Counterintelligence played an enormous and very beneficial impact on the success of the first Gulf War, “Desert Storm.”Military action was swift, decisive and successful. During 1990 the CIA closely monitored Iraq’s military and political actions. The CIA also notified the U.S. Military and U.S. policy makers as Iraq began an armed forces buildup near Kuwait. CIA had determined they would probably attack Kuwait. CIA assessed the attack as being “highly likely” to occur in a short time and that forces were significant enough to not only seize all of Kuwait but also to drive into Saudi Arabia. CIA established continuous watch in its operations to conduct whatever collection, assessment, etc. needed. Included were operations officers, political analysts, weapons analysts, military analysts, economic and oil analysts, imagery analyst and cartographers. They produced mass amounts of intelligence cables, reports and briefings. Much of the intelligence dealt with probable locations and capabilities of Iraqi chemical weapons and systems. The analysts gave briefings to the US military on such topics as Iraqi ground, air and air defenses; their tactics of which included chemical weapons which Iraq utilized during their war with Iran, minefields, etc. The CIA warned Iraqi forces had chemical weapons, warheads and possibly biological warheads. And it was prepared to launch Scud missiles. The CIA also warned the Scuds would be launched into Israel within 48 hours of the start of the war. President Bush warned Iraqi President Hussein that grave consequences would await Iraq should they use chemical weapons.
The CIA also lent support that aided in the execution of the war. It provided specifics of what WMD might be used and locations of such. The logistical information on Iraqi ground forces was very beneficial. The CIA also provided logistics to the Coalition. The air and defense forces information was provided to the military, and also any threat to naval forces.
Although aligned with Desert Storm the US post war provided “Operation Provide Comfort” which provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and also enforced a “no fly zone” north of the 36th parallel and a no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, and some later were renamed and continued operations.
In my second operation I will briefly analyze The Iran-Contra Operation, which was controversial in that it dealt with rogue nations but it did have strong merit as priorities were worthy and included persuading Iran to release American hostages and to aid the Contras since they were favorable to the United States rather than the Sandinistas which were pro-socialist.The Sandinistas gained power as socialists in Nicaragua through revolution in 1979. President Carter of the United States tried providing aid of $99 million to The FSLN so to influence them to a pro-US view. But FSLN had Cuban influence and also sought an alliance with the Soviet Bloc. They passed three decrees limiting the freedom of press and political organizing. Carter tired of this and authorized the CIA to support resistance forces in Nicaragua but did not include armed action.
In 1981 President Reagan is inaugurated and with it a shift to the conservative side of politics. President Reagan continues encouragement of the CIA, but stops short of authorizing arming the rebels. Reagan then establishes a “democratization everywhere” proclamation. In 1983 the CIA assists the contras in attacking transportation and economic targets in Nicaragua. In spring of 1984 the U.S. Congress found out about the CIA’s mining of the harbors-which even intelligence committee members did not have much knowledge of. In June of 1984 Saudi Arabia provided money through McFarlane for the Contras. Oliver North in Summer of 1984 asked Richard Secord to get supplies to the Contras. The Boland Amendment II established a policy of not financing the Contra’s and no solicitation of 3rd party donors. The Iran focus of the Iran-Contra operations was to obtain needed military equipment for its ongoing war with Iraq. U.S. reluctantly did agree to provide arms after a long and arduous hostage release program that was unsuccessful and kept it distanced directly from involvement with the United States by shipping the supplies from Israel as a cover seller. Later in 1985 Israel initiated a sale to Iran of 500 TOW missiles which were obtained from the United States. Oliver North then assisted and arranged Hawk missiles to be sold to Iran to be shipped from Israel. Importantly “On January 17, 1986, the defendant JOHN M. POINDEXTER orally briefed the President from a memorandum prepared by the defendant OLIVER L. NORTH, after which the President signed a finding authorizing the sale of arms by the United States Government to elements in Iran in support of a United States initiative to establish a more moderate government in Iran, to obtain intelligence relating to Iran, and to secure the release of American hostages held in Lebanon.” Iran subsequently offered to pay $10,000 per TOW missile to the U.S for each missile. Oliver North arranged that the CIA be paid $3,469 per missile. The Iranians had made the $10 million dollar payment to the account Lake Resources for the 1000 TOW missiles. The ending financial results paid the CIA $3.7 million for the TOW missiles and left $6 million in the Enterprise account. These missiles were shipped from the U.S.
