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Russia races for the African market

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Russia plans to offer trade subsidies and investment guarantees as an emergency support for Russian companies to penetrate into African markets, part of the strategy for the development of economic ties between Russia and Africa, according to an official report released by the Ministry of External Affairs.

The report indicated that Business Council had discussed a wide range of issues on promoting Russia and Russian businesses’ interests in Africa. Noting further that Africa has huge natural resources still untapped, all kinds of emerging business opportunities and constantly growing consumer market due to the increasing population. It has currently become a new business field for global players.

There was a lot of interesting and demanding work ahead, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at the Ministry’s Business Council meeting held on July 16 in Moscow. He added “perhaps, there is a need to pay attention to the experience of China, which provides its enterprises with state guarantees and subsidies, thus ensuring the ability of companies to work on a systematic and long-term basis.”

He urged Russian entrepreneurs, both small and medium-sized, to race against other foreign players to get access to the African markets and its trading resources, be fearless of competition and rivalry but play with adequate caution to save Russia’s image in Africa.

“We find it important to estimate options for attracting small and medium-sized businesses to African markets. This segment of our cooperation is still insignificant,” he stated.

“We rely on the existing and strengthening foundation of Russian-African cooperation. This year we have significantly intensified political dialogue, cooperation between parliaments and civil societies,” Lavrov said.

“This positive groundwork allows us to convert this into increasing trade, economic and investment exchanges, to expand banking cooperation, the implementation of mutually beneficial projects,” he pointed out.

Lavrov, however, underscored the fact that trade and economic relations have reached a new level, and “the first ever Russia-Africa summit, which is to be held in October in Sochi, would give a special impetus to these processes.”

The first Russia–Africa summit scheduled to take place in Sochi on October 24 and will be co-chaired by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who currently chairs the African Union.

In June, Moscow hosted a shareholder meeting of the African Export-Import Bank, as well as the Russia-Africa Economic Conference. Early July, the Russia-Africa Parliamentary Conference was also held as part of the International Development of Parliamentarianism Forum, which took place in Moscow.

During the plenary session on Russia-Africa held July 3, the former Special Presidential Representative to Africa, Professor Alexey Vasileyev, pointed out that the level and scope of Russian economic cooperation with Africa has doubled in recent years, “but unfortunately Russian-African cooperation is not in the top five among the foreign investing players in Africa.”

Specifically about trade, Vasileyev noted that not all African countries have signed agreements with Russia, for example, on the abolition of double taxation. He urged African countries to make trade choices that are in their best economic interests and further suggested that Russia should consider the issue of removal of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on economic relations.

In order to increase trade, Russia has to improve its manufacturing base and Africa has to standardize its export products to compete in external markets. Russia has only few manufactured goods that could successfully compete with Western-made products in Africa.

The former Presidential Envoy believes that it is also necessary to create, for example, free trade areas. “But before creating them, we need information. And here, I am ready to reproach the Russian side, providing little or inadequate information to Africans about their capabilities, and on the other hand, reproach the African side, because when our business comes to Africa, they should know where they go, why and what they will get as a result,” Vasileyev told the gathering of African parliamentarians.

Interestingly, there are few Russian traders in Africa and African exporters are not trading in Russia’s market, in both cases, due to multiple reasons including inadequate knowledge of trade procedures, rules and regulations as well as the existing market conditions, he pointed out.

“The task before us, especially before the both parliaments, is to harmonize the norms of trade, contract and civil law. The parliamentarians of the two sides have the task to work together on a legislative framework that would be in the interests of both sides. This should be a matter of priority,” Vasileyev concluded.

Whether Moscow will move from mere intentions to concrete actions, with commitment and consistency, remains largely to be seen in the subsequent years, according to policy experts and observers who monitor developments between Russia and Africa. According to official reports, Russia has a positive dynamics of trade with Africa, its trade exceeded US$20 billion in 2018.

