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Yom Kippur War Intelligence Failure

Bob Budahl

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The Yom Kippur War intelligence failures were broad and to the highest level of government and military within Israel. They misperceived themselves as being free and safe of attack from the Arabs, at least in the near and current future. The Israelis were confidant an attack would only occur along the perimeters in which they themselves perceived the Arabs may attack, which they believed to be in the distant future. Israel felt that such an attack was bound to fail and thus preventing the Arabs from initiating an attack. Israel had let down their guard and therefore were surprised by the timing of the attack, the method of attack and also the place of the attack. Few military parallels are found as great as the strategic surprise Egypt and Syria enjoyed on October 6, 1973.

Information divulged years later is that King Hussein of Jordan made a visit September 25, 1973 to Israel and met with the Prime Minister and gave his assessment that Egypt and Syria were about to attack Israel. Warning was not heeded as the attack took place October 6, 1973. And importantly Jordan itself had been involved in former wars itself with Israel so their motivation for informing them of an impending attack was suspicious from the Israelis’ view. Skeptics argue that Hussein disavowed giving warning to Israel during this visit. Hussein had hoped that the warning would influence the Israeli Prime Minister to make changes and progress with the Arabs and avoid a costly war. Israel’s intelligence officer dismissed Hussein’s claim and believed that the Arabs were too weak to attack. Also believed by the Israelis is that the Arabs would not fight a war they knew they would lose. This may be a key point as to misperception as the Arab’s initially in the war obtained their objectives and possibly in their view set the course right from the “1967 War” in which they lost territory. Egypt’s Sadat even made a trip to Saudi Arabia before the war and made a plea that if the United States resupplied Israel during the war for Saudi Arabia to emplace an oil embargo on the United States to exert influence. The CIA passed a report on September 30th to the Israelis which was sourced to King Hussein which elaborated on what he had previously told the Prime Minister. By September Syria had received Soviet SAM’s and other equipment and were ready for war. The Soviets removed dependents of advisors and diplomats from Egypt and Syria October 5th.Israel suffered 2,656 dead and 7,250 wounded in the battle.

The Israeli armed forces were reliant on reservists which made up a large portion of Israel’s armed forces. In order to prove successful time was needed in times of attack to mobilize and move them from civilian life and emplace these personnel into a war-time theater of operation. As such, Israel put much effort into developing their intelligence services into the elite force for which much trust was given by the country to provide the warning it needs to prepare for war.With the failure of fore-warning to Israelis’ the Arab’s controlled the early moves in the war and brought initial success which they desired and in effect changed the balance of power within the Middle East away from Israel’s advantage.

Egypt and Syria’s attack on October 6, 1973 occurred at 14:00 hours which caught the IDF off guard and Israel’s military and political leaders did not understand a war was about to break out until 18:00, which was too late. The Commission investigating the intelligence failure indicated three reasons for the mistake. The first reason involved two assumptions in which Egypt would conduct air strikes deep into Israel against its air force before starting a war and the other assumption was Syria would not go full-scale war unless Egypt was in action against the Israelis already. The 2ndreasonwas a major mistake as Military Intelligence had guaranteed that they would be able to provide adequate advance warning of any attack and they did not do so. The 3rd reason is the intelligence services basically dismissed the adversaries’ forces buildups as either defensive or an exercise. Prime Minister Gold Meir and the Defense Minister Moshe Dayan concluded full mobilization was not necessary early on and they only placed the standing army on full alert.

To lend support to Israelis’ perception that attack was not probable at least not in the near future there is evidence and facts that the Arab’s did successfully employ deception methods on Israel as well as on the United States. The Arabs had been open to Dr. Kissinger’s peace negotiation in September 1973 and even planted items in a Lebanese newspaper about neglect and deterioration of equipment from the Soviet Union within the Suez Canal area. A very good synopsis which perhaps lends Israeli a sympathetic path is that estimating intentions are one of the most difficult and yet crucial element within intelligence. One may use hard evidence. If the evidence is incomplete it is more difficult to determine intention. Technology has advanced greatly in later years which makes a surprise attack much more difficult to achieve with the presence of advanced IMINT and SIGINT.

Is the current state of counterintelligence in the Intelligence Community adequate?

