Authors: Jean-Baptiste Le Marois and Claire Hilton*
Governments around the world are setting increasingly ambitious climate targets while at the same time pursuing challenging national policy goals such as affordable and sustainable energy for all. In many cases, achieving these goals will require technologies that either do not yet exist, or are not yet ready for market, meaning innovation will be critical. Technology innovation can be a game changer across all sectors, including power generation, industry, buildings and transport.
Yet it is unlikely that any single country will be able to solve all of its energy and climate problems alone. International collaboration can help countries accelerate innovation processes by identifying common priorities and challenges, tackling pressing innovation gaps, sharing best practices to improve performance, reducing costs and reaching broad deployment of clean energy technologies. Given this massive potential, the fundamental question is not if countries should collaborate, but rather who should collaborate and how they can do so efficiently.
As part of the IEA’s efforts to support global energy transitions, we are working to help governments identify relevant collaborative partnership opportunities, engage with international partners and optimise possible synergies among existing initiatives. Our recent Energy Technology Innovation Partnerships report is a key step along this path, providing an overview of the global landscape of multilateral efforts relevant to energy technology innovation, and examining four selected collaborative partnerships. There are three key takeaways that highlight the challenges and potential of these efforts.
Enhancing collaboration among existing multilateral initiatives
International collaboration in the field of energy technology innovation is not new – many countries already participate in numerous multilateral initiatives, some of which have been active for decades, such as The Technology Collaboration Programme by IEA (TCP) which was established in 1974. Today, 38 independent Technology Collaborations operate under the TCP, made up of over 6,000 experts from nearly 300 public and private organisations based in 55 countries, who work together on topics ranging from renewable energy and smart grids to hydrogen and nuclear fusion.
Governments have launched several new partnerships over the last decade, such as the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) in 2009 and Mission Innovation (MI) in 2015, which both aim to accelerate international efforts to address climate change. The 27 members of CEM collaborate to promote the deployment of clean energy technologies through over 20 initiatives and campaigns. Similarly, MI counts 25 members who have pledged to double clean energy RD&D spending and co-lead activities under eight key innovation challenges, such as clean energy materials and affordable heating and cooling in buildings. Participation in Technology Collaborations, MI and CEM present a great degree of overlap, as countries tend to join the full suite of collaborative partnerships. In fact, 13 countries and the European Commission participate each in more than 20 Technology Collaborations, CEM and MI: the United States, Japan, Korea, Canada, China, Germany, Australia, France, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. This “core” group of decision makers is in a strong position to pursue further synergies across partnerships.
There are also many relevant regional partnerships that are making valuable contributions to energy technology innovation, such as the European Technology and Innovation Platforms (EU-ETIPs), which bring together EU governments and companies to identify research priorities and relevant energy innovation strategies.
Other examples of regional partnerships include mechanisms under the African Union and other African regional partnerships; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; various partnerships in the Middle East; and the Latin American Energy Organisation and the Organisation of American States. Many other partnerships focus on specific themes of interest, such as the Biofuture Platform, a group of 20 countries seeking to advance sustainable bioenergy and facilitated by the IEA.
As the global landscape of multilateral activities relevant to energy technology innovation becomes increasingly diverse and complex, it can be challenging for policy makers to identify which partnerships to engage with. In fact, despite the central role of innovation in energy transitions and the potential of international collaboration, there is limited information available on the full landscape of multilateral initiatives and how they interact.
Examining a selection of collaborative partnerships reveals that numerous initiatives focus on the same technology areas. Our own examination shows that in eight technology areas, at least three of the four selected partnerships have active initiatives: heating and cooling; carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS); nuclear; bioenergy and biofuels; wind; solar; smart grids; and hydrogen. The overlap becomes even more apparent when including other global, regional and thematic partnerships: for example, Technology Collaborations, MI, EU-ETIPs, the Biofuture Platform and the Global Bioenergy Partnership all focus on bioenergy. More generally, recent trends suggest that partnerships are increasingly centring on low-carbon energy sources and cross-cutting themes including systems integration.