MD Africa Editor Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics. He wrote previously for African Press Agency, African Executive and Inter Press Service. Earlier, he had worked for The Moscow Times, a reputable English newspaper. Klomegah taught part-time at the Moscow Institute of Modern Journalism. He studied international journalism and mass communication, and later spent a year at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He co-authored a book “AIDS/HIV and Men: Taking Risk or Taking Responsibility” published by the London-based Panos Institute. In 2004 and again in 2009, he won the Golden Word Prize for a series of analytical articles on Russia's economic cooperation with African countries.

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Taxing The Super-Rich To Help The Poor

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What was traditional became law in 1941 when Thanksgiving was designated as the fourth Thursday in November.  Large turkeys, plenty of trimmings and family gatherings became the norm. . . that is until this year of the self-isolated holiday.  Small turkeys disappeared fast leaving masses of 20 lb birds and presumably more leftovers and more waste.  Yes, w e belong to the lucky 13.5 percent in this world through an accident of birth.

Half of the world’s population lives on less than $5.50 per day.  Of these, three quarters of a billion are in extreme poverty, classified as less than $1.90 per day.  Covid 19 has swelled these numbers by 114 million and the situation is dire.  Worst affected by poverty are the day laborers i.e. informal workers without a regular job.  Moreover, the ILO (International Labor Organization) estimates 200 million job losses from Covid.  It also notes that the average income of informal workers in places like Ethiopia, Haiti, and Malawi has already fallen by 82 percent. 

The US is not immune.  Adjusting for purchasing power the US Census Bureau classifies 11.1 percent of the population as poor with Covid exacerbating the situation.  Forty seven million have to rely on food banks including 16 million children.  Hardly surprising then that the US has the highest child mortality rate among the 20 OECD countries (major economies) as reported by the U.S. Health Affairs journal.  And life expectancy has shrunk by three years, affirms the U.S. Census Bureau. 

Even in Europe with its social net and social conscience, Covid 19 is estimated to increase poverty by about half if the pandemic lasts until the summer of 2021.  Italy alone, forecasts Caritas Italiana, will have a million more children living in poverty. 

In April of this year UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) warned that at least $2.5 billion was needed to lessen the impact of the impending crisis within the narrow purview of their remit. 

So where is the money to come from?  If taxing the rich is unlikely to pass in most legislatures for the most obvious of reasons — they paid for them to be there — how about taxing only the super-rich, the storied 1 percent?

The wealth of the billionaire class has surged.  While 45.5 million filed for unemployment in just three months, the U.S. added 29 more billionaires and the wealth of the billionaire class surged nearly 20 percent or $584 billion, from $2.948 to $3.531 trillion, during the same period.  Just the top five billionaires, namely, Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Warren Buffet and Larry Ellison increased their wealth by a whopping $101.7 billion between March 18 and June 17 of this year.  Bezos and Zuckerberg alone made $76 billion or almost three-quarters.  To be fair one has to point out that the stock market took a sudden dip in March from which it recovered to new highs. 

It’s shocking that just 10 percent of their $584 billion gain would have bailed out their compatriots classified as poor over the same period.  Is it time for a tax on the super rich?  Warren Buffett has often said that he needs to be taxed more.  The fact is a small extra tax would not make an iota of difference in their lives but would help out millions of the poor and also the economy because the latter are much more likely than the rich to spend the money.  

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International Conflicts from the View of Trade Expectations Theory

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Does economic interdependence between great powers have a significant effect on the probability of war between them? This once seemingly impossible question has become extremely realistic and urgent in the current tide of anti-globalization.

In fact, it is not the first time that free trade has been terminated, as all the great powers in the Western world had abandoned the principle of free trade at one point, such as Germany in 1879, France and Britain in 1881, and the United States as early as the 1860s during the Civil War. Global trade frictions and conflicts have developed from competing for raw materials, energy, and investment to today’s competition for market space (see Chan Kung’s “Spatial Determinism” for details).

