Middle East
US alliance with Gulf Decays as UAE Strengthens Ties with China and Russia

The United States has stayed as staunched to its allies as it has remained to its foes. However, where the rivalry has been equally retaliated, some of its partners chose to maintain strategic relations. It won’t be a misconjecture to say that one of the most influential nations in the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been that ally.
The Emirati sands have recently blown in a different direction altogether, as it began purchasing Chinese weapons, creating bloodbath in the MENA region. Besides, some secret meetings at Seychelles — involving Trump administration, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Russians — also influenced the US electoral process. The meddling not just hurt the US’ national interests, but is also believed to potentially change the American perception about Democrats in future elections.
Before the partnership between these three nations, the US was the sole influential player. Going back to the early 1970s, the US-UAE relations grew into one of the greenest trees in the global garden of alliances. Besides, the major benefits have fallen into the laps of the UAE, as its de facto ruler MbZ shrewdly expanded his empire of influence by following the American lead.
The formal diplomatic relation between the two countries was established in 1972, and the bilateral cooperation has since turned stronger. Both have been partners in defence, non-proliferation, trade and law enforcement.
With vast oil and gas reserves, the UAE became the single largest exporter to the US in the MENA region. Washington, on its part, provided protection from external aggression, especially Iran, with which both share a common rivalry.
Prince MbZ used American expertise for its military training and former spies to set up its intelligence service. From 2007-2010, Prince Mohammed spent huge amounts on acquiring weapons — 80 F-16 fighters, 62 French Mirage jets and 30 Apache combat helicopters. This was more than those received by other five Gulf monarchies put together.
In the later years, the US began deploying various aircrafts at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi. In 2014, the United States began supplying more fighter jets as well as bombs to assist the UAE’s mission in Iraq and Syria. Even today, America is backing the Emirates’ intervention in both Yemen and Libya. It still provides weapons, intelligence and other support to the Saudi-UAE led coalition, causing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
In 2018 fiscal year, the US supplied more than half of its arms to the Middle East. Out of Pentagon’s total foreign sales of $55 billion, more than $30 billion worth of weapons and other military products were sold to Saudi and the UAE, in particular.
Moreover, a number of US Officials have provided such militarily or intelligence assistance to the UAE in the past. However, many have also crossed moral and legal boundaries in order to aid the Gulf monarchy. A fine example would be a CIA veteran and former US assistant secretary of defense, Mary Beth Long. In 2017, the HuffPost revealed Long’s questionable links to the UAE ambassador to US, Yousef Al Otaiba. This was revealed through leaked emails.
The US official, Mary Beth Long, is also known for having connections with general Khalifa Haftar, during Mohammed Gaddafi’s era. At the time, she was heading a group of US companies lobbying a sceptical Congress to sell weapons to Libya.
In return, the Gulf nation has not just supplied oil to Washington, but also became the first Middle Eastern country to assist the US-led mission in Afghanistan by sending its troops. In 2003, Mohammed bin Zayed willingly deployed 1,200 soldiers belonging to the Presidential Guard forces. The Emirati troops reportedly remained in Afghanistan till 2014. Moreover, the UAE also made its military facilities available for America and allied use, after the September 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda in the US.
Along the same lines as US, even the Gulf nation opted unethical practices of supporting its only friend in the White House, Donald Trump, during the 2016 presidential elections. Apart from their role in Russian meddling, Otaiba and Emirati businessman Rashid al-Malik allegedly intervened in Trump’s May 2016 speech on energy policy. The links were revealed through the emails they exchanged with Thomas J Barrack Jr, the top campaign fund-raiser and close friend of Trump.
However, the alliance tree is now on the verge of decaying, as the UAE’s interests are now spreading in varied directions. US is no longer its sole focus. The UAE has remained clear in terms of its needs, maintaining strategic ties with the US and its greatest foes— China and Russia.
China Injures US in Silence
China has been standing up to President Trump and America in multiple areas, especially in the trade sphere. While Trump continues to throw sanctions at the Asian nation, China’s confidence remains unwavering. China has been working on attaining greater support from the rest of the world. It has increasingly been successful through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Along with African, European and Asian countries and the US rival Russia, the UAE is also set to play a big role in China’s BRI.