Funds kept crediting to the U.S. with a large portion of it being available for the Contras. In late 1986, 500 TOW missiles were again sent to Iran. The amount received for the missiles was higher than the amount paid to the CIA.
In addition during 1985 and 1986 military weapons and supplies flowed to the Contra leaders with $100,000 of radios. Also, money was earmarked for cash for use by DEA officers including gaining information on American hostages in Lebanon. The operation was made public and hearings took place. The release of hostages was an opportunity that most would attempt if it had a chance of success. Supporting Pro-American Nicaragua Contras instead of the Sandinista socialist form of government is preferred. It resulted in charges and most involved were pardoned. It had worthy purpose and cause but procedurally did not have authority to conduct all operations that were conducted, or at least in the manner they were.
Operation Desert Storm was very successful and counterintelligence played a beneficial role in the operation. This is a great example of post-Cold War to pre-9/11 in which it showed great technological advances in IMINT and SIGINT. The main challenge presented was to civilians in proximity to the war campaign and also friendly fire within such close quarters with amassed forces.
The Iran-Contra Operation was also pre-9/11 and as such did not have the leniency afforded intelligence personnel via the “Patriot Act.” I do think if this operation had been post 9/11 the Congress and public may not have perceived the operation as it did. The Iran-Contra operation faced enormous difficulties in the legal spectrum from violating our own doctrine of not aiding Iran and not directly interfering in political affairs. It resulted in investigations and charges filed.
These two operations are 180 degrees apart with conclusions at that same level of disparity and it illustrates how a counterintelligence operation such as “Desert Storm” given the support and tools needed can provide a most valuable service. In the Iran-Contra operation it had a wide spectrum of goals which perhaps were unrealistic. Their counterintelligence should have diligently and regularly provided statistics as to probability of outcome and risk/reward.
These two examples of operations I discussed may strengthen Mission Objective 1 of the National Counterintelligence Strategy regarding the deepening of understanding foreign intelligence entities plans, intentions and capabilities. In the Desert Storm Operation the CIA did a great job of assessing Iraq’s aggression towards neighboring countries. An accurate assessment was in place and perhaps could only be slightly improved upon. And the Iran-Contra operation realizes the need of Mission Objective 2 especially into assessing the adversary’s capabilities, strengths and weakness, as well as the capabilities and likelihood of the Contras gaining power.
Transnational Crimes in the Maritime Realm
Maritime trafficking routes closely follow the commercial shipping lanes. The modalities, technologies and strategies put into place by criminals are often times more sophisticated in caliber than those used in regulated trade. The vast expanses of the sea, the complexity of the maritime transportation system, the immense volume of cargo transferred at each port, and the limited capacity for inspections of cargo creates opportunity for criminals. Seaborne trade in the maritime realm follows a defined set of “sea lines of communication” based on currents and weather. Because of the robustness of shipping and mass amounts of cargo moved, traffickers utilize the same shipping industry routes with great effect. Shipping and sea lanes tend to offer anonymity for criminals, whereas their activities can be hidden behind legitimate industries. Criminal activity, especially illicit trade in narcotics, humans, and weapons, has become so extensive that it is difficult according to various studies to rule out implications of states and corporations in the criminal enterprise.
Individuals from various nationalities, followed by multiple vessels flagged to different states, adds the UN Drug Trade Report 2019, are used in the networks which transit the waters of various states and call at different ports before reaching their final destination. Despite the abundance of laws designed to combat illicit trafficking and an apparent impetus to stop specific types of crime, government’s remains only marginally successful in preventing the global flow of illegal goods due to the overwhelming volume and complexity of the markets for illicit trade. Working in tandem, the maritime forces nevertheless have made successful efforts to disrupt the illicit supply chains as a result of sea-based security operations; cooperation and collaboration between law enforcement organizations.
Nevertheless, legal complexity arises as the high seas “fall outside the jurisdiction of any single state” under the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ocean space is to be collectively policed by all states governed by principles of Freedom of navigation. Piracy and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons comprise the main varieties of transnational crime. UNCLOS addresses these matter of concern in the realm of the sea, where various articles provide guidance in order to curb or limit the threats. Article 110 expounds the customary rule that warships may “approach and visit” on the high seas “any ship that is suspected of piracy, human trafficking, unauthorized broadcasting; and is without nationality”; or, “is flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag.” Article 111 addresses the right of “hot pursuit”, allowing warships of one state to follow a vessel through the different maritime zones of the ship if based on “reasonable grounds,” it is suspected of illegal activity.
