It is essential to point out before dwelling upon this issue that international terrorism in its current shape remains one of the most challenging global threats. The area of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is no exception.
Even though the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda (which are banned in the Russian Federation), and the armed terrorist groups linked to them have sustained severe losses both in Syria and Iraq, we are nevertheless concerned about a serious threat coming from these international terrorist organizations.
The fact is that it would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of present-day terrorists to, figuratively speaking, mimicry, quickly adapt to the changing environment. So, as soon as it became clear that the above mentioned terrorist structures were facing a defeat in the Middle East, their leaders began to reorganize the system of command and control of their groups and units. While they were doing so, they focused on training militants to popularize extremist ideology and recruit new members, to raise financial support, and to mount units responsible for the preparation and execution of terrorist attacks.
In a word, terrorist leaders devised a fairly effective strategy which envisaged regrouping forces and resources according to the network principle. According to experts, in practice this means a well-coordinated approach in place of a chaotic movement of interconnected and autonomous Islamic State groups from the Middle East to countries of Europe, Central and Southeast Asia. Incidentally, foreign terrorists do not have any particular difficulty in entering countries of their further stay, since they use mainly legal channels of labor and humanitarian migration.
Naturally, CSTO experts are keeping an eye on this so-called “rotation”. The stake is on foreign terrorists returning to countries of origin or settling on the territory of other states. Before that, they, as a rule, are trained in Islamist camps, acquire the skills of subversive and sabotage activity, and, finally, set up underground cells. Thereby, as they say, they automatically increase the combat potential of existing terrorist groups and structures.
As for the CSTO area of responsibility, what triggers particular concern is the situation in Afghanistan. The fact is that international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan are reinforced by terrorists from Syria whose major purpose is to create the so-called “Islamic Caliphate Khorasan” with its further spread to the neighboring states of Central Asia. Unfortunately, the situation is aggravated by the fact that there are quite a few citizens of the CSTO member states in these terrorist organizations. Accordingly, we are aware only too well that under the circumstances the threat of terrorist acts on the territory of our states increases significantly.
What should we do given the situation, and what has already been done?
First of all, proceeding from the analysis of the situation on the border between the CSTO and Afghanistan, the CSTO heads of state, during the Council’s meeting in October 2016, took a “decision to introduce additional measures to counter international terrorism and extremism, which provide for a number of organizational steps to boost political and military cooperation and strengthen the CSTO’s antiterrorist potential. ”
As a result of this, the Organization has significantly increased the effectiveness of its annual regional operations. Among these is Operation “Channel” to combat drug-related crime, operations to curb illegal migration, codenamed “Illegal”, and “PROXY” – an operation to counter crimes committed with the use of information technology.
Thanks to the above measures, in 2018 alone, the law enforcement agencies confiscated over 16 tons of drugs, psychotropic and strong-impact substances, 407 units of rifled firearms, detained 443 people from the international wanted list, started 30 criminal cases on crimes related to terrorism and extremism, and exposed more than 10 thousand information resources that were disseminating information in the interests of terrorist and extremist organizations.
What other measures? An operation codenamed “Mercenary” was held in the spring of 2019 as part of the CSTO’s “Additional measures”. It was designed to block the recruitment channels, the entry and exit of citizens of the CSTO member states to participate in the activities of international terrorist organizations and neutralize their resource base in the CSTO area of responsibility.
Besides, a special task force has been formed and is training intensively with a view to address counter-terrorism agenda within the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces.
It is quite obvious that military exercises “Border”, “Interaction”, “Indestructible Brotherhood” and a number of special drills and operations conducted in tandem with the Collective Forces have become a serious deterrent and a demonstration of the intentions of the CSTO to resort to force if necessary.
I would also like to say a few words about preventive measures which are being taken by the relevant CSTO structures. According to the analysis of the situation in the Afghan provinces bordering the southern borders of the CSTO, not only has there been reported an intensification of terrorist activities, but there has also been a significant increase in drug production. According to the UN Agency on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan remains one of the world’s leaders in the production and export of opiates – today it accounts for more than 80% of the global drug market.
