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The Bahrain Summit: A Cyber Rescue for Gaza?

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On the eve of the upcoming American peace-summit in Bahrain, there is only one burning question: what about Gaza? It’s already been made clear that the upcoming summit is not about addressing regional flashpoints, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, the meeting will focus on economic cooperation and development in a region facing immense systemic challenges, such as youth unemployment, water and food scarcity, and others. While this approach may appeal to the more diplomatic angels of our nature, it does not reflect the complex reality on the ground in which a lack of economic growth, or worse de-development, is a major force behind violent upheavals.

This is particularly the case in the Gaza Strip, which inches closer to total political, economic, and humanitarian collapse daily. Even if solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn’t on the table in Bahrain, developing Gaza’s economy certainly should be.

This situation really is the epitome of a rock and a hard place. How can Hamas come to the negotiating table and not lose the support of its base, or worse, invite competition which will likely result in civil war? How can Israel proverbially keep the heads of Gaza’s civilian population ‘above water’ (no irony lost in that metaphor) without allowing Hamas to co-opt resources and entrench their positions? Moreover, what can the rest of us, or the international community for that matter, really do about it?

It turns out there are a multitude of international organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and even private think tanks which are trying to provide strategies, funds, and projects as an answer to Gaza’s questions. It takes about ten seconds of looking at the situation on the ground to understand that these international actors are consistently falling short of their ambitions and things are getting worse before they get better. The urgency of bolstering Gaza’s economy becomes apparent to an Israeli when considering the prospect of another regional humanitarian and possibly refugee crisis, this time on Israel’s southern border. In fact, it was these concerns that were the impetus for a year-long study my colleagues and I conducted. We essentially asked, how can international strategies for Gaza, particularly those concerned with development, be refined and adjusted to be more effective in facilitating real change? What we found ultimately led us to some surprising recommendations for decision-makers. If Gaza is going to be discussed in Manama, those attending should be aware of these findings.

For international organizations, there are many actors to consider coordinating with on Gaza’s development (Israel, Hamas, NGOs, and civil society organizations). However, we found that coordination is disproportionately higher with one actor in particular, almost by twice as much – the Palestinian Authority (PA). Despite its extremely limited influence in Gaza, the PA is coordinated with at a much higher degree than Hamas, Israel, or even UNRWA. The reasons for this are unclear. Gaza cannot be discussed in isolation of the West Bank, since any future Palestinian state would encompass both territories as a unitary political entity. Given the PA’s status as the sole legitimate political representative of the Palestinian people, development goals must be in line with what Ramallah wants more so than Gaza City.

There are those who advocate that working with the de facto regime in Gaza is the only way to make progress on the ground and have called on international players to abandon their no-contact policies vis-a-vis Hamas. However, this is an odd preference when considering the ambiguous status of Gaza and Hamas under international law. This is a serious technical problem that the PA does not have. This is where, contrary to the recommendations of Gisha and other policy forums, we found that attempts at working directly with Hamas will not only be counterproductive in Gaza, but will ultimately weaken the political position of Israel’s only real partner for a viable two-state solution. This is an externality Israel and the international community cannot afford.

In a separate vein, we found a motif within nearly all strategies and policies that from the onset screamed ‘fatal flaw’. Being the most powerful actor in the equation, almost all plans call on Israel to unilaterally lift restrictions on the flow of goods in and out of Gaza, offering no incentives, rationale, or process as to how or why they would be inclined to do so. Even an amateur negotiator could point out the problem with this approach – not only does this call to action ignore Israel’s key objections and concerns, but it treats it as a monolithic party when that couldn’t be farther from the case. Unlike many of their regional counterparts, Israeli decision-makers are democratically beholden to their constituents. Therefore, calling upon them to do something is about as effective as wishing it into reality, as Israel’s security policy is directly shaped by the intricate and complex processes of democratic national politics. In fact, most members of the international community work with the Israeli state via a separate and completely detached diplomatic channel than those concerned with Palestinian state-building, where coordination is at a minimal level with the IDF (COGAT) rather than Israeli decision-makers.