UNCLOS under Article 108 empowers states to cooperate and offer assistance to suppress drug trafficking by other state-flagged vessels. Traditionally, drug traffickers used overland routes, but since last two decades, they have shifted transportation into the “Indo-Pacific Ocean”. The majority of this trafficking has proliferated in the littoral regions, and often within territorial waters. In the latter years, advancement in technologies, providing for larger ships have allowed traffickers to move further into the sea to capitalize “blue water” areas, outside the 12-nautical mile mark and at times further than the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of any country. It is a documented fact that U.S. is the world’s largest consumer of illegal drugs, also according to various studies the source and transit zones of drug trafficking between South America and the U.S despite high patrols on the border.
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Piracy has been one of the most ancient forms of maritime crime that is treated rigorously under the provisions of UNCLOS. Article 101 defines piracy as “any illegal act of violence or detention, any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, outside the jurisdiction of any state.” The latter parts highlights an important aspect that piracy is a type of transnational crime conducted by non-state actors in international waters. Article 105 of UNCLOS grants everystate the authority to seize any vessel, associated property and to arrest any persons engaged in piracy. Domestic courts of the state conducting the seizure have the mandate prosecute the pirates under domestic law and determine what to do with the vessels; however, to date the courts remain inadequate or unsupported in many places.
Piracy became a security issue of international concern since the last decade and half, primarily in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea largely due to weak patrolling and sea blindness by the littoral states of the region. However, to an extent order at sea has been maintained with the presence Combined Task Force-151(CTF-151), focused on counter-piracy, and Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) to combat illicit activities at sea. Supported by several U.N. Security Council Resolutions, these task forces have “engaged with regional partners to build capacity and improve capabilities to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.”
Piracy in the Asia-Pacific remains a matter of concern, however most of the incidents are underreported and those reported are of such small scale that they cloud the assessment of major piracy events. In the region, although piracy has been contained in the eastern region of Africa whereas it has proliferated in the western Africa around the Gulf of Guinea. This subject-matter experts conclude is a result of an increased trafficking in narcotics from Latin America, along with the various other illicit elements involving illegal fishing and human trafficking. The increased in piracy is a reminder for states that piracy remains a persistent and widespread challenge to maritime security. The recent activities in Somalia and Yemen foreshadow a resurgence of piracy in the region, encouraged by trafficking of light weapons and small arms, along with non-state actor’s unprecedented access to ship monitoring, tracking devices, and use of unmanned systems and long range communications.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) identifies only certain types of transnational crime that affect maritime security, but there are many varieties and combinations of criminal activity that affect security and safety from the high seas to internal waters. Domestic laws however need be brought in line with international law, and cooperative partnerships between the states, law enforcement, and militaries to combat illicit activity needs to transcend the morass of politics that are often a hurdle in the way of more comprehensive legal regimes. It is recommended that information and intelligence sharing, along with TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) need to be employed by the maritime forces to ensure freedom of the seas. UNCLOS provides a strong framework and multilateral efforts to deter criminal activity at sea for a more secure, safer operating environment for all. However, it is the difficulty in effective prosecution and applying of an equitable punishment to the culprits, involved in piracy, human trafficking and illicit drugs that must serve as a reminder to all states that much awaits for an all-inclusive solution.
Fighting Corporate Espionage by a Counterintelligence Agent
Corporate executives must bear the responsibility of today’s evolving corporate world entering into a global community where not only are the exposures to such a wide market area lucrative to an already thriving business, but also to a grave danger of the companies’ trade and technology secrets, systems, financial accounts and much more. No longer is “Security” to the facility and personnel all that is required. Many foreign countries and interests take short cuts to becoming competitive through the theft of trade secrets, products and overt and covert espionage of all sorts. Some of these entities are now facing a growing challenge from United States corporations with safeguarding of commercial information, proprietary information, and economic factors.
Many of the tactics utilized in private sector counterintelligence have much in common with the secrets and information the government does its best to safeguard from theft of foreign governments or non-traditional actor threats. The FBI estimates U.S. Corporations lose over $100 billion annually. There are open and legal methods of collection open that are harmful and a good counterintelligence program should target this as well as illegal activities such as electronic eavesdropping, hacking, etc. Passive counterintelligence tries to curtail what a collector may do through countermeasures, and awareness training. Active counterintelligence will prove beneficial to identify and detect a threat, and will conduct operations including eliminating threats or ongoing targeting. A mitigation policy should be of avail. After an attack it may raise shareholder concern which needs to be quelled quickly. Quick realization of a threat and implementing action promptly and efficiently can stop immeasurable damage.