On April 27, 2019, the Dubai ruler, Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, concluded their partnership in the BRI. He announced that the deal would potentially boost existing $53 billion bilateral trade to $70 billion in 2020.
China has not just retaliated in the trade war, but has also strategically established a strong foothold in the UAE. Dubai’s tribute to the Chinese New Year from the past two years, celebrating it with a nine-days ‘Light Up’ show in Burj Khalifa, is a testimony to their growing camaraderie.
In December 2015, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed visited China, which came as a major leap in relations of the two countries. He signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, to launch a significant investment cooperation fund worth $10 billion.
The relations further strengthened when Xi visited the UAE in July 2018, and the diplomatic relations turned from a mere bilateral cooperation to a comprehensive strategic partnership. During the three-days visit, the Chinese leader also met the Dubai ruler, along with Abu Dhabi’s MbZ. Besides, the UAE President Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan awarded Xi the Order of Zayed— the Emirates’ highest civil decoration.
The two nations announced 13 agreements and MoUs, which also included the approval for first Chinese state-owned financial services firm to set up in Abu Dhabi Global Market. Besides, the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company also agreed to explore joint business opportunities.
This year, Crown Prince MbZ visited Beijing for the first time since 2015, along with a considerable delegation of government and businesses. The three-day visit from July 21-23 advanced the relations between the two nations in more practical ways.
Leaders of the two nations announced to work towards increasing bilateral trade volume to $200 billion by 2030. Besides, a total of 16 agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed, aiming to strengthen cooperation across several sectors.
The visit also induced a major change in Arab culture, where the UAE became first Gulf nation to include Chinese language in their national education system.
China has also been facilitating the UAE’s needs better than America, when it comes to the Emirates’ ongoing missions in different countries of the MENA region. Top security partner to the UAE, the States’ Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy restricts the Pentagon from supplying armed drone technology to its Arab ally. On the other hand, China has displayed its weaponized drones in the market under its “no questions asked” policy.
Statistics reveal that the UAE’s defense spending grew by 10.8 per cent in a year— from $19.3 billions in 2017 to $21.4 billions in 2018. The UAE first purchased a Chinese drone, Wing Loong I, in 2016. More than a year later, in early 2018, the purchase of an upgraded and much deadlier version, Wing Loong II, was reported.
There were multiple reasons for the UAE to opt Chinese drones, particularly since America, under the Obama administration, denied to sell their armed UAVs to the Arab ally. Besides, Chinese weapons were easily available at much cheaper prices. The estimated cost of Wing Loong is about $1 million, while the US-made counterpart is sold at about $5 million.
In July 2017, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Chinese strikes and surveillance drones were being used by both UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Yemen war. A former Pentagon official and president of the US-UAE Business Council, Danny Sebright, stated that the Emiratis bought Chinese drones and equipped them with South African laser targeting systems. They have used them to guide missiles from planes for strikes in Yemen, he said.
According to the satellite images, the UAE has also used these drones to support Khalifa Haftar in Libya, who is in a battle of control against the United Nations-backed government in Tripoli.
While the US-UAE weapon trade cords were gradually rifting, the American President recently decided to win back the confidence of the Middle Eastern allies. On May 23, the Trump administration announced to sell $8.1 billion worth of munitions, aircraft parts, and other supplies to Saudi Arabia and UAE, without congressional approval. However, on July 17, the House joined the Senate and voted to block the arms sales.
UAE has also been engaging with a controversial military contractor, Erik Prince, the bother of US Secretary of Education, Betsy DaVos. He is allegedly the common link between China and the UAE. Prince is accused of training the militia for the ethnic cleansing of the Uighur Muslims in China and training the Emirati troops for showdown against the Houthis in Yemen.
China has also defeated the US in providing artificial intelligence technologies to the UAE. While such a technology faces escalated scrutiny in the States, China’s Hikvision and Huawei have been marketing biometric surveillance systems in the Gulf nation, which has made heavy investments in surveillance technology and has been using cellphone hacking software to spy journalists and dissidents.
Moreover, several Chinese firms have also been making large investments in Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi (KIZAD), over the last two years. Earlier this month, the East Hope Group of China also proposed an investment of $10 million, which would be implemented in three stages over 15 years.