The web becomes further tangled when adding to the mix the Oslo-era institutions, which inextricably bound the Israeli and Palestinian economies together. How can anyone realistically expect to set economic development goals and implement them when the entire economic and monetary system sits in the hands of Israel under the framework of the Paris Protocol? Israel is and will remain the lynchpin of any economic development in the Gaza Strip, but for some reason there is a disconnect between what Israeli decision-makers are asked to do and what they can expect in return or regarding their key inhibitions as a prospective customer. Those designing strategies for Gaza’s development must be acutely in tune with the interests of Israel’s national leadership. Of course, before someone uses this analysis to advocate that international pressure on Israel is the answer, a quick historical review demonstrates that when it comes to affecting Israel’s policies from the outside, honey works much better than vinegar.

One area in which nearly all international strategies converge is identifying the private sector as the key driving and guiding force in sustainable, scalable growth. This is not only expressed outright as a goal by most actors, but it is reaffirmed by their strong emphasis on reforming the regulatory environment and fostering the flows of investment – foreign, domestic, and regional. There are essentially two major problems, however, inhibiting this private sector-led growth, even with Gaza’s immense economic potential. First, the lack of a sound banking system (or effective monetary system for that matter) within Palestinian society means that there are little to no local banks which can finance local projects, leaving Palestinian entrepreneurs dependent on external backing. This isn’t just a problem for private sector investment, but also for governance and civil institutions. Civil servants and citizens alike are currently reliant on suitcases of cash brought in from the outside – a phenomenon which often results in Hamas seizure and, based on the rhetoric of Israeli politicians, has a short shelf-life as a solution.

Second, the material risks on any investment in Gaza are extremely high. For example, suppose Mercedes was interested in building a manufacturing facility in Rafah. They would have to consider the viability of their investment compared to the risks. Such risks include, but are not limited to: unstable flow of electricity; a lack of healthcare; a non-existent payroll mechanism other than cash; double taxation at the border; the dual-use list limiting the flow of raw materials for building the infrastructure and the goods; and of course, the constant threat that militants may commandeer the facility, resulting in all that investment going up in smoke during the next military escalation.

So, now that you know some of the risks, is your checkbook ready? Even something as altruistic as charity has utilitarian considerations attached and unfortunately the lack of investment security is a big problem for growing any industries in Gaza. After all of these insights it would be easy to see Gaza’s development as a Sisyphean task in which everything is tangled, linked, or could only be changed with a fundamental shake-up the status quo. Instead, and contrary to our own expectations, what we found were three clear conclusions in the midst of the chaos and confusion. First, we found that experts and practitioners tend to be in ‘silos’ in the framework of their disciplines, missing critical input from other areas of expertise and limiting the viability of their recommendations. Second, long-term planning in Gaza is a strategic mistake and many plans are contingent on realities which are far from materializing, such as politically negotiated settlements. Third, while Israel is called upon to change certain aspects of the status quo, its concerns and objections are not sufficiently addressed or taken seriously – making them unlikely to accept those recommendations fully.

The necessity of developing Gaza’s economy demands that it be approached with the current limitations in mind and perhaps the fundamental shake-up we’ve been waiting for might already be here. International actors should develop Gaza’s economy with the tools of today, not yesterday, and should therefore focus on the digital rather than the physical sphere. With two key pillars in mind, digital payments systems and web-based job creation,  the reasons for shifting emphasis toward a digital economy are all tied to the challenges we identified beforehand. Going digital bypasses the physical restrictions in Gaza today. From high transaction costs, to crippling import export regimes, and the stifled flow of funds, all of these barriers are unlikely to disappear overnight. Cyberspace, however, has no borders or political roadblocks. But it gives Gaza a way of offering value to a global marketplace as a freelance/outsource hub. Perhaps more importantly, it creates a way for its people to be directly connected with those who financially support them – through employment, investment, or aid.

