A decade and half ago, precisely in May 2004, this opinion article has since remained unpublished by the local Russian and foreign media. But, this time when Sochi is preparing to host the first historic Russia-Africa Summit, some aspects are still important for enriching public knowledge about the Russia-African relationship.
Understandably, in 2004 the theme “Russia and Africa at the Crossroad” formed the basis for the scientific conference that forms an integral but the most significant part of the “Africa Week” was celebrated in Moscow. Soon after the academic conference and to an extent, the theme has generated diverse views and debatable opinions, even until the present day. What is the importance of “Russia and Africa at the Crossroad” today?
Even though Russia shows a growing interest and opening up relations with African countries, there still exist bewilderingly large number of knowledgeable Africans (including politicians, business people and high-ranking diplomats) who have refused to face the bitter truth and recognize facts posed by the present-day political and economic factors shaping Russia’s policy toward African countries after the Soviet collapse.
Driven by real curiosity to ascertain how African and Russian academics and experts think about Russia-African ties, I willingly accepted an invitation to attend the above-mentioned African conference. The half-empty hall was the first sign of declining interest in the continent’s affairs, even by the Africans including diplomats themselves. For me and for a few of my colleagues, the most striking question, among others, till day is whether Russia really needs Africa or vice versa.
Thereafter, the ninth Africanist conference held at the Institute for African Studies drew more than 150 academics and experts from different countries. The conference exhaustively debated this controversial topic of Africa’s relations with Russia, or Russia’s relations with Africa, within the context of globalization and development.
By and large, time has distinctly changed and there are signs of hope for better ties and energized friendship with African countries. Important to say that Russia’s internal policies have ushered in more opportunities than there were in the Soviet era and therefore it would be shortsightedness to say that Russia has ignored Africa in its foreign policy activities as many Africans have already thought.
In the present situation, the problem of Russia-African relations under President Vladimir Putin is increasingly becoming re-activated compared to Boris Yeltsin’s days popularly referred to as “the Lost Decade” on Africa.
It’s, however, true that the most important factors are the revision of the policy concept which has manifested itself in a drastic change of preferences in favor of cooperation with Southeast Asian region, Europe and Western countries. On the other hand, African countries, too, have to demonstrate their interests especially in the economic spheres with Russia.
It is completely absurd to think that Russia has to adopt a universal approach to the whole continent. This is practically unacceptable, impossible and an unprofitable venture. In this setting, Russia can only apply its “selective diplomacy” which it always does, by trying to preserve high-level trade and economic relations with a few priority African countries.
Many western countries are helping Africa to develop. Apparently, Russia has also realized that many foreign players are supporting Africa’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) simply because it has seen it as an opportunity and conduit pipe to develop businesses, for example, huge infrastructural projects that are being built across the continent. Russia has only indicated its support, in principle, without watching what’s far beyond, but the United States, Europe and Asian countries have already done its own calculations, estimated economic and business returns.
Some global leaders have been craftily treading by visiting the continent and sending high-level trade and investment delegations promising to help integrate into the globalization and development process. The U.S. trade policy, for example, Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is one major step forward to penetrate and deepen business roots into Africa – offer U.S. industries and companies to manufacture goods in African countries. African exporters have been granted with trade preferences and flexible customs rules and regulations but strict on products quality.
Of course, Russia has made some efforts in the past, investing in Africa and training African specialists and the African Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences has also made research contributions to the Africa studies in Russia but, to a large extent, failed in turning the research efforts or results into profitable undertaking. The Institute remains cash-strapped and most of the hardworking researchers have left for alternative gainful employment elsewhere and/or abroad. What is worse within the context, Russian enterprises and business, in practice, offer little support to academic studies and research.