There are two views on the relationship between economic interdependence and war. Liberals assert that with commercial ties, trade and investment flows can raise the opportunity cost of going to war and thereby providing a large material incentive to avoid war. Realists claim that commercial ties make states vulnerable to cutoffs, which can devastate an economy that has reoriented itself to rely on critical markets and goods from abroad, and thereby prompt leaders to go to war.

American scholar Dale C. Copeland believes that an additional causal variable, i.e., a state’s expectations of the future trade and investment environment should be introduced to determine whether the liberal prediction or realist prediction would prevail. When a dependent state has positive expectations about this future environment, it is more likely to see all the benefits of continuing the current peace and all the costs of turning to war. Economic interdependence would then be a force for peace. Yet if a dependent state has negative expectations about the future economic environment, i.e., seeing itself being cut off from access to foreign trade and investment, or believing that other states will soon cut it off, then the realist logic will kick in. Such a state would tend to believe that without access to the vital raw materials, investments, and export markets needed for its economic health, its economy will start to fall relative to other less vulnerable actors. If this economic decline is anticipated to be severe, the leaders of the dependent state would then begin to view war as the rational option, the lesser of two evils. Such leaders would consider it is better to fight that being forced to submission.

This argument is similar to the “preventive wars” in the field of international political economy, and Dale C. Copeland calls it the “trade expectations theory”. Copeland believes that in the situation where there are different great powers, the combination of economic interdependence along with expectations of future trade and investment was a critical driving force shaping the probability of war and conflict between these powers.

Several historical examples from the twentieth century are clear prove of this. Japan’s attacks on Russia in 1904 and the United States in 1941 were intimately related to Japanese fears of future access to the raw materials and trade of the East Asian region. In the first case, Japan witnessed Russia’s steady penetration into economically valuable areas of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. After repeated and invariably unsuccessful efforts to convince Russia to pull back, Tokyo realized that only preventive war would mitigate Japan’s long-term economic and military concerns. The closed economic policies of the great powers after 1929 had a devastating impact on Japan’s economy and Japanese views of the future trade environment. Tokyo’s efforts to consolidate its own economic sphere in Manchuria and northern China, spurred by its decades-long worry about Russian growth in the Far East, led to conflicts with the Soviet and Nationalist Chinese governments. When the United States entered the fray after 1938 and began a series of damaging economic embargoes, Japanese expectations of future trade fell even further, prompting a desperate effort to acquire access to oil and raw materials in Southeast Asia. The ultimate result was the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

During the forty-five-year Cold War struggle after World War II, there was a low level of economic dependence between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the “trade expectations theory” seemed unable to explain the geopolitical rivalry between the two great powers. Obviously, economic relations between states do not explain all the problems of geopolitics, which involves a variety of other issues (e.g., ideological rivalry, mutual military threats, etc.). However, the impact of economic relations can be seen even during the Cold War. In the late 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower’s unwillingness to relax stringent economic restrictions alienated Nikita Khrushchev and contributed to the extreme tensions of the 1960–1962 period. But in the early 1970s and again in the late 1980s, Washington was more willing to commit itself to higher future trade with the Soviets. This proved critical to achieving an initial détente period and then an end to the Cold War altogether.

In the current tide of anti-globalization, it seems that the phenomenon of “trade expectations theory” can also be seen. The Trump administration, following the principle of “America First”, believes that the major trading partners of the United States have taken advantage of the United States through trade, making the economic interests of the United States damaged, and China has caused the greatest economic damage to the United States. As a result, the United States has adopted a series of crackdowns and sanctions on its major trading partners, including China. The modern world is less prone to war between major powers, but instead manifests in more diverse non-war forms, i.e., trade sanctions, technological sanctions and blockades, financial sanctions, diplomatic recriminations, and geopolitical repression. In the view of researchers at ANBOUND, this overall deterioration in geopolitical relations, triggered by economic ties, is merely an alternative to the “trade-security” model of war. If the geopolitical friction intensifies further and the threshold of a certain aspect is breached, a war of some kind is not out of the question.