Here are some more facts and figures to this account. Reports say the gross annual income of international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan ranges from 300 to 400 million dollars. About 200 million dollars come from underground drug production. Operating in the provinces of Kunduz and Takhar, bordering Tajikistan, are 48 large drug groups that, in cooperation with international terrorist organizations, smuggle drugs out of the country in exchange for weapons and ammunition.
It is no wonder then that such terrorist structures have been making their presence felt and have been expanding the scope of their activities. As a result, clashes between law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan and the country’s irreconcilable armed opposition, as well as terrorist activities of the Taliban movement, of militants of the Afghan wing of ISIL (Vilayat Khorasan) and other similar organizations have long become habitual. Moreover, according to expert estimates, the intensity of hostilities in 2018 increased by almost 40% compared to the previous year. The beginning of 2019 saw a series of terrorist acts, including in Kabul, and an increasing activity of terrorists in the provinces of Kandahar, Faryab and Farah.
And one more important observation. According to analytical services of the CSTO, military operations in Afghanistan have shifted to the northern provinces — to the borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Clearly, by the end of 2018, most of the northern areas of Afghanistan had found themselves instability zones or areas under permanent control of militants of the armed opposition.
However, an increase in hostilities on the border with Tajikistan is a minor thing compared to other issues of concern. There is growing concern over the fact that another terrorist enclave controlled by ISIL (banned in the Russian Federation) is de facto being formed in the provinces of Jowzjan and Sari-Pul, which are located very close to the Turkmen border. According to the expert community, there exists a real threat of traditional one-man sabotage terrorist acts, and of a direct invasion of armed terrorist units with the establishment of control over transnational criminal networks related to drug smuggling and the creation of uninterrupted drug trafficking channels in the CIS countries.
Apparently, amid the present instability in the IRA, the Afghan issue is permanently on the agenda of the statutory bodies of the CSTO. Given the situation, it is very important that the Organization is developing and implementing projects of the CSTO Intergovernmental Program on the strengthening of the Tajik-Afghan border and is following the List of Additional Measures aimed at reducing tension on the Tajik-Afghan border.
In addition, a Working Group on Afghanistan was set up at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSTO, which examines the situation in the country and drafts recommendations aimed at coordinating regional security efforts.
Notably, experts from the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the OSCE Secretariat and regional anti-terrorist structures participate in meetings of the Working Group on a regular basis.
Undoubtedly, all the above measures pursued by CSTO funtion as a deterrent containing the activities of international terrorist organizations within our area of responsibility.
From our partner International Affairs
Transnational Crimes in the Maritime Realm
Maritime trafficking routes closely follow the commercial shipping lanes. The modalities, technologies and strategies put into place by criminals are often times more sophisticated in caliber than those used in regulated trade. The vast expanses of the sea, the complexity of the maritime transportation system, the immense volume of cargo transferred at each port, and the limited capacity for inspections of cargo creates opportunity for criminals. Seaborne trade in the maritime realm follows a defined set of “sea lines of communication” based on currents and weather. Because of the robustness of shipping and mass amounts of cargo moved, traffickers utilize the same shipping industry routes with great effect. Shipping and sea lanes tend to offer anonymity for criminals, whereas their activities can be hidden behind legitimate industries. Criminal activity, especially illicit trade in narcotics, humans, and weapons, has become so extensive that it is difficult according to various studies to rule out implications of states and corporations in the criminal enterprise.
Individuals from various nationalities, followed by multiple vessels flagged to different states, adds the UN Drug Trade Report 2019, are used in the networks which transit the waters of various states and call at different ports before reaching their final destination. Despite the abundance of laws designed to combat illicit trafficking and an apparent impetus to stop specific types of crime, government’s remains only marginally successful in preventing the global flow of illegal goods due to the overwhelming volume and complexity of the markets for illicit trade. Working in tandem, the maritime forces nevertheless have made successful efforts to disrupt the illicit supply chains as a result of sea-based security operations; cooperation and collaboration between law enforcement organizations.
