France (plus demilitarized zone along Rhine) with the unspecified promise to arbitrate before pursuing any change of its borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland. The same modus operandi applied to the Austrian borders with Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Locarno accord actually instrumentalized two sorts of boundaries around Central Europe (Germany–Austria): strict, inviolable ones towards Atlantic Europe; but semipermeable and soft towards Eastern Europe.[7]

That is how the predominant player from Central Europe, Germany, was accepted to the League, a collective system which the Soviet Russia (meaning: Rusophone Europe) was admitted to only a decade later (1934).

Soon after, this double standard sealed-off a faith of many in Europe and beyond.


[1]To be more accurate: Westphalia went beyond pure truce, peace and reconciliation. It re-confirmed existence of western Christianity’s Ummah. Simply, it only outlawed meddling into the intra-western religious affairs by restricting that-time absolute Papal (interpretative) powers. From that point of view, Westphalia was not the first international instrument on religious freedoms, but a triumph of western evangelic unity. This very unity later led to the strengthening of western Christianity and its supremacy intercontinentally.

[2] All modern European languages that are taught in schools today, were once upon a time, actually a political and geographic compromise of the leading linguists, who – through adopted conventions – created a standard language by compiling different dialects, spoken on the territory of particular emerging nation-state.

[3]Early Russian state has ever since expanded north/northeast and eastward, reaching the physical limits of its outreach by crossing the Bering straits (and the sale of Russian Alaska to the USA in 1867). By the late 17th and early 18th century, Russia had begun to draw systematically into European politico-military theatre. (…) In the meantime, Europe’s universalistic empire dissolved. It was contested by the challengers (like the Richelieu’s France and others–geopolitical, or the Lutheran/Protestant – ideological challengers), and fragmented into the cluster of confronted monarchies, desperately trying to achieve an equilibrium through dynamic balancing. Similar political process will affect Russian universal empire only by late 20th century, following the Soviet dissolution. (…) Not fully accepted into the European collective system before the Metternich’s Holy Alliance, even had its access into the post-Versailles system denied, Russia was still not ignored like other peripheral European power. The Ottomans, conversely, were negated from all of the security systems until the very creation of the NATO (Republic of Turkey). Through the pre-emptive partition of Poland in the eve of WWII, and successful campaigns elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Bolshevik Russia expanded both its territory and its influence westwards. (…) An early Soviet period of Russia was characterized by isolated bilateral security arrangements, e.g. with Germans, Fins, Japanese, etc. The post WWII days have brought the regional collective system of Warsaw Pact into existence, as to maintain the communist gains in Europe and to effectively oppose geopolitically and ideologically the similar, earlier formed, US-led block. Besides Nixon’s rapprochement towards China, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the final stage in the progressive fragmentation of the vast Sino-Soviet Communist block (that dominated the Eurasian land mass with its massive size and centrality), letting Russia emerge as the successor. The sudden ideological and territorial Soviet break-up, however, was followed by the cultural shock and civil disorder, painful economic and demographic crisis and rapidly widening disparities. All this coupled with the humiliating wars in Caucasus and elsewhere, since the centripetal and centrifugal forces of integration or fragmentations came into the oscillatory play. Between 1989 and 1991, communist rule ended in country after country and the Warsaw Pact officially dissolved. Subsequently, the Gorbachev-Jeltsin Russia experienced the greatest geopolitical contraction of any major power in the modern era and one of the fastest ever in history. Still, Gorbachev-Jeltsin tandem managed to (re-)brand themselves domestically and internationally – each got its own label of vodka.

[4] Many would say that, past the peak Ottoman times, the aggressive intrusion of Atlantic Europe with its nation-state concept, coupled with Central Europe’s obsessive control and lebensraumquest, has turned lands of a mild and tolerant people, these pivotal intellectual exchange-corridors of southeastern Europe and the Near East into a modern day Balkan powder keg. Miroslav Krleza famously remarked: “It was us humans who transformed our good swine to a filthy pig.”

[5] At the time of Vienna Congress, there were nearly a dozen of Italophone states and over three dozens of Germanophone entities – 34 western German states + 4 free cities (Kleinstaaterei), Austria and Prussia. Potsdam conference concludes with only three Germanophone (+ Lichtenstein + Switzerland) and two Italophone states (+ Vatican).

[6] Why did the US join up Atlantic Europe against Central Europe in both WWs? Simply, siding up with Central Europe would have meant politico-military elimination of Atlantic Europe once and for all. In such an event, the US would have faced a single European, confrontation-potent, block of a formidable strategic-depth to engage with sooner or later. Eventually, Americans would have lost an interfering possibility of remaining the perfect balancer. The very same balancer role, the US inherited from the declining Britain.

[7] Farce or not, history of 1914 nearly repeated itself to its last detail in early 1990s. And, it was not for the first time. 25 and again 75 years after 1914 – meaning that 1939. was nearly copied by the events of 9/11 in 1989. Hence, November 1989 was the third time that the western frontiers of Central Europe remained intact, while the dramatic change took place to its East. Besides Anschluss of Eastern Germany by the Western one, borders there in 1990s nominally remained the same, but many former neighbors to Central Europe have one by one disappeared for good from the political map of Eastern Europe.

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