The view of defensive realism is that national leaders, aware that their actions can lead to a vicious cycle of hostility, are justified in maintaining their current reputation for neutrality, prudent territorial policies, constant trade with other countries, and a willingness to embrace common international rules in a relatively open attitude. This view helps to create a pattern in which great powers tend to coexist for a long time without serious conflict or war. However, if national leaders take the view of aggressive realism, that in a leaderless world, great powers must always worry about what other nations will do in the future, and prepare for the worst, then they must maximize their power. The likelihood of violent conflict or even war between the great powers would then increase.

How to avoid security conflicts between great powers over trade issues? Some scholars have argued that it depends on the rationality of the national decision-makers, as well as the objective judgment on the strength and determination of both sides in the conflict. Rational actors have an incentive to reach agreements that prevent war from inflicting damage on each other, so that the situation for war does not arise and thereby improving the circumstances of both sides. In the event that if an actor do not understand the true balance of power and the determination of the other side, or do not trust the other side to keep the promises made in the agreement, war may occur.

Final analysis conclusion:

After World War II, the world as a whole has been largely at peace for 75 years (meaning that there was no major war involving a large number of countries). The current tide of anti-globalization and increasing geopolitical frictions is shaping up to be the most far-reaching and influential period of global trade and geopolitical turmoil since the end of the Cold War. “Trade expectations theory” provides an explanation for the current global conflicts, as well as an idea for countries to make rational decisions and mitigate international conflicts.

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Democracy in decline and its fate after the crisis: Why will the big crisis kill liberalism with or without the demos

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Being praised as never before, democracy was in crisis. The reality of the economic problems of 2008-2020 led to a new critical moment. All this makes us think about the meaning of the word “democracy”, about the economic logic of history and much more.

Twilight of a new big crisis

The countries of the core of capitalism had to face a new big economic crisis in 2008. In semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, democracy was outwardly similar to the central, with the difference that it was much more formal, implicated in falsifications and did not exclude coups and turmoil, though formally they started as a struggle for fair elections. Neoliberalism in a broad sense had no alternative and could only be mitigated in some countries. Therefore, due to its strength and rootedness, the encounter with the crisis was delayed and turned out to be completely unpleasant. In 2020, this story has not yet been concluded.

Neoliberal doctrine and ideology brought market and commercial freedom to the forefront, while public interests were pushed to the background. Under the pressure of neoliberal reforms, the social structures supporting democracy, as known in the 20th century, weakened, mass participation in them declined. People resorted to private life and the elites boldly practiced manipulations. The protest became anti-globalist with faith in social networks and a growing mistrust of “rotten parties.” The criticism of neoliberalism and the democracy that it subordinated, namely liberal democracy by the “stars” of anti-globalism was spectacular. It was not effective, as its countercultural pathos did not prevent it from fitting into the mainstream.

Not everything looked unequivocally gloomy in the era preceding the 2008–2020 crisis. When Bill Clinton came to power in the United States and Tony Blair in the United Kingdom a considerable number of ordinary people felt a certain turn. In France, such a feeling was created later by the victory in the elections of socialists led by Francois Hollande. In Greece by the election of the party “Syriza” and Alexis Tsipras. In practice, the turn did not occur, everything turned into manipulative simulations, convenient for continuing the old course. They undermined faith in the seemingly existing democratic mechanisms. Might the opposition have found a solution to the neoliberal mainstream? Wasn’t there an alternative to the “outdated” base organisations of trade unions and parties, the idea of network organisation? In the 2000s it was widely cherished in Europe and America.

Alas, the networks did not become the basis for the revival of “genuine democracy,” and faith in them only helped conserve the opposition of neoliberalism. In these networks it rotted, telling itself from time to time not to follow the way of old parties, they were all evil, they killed the egalitarianism of a genuine popular movement and not to suggest designs instead of the people and for the people (all these congresses, committees and commissions) for in this way the true spirit of democracy will be completely ruined. As a result, the “genuine spirit” existed only in imagination.