Nevertheless, legal complexity arises as the high seas “fall outside the jurisdiction of any single state” under the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ocean space is to be collectively policed by all states governed by principles of Freedom of navigation. Piracy and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons comprise the main varieties of transnational crime. UNCLOS addresses these matter of concern in the realm of the sea, where various articles provide guidance in order to curb or limit the threats. Article 110 expounds the customary rule that warships may “approach and visit” on the high seas “any ship that is suspected of piracy, human trafficking, unauthorized broadcasting; and is without nationality”; or, “is flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag.” Article 111 addresses the right of “hot pursuit”, allowing warships of one state to follow a vessel through the different maritime zones of the ship if based on “reasonable grounds,” it is suspected of illegal activity.
UNCLOS under Article 108 empowers states to cooperate and offer assistance to suppress drug trafficking by other state-flagged vessels. Traditionally, drug traffickers used overland routes, but since last two decades, they have shifted transportation into the “Indo-Pacific Ocean”. The majority of this trafficking has proliferated in the littoral regions, and often within territorial waters. In the latter years, advancement in technologies, providing for larger ships have allowed traffickers to move further into the sea to capitalize “blue water” areas, outside the 12-nautical mile mark and at times further than the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of any country. It is a documented fact that U.S. is the world’s largest consumer of illegal drugs, also according to various studies the source and transit zones of drug trafficking between South America and the U.S despite high patrols on the border.
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Piracy has been one of the most ancient forms of maritime crime that is treated rigorously under the provisions of UNCLOS. Article 101 defines piracy as “any illegal act of violence or detention, any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, outside the jurisdiction of any state.” The latter parts highlights an important aspect that piracy is a type of transnational crime conducted by non-state actors in international waters. Article 105 of UNCLOS grants everystate the authority to seize any vessel, associated property and to arrest any persons engaged in piracy. Domestic courts of the state conducting the seizure have the mandate prosecute the pirates under domestic law and determine what to do with the vessels; however, to date the courts remain inadequate or unsupported in many places.
Piracy became a security issue of international concern since the last decade and half, primarily in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea largely due to weak patrolling and sea blindness by the littoral states of the region. However, to an extent order at sea has been maintained with the presence Combined Task Force-151(CTF-151), focused on counter-piracy, and Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) to combat illicit activities at sea. Supported by several U.N. Security Council Resolutions, these task forces have “engaged with regional partners to build capacity and improve capabilities to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.”
Piracy in the Asia-Pacific remains a matter of concern, however most of the incidents are underreported and those reported are of such small scale that they cloud the assessment of major piracy events. In the region, although piracy has been contained in the eastern region of Africa whereas it has proliferated in the western Africa around the Gulf of Guinea. This subject-matter experts conclude is a result of an increased trafficking in narcotics from Latin America, along with the various other illicit elements involving illegal fishing and human trafficking. The increased in piracy is a reminder for states that piracy remains a persistent and widespread challenge to maritime security. The recent activities in Somalia and Yemen foreshadow a resurgence of piracy in the region, encouraged by trafficking of light weapons and small arms, along with non-state actor’s unprecedented access to ship monitoring, tracking devices, and use of unmanned systems and long range communications.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) identifies only certain types of transnational crime that affect maritime security, but there are many varieties and combinations of criminal activity that affect security and safety from the high seas to internal waters. Domestic laws however need be brought in line with international law, and cooperative partnerships between the states, law enforcement, and militaries to combat illicit activity needs to transcend the morass of politics that are often a hurdle in the way of more comprehensive legal regimes. It is recommended that information and intelligence sharing, along with TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) need to be employed by the maritime forces to ensure freedom of the seas. UNCLOS provides a strong framework and multilateral efforts to deter criminal activity at sea for a more secure, safer operating environment for all. However, it is the difficulty in effective prosecution and applying of an equitable punishment to the culprits, involved in piracy, human trafficking and illicit drugs that must serve as a reminder to all states that much awaits for an all-inclusive solution.