The leaders in the private sector need to be proactive and realize that it is no longer only local threats they face. The threats can be global and may not only be an economic threat but also a threat to national security. In the U.S. private sector ties to the Defense, Intelligence and other government entities can be vast with a great deal of interplay and interconnectedness. Also, corporations do not employ many of the safeguards put in place by the defense and other government departments. Compartmentation, clearance, and many operations taken for granted in the government aren’t serving the corporate structures well-being at all or as well as it should be. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Title 18, Sections 1831 and 1832 of the U.S. Code covers economic espionage and also if they are considered trade theft prosecutions.
Where once economic espionage meant directly infiltrating a company or recruiting an employee within the corporation our biggest challenge today is cyber espionage. In reality secrets and information are stolen often and not even known they were taken. And a much less chance of apprehension. Cybercrimes operate in a stealth mode in many ways, but in a contrast way can be identified and detected and countered with effective counterintelligence methods. The U.S. economy has changed over the past 20 years. “Intellectual capital rather than physical assets now represent the bulk of a U.S. corporation’s value.”
With the growth of cybercrimes including corporate espionage some tips for safeguarding and thwarting foreign hostile intrusions include
Conduct real-time monitoring of networks and retaining access records
Software tools for content mgt., data loss prevention, network forensics
Utilize multi-factor authentication measures such as biometrics, PINS, passwords
Mobility policy in which measures are developed to oversee which connections can and cannot be made to corporate systems
Limits on social networking
Establish contingency plans
When deciding to emplace a counterintelligence program to safeguard a corporation the first stepis to conduct a risk assessment by assessing vulnerabilities and estimating the consequences of losing critical assets. This should be headed up by a board member or senior executive.
Then move to step two in which groundwork is laid for establishing a corporate counterintelligence program. Hire a manager dedicated to counterintelligence. Hook up the company’s security, intelligence assurance, general counsel and HR departments. Develop liaison with government law and intelligence. Ensure centralized management of the counterintelligence program. And have legal counsel provide guidance on the counterintelligence program actions.
Identify the Capabilities needed
Threat awareness and training
Analysis, Reporting and Response
Suspicious activity reporting
Implement the Counterintelligence Program
A basic counterintelligence program description will look something like this: PM (Program Manager) interplay such as:
PM develops and implements CI program
PM oversees a centralized CI Program office
PM maintains insight into all corporate elements
PM is responsible for liaison with US Government
Security officers responsible for tactical CI
PM provides CI guidance through training programs
Also be aware that not only high tech companies are targeted since the targeted information they seek may be deemed important by who is doing the shopping.
Where does allegiance lie?
Dongfan “Greg” Chung who is a native of China and a naturalized U.S. Citizen had “secret” security clearance while working with Rockwell and Boeing Corporations on the Space Shuttle project. He had retired in 2002 but returned a year later as a contractor until fall 2006. The government proved Chung committed espionage by taking and concealing Boeing secrets regarding the Delta IV rocket and also the Space Shuttle. He did this for the People’s Republic of China. He was convicted on charges of acting as an agent of the PRC as well as economic espionage.
The investigation of a different engineer working within the U.S is what led to Chung’s investigation and resulting conviction. He was sentenced to more than 24 years in prison.
The Chinese had sent letters requesting information as far back as 1979. In correspondence with the PRC Chung expressed his wishes to help the PRC modernize. He also sent 24 manuals related to the important B-1 Bomberfrom Rockwell Corporation which was very damaging.
Travel trips to the People’s Republic of China occurred on multiple occasions to lecture but he also met with government officials. In letters from his handlers they use his wife Rebecca and Chi Mak to transmit information. In the fall of 2006 FBI and NASA agents searched his home and discovered more than 250,000 documents from Boeing, Rockwell and others which were secret.
The Shuttle Drawing System or “SDS” that Rockwell and Boeing engineers created held information regarding performing processes regarding the Space Shuttle. The engineers need a password and authorization to be able to access this system and files. This is a clear case that defensive counterintelligence measures could have prevented printing, concealment and removal of documents from the workplace. One great example of offensive counterespionage was the search of Chung’s trash which led to much revealing evidence.Also his extensive travel to the PRC was an indicator that his scope of activities while in the PRC were above speaking engagements, seminars, teaching, personal. The authorities did conduct offensive counterintelligence to the best of their abilities once it learned via the other agent implicated in similar dealings with the PRC.
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