When the time of social networks on the Internet came, it showed how much they enable the control over individuals and how little horizontal connections of individuals mean to them. With such networks it was easy to organize a wave of protests and after a change of power (a coup by order of the United States or the Eurocracy) to return the mass participants to their places.

Democracy in an era of crisis once more in crisis

In 2008, the time of sustainable financial globalisation ended and the great global economic crisis began. The waves of crisis came one after another until 2020. And then it finally became clear that the seeds of the anti-globalist alternative give rotten seedlings even in the United States: Bernie Sanders withdrew from the elections at the most dramatic moment for his people in the 21st century. Before that there was a series of unsuccessful attempts by society to influence the process in Europe. It turned out that he has no structures and understanding of the mechanics of their work and personal work in them, lacks solidarity and understanding of the situation. As a result, the liberal elite retained dominance over “democracy”.

But liberal political constructs have become an obstacle in the fight against the crisis. And if in Russia and China the shift from neoliberalism to a new practice neo-mercantilism started from above, without the help of republican mechanisms set in motion by the people (the starting point were the problems of economic development),  the situation was different in the West. The manipulative liberal democracy preserved the crisis, blocking attempts to change politics. Even Trump, with his conservative transformation plan, came up against the resistance of liberal forces from the Democratic Party and its adherents in the power system. He could not overcome the checks and balances.

An extensive programme about which my colleagues and I in the Department of Political Economy and the History of Economic Science of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics spoke in the report “Donald Trump and the Economic Situation” back in 2016[1]. In another report, entitled “A Society Without Opposition,” prepared with my participation in the Institute of the New Society, many vices of the left were revealed that prevented them from acting as the main force of transformations[2]. One of the problems lies in the desire to apply ready-made schemes to new historical conditions and the belief that capitalism cannot have anything new in itself, nothing that would not have happened before.

“Revolution or reform?” and myths about the ways

The disappointment in democratic mechanisms brought the old question, which in 1918 was included by Rosa Luxemburg in the title of her pamphlet “Reform or Revolution”, back to life. Reforms over the past 40 years have been neoliberal, and therefore the word “reform” often evoces negative emotions in people. In Russia, it is difficult for many citizens to accept the fact that the socio-patriotic reforms that are taking place in the country are not liberal, they are not shattering, but strengthening society. Therefore, the question remains valid.

But this question is false. However, it seems logical to many, as since the 1980s it was suggested that there are two ways that contradict each other: a seemingly tough and a seemingly soft one (identical to liberal democracy). In another interpretation: a progressive and an opportunistic, destructive or reactionary. Neoliberal reforms inspired the latter understanding, as they were destructive and antisocial in nature everywhere. However, under the influence of the global crisis of 2008-2020 at its very end, that is presently, reforms of a different type are now becoming possible. They are associated with the need to overcome the protracted era of economic crisis and the resumption of a sustainable growth and development. Naturally, they should increase the stability of the states in which they are implemented and, as a result, make them stronger in international rivalry.

Reforms of a new type and dictated by the new era became possible. In Russia they have already begun and with them another social reality started to form. But what about cliches? And what about the vulgar, but in practice voluntaristic understanding of revolutions based on disappointment in liberal democracy?

In the book “Capitalism of crises and revolutions how formation epochs alternate, new long waves are born, restorations die and neomercantilism advances” I devoted many pages to the complexity of such a phenomenon as the great modernisation revolution, as well as the Great Russian revolution. Here there is a unity of both revolutionary, evolutionary and reformist stages (not methods!). Voluntarists of “revolution” will never understand nor accept this. For them, all sorts of reforms of Russian or other capitalism will be a deception of the masses, and their support will be a betrayal of the “cause of the liberation of the working people” or a reactionary measure. There is no dialectic in such a vision of history. That is why voluntarists, adherents of maximalist phrase, are not related to real social revolutions with their complex diverse consequences.