Focusing on the same technologies across different partnerships may induce risks of duplication, thereby diluting policy maker attention and creating fundraising or political support challenges. That said, in some instances, activities may well address different aspects of the same technology area, justifying the overlap. Yet even in those cases, stakeholders have acknowledged that the perception of duplication may be enough to trigger a degree of competition between multilateral efforts. Policy makers would therefore benefit from identifying possible synergies between mechanisms to avoid replication of efforts while at the same time maximising complementarity.
Enhanced cross-mechanism collaboration may increase the impact of ongoing activities. For instance, co-locating stakeholder dialogue, events and roundtables may mobilise more actors and bring varied and valuable perspectives, attract attention from policy makers and enhance networking opportunities. Co-branding technology policy and market analyses may reveal new findings thanks to the combined experience, knowledge and networks of the initiatives involved. Collaboration between early-stage activities executing RD&D and initiatives providing competitive funding or grant opportunities may facilitate the development of energy technologies and their demonstration in real-life conditions or in strategic markets.
However, innovation stakeholders have also reported challenges in engaging with other collaborative mechanisms, in part because of a lack of systematic co-ordination processes. As a result, the number of interactions between existing partnerships, whether at the political or working level, remains low relative to the number of ongoing activities.
Despite these challenges, there are some initiatives that are already effectively collaborating across partnerships. For example, last year the co-leads of collaborative activities on smart grids under the International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN) (both a TCP and a CEM Initiative), identified a strategic opportunity to work more closely with the relevant Innovation Challenge under MI and formalised this co-operation.
Focus on emerging markets
Participation in collaborative partnerships continues to grow and diversify every year. IEA Members and Association countries currently account for the broadest participation in Technology Collaborations, CEM and MI, as illustrated by the “core” group of top-collaborators mentioned above.
While a strong central core of support is invaluable, an important trend for global innovation ecosystems is the increasing participation of emerging economies, such as China (currently a member of 23 Technology Collaborations), India (11), Mexico (10), South Africa (8) and Brazil (5).
Emerging market countries also tend to participate in regional partnerships, which allow governments that are not necessarily members of global efforts to benefit from international co-operation. The transition from regional to global collaboration is an encouraging trend for key emerging market countries, with which the IEA seeks to deepen engagement as part of the Clean Energy Transitions Programme (CETP).
Partnerships have made it clear that emerging economies are a top priority. As part of a survey conducted in 2019 by the IEA Secretariat, India was identified as a key prospective partner by 14 Technology Collaborations; Brazil by 12; Chile and China by 8; Mexico and Indonesia by 7. If prospective membership materialised, China would consolidate its high participation by holding membership in over 30 Technology Collaborations; India would join the “core” group of top-collaborative countries; and both Mexico and Brazil would be involved in over 15 Technology Collaborations.
Strengthening public-private cooperation
In addition to public agencies, private-sector actors play a critical role in RD&D and in ensuring key technologies reach markets. Examining both public and private contributions can help governments better understand the broader innovation ecosystem, engage with companies to leverage corporate expertise, influence and capital; and strategically allocate public funds in those energy sectors that remain underfunded or face financing access challenges.
While there is substantial interest from collaborative partnerships to deepen engagement with private-sector actors, this engagement is, at least for now, relatively uncommon. Among the four partnerships analysed in the report, only EU-ETIPs are co-led by industry stakeholders while some 80% of participants in Technology Collaborations are public bodies. For now, membership in MI and CEM is restricted to national governments, although engagement of private sector is actively sought and governments may designate in-country private sector experts to represent national interests in certain initiatives.
Different factors may be preventing companies from seeking engagement with government-led multilateral initiatives, including a lack of awareness of such programmes, differing working cultures between public and private actors, diverging priorities and little incentive to share information, and burdensome administrative procedures. On the other side, some stakeholders within collaborative partnerships remain reluctant to engage with industry, fearing the influence of corporate interests on their strategic decisions, work programmes or outputs. These reasonable concerns need to be overcome for effective public-private co-operation to take place.
Thankfully, we are seeing some positive developments. For instance, over 100 private-sector companies are now participating in the technical work of CEM activities, resulting from both CEM stakeholders reaching out to companies, and vice versa. In collaboration with the IEA, CEM also leads an Investment and Finance Initiative (CEM-IF) to help policy makers mobilise investments and financing, particularly from private sources, for clean energy deployment. Policy makers, collaborative partnerships and energy innovation stakeholders may benefit from further research on private-sector participation, building on these encouraging cases, to find ways to best leverage corporate capabilities.