Digital development also offers two things that traditional industries can’t – portability and scalability. When a job only requires a computer and an internet connection, the combination of low overhead costs and portability in times of conflict make it much more attractive to investors since it mitigates major risks. Furthermore, the marketplace for digital goods and services is expanding exponentially, so compared to the profit potential of textiles, furniture, or agriculture, it’s a no-brainer for someone concerned with ROI. Perhaps the most promising aspect of a digitally connected economy and finance system is that it can address Gaza’s cash crisis, answer Israel’s primary security concerns, and offer critical oversight, which is lacking in the status-quo all at the same time. Technological advancements in e-commerce could empower Gaza’s consumers, businesses, and even civil servants by providing them with a stable source of income protected by smart contracts. Both Israel, the PA, and international organizations could automatically track and prevent Hamas from shaking down civilians or misappropriating funds for terrorist operations. In fact, this technological shift already enjoys support among some Israeli decision-makers and of course will create a tool for the PA to bolster its influence in the Strip by being seen as ‘the one who pays the bills’.

Obviously this is not a silver bullet, and of course there are major hurdles to be overcome to make this vision a reality. What is certain though is that the prerequisites for developing Gaza’s digital economy are far fewer and much more manageable than anything else which has been tried before. These ideas have already been tested and proven on a small scale by an incredible initiative that created Gaza’s first tech hub, known as Gaza Sky Geeks, even under the current crippling political inertia. Between this proof of concept and our research, I think it’s safe to say that those attending the summit in Manama would do well to think outside the box when addressing economic development and cooperation in the Middle East, especially where it is desperately needed most. Einstein famously stated, “we can’t solve the problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them” and I think he would agree that this is certainly an experiment worth trying.

Ariel Brodkey is a recent graduate of the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya’s Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy where he was also a fellow in the Argov honors program. He served as an operator and commander in an elite IDF special operations unit, earning several awards and a citation. Today, Ari is a research and teaching assistant specializing in American and comparative politics, the Middle East peace process, and international political economy.

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Hybrid Warfare Against Pakistan: Challenges and Response

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The term ‘hybrid warfare’ entered the strategic lexicon in the early 21st century despite having been practiced in various forms for a long time. It is defined as a blend of both kinetic and non-kinetic options to offset conventional power dynamics.  Hybrid warfare includes extensive use of tools like spreading disinformation, propaganda, economic coercion, backing proxy militia and cyber-attacks to achieve strategic objectives. In modern times, owing to the exponentially high cost of men and material used in traditional warfare, not only the great powers but various middle powers engage in hybrid warfare in order to destabilize, demoralize and disintegrate their core adversaries.

The advancement in technology over the 21st century encourages the blending of the different modes of warfare making hybrid warfare a practical option for meeting political objectives. The aspects of ambiguity and deniability that accompany hybrid warfare, make it an attractive option for states to exercise subtle power – they do not have to fear attribution and retribution. Hybrid warfare has become more popular because of the issue pertaining to major wars. The arrival of nuclear weapons in the 20th century even to India and Pakistan, and the different major wars have made conventional warfare much riskier. The consequences of the major wars have led to a transformation in how these wars are viewed. States that want to exert their influence have found other means to do so. There is an on-going debate in the UN about the serious consequences of the internet that can be constituted as acts of war. Its warfare without any direct violence.

Pakistan’s arch enemy, India, has constantly been waging hybrid warfare against Pakistan since partition but it has been recently expedited with increased funding, training of a separatist militia, through economic subversion by politicizing international bodies such as FATF and carrying out diplomatic sabotage in the form of disinformation campaigns disclosure by EU Disinfo Lab. Though the decision was motivated by the political objective of placing Pakistan on the grey list, India’s hybrid warfare against Pakistan jeopardizes South Asia’s stability.

India’s main objective when it comes to hybrid warfare against Pakistan is it to keep Pakistan politically and economically unstable. This helps achieve certain other goals like preventing the rise of Pakistan’s power in Kashmir and pressuring Pakistan to settle on India’s terms in issues like Siachen and Sir Creek. India has tried to employ numerous tools to wage this warfare against Pakistan at the different levels.