Globalization is as irresistible as it is inescapable. Unfortunately, while the rest of the world is rapidly globalizing, Africa has been left behind due to “Afro-pessimism” and “Afrocentric” attitudes. Changing the negative perceptions of Africa must be a challenge for African leadership in politics, business, academia and civil society. Africa really need to properly position itself as a key player in global economic sectors if it wants to improve the living standards for the 1.2 billion population.
Many Asian countries such as India, China and Singapore have benefited from globalization, while retaining certain key aspects of their local character and culture. Africa needs to do the same through good leadership, governance and well thought out policies and strategies that fit into the changing dynamics of a globalizing world.
It is a well-known fact that Africa largely has untapped natural resources and the market is potentially wide. Africa has the third largest oil reserves after Middle East and Latin America. Five countries account for 85% of the continent’s oil production – Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Angola and Algeria. The remaining 15% produced in Gabon, Congo, Cameroon, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and Cote d’Ivoire.
But one more fact about Africa is that it is composed of a multiplicity of social and ethnic groups. Many African countries have had varying degrees of endless conflicts, these have negative effects on relations with external countries including Russia. It seems a “new development thinking” and a “bottom-up development strategy” are necessary – primarily to improve infrastructure, modernize agriculture and focus on manufacturing, employment generating sectors as well as health and education – that could help minimize all kinds of conflicts there.
Sadly enough, forging progressively ahead with good policies that can ensure economic stability and prosperity as dictated by the global changes seemed completely out of sight for many African leaders. After the Soviet collapse, Russia has significantly changed making foreign investments and trade priority. Africans have the same chances as well. Looking at Russia’s market and the economic scene, only a few African countries are indisputably playing active role in Russia’s competitive economy.
Africa’s overall involvement in Russia is extremely negligible due to obvious factors. Most feared to tread the path of Egypt, Morocco, Kenya and South Africa, their products are gradually gaining foothold on the market. If Africans are seeking genuine development of mutually bilateral relationships with Russia, they must on their part, therefore to demonstrate bravery and establish the needed presence in Russia rather than perch on the sidelines. An increased involvement will help to perpetuate the expected economic cooperation they dream to achieve.
Africa could benefit substantially from well-functioning Russia-African relations, but again there are no organized non-government agencies committed to see such relations established and perfectly managed. The African business community is grossly absent in Moscow. Back in Africa, doing business presents real problems: poor business culture, poor infrastructure and technology. Above all, there is deep-seated corruption among the political elites and graft has become an accepted order of the day.
In an interview, Professor Vladimir Shubin, Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences, reiterated: “Russia is not doing enough to communicate to the broad public, particularly in Africa, true information about its domestic and foreign policies as well as the accomplishments of Russian culture, the economy, science and technology in order to form a positive perception of Russia abroad and a friendly attitude towards it as stated by the new Concept of the Foreign Policy.”
Unfortunately, effective means of influencing public opinion in Africa, as such as broadcasting and publishing have been lost in the Yeltsin’s era and have to be developed again. It must form one of the key foreign policy tasks of the state, according to Professor Shubin. In addition, Sergey Karaganov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and his colleagues might have shared the same thoughts with Professor Shubin.
In April 2004, more than 100 members of the political and business elites who gathered at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy annual retreat, drummed home preliminary plans to create an NGO something parallel to the Alliance Francais or the British Council as a way to promote better understanding of Russia abroad. That resulted into the creation of Russkiy Mir, but Russkiy Mir is still extremely weak on the African side. Soft Power is currently softer in the Russia-African relations.
The dark rainy clouds over Africa have long descended and the skies are getting brighter than before, Africans can still see far beyond their narrow self-centered interest, now that they have the African Union, – an important continental force to reckon with. The African Union, as a powerful instrument could broadly be used to solve the continent’s concrete multiple problems especially pushing the African Industrial Revolution in addition to the Continental Trade. There must be clear perspectives and this ought to be, however, for Africans themselves to provide legitimacy to whatever they want especially towards achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
It is time for African governments to review, set priority to removing obstacles and working productively so that the real benefits impact on the lives of the people and society. Africans should explicitly understand that the Russian government has made a complete turnabout from the communist past, now is briskly doing business with foreign countries and further looking to trade favorably with the international community, share its scientific and industrial achievements.