As we continue to enhance our efforts related to technology innovation to support global energy transitions, the IEA encourages broad international collaboration to tackle pressing innovation gaps, share best practices and accelerate the deployment of clean energy technologies. Enhancing collaboration between existing initiatives, engaging with emerging markets and leveraging corporate capabilities, are three areas of promising focus for policy makers looking forward.
*Claire Hilton, Energy Partnerships Analyst.
China’s Unorthodox Intervention in the Global Oil Market
Apparently, China has been the talk of the town for quite some time. While the entire yesteryear passed in a flurry of blame game over the pandemic, this year has been nothing short of a blessing for Xi’s regime. However, while China rapidly compensated for the drastic slump last year, the bustling economy has now cooled down – though a bit prematurely. Due to the expansive outbreak of the delta variant, China – like most countries around the world – now faces surging inflation and a crippling shortage of raw materials. However, while one might get a bolder vibe from China’s recent crackdown on industrial giants, the supposed ‘Second Cultural Revolution’ seems on a divergent path from the government’s latest aspirations for the domestic industry.
China seems to be on a path to harness growth that appears to be slowing down as the global economy battles uncertainty. However, while many expected China to take orthodox measures to prolong growth, hardly anyone expected a drastic change of strategy: intervening in a close-knitted global market like never before.
China recently posted its most robust trade surplus in history, with a record rise in exports jumping 25.6% from last year to stand at $294.3; $10 billion more than any previous month. However, while the glowing figures imply sturdiness, the underlying fragility of the Chinese economy is not disguised. In the past few months, China’s production engine has taken a toll as surging energy costs have inhibited production capacity. The factory-gate inflation stands at a 13-year-high which has forced factories to cut output. Amid declining domestic demand due to covid restrictions, manufacturing surveys show that China’s export orders are eroding as supply bottlenecks coupled with energy costs have weighed heavily on the production function. To counter the problem, China recently supplied its reserves into the domestic market; undercutting the surging global price tag dictated by the petroleum giants.
Last Thursday, China’s National Food and Strategic Reserves Administrator made a press release, confirming that the world’s second-largest economy tapped into its crude reserves – estimated at 220 million barrels – to “ease the pressure of rising raw material prices.” While China is known to intervene in commodity markets by using its strategic reserves, for example, Copper, Aluminium, or even grains.
Recently, China tapped into its national reserves to intervene in the global commodity market of industrial metals for the first time since 2010. The intervention was situated as a release to normalize surging metal prices and retain domestic manufacturers’ margins. However, it is a novelty that a national agency confirmed an active supply of petroleum buffer via an official press conference. And while no additional details were offered, it is presumed by global strategists that the press release referred to the 20-30 million barrels allegedly poured into the domestic industry around mid-July: when Xi’s government offered to supply crude to the OPEC.
Furthermore, China’s Stockpile Agency claimed that through open auctions, China’s reserve crude was intended to “better stabilize the domestic demand and supply.” It was apparent that as China ventured through a supply crunch when Brent Crude – Global Crude Index/Benchmark – breached the $76 bpd mark, the country instead resorted to utilizing its own stockpile instead of relying on expensive imported petroleum. Thus, it shapes a clear picture of how China managed to clock a phenomenal trade surplus despite not importing its usual crude quota.
While it is common knowledge that economies like the US and Europe maintain strategic petroleum reserves, the buffers held by China were utilized to actively manipulate the price in a ‘normalized’ oil market instead of their designated usage in supply crunches or wars. The situation today is anything but critical for the oil market to warrant such an intervention. As OPEC+ has boosted its output by 400,000 bpd starting August, output has bloomed beyond its peak since the price war back in April 2020. While the oil market is still well below the output capacity, mutually curbed by the OPEC+ alliance, the demand is still shaky and an equilibrium seems set. Yet, when we observe China – the world’s largest oil importer – we extricate reason that despite a growing economy, China continues to experience massive shortages: primarily in terms of oil, gas, coal, and electricity.