India is trying to build a narrative, especially among Indian Muslims and Kashmiris that Pakistan is a failed or failing state and the partition of the Indian sub-continent was huge mistake. They are also generating the idea that the Indian Muslims are far superior to the Pakistanis and even the Bangladeshis. The hybrid warfare against Pakistan also has its internal dynamics, as it is very much part and parcel of India’s domestic politics particularly around elections. Even the Hindutva intoxicated BJP came to power by employing this strategy. India has also given rise to the narrative that she always tried to build good relations but the Pakistani military does not let the relations normalize. Also, it is the Pakistan Army, which is not allowing a solution to the Kashmir dispute because when Pakistan and India were engaged in backchannel diplomacy to work out a solution on the basis of President Musharraf’s four-point formula, it was the Pakistan Army which conducted, supported and funded the Mumbai attack of 2008. Thus, the Pakistan Army is portrayed as a major problem when it comes to Pakistan. It is also being projected that Pakistan’s defense expenditure is illogical as it needs to invest more in its development rather than the armed forces to defend itself against India. India is also exploiting the fault lines of Pakistan – Baluchistan and CPEC. Pakistan is also blamed for not allowing regional peace and integration. India links Pakistan to the Taliban at international level. Certainly, India’s main aim is to weaken the social contract of Pakistan by creating restlessness, divisions and instability within the country.

Pakistan needs a well calibrated strategy in how to counter India’s move at every platform. Therefore, it is the need of the hour to understand the nature of hybrid warfare while concentrating on Pakistan’s social and political harmony. More importantly, we need to realize the potential of CPEC. There must be good governance based on deliverance to overcome the vulnerabilities. There is no denying the fact that this is an era of multilateralism, but multilateral approach works well when there are healthy bilateral relations. While it is good to host conferences and seminars, there is a need for more practical action. We live in world were information spreads quickly. Hence, we need a counternarrative to India’s narrative of ‘talks and terrorism cannot go side by side’ but unfortunately Pakistan always acts in an apologetic manner. The media can potentially be the face of any state but in the case of Pakistan, the media does not care and there is no policy-based discussion between the media and the government. Also, Pakistan does not have enough English news channels to portray the positive image of Pakistan. Furthermore, every part of Pakistani society including the media, the civil society and academia should collectively respond to India’s hybrid warfare against Pakistan. For all of this to be successful, Pakistan’s immune system must be protected through socio-political harmony and improved governance. Last but not the least, India may not be able to sustain its economic lure for long, therefore, India must stop this hybrid warfare against Pakistan, and resume diplomatic activities for stability and prosperity of the region.

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How Putin’s Russia is Exploiting Jihadists Against pro-Navalny Protesters?

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Who is Putin’s terrorist: Navalny or Jihadist?

Russia’s strongman Vladimir Putin is considering using old tactics to stem the growing wave of nationwide protests in support of his fiercest critic, popular opposition leader Alexei Navalny. This tactic was developed in the late 90s by the KGB ideologists and successfully applied in order to bring to power Vladimir Putin, who is ruling the country with an iron hand longer than all his Soviet predecessors except Joseph Stalin. The tactical skills of the Putin’s policy architects were aiming to frighten Russian citizens by Islamist terrorism and Chechen separatism and unite patriotic and nationalist forces around a new leader capable of challenging the West.

Thus, when the nationwide protests in support of Navalny from Yakutia to Kaliningrad became the most serious challenge, the Kremlin began to trumpet the threat of Islamist extremists and international terrorists. This time, the Putin regime is intimidating protesters with impending terrorist attacks of Central Asian and Caucasian jihadists and their Syrian parent organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

On the eve of the next nationwide protests on February 14, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russia warned of the inadmissibility of calls to participate in an unsanctioned rally. Russian state news agencies RIA Novosti and TASS have disseminated information that the most powerful Sunni militant faction of HTS in northern Syria is preparing a series of lone-wolf attacks during the upcoming mass street protests of Navalny’s supporters in various Russian cities. In doing so, however, the pro-Kremlin media cited its undisclosed law enforcement sources and ultimately spread merely conspiracy theories.