Fighting Corporate Espionage by a Counterintelligence Agent
Corporate executives must bear the responsibility of today’s evolving corporate world entering into a global community where not only are the exposures to such a wide market area lucrative to an already thriving business, but also to a grave danger of the companies’ trade and technology secrets, systems, financial accounts and much more. No longer is “Security” to the facility and personnel all that is required. Many foreign countries and interests take short cuts to becoming competitive through the theft of trade secrets, products and overt and covert espionage of all sorts. Some of these entities are now facing a growing challenge from United States corporations with safeguarding of commercial information, proprietary information, and economic factors.
Many of the tactics utilized in private sector counterintelligence have much in common with the secrets and information the government does its best to safeguard from theft of foreign governments or non-traditional actor threats. The FBI estimates U.S. Corporations lose over $100 billion annually. There are open and legal methods of collection open that are harmful and a good counterintelligence program should target this as well as illegal activities such as electronic eavesdropping, hacking, etc. Passive counterintelligence tries to curtail what a collector may do through countermeasures, and awareness training. Active counterintelligence will prove beneficial to identify and detect a threat, and will conduct operations including eliminating threats or ongoing targeting. A mitigation policy should be of avail. After an attack it may raise shareholder concern which needs to be quelled quickly. Quick realization of a threat and implementing action promptly and efficiently can stop immeasurable damage.
The leaders in the private sector need to be proactive and realize that it is no longer only local threats they face. The threats can be global and may not only be an economic threat but also a threat to national security. In the U.S. private sector ties to the Defense, Intelligence and other government entities can be vast with a great deal of interplay and interconnectedness. Also, corporations do not employ many of the safeguards put in place by the defense and other government departments. Compartmentation, clearance, and many operations taken for granted in the government aren’t serving the corporate structures well-being at all or as well as it should be. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Title 18, Sections 1831 and 1832 of the U.S. Code covers economic espionage and also if they are considered trade theft prosecutions.
Where once economic espionage meant directly infiltrating a company or recruiting an employee within the corporation our biggest challenge today is cyber espionage. In reality secrets and information are stolen often and not even known they were taken. And a much less chance of apprehension. Cybercrimes operate in a stealth mode in many ways, but in a contrast way can be identified and detected and countered with effective counterintelligence methods. The U.S. economy has changed over the past 20 years. “Intellectual capital rather than physical assets now represent the bulk of a U.S. corporation’s value.”
With the growth of cybercrimes including corporate espionage some tips for safeguarding and thwarting foreign hostile intrusions include
Conduct real-time monitoring of networks and retaining access records
Software tools for content mgt., data loss prevention, network forensics
Utilize multi-factor authentication measures such as biometrics, PINS, passwords
Mobility policy in which measures are developed to oversee which connections can and cannot be made to corporate systems
Limits on social networking
Establish contingency plans
When deciding to emplace a counterintelligence program to safeguard a corporation the first stepis to conduct a risk assessment by assessing vulnerabilities and estimating the consequences of losing critical assets. This should be headed up by a board member or senior executive.
Then move to step two in which groundwork is laid for establishing a corporate counterintelligence program. Hire a manager dedicated to counterintelligence. Hook up the company’s security, intelligence assurance, general counsel and HR departments. Develop liaison with government law and intelligence. Ensure centralized management of the counterintelligence program. And have legal counsel provide guidance on the counterintelligence program actions.