Furthermore, with the ensue of Hurricane Ida, massive US crude reserves have been wiped which has majorly impacted China as well. The US and China rarely stand on the same page on any front. However, even the White House recently asked OPEC to pump more crude into the market due to the rising gasoline prices in America. The same scenario is panning in China as energy shortages have led to surging costs while domestic demand is diminishing. The brunt is thus falling on the national exchequer: something China is not willing to haggle. While it is highly unorthodox of China to explicitly announce its intervention, many economists believe that it was a deliberate move on part of China’s communist brass to amplify the impact on the market. The plan seemingly worked as Brent fell by $1.36 to stand at $71.24 on Thursday.
If China’s commitment to normalize domestic energy prices is this significant, it is highly likely that another intervention could be pegged later in the fourth quarter. Primarily to counteract the contraction in export orders by cutting imports further to maintain a healthy trade surplus. In my opinion, it is clear that both the US and China are not willing to let Brent (and WTI) breach the $70-$75 bracket as key industries are at stake. However, while one takes a passive approach, the other is touted to go as far as pouring another 10-15 million barrels of crude by the end of 2021. Yet revered global commodity strategists believe that the downturn in prices is “short-lived” just like any other Chinese intervention in a variety of other commodity markets globally. And thus, experts believe that the pump is simply “not enough physical supply” to quite strike a permanent dent in an inherently flawed market mechanism.
Energy Forum Seeks To Analyze Africa’s Energy Potentials And Utilization
African Energy Week (AEW) 2021 in Cape Town, fully endorsed by the Government of South Africa, is committed to accelerating Africa’s energy growth with the aim of establishing a secure and sustainable energy future for every individual on the continent. Accordingly, AEW 2021 firmly believes in the role that oil and gas will continue to play in Africa and will emphasise the continent’s upstream market through a collaborative, International Oil Company (IOC) forum. Led by IOC executives, as well as government representatives from notable energy markets in Africa, the IOC forum aims to address the upstream challenges faced in Africa, providing solutions and strategies to drive exploration and make Africa more competitive for investment.
With the discovery of sizeable oil and gas reserves across the continent in recent years, regional and international explorers are turning an eye to the world’s final frontier market – Africa. Nigeria’s 200 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas reserves and 37.2 billion barrels of oil (bbl); Mozambique’s 11 tcf of gas; Senegal’s 450 billion cubic meters of gas; Libya’s 48 billion bbl and 53.1 tcf; and Egypt’s 77.2 tcf of gas have all made Africa the ideal destination for hydrocarbon exploration. What’s more, with many African countries making significant steps to enhance their regulatory environments, implementing legislation to create an enabling environment for investment, the continent has become a highly competitive market for exploration and production. Nigeria’s recently implemented Petroleum Industry Bill, Gabon’s new Hydrocarbon Code, and Angola’s inclusive petroleum regulation, to name a few, have all ensured a competitive and highly attractive market.
With the world’s six oil ‘supermajors’ – BP, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and TotalEnergies – all actively present in mature and emerging markets across Africa, the continent has become an upstream hotspot. AEW 2021 aims to accelerate this trend, promoting new upstream opportunities and ensuring both National Oil Companies (NOC) and IOCs drive the continent into a new era of energy and economic success. Accordingly, Africa’s premier energy event will host an upstream-dedicated IOC forum in Cape Town, led by IOC executives and government representatives. The IOC forum aims to address key challenges in Africa’s upstream market, whereby the diverse speaker panel will offer up solutions to expand exploration and production, while ensuring the continent remains competitive for investment in a post-COVID-19, energy transition era.
In addition to the discussion on upstream activities, the forum aims to highlight the role of IOCs in enhancing capacity building, whereby emphasis will be placed on IOC-NOC collaboration. IOCs have a critical role to play in Africa, not only regarding resource development, but human capital and local business development. In order for the continent to become truly sustainable and competitive, NOCs require support from IOCs. Accordingly, the forum aims to identify strategies to enhance cooperation and partnerships, with IOCs taking the lead in Africa’s energy development.