President Vladimir Putin could, indeed, give a strong and fresh impetus, not only in strengthening the existing relations, but also open entirely a new chapter with multiple and broad business opportunities that will boost the economy of Russia and Africa.
The European Union and Russia: To talk or not to talk and about what?
The recent visit of the High Representative of the European Union Josep Borrell to Moscow was seen by those, who care about good-neighbourly relations between the EU and Russia, as a first step on the way of putting an end to their decline, since already for some time they were going from bad to worse. Why didn’t the expectations of these people of good will bear the fruit? Were they simply naïve? To an extent, it is true. But why was there such a negative reaction to Borrell’s visit in several European capitals, and also in the European Parliament, including the calls for his resignation? What led Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia, to declare that his country must be ready to severing relations with the EU in case the latter adopts new sanctions against Moscow? What would this mean for Europe, for Russia and even for the wider world since notwithstanding the coronavirus the world remains interconnected and interdependent, even if a reverse tendency has also become visible?
First of all, it has to be noted that there are those, both in Russia as well as in Europe, who are actively against any improvement of relations between Moscow and Brussels. In Russia these are not only, and even not so much, those ultra-nationalists (exemplified, say, by Alexander Prohkanov) for whom the Western influence in Russia is like a bat from the hell infected by coronavirus. These are also members of the radical pro-Western opposition to the Kremlin, exemplified by Alexei Navalny. For them any sign of reconciliation between the West and Russia is a cause for alarm since in such a case they may be soon out of job. And both of these Russian opponents of rapprochement between the EU and Russia have their counterparts in the West, including Europe. Significant parts of political elites, particularly in the Baltic countries and in Poland, for whom trans-Atlantic ties are much more important than European interests, hope that by supporting the radical opposition in Russia they could enforce there a regime change, a kind of ‘colour revolution’.
However, as the success of such scenarios is ‘highly unlikely’ and political pragmatism and economic self-interests usually prevail over vociferous extremism, be it political or religious, there is still hope at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, when Sergei Lavrov said that Russia should be ready to possible severing relations between EU and Russia, he didn’t mean at all that it would be Russia’s choice. It was said in the context of a response to a threat of new EU’s sanctions and Moscow’s countersanctions since all such unfriendly measures inevitably undermine relations between States and societies. And though it is impossible to realistically imagine a complete severance of relations between Brussels and Moscow, it may well be that at least for the nearest future political relations between them become a bit frozen. It maybe even advisable to take the time off and reflect for a while, instead of continuing with mutual recriminations. However, this would also mean that relations between Russia and individual member-States of the Union would necessarily rise in importance since there are areas and issues where cooperation between Russia and Europe is inevitable and unavoidable (be it the situation in the Middle East, the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, responses to cyber-terrorism and even the conflict in Eastern Ukraine or the situation in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh, etc.). Moreover, Covid-19 is not only forcing States to impose stricter border controls, even within in the Schengen zone; the virus is also pushing them to cooperate in the distribution and use of effective vaccines, notwithstanding their ‘politically incorrect’ origin. This all means that the role and position of the EU in the world would further weaken.