The Rising Russia-UAE Axis
Russia has been another significant rival of the United States and an emerging major ally of the UAE. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, often have telephone conversations. In June this year, MbZ received a phone call from Putin. The two leaders reportedly discussed their relationship and joint co-ordination on international issues of mutual interest.
In June 2018, the Abu Dhabi ruler visited Moscow with a delegation for two days. Apart from discussing cooperation, the two nations also signed a declaration of strategic partnership in all domains, including political, economic, cultural and security.
MbZ had stated that it was crucial to “maintain a continuous coordination with Russia on regional issue to ensure security and stability”.
The Russian-UAE links were also highlighted in 2016, during a secret meeting in Seychelles that centered around influencing the US electoral process. Special counsel Robert Mueller, in his report, has mentioned the connivance between the Trump administration, MbZ, Russia and Erik Prince aimed at ensuring victory for Donald Trump.
Russia, too, has been supplying weapons to the UAE, indirectly backing the Emirates’ interests in war-torn nations like Yemen and Libya.
Russia is one of the three global producers of advanced air superiority fighters, along with China and the US, and the UAE was significantly interested in acquiring high-end fighter jets. Among the three producers, Washington has not produced a high-end fourth-generation heavy fighter, restricted the export of its fourth generation platform, the F-15C, to three clients, and has imposed a complete ban on the export of its fifth-generation platform, the F-22.
In the past, the UAE has constantly raised requests for F-35 aircrafts to the US, which have been rebuffed since 2011. China, on the other hand, remained unwilling to sell off its own air superiority platforms. Because of that, Russia became a monopoly in fourth-generation air superiority fighters, such as the Su-30 and Su-35.
In February 2017, Russia signed an agreement to sell multiple Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-E fighter jets to the UAE, and help it develop a fifth generation platform for its Air Force. At the time, the Gulf nation also awarded a $708 million contract for anti-armor missiles to the Russian agency Rosoboron export, during the IDEX 2017.
The growing partnership between the UAE and Russia were believed to be the Emirates’ way of gaining US concessions on F-35s and other possible transactions, which according to the Congressional Research Service could have become possible due to the US concerns regarding Russia-UAE arms dealings.
The concerns slightly proved to be true on April 15 this year, when the US deployed the F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters to Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE. The aircraft costs about $90 million and could not be redacted by radar. Besides, on April 30, the Emirates also conducted airstrikes on a Daesh tunnel network in Iraq, using the US fighter jets for the first time.
The relationship between Russia and the UAE is enhancing at a greater pace. The trade between the two nations increased by nearly 35 per cent in two years – from around $161 million in 2015 to $217 in 2017.
Earlier this month, the Russian Energy Minister, Alexander Novak, met the UAE’s minister of state, Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, running the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), to discuss cooperation in LNG projects in Moscow.
While the Trump administration is indulged in a conflict with China and Russia, these powerful global nations have been finding ways to establish strong relations with the Gulf. Several media reports have stated that it is crucial for the Pentagon to develop weapons, since both its rivals are developing hypersonic capabilities that can potentially defeat conventional anti-missile defense systems.
However, weaponry is not the sole area that is slipping from the hands of the US. Trade, energy, investments, diplomatic as well as cooperative relations, have also enhanced between the Gulf monarchy and the US foes – Russia and China.
The UAE has been defying America by establishing stronger relations with both China and Russia. While the expanding distance with the allies is often blamed on the American policies, it could also be associated to the UAE’s nature of perceiving ties, which apparently strengthens strategic partnerships with countries facilitating its interests without a hitch.
Middle East
View Turkey’s Life Following the 2023 Elections

Turkey has just celebrated the victory of its presidential election amidst inflation and also just recovering from the earthquake that occurred some time ago. The vote advantage in this election certainly leaves many pros and cons for the figure of an authoritarian leader in the country that oversaw the Arab Spring revolution. President Erdogan managed to win with only about 52% of the vote based on the results of the incomplete official vote count. This is because almost half of the voters in the deeply divided country do not support Erdogan’s authoritarian vision for Turkey. But in other parts of the world, Erdogan is still a favorite and a role model as a Muslim leader who can lead and last. In essence, no politician or president is truly good and ideal, each has its vices and disgraces. It’s just that the standards of good and bad are judged by time and the needs of the times.