In the United States, Britain, Western Europe and Japan, the situation is special. There neoliberalism has gone far in influencing society. From manipulations with the help of liberal institutions, it proceeded to the destruction of the basic norms of morality and relations, not centuries-old, but largely cultivated in the 20th century. Nuclear family was attacked as “slavery of the patriarchy”, trade unions as fetters to the market, the right of the majority to laws in its interest as the anti-democratic egoism of white men, discriminating minorities. Minorities themselves were nurtured and helped to fragment a society in which, as the events of 2008–2020 showed, no forces were found to overturn neoliberalism from the bottom in a left, reformist or more radical way.

Without being defeated, neoliberalism will die from the fact that its time has passed. This is already evident in some parts of the world, but not obvious in others. However, the impossibility of overcoming the crisis on the basis of neoliberal policy is the absolute proof of this thesis. And then what about democracy?

Neo-mercantilism is approaching

Left-wing intellectuals love to write phrases like this one: the struggle for social and cultural reforms, for another world with opportunities for every person to creatively find themselves, to be free, to control power and not be afraid to be poor, will continue and lead the world to success. In parallel, they can criticize the national conservatism of the “right”, and talk about the benefits of diversity in society, without which there can be no democracy. But truth requires adding at this point the story of Socrates. Athenian democracy did not at all tolerate his liberties and forced him to drink poison. His disciple Plato was forced to behave more carefully with the people. In modern realities, we must be prepared for a democratism that is conservative in spirit.

Neoliberalism has created a moral opposition in society, the foundations of which are considered traditional. The liberal left is indignant about this unrighteous, in their opinion, way of denying globalisation and the ideas of “free trade” in all spheres of life. However, conservatism is very limited here. It is not very religious, since society in countries with developed markets is not very religious, and the protection of family values and the importance of marriage is more like the defense of the Soviet understanding of relationships and lifestyle; it should be borne in mind that the emancipation of the 20th century is irreversible, universally recognised and inseparable from society, and these are not “patriarchal mores,” but the product of modernisation. Though this modernisation took place not so long ago. Therefore, anti-neoliberal conservatism does not at all refer to old morals, and only because of the love of religious justification of its position can be called right. However, there is also a reference to the national values and interests of nations, opposing the interests of global financial structures. And here it is important to finally accept the fact: neoliberalism hit the organised working class, the old class and left structures (including their structure) so hard that it left only a limited number of means to eliminate itself. The dismantling of neoliberalism is not a socialist act, but a bourgeois measure ensuring the further development of society. Another thing is that in the process in some countries a revival of the social state is possible.

The era of globalisation has taught many people to view democracy as something universal. Neoliberalism has replaced the dictatorship of modernisation in the countries of the semi-periphery and periphery of world capitalism. There was not much personal freedom and public freedom in them. But with neoliberalism, the local elites were able to cover up their rule with the word “democracy”. The plans of the elite of the countries of the centre did not include the transformation of part of the countries of the production periphery into new centres of development of capitalism, as candidates to play part in the core of the global economy. It was not part of the plans of the old centres that the local top officials should search for support in the “lower strata”, largely due to the rejection of the neoliberal course and reliance on social and patriotic measures. And the bold and independent behaviour of the highest bureaucracy, grand bureaucracy, is absolutely perceived in Washington and Brussels as a riot.