The failure of Borrell’s mission was also predetermined by what the High Representative himself called ‘the DNA’ of the European Union – the concern for human rights, particularly in States that don’t belong to the Union. As the High Representative himself claimed, in justification of his visit and apologising before the MEPs for its meagre results, the primary purpose of his twofold mission was to convey to the Kremlin the Union’s concerns for human rights and political freedoms in Russia and particularly for the situation of Mr Navalny. He even demanded Navalny’s ‘immediate and unconditional release’. And only then came issues of bilateral cooperation between the EU and Russia. This was an absolutely wrong, even disastrous, way to start a dialogue. The European Union is not a human rights NGO, like the Amnesty International or the Human Rights Watch, and even if it has a human rights mandate, then only vis-à-vis its member-States. Moreover, the whole history of the human rights movement shows that inter-State relations (and relations between the EU and Russia are inter-State relations) are not the best forum for conducting a human rights discourse. For that there are specialised human rights bodies, both international and domestic, intergovernmental and non-governmental. When human rights diplomacy of States has had tangible positive effects, it has been achieved by unobtrusive approaches, never through public criticism in the face of mass media. Such criticism has always been counterproductive, even vis-à-vis smaller and weaker States, to say nothing about great powers.
Usually such public criticism doesn’t even have a purpose of improving the human rights situation in a target country. It may be a form of self-satisfaction – we are holding a moral high-ground, while you are outcasts (rogue or pariah States). It is nice to feel virtuous even if things on the grounds don’t change at all or even get worse. It may be also a part of regime-change tactics in parallel with undercover support for opposition forces in target States. Never have such public campaigns improved human rights situations. The opposite is true – human rights situations have improved as a result of fruitful cooperation between States. So, the reforms in China and the inclusion of China in the world-wide economic cooperation have lifted, according to the World Bank, 850 million Chinese out of extreme poverty, helping thereby the UN to achieve one of its Millennium Development Goals. However, such an unexpected success has not been to everybody’s liking and today Washington is trying to harness its allies to help contain Beijing’s rise, using for it, inter alia, human rights discourse that is not doing any good either for Uighurs in the North or Hongkongese in the South of the country. But such policy of containment is not at all about Uighurs or inhabitants of Hong Kong; it is about geopolitics in the disguise of human rights.
In the aftermath of the failed attempts to promote democracy and human rights in the wider Middle East, the former British Prime Minister Theresa May promised that there is no ‘return to the failed policies of the past. The days of Britain and America intervening in sovereign countries in an attempt to remake the world in our own image are over.’She vowed never to repeat the ‘failed policies of the past’, breaking from the ’liberal intervention’ principle established and promoted by her predecessor Tony Blair. Hubert Védrine, the former French Foreign Minister, was right in emphasising that ‘democracy and human rights will progress in future much less through the prescriptions and interference from the outside by the West than depending on the internal dynamics of individual societies’. It is often, though not always, the case that the less States publicly criticise other States on human rights issues, the better would it be for human rights.
From our partner International Affairs
The Role of Ideology in Foreign Policy: Why Contemporary Russia Cannot Be Compared to the Soviet Union
Ideology is a crucial component in understanding the motivation behind any individual or group of people. Realism falsely presupposes that the motivation of actors can be understood purely through the lens of survival in a limited resources zero-sum domain. At face level, this sounds rational and economic, but it should be understood that in microeconomics, even though people are assumed to always act self-interestedly, it is also understood that what their self-interest is actually composed of is ultimately subjective. Therefore, a more realistic and analytical view of realpolitik allows us to understand that the self-interest of nations is also subjective, which means that the role of ideology cannot be discounted as it pertains to foreign policy.
Throughout human history, nearly every nation has been founded for the sake of itself, even expansionist empires. A glaring exemption to this rule was observed during the Cold War, a clash of two markedly ideological countries.
The United States is a country that was founded on the ideology of humanist enlightenment liberalism and is a country whose founding was assumed to be not for the sake of themselves, but for the sake of all mankind. This was seen as early as the settling of the American continent, with John Winthrop’s famous imagery in A Model of Christian Charity which portrayed the country as a moral paragon, a city on a hill for all the world to see. Likewise, this idea of liberal universalism was evident in the very founding documents of America. In the United States Declaration of Independence, the founding fathers wrote that their country was being incepted to secure the idea “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”.