What Erdogan means to Turkey
Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a very influential figure in the Turkish political landscape. He has been a prominent politician in Turkey for over two decades and has held various positions of power, including Mayor of Istanbul, Prime Minister, and now President of Turkey. Throughout his political career, Erdogan has been known for his conservative, nationalist, and Islamist political views.
Erdogan’s leadership has been praised by many for his ability to bring stability and economic growth to Turkey. During his tenure, Turkey has experienced significant economic development, and Erdogan has been credited with spearheading many of the country’s modernization efforts.
However, Erdogan’s leadership has also been criticized for its authoritarian tendencies, with many accusing him of eroding democratic institutions and muzzling opposition voices. In recent years, Turkey has been the subject of international scrutiny for its crackdown on dissent, including the imprisonment of journalists and human rights defenders. Erdogan’s role in Turkish politics is complex and controversial, with opinions on his legacy varying widely depending on one’s political beliefs and values.
A brief biography of the leader
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was born on February 26, 1954 in Rize, Turkey. Before entering politics, he worked as an imam and was active in Islamic organizations. In 1994, he was elected Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality of the newly established Justice and Development Party (AKP). In 2003, Erdogan was elected Prime Minister of Turkey and became President in 2014. During his tenure, he succeeded in bringing Turkey economic progress and gained widespread support from Turkey’s conservative and Islamist society. However, Erdogan’s leadership has also been criticized for being accused of restricting press freedom and curbing political opposition as well as being associated with human rights violations.
The strengths and weaknesses of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership in Turkish politics have always been a topic of debate among the public and politicians. Here are some examples of the strengths and weaknesses of Erdogan’s leadership:
Strengths of Erdogan’s Reign
Erdogan has managed to create economic stability in Turkey and attract foreign investment to his country.
He has succeeded in removing the ban on women wearing headscarves in Turkish state institutions.
Erdogan has strong support from conservative and Islamist circles in Turkey.
He has built adequate infrastructure in Turkey, such as fast railways and new airports.
Erdogan has successfully introduced education reforms and protected the rights of minorities.
Disadvantages:
Erdogan has been criticized for being authoritarian and suppressing political opposition, such as the arrest and detention of activists and journalists critical of his government.
He is also accused of restricting media and internet freedom in Turkey, such as shutting down media critical of him and suspecting people active on social media.
Erdogan has played a role in the conflict in Syria, which some say has caused security problems in Turkey.
He is in cahoots with conservatives and Islamists in Turkey and has taken no decisive action to push the country towards modernity.
Erdogan is considered unresponsive to humanitarian issues, such as failing to respond quickly to natural disasters, such as the earthquake in Turkey.
Erdogan in Turkish and Global View
The international community’s view of Recep Tayyip Erdogan varies. Some view him positively and appreciate his success in creating economic stability and modernizing infrastructure in Turkey, while others criticize him for being authoritarian and suppressing political opposition as well as limiting civil liberties and human rights.
Some of Erdogan’s controversial moves, such as granting mosque status back to Hagia Sophia and taking military action against Kurdish terrorists, have created pros and cons in international circles.
In addition, Turkey’s relations with neighboring countries are also sometimes not harmonious. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, has been involved in several conflicts and disputes with neighboring countries. Here are some of them:
1. Syria: Erdogan has been involved in the Syrian conflict, including supporting rebel groups fighting against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Turkey’s relations with Syria are already not good, however, and Erdogan has also been criticized by some neighboring countries for perceived interference in Syria’s internal affairs.
2. Military Coup in Turkey and Relations with Greece: In 2016, an attempted coup was staged by followers of fethullah gulen in Turkey. Erdogan claimed that Fethullah Gulen fled to neighboring Greece and accused them of refusing to hand over Gulen to Turkey. This conflict caused relations between Turkey and Greece to deteriorate further.
3. Armenia and Azerbaijan border: Erdogan has supported Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that took place in 2020 and called for the withdrawal of Armenian soldiers from the region. This has worsened Turkey’s relations with Armenia and its relationship with Russia, which mediates the conflict.
4. Libyan conflict: Erdogan has given support to the UN-recognized Libyan government and has denounced the support of the United Arab Emirates and Egypt for giving support to different parties. This has worsened relations between Turkey and these countries.