According to anonymous sources of Russian security services, HTS-backed Uzbek Jihadi battalion Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad(KTJ), Chechen militant groups Ajnad al-Kavkaz (AK) and Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JMA) are planning to carry out explosions and attack protesters. To achieve these purposes, terrorist groups allegedly recruited Russian citizens and Central Asian migrants, who expect their leaders’ commands.

pro-Navalny protesters

The Putin regime faced the most serious challenge when anti-government protests took place across the Russia in support Navalny in recent weeks. As is known, in mid-January, Navalny returned to the country after recovering from a chemical Novichok poisoning that nearly took his life and was immediately detained and later jailed for alleged parole violations. The robust Putin regime first demonstrated its grave alarm when tens of thousands pro-Navalny protesters demanded his resignation in more than 100 cities and towns, chanting Putin as a ‘thief’. Police detained more than 11,000 people at what they say were unsanctioned protests that the Moscow condemned as illegal and dangerous.

Alexei Navalny’s political creativity and tactical skill inspired Russian liberal youth weary with the corruption-plagued political order presided over by Putin. Fierce clashes between protesters and riot police during the mass rallies indicate that a new generation is not afraid of arrests and the repressive state machine. And to stop the pace of marathon confrontation with the opposition, Putin resorted to his long-standing KGB tactics, intimidating society with possible terrorist attacks and explosions by Islamists.

Will Uzbek and Chechen Jihadists hit pro-Navalny Protesters?

But the fact is, it’s not the first time Putin’s Russia has intimidated society with possible terror attacks by Islamist terrorists and Chechen separatists to achieve political goals. During the transition of power from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin at the end of the second millennium, Kremlin ideologists successfully tested anti-Islamist tactics to overcome the challenges of the political opposition. The ideologists of Putin’s election campaign created his image as a decisive and strong leader, the one who can defeat Islamist terrorism, Chechen separatism and preserve the integrity of Great Russia. His image as the only savior of the Russian Empire was accompanied by radio and television spots and news about the atrocities of Chechen militants and their beheading of Russian soldiers.

Meanwhile, there is a conspiracy theory in Russian political circles that the powerful FSB orchestrated apartment bombings in the Russian cities of Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999 to boost Putin’s approval rating aiming to ensure his victory in the presidential elections. As a result of these “terrorist attacks”, 307 people were killed, more than 1,700 people were injured. Russian officials concluded that there was a “Chechen trail” in the bombings, but no proof of their involvement was adduced. Many still doubt the results of the investigation and consider Putin to be the culprit of this tragedy.

That’s when Putin uttered his famous phrase: “We will pursue the [Islamist] terrorists everywhere. If they are in an airport, we’ll kill them there. If we catch them in the toilet, we’ll exterminate them in the toilet.” Many still believe that the apartment bombings and the FSB’s tactic against Islamist extremists catapulted Putin into the presidency. Putin soon launched a second war in Chechnya and emerged victorious in the intra-Kremlin struggle. His ratings soared. He met with huge approval in a society weary from the economic collapse, corruption and crime of the Yeltsin era.

Usually people prefer to keep quiet about this tragedy. Russian political figures Sergei Yushenkov, Yuri Shchekochikhin, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, and Boris Berezovsky worked to unravel the mystery of apartment bombings. But all of them were brutally murdered under mysterious circumstances. Ultimately, the Kremlin’s tactics to combat Islamist terrorists not only helped to rocket Putin to the political Olympus, but also increased Islamophobia, nationalism and chauvinism in Russian society.

Today, even 22 years after Putin came to power, the Kremlin’s ideologists have begun to intimidate Russia’s liberal society with likely Islamist terrorist attacks again as the nationwide protests seriously threaten his regime. This illustrates the regime exhaustion and the lack of confidence in face of the strategic sophistication of Navalny’s team.

So far, neither HTS, nor Central Asian and North Caucasian Salafi-Jihadi groups have officially responded to the FSB on the plotting of terrorist attacks in Russian cities during opposition rallies. However, in encrypted Telegram chats, Uzbek and Chechen jihadists actively discussed the “leak information”.

Thus, one of the KTJ’s followers on Telegram under the name Al Hijrat said in Uzbek: “Kafir Putin frightens his people with the just sword of Allah.But the people of the blessed land of Sham know that he himself is the main terrorist. Russian infidels and Putin’s Nusayri puppy (Alawites regime of Bashar al-Assad) bomb Greater Idlib to destroy Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah. Executioners will have to hold a harsh response before the Almighty for their crimes.”