This founding ethos directly affected America’s foreign policy, as America has historically occupied a position as the world’s “policeman,” believing that they uniquely have an obligation to defend democratic values everywhere. This rhetoric can be found exhaustively in colloquial American media, but one noticeable concrete example of it is found in George Bush’s 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, where the document states that “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”.
In a similar vein, the Soviet Union was also founded upon an ideology that extended beyond its national borders. The USSR was the product of Marxist theory and was therefore not founded for the sake of national interest or nationalism, but for the sake of facilitating the international communist revolution, a sentiment captured in the final remarks of Marx’s Communist Manifesto: “the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains…WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!”
This created an interesting vision for communist statehood, because in the USSR, the state was not the merely the final end, as it is in many governance structures, but both an end in itself and a means to a further end. This Proletarian internationalism manifested itself into an interventionist foreign policy, one that sought to propagate communist ideology across the world and facilitate revolution. In fact, it could even be said that this was the primary function of the USSR. Even Lenin once admitted that “from the beginning of the October Revolution, foreign policy and international relations have been the main questions facing us” (Jacobson, 1994) .
The clash between these two ideological superpowers became physically manifest during the Cold War through various “cold conflicts” such as the Vietnam War, conflict in Angola, and Cuban missile crisis, instances when the US and USSR sought to project their values onto other nations. As can be imagined, the war made tensions very high between the two countries, and in the West, a staunch fear-based perception of Russia developed. The Cold War was portrayed in America as a fight between good and evil, and Russia was portrayed as a relentless enemy that will never back down, a sentiment which had a lasting effect on the way that Russia is viewed in the contemporary West. This impact has been so salient, that even Russia today is still often characterized as if it was some great evil, waiting for “red dawn” to arrive.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the communist ideology that had influenced the behavior of the USSR fell with it. Without this ideological superstructure, Russia reverted back into a country that falls into a normal range of ideological behavior, determined primarily by a defined set of national interests. While the USSR and US fought for the ability to hegemonize a bipolar system into a unipolar one, contemporary Russia rejects the idea of unipolarity and seeks to coexist with other nations in a multipolar world. Russia certainly has defined geographical areas in which it has foreign interests, specifically the Eurasian sphere, but these interests are predicated on a shared history and mutual economic benefit, and not desires to imperialize.
Nevertheless, in the modern age, there are still fears about Russian imperialism and a “new cold war”. Such fears come from a misunderstanding about the role of ideology in foreign policy. These sentiments demonstrate both a failure to understand the determining factor behind Soviet foreign policy—the union’s ideology, and a failure to analyze a modern country independently of its ideological history. These feelings come from an assumption that Russia today has the same motivational foundation as the Soviet Union, and that is simply not true.
The ideology supporting modern Russia’s foreign policy had formed largely in response to the conclusion of the Cold War, when a bipolar system was turned into a unipolar one, dominated by the United States. In this condition, the world was severely influenced by American foreign policy, military interests, politics, culture, and media, and could be defined as what many scholars would call a global hegemon. Russia considers such a distribution of power to be undemocratic and an affront to the individual autonomy of nation-states.
In his 2007 Munich address on security policy, Vladimir Putin criticized the idea of an America controlled hegemonic order when he stated that in our world, “there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within”. Another comment by Putin from around the same time period attacks this model of governance was when he stated that “(the) people are always teaching us democracy but the people who teach us democracy don’t want to learn it themselves”.
It was in response to this new structural backdrop, as well as increasing levels of globalization, that an ideology of multilateralism and polycentrism became the underlying motivator behind contemporary Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s ideology rejects a vision of an American led hegemonic order, but also does not seek to hegemonize the order for itself either, it merely beckons for the mutual coexistence and recognition of autonomy between the world’s global powers and regional subsystems.