Erdogan’s conflicts with leaders of neighboring countries have created tensions and worsened bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Turkey remains an important player in global geopolitics and Erdogan continues to be active in international relations including in the role of mediator in various regional and global conflicts.
However, Turkey remains an important country in global geopolitics, and Erdogan continues to be active in international relations, including in the role of mediator in various regional and global conflicts.
Turkey: Glance the Near Future
Following his election victory in 2023, Erdogan’s leadership in Turkey will enter a period that extends his rule after nearly 20 years in office. Here are some of the changes that can be seen in Erdogan’s leadership:
Extension of the term of government: With the victory, Erdogan extends his term as Turkey’s leader. This will allow him to implement a longer and more extensive political and economic agenda.
Consolidation of power: Erdogan’s election victory implies that he still receives strong political support from conservative and Islamist circles. This strengthens his position in allocating power and maintaining political control.
Economic Issues: Erdogan will be faced with the challenge of improving Turkey’s economic situation which still suffers from several problems such as inflation and budget deficit. Consolidation of political power may provide the stability needed for the implementation of economic policies.
Future of Foreign Relations: Erdogan needs to find ways to strengthen Turkey’s relations with several neighboring countries and international organizations. Appropriate foreign policy is needed to maintain stable regional and global relations.
Human rights and civil liberties: There are concerns about the suppression of political opposition, human rights and civil liberties in Turkey. Erdogan needs to take appropriate measures to improve this situation.
Erdogan’s victory in the 2023 election gives him strong political power to carry out the policies and programs of the Turkish government. However, the policies and actions he takes during his leadership will still be monitored and assessed by a number of national and international parties.
It is uncertain whether the future of Turkey will continue under Erdogan’s leadership in the economic atmosphere and post-recovery from natural disasters. But it is likely to be more complex.
Middle East
Gulf support for Turkey’s Erdogan is about more than economics

When jailed Turkish politician Selahattin Demirtas apologized for his pro-Kurdish party’s poor performance in recent Turkish elections, he did more than take responsibility.
Mr. Demirtas implicitly questioned the notion that Turks vote primarily along ideological and identity lines rather than based on assessing which party will best further their economic and social interests. However, the reality is that all the above shape how Turks vote.
Mr. Demirtas’ Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), running under another party banner due to a potential ban over alleged militant ties, won 8.79 percent in last month’s parliamentary election compared to 11.7 per cent in 2018. Even so, it remains the third-largest party in parliament.
At first glance, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic performance suggested that Turks would choose change. Inflation hovers around 44 per cent; the Turkish lira has lost 90 per cent of its value over the last decade and hit a new low a day after Mr. Erdogan’s electoral victory.
In addition, many blame corruption and a failure to enforce building standards for the degree of devastation caused by earthquakes in February in eastern Turkey, parts of which are predominantly Kurdish.
Stunning as those statistics and allegations may be, they tell only part of the story.
Counterintuitively, Mr. Erdogan likely benefitted not only from skills that best come to the fore when he is in a political fight but also from his religiosity, religious lacing of politics, and promotion of greater freedom for public expressions of piety in a country that long sought to restrict them to the private sphere.
Conservative religious women were one major constituency that benefitted economically and socially from Mr. Erdogan’s rollback of Kemalist restrictions that barred women from wearing headscarves in government offices and universities.
“Erdogan is loved that much because he changed people’s lives,” said Ozlem Zengin, a female member of parliament for the president’s Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Similarly, religion may have been one reason voters in earthquake-hit areas favoured the AKP above Mr. Demirtas’ HDP.
Economist Jeanet Sinding Bentzen notes that “individuals become more religious if an earthquake recently hit close by. Even though the effect decreases after a while, data on children of immigrants reveal a persistent effect across generations.”
Economics in mind, some voters questioned whether opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu with his vow to reintegrate Turkey into the Western fold, would have been able to secure badly needed support from Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
After years of strained relations, Saudi and Emirati support for Mr. Erdogan was displayed within days of the Turkish leader’s electoral success.
The UAE ratified a five-year, US$40 billion trade deal with Turkey three days after the vote. ‘This deal marks a new era of cooperation in our long-standing friendship,” said UAE Minister of State for Foreign Trade Thani al-Zeyoudi.