In regard to whether the state of counterintelligence within the Intelligence Community is adequate today one can best assume counterintelligence is a forever changing, evolving, assessment and reactive process of making sure our capabilities are up to date with the current world intelligence threat that exists in the world today. I do believe that counterintelligence is adequate as of today but that does not mean we do not need to improve. Much can be derived as to pre-9/11 or post-9/11 scenario. The intelligence officials and decision makers have to make sure that the IC is able to function strategically and operationally. Post 9/11 there exists “old” and “new” threats but clearly now we are primarily and immediately faced with “new” threats such as prevention of individual or small group acts rather than State actors. And because of this emphasis is placed upon utilizing human sources or spies, and interrogations of suspects or informants. The “old” threats still require IC collection, analysis and operations regarding State actors and these services are still intact and operating fully. The intelligence community may involve two ways in which it adapts to its external demands and when a perceived intelligence failure occurs then it reinvents itself to deal effectively. Or it may change proactively because of anticipating or observing environment changes.

There still exist threats from State actors in regard to our intelligence community and national decision makers and counterintelligence needs to be vigilant to deter, detect, exploit, neutralize and disrupt these attacks on an ongoing basis. National Security information as well as the US companies’ proprietary information will be targeted for collection. Some industries that may experience activity directed against them include the defense, finance, energy, dual-use technology, etc.  Insider threats will continue to be a closely surveilled item of interest of the counterintelligence agencies. And Russia is believed to remain a threat through cyber operations meant to influence or convey misleading information to encourage public opinion towards Russia’s best interests. Elections have been targeted and efforts are believed to continue. Increased and vigilant counter-cyber terrorism programs need to be fully conducted and expanded to the utmost ability the United States can exhibit and emplace.

Transnational criminal groups as well as terrorists are learning and utilizing advanced intelligence capabilities in technical, physical and cyber means. And “insider threats”, which is the oldest form of spying still exist in today’s world.

I am an educated professional with 3 college programs of which my latest is in Counterintelligence through American Military University. I am a former Bank Mgr. I hold a Real Estate license. I am a Citizen of the United States.

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Intelligence

Transnational Crimes in the Maritime Realm

Zaeem Hassan Mehmood

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Maritime trafficking routes closely follow the commercial shipping lanes. The modalities, technologies and strategies put into place by criminals are often times more sophisticated in caliber than those used in regulated trade. The vast expanses of the sea, the complexity of the maritime transportation system, the immense volume of cargo transferred at each port, and the limited capacity for inspections of cargo creates opportunity for criminals. Seaborne trade in the maritime realm follows a defined set of “sea lines of communication” based on currents and weather. Because of the robustness of shipping and mass amounts of cargo moved, traffickers utilize the same shipping industry routes with great effect. Shipping and sea lanes tend to offer anonymity for criminals, whereas their activities can be hidden behind legitimate industries. Criminal activity, especially illicit trade in narcotics, humans, and weapons, has become so extensive that it is difficult according to various studies to rule out implications of states and corporations in the criminal enterprise.

Individuals from various nationalities, followed by multiple vessels flagged to different states, adds the UN Drug Trade Report 2019, are used in the networks which transit the waters of various states and call at different ports before reaching their final destination. Despite the abundance of laws designed to combat illicit trafficking and an apparent impetus to stop specific types of crime, government’s remains only marginally successful in preventing the global flow of illegal goods due to the overwhelming volume and complexity of the markets for illicit trade. Working in tandem, the maritime forces nevertheless have made successful efforts to disrupt the illicit supply chains as a result of sea-based security operations; cooperation and collaboration between law enforcement organizations.

Nevertheless, legal complexity arises as the high seas “fall outside the jurisdiction of any single state” under the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ocean space is to be collectively policed by all states governed by principles of Freedom of navigation. Piracy and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons comprise the main varieties of transnational crime. UNCLOS addresses these matter of concern in the realm of the sea, where various articles provide guidance in order to curb or limit the threats. Article 110 expounds the customary rule that warships may “approach and visit” on the high seas “any ship that is suspected of piracy, human trafficking, unauthorized broadcasting; and is without nationality”; or, “is flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag.” Article 111 addresses the right of “hot pursuit”, allowing warships of one state to follow a vessel through the different maritime zones of the ship if based on “reasonable grounds,” it is suspected of illegal activity.