This sentiment is captured in the words of Sergey Lavrov, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs for Russia in 2013. Lavrov stated that the world was undoubtedly moving towards a polycentric system of international relations, and that in order to ensure an equitable outcome during this transition, “fairer and more democratic systems where economic growth centers and new financial power centres should play a greater role in managing the world economy and political processes”. While the moves and actions of modern Russia are often framed in a realist lens by Western critics, the underlying ideology of the Russian Federation is actually quite liberal, as Russia accepts that a multipolar world should be brokered by polycentric or multilateral means, such as the United Nations.
It would be foolish to judge any country by its ideological history. It would be intellectually dishonest to evaluate a previously religious state in the context of religious ideology after secularization. Likewise, Russia today has largely, if not completely separated from its interventionist communist past and has embraced a new vision of both the world order and its foreign policy. When evaluating contempo
1. Jacobson, J. (1994). “The Ideological and Political Foundations of Soviet Foreign Policy.” In When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics. University of California Press. pp. 12.
From our partner RIAC
What Russia Wants In The Balkans
Popular narratives on Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Balkans point to two rather divergent directions. One of them, inherited from the 19th-century strategic thought, says that Russia, as a landlocked empire, must expand into the Balkans, so as to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. According to this narrative, the Balkans is treated as an empty space, regardless of the ethno-religious identity of the inhabitant population. The other one, which can be traced back to 19th-century romanticist pan-Slavism, but which has been popularized in its present form after the publication of Samuel Huntington’s theory of „the clash of civilizations“, says that Russia conceives of its influence in the Balkans through the cultivation of fraternal relations with the region’s Orthodox Christians, using common religious identity to project its geopolitical ambitions.
Facts on the ground, however, do not support either. Russia’s influence in the region, from the early 19th century to the present day, could never compete with the influence of the Anglo-French axis, exercised through the channels of Serbian and Greek nationalisms, constructed on the anti-Ottoman/anti-Islamic and anti-Habsburg/anti-Catholic foundations, in accordance with strategic interests of the two West European powers to dismantle the declining empires and transform them into a number of weak nation-states. Although these nationalist movements used Orthodox Christianity and a popular folklore motif of fraternity with Orthodox Russia as effective tools for mobilizing the targeted populations on the anti-Islamic and anti-Catholic grounds, their elites always remained clearly detached from Russia, being continuously oriented towards their true patrons in London and Paris.
The Russian motive in mobilizing Serbian nationalism in the 1990s was, of course, quite convenient for London and Paris, having concealed their continuous support to the Serbian military invasion of Bosnia and Croatia, which produced a gigantic campaign of ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population in the occupied areas, with more than 100.000 dead and over one million expelled. That was one of the reasons why the British propaganda, both diplomatic and public, insisted on the alleged Russian support to Serbia and its military expansion as a reason why the Western powers could not intervene in the war in Bosnia and prevent further bloodshed. Another reason, much more important from a strategic point of view – indeed, the reason why the Serbian campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing was supported by London and Paris in the first place – was the global promotion of Hungtington’s theory of „the clash of civilizations“ as „the next pattern of conflict“. According to that pattern, future geopolitical blocs would be formed on the basis of religious identities, acting as „civilizations“ in ineradicable conflicts. As a model of such conflicts at a micro-level was the one launched in Bosnia, in which Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians were pushed to the point of mutual extermination, in an attempt to form „ethnically cleansed“ areas. This scheme was imposed on these communities’ self-appointed leaders (Izetbegović, Karadžić, Boban) by the European Community’s negotiator Lord Carrington at the conference held in Lisbon in 1992, several months before the war. The widely promoted narrative of the alleged Russian support of the Serbian aggression on Bosnia, and the alleged pan-Islamic support to Bosnia’s defenders (with the deliberate media characterisation of all Bosnians, whatever their religion, as „Muslims“) served the purpose of transforming the world into one of clashing „civilizations“. The ultimate goal was to generate an analogous conflict between Orthodox Christians and Muslims on the macro-level, which would eventually push Russia into a lasting armed conflict with the former Soviet republics populated by Muslims, and then into a global conflict with the rest of the Islamic world. Needless to say, such a development would have created a significant strategic advantage for the Anglo-American powers and a great strategic loss for both Russia and the Islamic countries.