Meanwhile, Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s national oil company, met in Ankara with some 80 Turkish contractors this week to discuss US$50 billion worth of potential projects.
“Aramco wants to see as many Turkish contractors as possible in its projects. They are planning refinery, pipeline, management buildings, and other infrastructure construction that will be worth $50 billion in investment,” said Erdal Eren, head of the Turkish Contractors Association.
In a bow to foreign investors, including Gulf states that increasingly tie aid to recipients’ economic reform policies, Mr. Erdogan on Saturday named Mehmet Simsek, a widely respected former banker and deputy prime minister and finance minister, as his new treasury and finance minister.
Foreign investors and analysts saw the appointment of Mr. Simsek, an advocate of conventional economic policies, as a sign that Mr. Erdogan may shift away from his unorthodox refusal to raise interest rates that fueled inflation and an exodus of foreign money.
In addition to stabilizing the economy, Mr. Erdogan faces challenges funding reconstruction in earthquake-hit areas as well as northern Syria as part of an effort to facilitate the return of refugees.
With 3.7 million registered refugees, Turkey is home to the largest Syrian exile community. Anti-migrant sentiment and pledges to return refugees were important in last month’s election campaigns. Refugee return is also part of the Gulf states’ renewed engagement with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
In a twist of irony, Gulf support for Mr. Erdogan, despite his Islamist leanings, may be driven as much by economics as geopolitics.
At a time when the UAE and Saudi Arabia adopt positions at odds with the policies of the United States, the region’s security guarantor, they may see Mr. Erdogan as an increasingly important partner irrespective of whether the Gulf states’ moves constitute a genuine policy shift or merely a pressure tactic to persuade the US to be more attentive to their concerns.
Like the two Gulf states, Mr. Erdogan, despite Turkey’s NATO membership, has pursued an independent foreign policy involving close ties to Russia and a military intervention in Syria that impacts Gulf efforts to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran.
In its latest charting of an independent course, the UAE said it was pulling out of a US-led maritime security force, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).
Led by a US admiral, the CMF groups 38 countries, including Saudi Arabia, in a bid to halt Iranian attacks on commercial ships, weapons smuggling, and piracy.
The UAE said its withdrawal was part of an assessment of “effective security cooperation” in the Middle East.
However, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his Emirati counterpart, Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, did not mention a UAE withdrawal in a joint statement on Friday after talks in Washington.
“Sheikh Tahnoon praised the United States’ strong security and defense partnership with the UAE. Mr. Sullivan confirmed the US commitment to deterring threats against the UAE and other US partners while also working diplomatically to de-escalate conflicts and reduce tensions in the region,” the statement said.
Moreover, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken will meet in Saudi Arabia this week with his Gulf Cooperation Council counterparts, including the UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan.
At the same time, various Iranian and other media quoted a Qatari news website, Al Jadid, saying that China was facilitating talks between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iran to create a joint naval force to enhance maritime security in the Gulf.
The report did not clarify whether China would play an active role in the force or whether participation would be limited to Middle Eastern states.
Iranian naval commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani discussed plans for a joint maritime force on local television but did not mention Chinese involvement.
In a first response, CMS and US Fifth Fleet spokesman Commander Tim Hawkins dismissed the notion of maritime forces that includes Iran. ““It defies reason that Iran, the number one cause of regional instability, claims it wants to form a naval security alliance to protect the very waters it threatens,” Mr. Hawkins said.
Nevertheless, the force, if created, could cast a different light on Emirati and Saudi efforts to boost Mr. Erdogan.
Taken together, the UAE’s alleged withdrawal from the US-led CMF, the creation of a China-associated alternative force, and support for Mr. Erdogan would signal a Gulf willingness to take greater responsibility for the region’s security.
It would also indicate a qualitative change in Chinese engagement in the Middle East following the China-mediated agreement in March between Saudi Arabia and Iran that restored diplomatic relations.
Turkey has been conspicuously absent in discussions about Gulf security even though it is a regional powerhouse with a battle-hardened military, an expanding homegrown defence industry, and regional ambitions. The UAE and Saudi Arabia account for 40 per cent of Turkish arms exports.