Narcotics Trafficking

UNCLOS under Article 108 empowers states to cooperate and offer assistance to suppress drug trafficking by other state-flagged vessels. Traditionally, drug traffickers used overland routes, but since last two decades, they have shifted transportation into the “Indo-Pacific Ocean”. The majority of this trafficking has proliferated in the littoral regions, and often within territorial waters. In the latter years, advancement in technologies, providing for larger ships have allowed traffickers to move further into the sea to capitalize “blue water” areas, outside the 12-nautical mile mark and at times further than the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of any country. It is a documented fact that U.S. is the world’s largest consumer of illegal drugs, also according to various studies the source and transit zones of drug trafficking between South America and the U.S despite high patrols on the border.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

Piracy has been one of the most ancient forms of maritime crime that is treated rigorously under the provisions of UNCLOS. Article 101 defines piracy as “any illegal act of violence or detention, any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, outside the jurisdiction of any state.” The latter parts highlights an important aspect that piracy is a type of transnational crime conducted by non-state actors in international waters. Article 105 of UNCLOS grants everystate the authority to seize any vessel, associated property and to arrest any persons engaged in piracy. Domestic courts of the state conducting the seizure have the mandate prosecute the pirates under domestic law and determine what to do with the vessels; however, to date the courts remain inadequate or unsupported in many places.

Piracy became a security issue of international concern since the last decade and half, primarily in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea largely due to weak patrolling and sea blindness by the littoral states of the region. However, to an extent order at sea has been maintained with the presence Combined Task Force-151(CTF-151), focused on counter-piracy, and Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) to combat illicit activities at sea. Supported by several U.N. Security Council Resolutions, these task forces have “engaged with regional partners to build capacity and improve capabilities to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.” 

Piracy in the Asia-Pacific remains a matter of concern, however most of the incidents are underreported and those reported are of such small scale that they cloud the assessment of major piracy events. In the region, although piracy has been contained in the eastern region of Africa whereas it has proliferated in the western Africa around the Gulf of Guinea. This subject-matter experts conclude is a result of an increased trafficking in narcotics from Latin America, along with the various other illicit elements involving illegal fishing and human trafficking. The increased in piracy is a reminder for states that piracy remains a persistent and widespread challenge to maritime security. The recent activities in Somalia and Yemen foreshadow a resurgence of piracy in the region, encouraged by trafficking of light weapons and small arms, along with non-state actor’s unprecedented access to ship monitoring, tracking devices, and use of unmanned systems and long range communications.

Conclusion

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) identifies only certain types of transnational crime that affect maritime security, but there are many varieties and combinations of criminal activity that affect security and safety from the high seas to internal waters. Domestic laws however need be brought in line with international law, and cooperative partnerships between the states, law enforcement, and militaries to combat illicit activity needs to transcend the morass of politics that are often a hurdle in the way of more comprehensive legal regimes. It is recommended that information and intelligence sharing, along with TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) need to be employed by the maritime forces to ensure freedom of the seas. UNCLOS provides a strong framework and multilateral efforts to deter criminal activity at sea for a more secure, safer operating environment for all. However, it is the difficulty in effective prosecution and applying of an equitable punishment to the culprits, involved in piracy, human trafficking and illicit drugs that must serve as a reminder to all states that much awaits for an all-inclusive solution.

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Intelligence

Fighting Corporate Espionage by a Counterintelligence Agent

Bob Budahl

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Corporate executives must bear the responsibility of today’s evolving corporate world entering into a global community where not only are the exposures to such a wide market area lucrative to an already thriving business, but also to a grave danger of the companies’ trade and technology secrets, systems, financial accounts and much more. No longer is “Security” to the facility and personnel all that is required. Many foreign countries and interests take short cuts to becoming competitive through the theft of trade secrets, products and overt and covert espionage of all sorts. Some of these entities are now facing a growing challenge from United States corporations with safeguarding of commercial information, proprietary information, and economic factors.

Many of the tactics utilized in private sector counterintelligence have much in common with the secrets and information the government does its best to safeguard from theft of foreign governments or non-traditional actor threats. The FBI estimates U.S. Corporations lose over $100 billion annually. There are open and legal methods of collection open that are harmful and a good counterintelligence program should target this as well as illegal activities such as electronic eavesdropping, hacking, etc. Passive counterintelligence tries to curtail what a collector may do through countermeasures, and awareness training. Active counterintelligence will prove beneficial to identify and detect a threat, and will conduct operations including eliminating threats or ongoing targeting. A mitigation policy should be of avail. After an attack it may raise shareholder concern which needs to be quelled quickly. Quick realization of a threat and implementing action promptly and efficiently can stop immeasurable damage.