Yeltsin’s foreign policy at the time did not show too much understanding of that geopolitical game, allowing for a public image of Russia as a promoter of pan-Orthodox ideology and a sponsor of the Serbian aggression in the Balkans. However, it must be noted that Russia was not drawn into any major conflict that would fit the pattern of Hungtington’s „clash of civilizations“, although the local conflicts in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh, in which it was directly or indirectly involved, did possess some elements of that model. In contrast, Putin’s foreign policy was based on a much deeper understanding of global relations and geopolitical games at play, so that eventually the Anglo-American strategy of drawing Russia into inter-religious conflicts in Central Asia, in line with Huntington’s theory, did not bear much fruit. And so did the constructed image of Russia’s involvement on the Serbian side gradually wither away.
Yet, paradoxically, in the last couple of years Russia has played the role, previously insinuated by the Anglo-American propaganda, of a protector of Serbia’s efforts to create a Greater Serbia out of the territories of the neighbouring countries with a Serb ethnic minority population (Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo).It is difficult to imagine anything more destructive for a country, which is a home to more than 190 ethnic groups, than to adopt the principle of ethnic and religious homogeneity. However, contrary to the principles of ethnic diversity applied in its own territory and in the broader area of the former Soviet Union, Russia’s attitude in the Balkans has shown open support to the Greater Serbian programme of uniting all Serbs into a single, ethnically homogenous state. Russian foreign policy of open support for the Serbian efforts to cede the Serb-populated renegade province of Bosnia to Serbia is self-contradictory, to say the least. It is also self-defeating, if taken seriously and applied to Russia itself and the neighbouring countries with a Russian ethnic minority. Can anyone imagine today’s Russia in permanent efforts to cede parts of all post-Soviet republics populated with Russians, so as to unite them in some mythical Greater Russia? Or, can anyone imagine Russia attempting to ethnically cleanse its own territory, so as to expel or exterminate all those 190 ethnic communities, in the name of an ethnically homogenous Russian nation-state? Of course not. Yet, that is precisely the policy of Serbia towards its neighbours and towards its own population that Russia now openly supports on the international scene. Therefore, one has to rightfully ask, what is it that Russia wants in the Balkans?
In the first place, it is highly questionable how influential Russia really is in Serbia, despite its public support for it. For, the very existence of Serbia, from a semi-autonomous principality within the Ottoman territory in the 1830s to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1882 , to its expansion into other South Slavic territories in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) at the Versailles Conference in 1919, always had explicit support by London and Paris. The dissolution of the communist Yugoslavia, which Serbia used as a convenient opportunity to implement the Greater Serbia programme, was also clearly backed by London and Paris, with no relevant participation by Moscow. Under these conditions, it is difficult to imagine a strategic shift from the centuries long Anglo-French influence to that of Russia. It is also difficult to identify Russian strategic interests in the Balkans, given that Russia’s foreign policy was not designed to exert control in the zones outside the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Yet, if Russia has no real influence on Serbia, then the current Russian support of Serbia’s continuing hostile policy towards its neighbours may well be a simulation of influence. Even if such a simulation cannot deceive the foreign policy circles in London, which are quite familiar with the extent of their long-term control over Serbia, it may well deceive such circles in Washington, which are commonly persuaded that Moscow’s influence can be detected everywhere. For what purpose? If the Balkan region is of strategic importance for the US, not only as a link between the West and the Middle East, but also in terms of its natural resources (e.g. Kosovo), then the simulated Russian influence in the Balkans might serve as a leverage against the American influence in the zones of true strategic importance for Russia. What first comes to mind, of course, is Ukraine and its aspirations to join NATO: if a tactical simulation of Russian influence in the Balkans, as a zone of traditional strategic influence of the West, turns out to be successful, then it might be possible to push Washington to reduce its ambitions in Ukraine and leave it outside NATO structures.