But it is precisely this rebellion that sets the limit to neoliberalism politically. Leaning or trying to rely on the majority of the country’s population (especially in Russia), it is democratic in its own way, reflecting the demos’ requests for social policy, the revival of national pride and the growth of prosperity based on the patronage of the state to its market, production and its mass buyer. This turn from neoliberalism, however, is not a turn created from below, that is, formally democratic, organised not under the pressure of society, but by society itself. In this regard, it is necessary to acknowledge the failure of attempts to end neoliberalism from below in many countries. With a firm commitment of the “upper strata” to this policy, it is not eliminated from above either. Even the split of the upper strata in the United States with the advent of Trump to the White House did not lead to such a development of events, the processes were blocked. Therefore, neoliberalism has not yet completed its history, it simply has lost economic efficiency and cannot be the basis for the exit of certain countries from the era of the great crisis. But this is not its complete end.

Democratism instead of democracy?

Nevertheless, the end of neoliberalism is inevitable. In some cases it will come in the form of a conservative in shade, and a socio-patriotic in form turn. In another case, problems in the economy will bring about movements that can either be such as in countries claiming to be new centres (Eurasian countries), or society will be able to move from an unstable and weak in content movement like the French “yellow vests” to something stronger and more productive. Finally, there is a scenario where popular intervention in politics will be like an outbreak such as in Argentina in the early 2000s. But in this case, progressive shifts will be the fruit of a new grand bureaucracy, simply not neoliberal.

All these paths are not easy. Democracy in them will probably be expressed not in procedures, but in mass support for the new agenda. It is hardly to be expected that the “lower strata” will restore the forms of organisation and practice that were characteristic of the 1930-1970s. In this sense, the prospect of the triumph of “pure democracy” soon seems doubtful. Republican procedures and structures will live, as society is agitated everywhere. However, even overcoming neoliberalism from above to a greater extent than from below will become a common scenario for overcoming the era of the great crisis, it should be taken into account: economic growth and social development in general will work for future democracy.

Formal Republics, where development does not stop and degradation does not happen (which is possible for some countries) will become more social. Relying on social unity, on the construction of nations and their associations, for example, during the Eurasian integration process, administrations will awaken reformist activity in society. As a result, formal Republics will move towards real Republics, where people influence processes not only through expression of mood. This will be the beginning of a new revival of democracy.

Here it is necessary to summarise. It was said enough by virtue of what economic processes neoliberal democracy (the right format of ideas and practice) found itself in a crisis, and was unable to provide a mechanism for leading the countries of the old core of capitalism out of the crisis and ensuring a change of power in Russia, China and other Eurasian states, claiming to be new centres of capitalism. There, the neoliberal “democrats” at the top are increasingly oppressed by the neo-mercantile grand bureaucracy. It can restart the growth of economies and this growth will continue for about 25 years. The big crisis will end and a new upward wave of development will begin; only shortly will commercial crises interrupt it, none of which will be similar to the era of 2008–2020. The establishment of a non-mercantile economic reality in the world launches a mechanism for mastering the practices and ideas of democracy in the conditions of strong national states of Eurasia, solving the tasks of continental integration and rivalry with the old global leaders. How the process of democratisation or the revival of democracy will develop is not yet clear. But economic recovery will be a better environment for this process than the last big crisis.

On the whole, the history of democracy is not only incomplete, but by and large is just beginning. And if in most countries in the era of neoliberalism democracy was a pure imitation, in a different era everything will be different.

 From our partner International Affairs

[1] Report of the Department of Political Economy and the History of Economic Science of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics “Donald Trump i ekonomisteskaya situatsiya: strategiya kandidatov v presidenty i Vroraya volna krizisa v SSHA”  // Institute for globalisation and social movements. – URL: http://igso.ru/trump_situation/ (publication date: 28.10.2016; reference date: 27.08.2018).

[2] Report of the Institute of the New Society “Society without Opposition: the crisis of the left in the era of neoliberalism and afterwards”// Institute of the New Society. – URL: http://neosoc.ru/%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%89%d0%b5%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%be-%d0%b1%d0%b5%d0%b7-%d0%be%d0%bf%d0%bf%d0%be%d0%b7%d0%b8%d1%86%d0%b8%d0%b8/ (publication date: 28.10.2016; reference date: 27.05.2020).

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