“AEW 2021 in Cape Town will offer a real discussion on Africa. Oil and gas are critical in Africa’s development and the African Energy Chamber (AEC) will not succumb to the misguided narrative that Africa should abandon its potential. The IOCs in Africa have demonstrated the continent’s potential, and by sharing strategies to enhance growth, address challenges, and accelerate upstream activities, they will be key drivers in Africa’s energy future. The IOC forum will not only offer a description of African reserves, but will provide clear, attainable solutions to exploitation, exploration and production with the aim of using energy to enact stronger economic growth. By coming to Cape Town, attending the IOC forum, and interacting with African ministers from across the continent, you will be able to be a part of Africa’s energy transformation,” stated NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the AEC.
Nord Stream 2: A Geopolitical Tension between Russia and Ukraine and the European Dependence
Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is a 1,230-kilometer direct linkage between the Russian natural gas producers and the consumer market of Europe. The model was made keeping in mind the successful operation of the existing Nord Stream pipeline after a thorough analysis by Nord Stream AG. The main aim of NS2 is said to be the increase in the annual capacity of the existing pipeline up to 110 billion m³. The pipeline starts from the Russian region of Ust-Luga then stretches through the Baltic Sea and ends at the area of Greifswald in Germany. It is due to this route that the project is mainly considered to be controversial. Bypassing directly through the Baltic Sea, the importance of Ukraine for Russia for exporting natural gas to the European market would reduce significantly which will end the $3 billion transit fees gained by the Ukrainian government in the year 2018 alone, causing a sudden and huge strain on the GDP of the country.
This project worth $11 billion would double the market of Russia in Germany which is the largest market in Europe, possessing a key position in international politics. It is said by the Russian officials that the pipeline has almost been completed and it may get operational by the end of August in the year 2021. Some analysts and International Relations experts have considered this as a geopolitical weapon that gives leverage to Russia to influence future events in the region particularly the ones related to the Crimean annexation.
Threat to Ukraine
Recently in a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the President of Ukraine appeared to be displeased by the Western recognition of the NS2 pipeline. He called it a “dangerous political weapon” in the hands of the authoritative regime of Russia which has already annexed an integral part of their country to fulfill their geopolitical and economic desires. The desperate opposition of this project by the Ukrainian government has several underlying factors which are very important to discuss.
Firstly, the transit fees earned by Ukraine just by giving passage to the gas going from Russia to Europe make up a fine amount of the GDP of the country. If projects like NS2 get operational then the importance of Ukraine will decline, causing an end to the $3 billion transit fee. Although Russia has ensured to still use Ukrainian passage for the export of their gas, this does not seem to be happening in the future. States are after their national interests and Russia would prefer the direct linkage with the European market instead of paying billions to the Ukrainian government. Currently, out of the quarter of natural gas transported to Europe, around 80% has to pass through the Ukrainian territory.
Secondly, after the expiry of the transit deal between Russia and Ukraine in 2024, it would depend upon the negotiations between the two parties to revive the fate of this deal. Although Kremlin’s Spokespersons have ensured the revival of this deal after its expiry in 2024, debates still exist about the prospects. No one can claim with certitude about the future of this deal between the two states.
Thirdly, Ukraine is intimidated by the future of the country if the Russian gas pipeline bypasses its territory. There already exist many gas-related disputes between the two states which resulted in the cut-off of the gas supply in 2014 and later on in 2015. Russia can pressurize Ukraine for accepting their demands to get their gas supplies back. Recently, Ukraine has started to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas by switching back to European gas. But this would not be beneficial in any sense if the Russian monopoly over the gas market increases through the NS2 pipeline.
And lastly, the dependence of European markets on Russian gas can undermine the Crimean cause. Once a state has to depend on the other state for the necessities, it has to let go of many important causes and decisions. As Angela Merkel has repeatedly called the NS2 pipeline a geo-economic project rather than a geopolitical “weapon” that can be used by the Russian government as a decisive tool at times of disputes and crises, this already shows the drowning picture of the cause. In addition to this, previously the US administration was very aggressive towards the pipeline but the current government despite its opposition, is unable to do much for stopping the project which can get operational very soon.