There is also another purpose for which such a simulation might serve. Not so many analysts, diplomats or politicians are aware of the tacit strategic alliance between Russia and Turkey, which has elevated Turkey to the status of a great power. This alliance has already been tested in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. In Libya, Russia and Turkey simulated a possibility of mutual military confrontation, each supporting one of the warring parties, while in reality they agreed to divide the spheres of influence, using the Libyan warring parties as their respective proxies. In Syria, under the pretended confrontation, the new allies also divided the spheres of influence. Still, the most interesting game was played out in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Turkey openly supported Azerbaijan in its efforts to restore sovereignty over this region. On the other side, Armenia was persuaded by Western powers, namely France, to go into the war over Azerbaijan’s region under the pretext that Russian military support to Armenia was a geopolitical inevitability. However, Azerbaijan, with Turkish military support, took the region over, with no resistance on Russia’s part. Russia thus returned to the principle of inviolability of post-Soviet borders and finally abandoned the principle of ethnically homogenous greater states, advocated by Armenia and its patrons in Paris and London. Is there a possibility for Russia and Turkey to play a similar game in the Balkans? Is there a possibility that Russia and Turkey want to generate an illusion among the Serbian nationalist elites that Russia would unquestionably support their attempts to cede parts of Bosnia and Kosovo, at the same time leaving Turkey with a free hand to extend its military support to Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s efforts to prevent Serbia from questioning their sovereignty? Is there a will in Russia to return to the principle of inviolability of borders in the Balkans, too, thereby abandoning the principle of ethnic homogeneity advocated by Serbia and its sponsors in London and Paris, the most harmful principle for Russia’s own interests? Is there a will in Russia to follow its own geopolitical interests, in cooperation with Turkey, along the same lines and with the same implications as in Nagorno-Karabakh? Really, what is Russia doing in the Balkans?
COVID-19 pandemic and positives/negatives of the Pakistani government’s policy towards it
The covid-19 erupt from Wuhan in December 2019. The first case in Pakistan was observed on February 26th, 2020.It is...
InvestEU: EU programme to encourage investment
InvestEU continues EU efforts to boost investment in Europe, support the recovery and prepare the economy for the future. MEPs...
Flipflopi sets sail around Lake Victoria to raise awareness on pollution menace
Flipflopi, the world’s first sailing boat made from 100% recycled plastic, is joining forces with the UN Environment Programme’s Clean...
Who pulls the strings of the government of India?
While talking to a Cornell college professor, Rahul Gandhi lamented (March 2, 2021) that the RSS was making use of...
Multilateralism Without the USA
It has already done so for a long time. As I have described earlier: “Nobody waits for Biden” (or the...
Reversing the Impact of the Pandemic on Female Workers in Latin America
Working women in Latin America and the Caribbean were disproportionately affected by the Covid-19 pandemic compared to men. This fact...
Chinese Diplomacy: Xi’s “Twin” Victory over Biden, Modi?
On China, the US public stands apart and India’s Hindu majority population is described by Beijing as “self-deceptive.” In the...
Green Planet3 days ago
The global plastic problem
Africa3 days ago
South Sudan’s transition from conflict to recovery ‘inching forward’
Middle East2 days ago
Iraq Opens Hands to the Pope Francis’ Historic Visit
Middle East2 days ago
Restart Iran Policy by Stopping Tehran’s Influence Operations
Americas2 days ago
Implications of Right-Wing Politics in United States
Americas3 days ago
New US Administration Approach to Syria: How Different Could It Be?
Intelligence2 days ago
UN Security Council: Taliban continues to patronize Central Asian Jihadists
Energy News3 days ago
Innovation and market reform needed to drive Japan’s clean energy transition