A pro-Jihadi chat “Inspire” in Telegram wrote in Russian: “the information about the impending attacks by Ajnad al-Kavkaz is fake. The authorities are trying to hold Russia’s awakening people from mass protests against Putin’s criminal group. To intimidate civilians, the Russian siloviki (FSB) can and are ready to commit terrorist acts, blaming HTS for this, which are not interested in what is happening there in Russia. The Putinists have a lot of experience in killing their own citizens and blowing up their houses.” In this message, Chechen militants indirectly protect HTS from accusations by pro-Kremlin media on impending terrorist attacks in Russian cities during opposition protests. This is no coincidence, since Ajnad al Kavkaz is known for its close ties with HTS.

On Telegram channel, some Russian-speaking jihadists from the post-Soviet space mocked at the ‘leaked information’, some expressed their anger against the “Russian occupants” in Sham, some advised protesters to be vigilant before the FSB provocation. A pro-Jihadi chat Icharkhoin Telegram recommended Muslims of Caucasus be ready for new repressions of Russian infidels and local Murtad (apostate), because after the bombings of houses in Volgodonsk, Putin started the 2-Chechen war and took away the independence of Ichkeria. The Telegram chat “Muhajireen” says that the Kremlin is preparing for a harsh suppression of the mass protests.

It is not the first time the Russian authorities have accused Central Asian and North Caucasian Jihadi networks of organizing terrorist act. On April 3, 2017, the Russian FSB blamed KTJ for the bombing on a subway train in St. Petersburg that killed 16 people and injured 67 others. On October 15, 2020, the FSB once again accused the Uzbek KTJ militants of preparing subversive and terrorist acts in Russian cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ufa, Maikop and Volgograd. In a statement, the intelligence services claimed that during the counter-terrorist operation, they prevented explosions and eliminated two members of KTJ. Then FSB distributed photos and videos of firearms, ammunition, IED’s chemical components, and religious literature seized during the operation.

On October 16, 2020, KTJ in its statement denied the Russian authorities’ accusation in these attacks. The Uzbek militant group stated that “according the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s policy, our activities are limited to the territory of Sham, and we do not conduct jihadi acts outside of it.” Further, KTJ assured via its Telegram channel that it “does not have its cells in Russia and is not involved in organizing terrorist acts there.”

Jihadi factor of Russian democracy

The Russian authorities often make thunderous statements about plotting terrorist attacks by “international terrorist groups” and how siloviki (FSB) successfully prevented its. This time, trumpeting about terrorist plots by HTS and its foreign subsidiaries during mass protests in various Russian cities, Moscow hoped to hit two birds with one stone. First, the Kremlin hopes that alarm on terrorist attacks could become a cold shower for Navalny’s supporters, as a result of which the activity of protesters will subside and the scale of the rallies will decrease. Second, by accusing HTS of plotting terrorist attacks, Russia is trying to justify its bloody bombing in northern Syria before the international community.

However, experts on jihadism and political Islam were skeptical about accusations of HTS for plotting terrorist attacks in Russia.HTS, Syria’s most powerful rebel group, is trying to implement a new strategy to transform itself from a global jihadist outlook into a local “moderate national liberation movement”. Today its new agenda is entirely dedicated to Syria and the Syrian local Sunni community. Within this new strategy, HTS severely restricted external attacks by its subsidiaries – Central Asian and North Caucasian Salafi-Jihadi groups –KTJ, AK and JMA. Consequently, HTS, which holds the last major rebel bastion in Idlib province and backs the local Salvation Government, is focused only on the internal Syrian jihad than organizing external terrorist attacks.

HTS emir Abu Mohammed al-Julani is well aware that any terrorist attacks in Russia could place his group among the global terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, from which he decisively disavowed. HTS pursues a pragmatic approach to the political context, and its external attacks outside of Syria could undermine its fragile legacy, which Julani has achieved with great difficulty.