The leaders in the private sector need to be proactive and realize that it is no longer only local threats they face. The threats can be global and may not only be an economic threat but also a threat to national security. In the U.S. private sector ties to the Defense, Intelligence and other government entities can be vast with a great deal of interplay and interconnectedness. Also, corporations do not employ many of the safeguards put in place by the defense and other government departments. Compartmentation, clearance, and many operations taken for granted in the government aren’t serving the corporate structures well-being at all or as well as it should be. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Title 18, Sections 1831 and 1832 of the U.S. Code covers economic espionage and also if they are considered trade theft prosecutions.

Where once economic espionage meant directly infiltrating a company or recruiting an employee within the corporation our biggest challenge today is cyber espionage. In reality secrets and information are stolen often and not even known they were taken. And a much less chance of apprehension. Cybercrimes operate in a stealth mode in many ways, but in a contrast way can be identified and detected and countered with effective counterintelligence methods. The U.S. economy has changed over the past 20 years. “Intellectual capital rather than physical assets now represent the bulk of a U.S. corporation’s value.”

With the growth of cybercrimes including corporate espionage some tips for safeguarding and thwarting foreign hostile intrusions include

Conduct real-time monitoring of networks and retaining access records

Software tools for content mgt., data loss prevention, network forensics

Encrypt data on servers

Utilize multi-factor authentication measures such as biometrics, PINS, passwords

Mobility policy in which measures are developed to oversee which connections can and cannot be made to corporate systems

Limits on social networking

Establish contingency plans

Many others

When deciding to emplace a counterintelligence program to safeguard a corporation the first stepis to conduct a risk assessment by assessing vulnerabilities and estimating the consequences of losing critical assets. This should be headed up by a board member or senior executive.

Then move to step two in which groundwork is laid for establishing a corporate counterintelligence program. Hire a manager dedicated to counterintelligence. Hook up the company’s security, intelligence assurance, general counsel and HR departments. Develop liaison with government law and intelligence. Ensure centralized management of the counterintelligence program. And have legal counsel provide guidance on the counterintelligence program actions.

Identify the Capabilities needed

Threat awareness and training

Analysis, Reporting and Response

Suspicious activity reporting

Counterintelligence Audit

Counterintelligence Investigations.

Liaison

Implement the Counterintelligence Program

A basic counterintelligence program description will look something like this: PM (Program Manager) interplay such as:

PM develops and implements CI program

PM oversees a centralized CI Program office

PM maintains insight into all corporate elements

PM is responsible for liaison with US Government

Security officers responsible for tactical CI

PM provides CI guidance through training programs

Also be aware that not only high tech companies are targeted since the targeted information they seek may be deemed important by who is doing the shopping.

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Intelligence

Where does allegiance lie?

Bob Budahl

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Dongfan “Greg” Chung who is a native of China and a naturalized U.S. Citizen had “secret” security clearance while working with Rockwell and Boeing Corporations on the Space Shuttle project. He had retired in 2002 but returned a year later as a contractor until fall 2006. The government proved Chung committed espionage by taking and concealing Boeing secrets regarding the Delta IV rocket and also the Space Shuttle. He did this for the People’s Republic of China. He was convicted on charges of acting as an agent of the PRC as well as economic espionage.

The investigation of a different engineer working within the U.S is what led to Chung’s investigation and resulting conviction. He was sentenced to more than 24 years in prison.

The Chinese had sent letters requesting information as far back as 1979. In correspondence with the PRC Chung expressed his wishes to help the PRC modernize. He also sent 24 manuals related to the important B-1 Bomberfrom Rockwell Corporation which was very damaging.

Travel trips to the People’s Republic of China occurred on multiple occasions to lecture but he also met with government officials. In letters from his handlers they use his wife Rebecca and Chi Mak to transmit information. In the fall of 2006 FBI and NASA agents searched his home and discovered more than 250,000 documents from Boeing, Rockwell and others which were secret.

The Shuttle Drawing System or “SDS” that Rockwell and Boeing engineers created held information regarding performing processes regarding the Space Shuttle. The engineers need a password and authorization to be able to access this system and files. This is a clear case that defensive counterintelligence measures could have prevented printing, concealment and removal of documents from the workplace. One great example of offensive counterespionage was the search of Chung’s trash which led to much revealing evidence.Also his extensive travel to the PRC was an indicator that his scope of activities while in the PRC were above speaking engagements, seminars, teaching, personal. The authorities did conduct offensive counterintelligence to the best of their abilities once it learned via the other agent implicated in similar dealings with the PRC.

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