Identify the Capabilities needed
Threat awareness and training
Analysis, Reporting and Response
Suspicious activity reporting
Implement the Counterintelligence Program
A basic counterintelligence program description will look something like this: PM (Program Manager) interplay such as:
PM develops and implements CI program
PM oversees a centralized CI Program office
PM maintains insight into all corporate elements
PM is responsible for liaison with US Government
Security officers responsible for tactical CI
PM provides CI guidance through training programs
Also be aware that not only high tech companies are targeted since the targeted information they seek may be deemed important by who is doing the shopping.
Where does allegiance lie?
Dongfan “Greg” Chung who is a native of China and a naturalized U.S. Citizen had “secret” security clearance while working with Rockwell and Boeing Corporations on the Space Shuttle project. He had retired in 2002 but returned a year later as a contractor until fall 2006. The government proved Chung committed espionage by taking and concealing Boeing secrets regarding the Delta IV rocket and also the Space Shuttle. He did this for the People’s Republic of China. He was convicted on charges of acting as an agent of the PRC as well as economic espionage.
The investigation of a different engineer working within the U.S is what led to Chung’s investigation and resulting conviction. He was sentenced to more than 24 years in prison.
The Chinese had sent letters requesting information as far back as 1979. In correspondence with the PRC Chung expressed his wishes to help the PRC modernize. He also sent 24 manuals related to the important B-1 Bomberfrom Rockwell Corporation which was very damaging.
Travel trips to the People’s Republic of China occurred on multiple occasions to lecture but he also met with government officials. In letters from his handlers they use his wife Rebecca and Chi Mak to transmit information. In the fall of 2006 FBI and NASA agents searched his home and discovered more than 250,000 documents from Boeing, Rockwell and others which were secret.
The Shuttle Drawing System or “SDS” that Rockwell and Boeing engineers created held information regarding performing processes regarding the Space Shuttle. The engineers need a password and authorization to be able to access this system and files. This is a clear case that defensive counterintelligence measures could have prevented printing, concealment and removal of documents from the workplace. One great example of offensive counterespionage was the search of Chung’s trash which led to much revealing evidence.Also his extensive travel to the PRC was an indicator that his scope of activities while in the PRC were above speaking engagements, seminars, teaching, personal. The authorities did conduct offensive counterintelligence to the best of their abilities once it learned via the other agent implicated in similar dealings with the PRC.
Syrian army gain strategic win in Idlib
On Tuesday, local news reported that terrorists withdrew from a key city, Khan Sheikhoun, in the Syrian province of Idlib...
Approaching ICJ against wily India on Kashmir
Kashmir is a simmering cauldron. `Indian Home Minister Amit Shah proposed in parliament to scrap Article 370 of the Indian...
German Education needs full Restructuring
Authors: Nicolas Böhmer and Ajmal Sohail In education and as a result in economy Germany seems to fall behind. Shortage...
The Media-Responses to Bernie Sanders’s Climate-Plan
U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, a U.S. Presidential candidate in the Democratic Party primaries, presented on August 22nd the most-detailed climate-plan...
Trump’s Tariff War, Brexit, and Spats in East Asia … Stocks Plunge
Can we believe their claims to represent the ordinary people if Donald Trump went to private military school and his...
The rebellion in Hong Kong and its geopolitical effects
The rebellion in Hong Kong is more complex and politically relevant than we may think, both nationally and internationally. In...
New ADB Country Strategy to Expand Trade, Drive Economic Growth in Georgia
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has today endorsed a new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Georgia. The 5-year partnership strategy,...
Intelligence3 days ago
Fighting Corporate Espionage by a Counterintelligence Agent
Economy2 days ago
Turkey’s Turn to East could have Deadly Economic Affects
Americas2 days ago
The Russiagate hoax is now fully exposed
Tech News3 days ago
Deloitte Debuts ‘Blockchain In a Box’ (BIAB)
Newsdesk3 days ago
The workplace equality challenge
South Asia3 days ago
Modi-fying Kashmir and Historical Facts
Economy1 day ago
WTO without United States?
South Asia2 days ago
Criminal Silence of Ummah on Kashmir