According to the new strategy, HTS has excluded Central Asian and local hardliners from its ranks. Those jihadists who did not want to submit to its new policy, such as former KTJ emir Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki and HTS Shura Council member Abu Malek al-Talli, were arrested or taken out of the Syrian jihad zone. Given the ability of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to pressure Russian-speaking militant groups to abandon its global jihadist ambitions, it can be concluded that the Russian FSB’s accusation against HTS raises many questions.

In conclusion, the Russian authorities alert about Islamists terrorist attacks during pro-Navalny protests is aimed at an internal audience and pursues exclusively domestic political goals. And these goals are clear as plain as the nose on the face. Using these methods, the Kremlin wants to stop the turbulent development of mass protests and divert the attention of people from the Navalny factor. If they succeed, the authorities will take time out to gather strength for the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2021.But if the wave of protests grows ever stronger and threatens Putin’s regime, then a repetition of the 1999 scenario is quite possible. As then, radical Islamism and terrorism can become a starting point for strengthening authoritarianism in Russia.

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Corona pandemic: Realism limitation in solving 21st century security threats

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Today, most serious threats of the 21st century are not ones we can protect ourselves by using armies or advanced weapons. Indeed, the popularity of extreme-right politics, unilateralism based on nationalism and COVID-19 are threatening the world’s post-war security architecture. 

The state-based unilateralism and the trends of national response to the 21st century’s biggest security threat trigger lack of coordination, diplomatic divisions, and incoherent global answer to COVID-19. Hence, as we face the biggest challenge of the contemporary century today, we need to rethink the very nature of our comprehension of national security threats. By doing so, we need a different approach to facing security threats.

With the Corona pandemic as a security threat, one of the foundational international relations theories, the realism, has been revealed to be far limited in terms of its explanatory power than it declares. The argument is that realism has a valid logic and reasons for confidence since answers to the pandemic have confirmed the supremacy of sovereign states, the grounds for the state’s power competition. Nevertheless, the pandemic also presents realism’s weaknesses as a source for successful policy answer to this security challenge. In other words, realism is better at defining risks and threats than suggesting solutions. Put simply, realism’s explanatory power lies in diagnosis rather than treatment or prevention. To make this clear, one insight the theory emphasizes is the representation of states as the fundamental actors in world politics. 

As the coronavirus hit, states shifted quickly to close or tighten international borders, controlled movement within their borders. However, while much independent national action is understandable from a realism’s point of view, it’s insufficient. Unilateralism and state-based measures, such as border controls did not spare states from the pandemic, and unilateral measures risk ending up in national economic and social crisis. 

To fight the Corona pandemic most efficiently, policymakers will have to shift to other theoretical traditions to overcome this security threat. They will depend more and more on greater international openness, trust and cooperation. Hence, while from the realism’s view, unilateral and state-based actions may serve national interest to fight the pandemic “within the national borders”, the pandemic is a global security threat and thus remains unsolved so long as other states and non-state actors have not done the same and states move on unilaterally. 

Solving global crises and security threats such as a pandemic, similar to world economic or other security crises cannot be solved based on the realist considerations of zero-sum competitive logic. Instead, transnational security threats, such as Coronavirus, is unmasking the limitations of individual states actions in the global system. Thus, while realism does an excellent job of “diagnosing the problem”, it does not offer solutions to that problem.   

Considering the necessity of worldwide medical items and actions, coordinated and offered by international organizations and non-state actors, the uncoordinated state-based actions result in an ineffective solution to this security crisis. The perspective this article aims to offer is that given the limitations of realism, we need more faith in international transboundary cooperation based on mutual trust, especially trust vis-a-vis international institutions. However, neither the United Nations nor the World Health Organization (WHO) nor any other non-state actor can overcome the Coronavirus on its own; nor non-state actors such as international institutions are alternatives to national states in international relations. 

Instead, they are an instrument of foreign policy and statecraft and states need to rely on them, incorporating them in finding solutions to global security threats. According to constitutionalists, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “States are indeed self-interested, but cooperation is often in their interest and institutions help to facilitate that cooperation.”

From our partner Tehran Times

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