Turkey first proposed establishing a military base in Saudi Arabia in 2015, two years before the kingdom and the UAE initiated a 3.5-year-long diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar that was lifted in 2021. The Gulf states demanded, among others, that Qatar halt military cooperation with Turkey and shut down a Turkish military base populated by Turkish forces at the beginning of the boycott.
“If the current trend of US detachment from the region continues, and Turkey’s rising regional posture keeps moving in a forward direction, Ankara may have an opportunity to fortify its position in the Gulf,” said Middle East scholar Ali Bakir.
Middle East
Wanted: A Democracy Assistance Strategy for Iran

At the second Summit for Democracy, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken underscored the importance of advancing gender equality and women’s participation worldwide, including by commending the brave women of Iran for fighting for “woman, life, and freedom.” Yet, the people of Iran continue to face brutal repression as the Islamic Republic kills, tortures, arrests and assaults Iranians who are fighting for basic rights.
Iran has seen a sharp rise in human rights violations over the past seven months, when protests erupted across the country—sparked by the death of Mahsa Zhina Amini, a young Kurdish Iranian who died in the custody of the morality police for an “improper hijab.” These protests have trained a spotlight on deep societal grievances fostered by over four decades of persecution, oppression and impunity which cannot be reversed by the regime’s crackdown. The Islamic Republic now faces a dire crisis of legitimacy.
Although the United States has taken some steps to support the democratic movement in Iran, including by expressing solidarity with the demonstrators, the time has come for a more active stance in supporting those risking their lives to promote change by helping opposition leaders and providing assistance to pro-democracy forces to enable them to advance peace and human rights in Iran. Working through the State Department, USAID and independent NGOs, the U.S. can draw on existing resources and experience on promoting peaceful, political transitions to help democratic activists articulate their vision of a democratic future.
To begin with, the U.S. government should amplify and support the opposition leaders in developing a united vision for Iran’s future. Momentum for change has found footing as opposition leaders collaborate to establish a new political identity that rests on the principles of democracy, secularism, and human rights. This has also taken shape in inclusion, which is a first step in enshrining the principles of human rights, inclusion and a secular democracy.
The U.S. should seize this opportunity to provide dialogue platforms for opposition leaders and activists inside Iran to work across divides to refine their strategy, key policy priorities and their vision for democratic transformation. This could also entail providing technical assistance to Iranian activists on issues of peace, democracy, and governance. International support for the opposition as a legitimate alternative to the regime could reinvigorate hope among the protestors in Iran, while helping activists become better organized around clear goals could maximize the chance of a democratic breakthrough.
The U.S. government should adopt a long-term strategy and start planning how to support a democratic Iran, in line with USAID’s emphasis on supporting “bright spots” and leveraging the momentum of democratic openings. Given that protest movements and political transitions alike sometimes stall or encounter barriers, the U.S. should maintain flexibility as it anticipates and supports a democratic breakthrough. Whether the regime falls in the next few months or years, the U.S. should be prepared to provide assistance that empowers the Iranian people to build a new democratic foundation. This could include assisting an interim government, preparing leaders to govern, supporting political party development, codifying inclusion in a legal framework, mitigating the impacts of spoilers and managing security sector reform.
In designing these plans for assistance, policymakers should take care to encourage an inclusive approach that recognizes the rights and priorities of youth, women, ethnic, religious, sexual, and racial minorities. Under the Islamic Republic, these groups currently face extreme forms of discrimination, persecution and violations of human rights. After decades of oppression, women and youth are at the forefront of the uprising today—the U.S. should amplify their messages and support the fight for women’s rights as part of its policy objectives.
Minimizing the risk of elite capture and maximizing public participation will be critical to unifying the Iranian opposition, as well as helping ensure that inclusion is featured in a long-term vision for democracy in the country. This should include mitigating backlash from elite and dominant groups by educating and informing the public of the benefits of expanding political participation to include women and ethnic, religious, sexual, and racial minorities.
Advancing democracy and governance in any country is a long-term endeavor, and in Iran it would be no different. If the democratic movement in Iran were to succeed, it would represent an extraordinarily consequential event in the global fight for democracy. As President Biden has said, “We’re at an inflection point in history, where the decisions we make today are going to affect the course of our world for the next several decades.” Enabling the Iranian people to lead the way in defining the future of democracy in their country could impact the future for decades to come. The U.S. should stand on the right side of history.
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