Role of US and NS2 Pipeline
The United States of America is well aware of the changing dynamics of the region and the intentions of resurgent Russia. The Republican government under Trump proved to be very destructive for the project. The US did not only oppose the gas pipeline openly but also imposed sanctions on entities aiding Russia in the development of this gas pipeline. In January 2021, Trump imposed sanctions on the gas-pipeline laying ship, “Fortuna” and its owner under the Counter American’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Previously, work on the pipeline had to be suspended as the US imposed sanctions on the main company, Allseas. President Biden was one of the many policy-makers who opposed this pipeline and considered it dangerous for the US and its allies. Although it was not clear what Biden’s policies would be, Blinken ensured to use “persuasive tools” against the pipeline, after acquiring the office. President Biden indeed imposed sanctions on the Russian ships and other companies involved in the laying of pipeline, but analysts think this would not cause any impact on the project as it is almost running towards completion. Rather, anti-sanction policy-makers consider it more important to waive off these sanctions and get into formal negotiation talks with the Russian government.
In May 2021, the President of the US and the Chancellor of Germany gave a joint statement for the agreement signed between the two countries related to the NS2 project. Some of the main features incorporated in the agreement are the announcement of sanctions on Russia in case it violates the peaceful use of the pipeline and utilizes it as a weapon against Ukraine. Germany would not only oppose such a step but would also press on the EU to take counter-measures. Similarly, it was decided to revolutionize the energy sector of Ukraine by the creation of a Green Fund for Ukraine by Germany worth $1 billion. Initially, it was decided that Germany would contribute an amount of $175 million. Also, it is said that Germany would use all its leverage to ensure an extension of the current transit agreement (which is going to expire in 2024) between Russia and Ukraine for at least up to 10 years. This would continue the role played by Ukraine as a transit state, helping its GDP and putting off the security threat over it. There is a sharp criticism on the Biden administration over this agreement which did not involve Poland and Ukraine while deciding their future. Also, the deal does not put any process of hindering the pipeline which is against the aspirations of all Americans and most of its allies.
In addition to limiting the role and influence of Russia in the European continent, the US is also looking forward to the opportunities of fulfilling its national interest. If the US becomes successful in hindering the operation of NS2, it can expand its gas buyers in the European countries. This way, like the post-war era the US can get a strategic and decisive role in this part of the world which can ultimately help it to counter the threats related to the rise of China and the Sino-Russian nexus. We can say that the US cannot only use this as an economic incentive but also utilize its importance in the future of great power rivalry.
Why states are against this Pipeline Project?
Along with the direct impacts of this project on Ukraine and Poland (to some extent). The major concerns of the states which oppose the NS2 pipeline include the additional leverage which Russia will gain when its national gas firm would directly export gas supplies between Russia and the European continent. This may result in a sudden disruption of the supplies, influenced by the changing dynamics of the region. The Russian authorities had cut off the gas supplies of Europe in the winters of 2006 and 2009, leaving millions without gas for days. Similarly, the increased dependence of Europe on Russian gas can be counter-productive and may hinder the interests of the states and the US soon. This situation can be utilized by both Russia and China to exploit the bonding between the US and its allies.
From the security perspective, the presence of Russia and its naval forces can cause a security threat to the states surrounding the Baltic Sea. The unsettled conditions may lead to chaos and problems in the region.
If Russia was to get a high stake in the energy market of Europe, this would also allow it to exploit the situation and create a monopoly over the market. This may not also lead to political outcomes and consequences but can also end the game of local and international gas market players in the continent. This is the biggest threat that is encouraging the US to make NS2 a security threat for itself and its allies.
Keeping in view the nature of international politics and changing economic dimensions to the project, the only possible way forward is an agreement between Russia and the US related to the pipeline and the future of Ukraine. If developments can be made over the existing US-Germany agreement then concerns of the states can be mitigated to a huge degree. The options of imposing sanctions on the pipeline are no more practical and can be counter-productive for the US concerning its allies especially Germany.
The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline despite its economic benefits cannot be separated from its geopolitical aspects and consequences. In international politics, the hardest thing to do is to trust the intentions of the other state, especially when it was a superpower previously and has several examples of violating the sovereignty and rights of neighboring states. But presently, all those who oppose the pipeline have no other option than to allow its proper functioning under certain terms and conditions.
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