Diplomacy

A Few Words in Defence of Francis Fukuyama

Published

4 years ago

June 22, 2019

Thirty years ago, in the summer of 1989, the National Interest published the famous article “The End of History” that made the young American political scientist and philosopher Francis Fukuyama famous. Three years later, the article was expanded into a voluminous book that became a bestseller in the United States and was translated into dozens of foreign languages.

In Russia, or at least among Russian intellectuals, The End of History quickly became a symbol of the era, much like the crimson jackets of the first “New Russians,” liter bottles of the Dutch distilled spirit Royal and the electrifying Macarena. Fukuyama was cited, Fukuyama was quoted, but most often, Fukuyama was criticized. For the haughtiness of his liberalism. For his superficial and unprofessional view of history. For his free interpretations of Hegel. For being an apologist of the “unipolar world.” Hardly any other contemporary western scholar was such a popular punching bag for Russian social scientists. Echoes of this criticism are heard even today, 30 years later, although, over these decades, Fukuyama’s work has somewhat receded into the background, ceding its place to new equally stark and equally provocative works by other authors.

I have always found it hard to share the spirit of the many critics of The End of History, if only for the simple reason that I met the scholar long before he became the great Francis Fukuyama. Back then, he was Frank, a young RAND staffer studying the Soviet strategy in the “third world.” At the start of perestroika, I had the opportunity to be the leader, on the Soviet side, of a bilateral cooperation project involving young Soviet and American scholars, and Fukuyama was a collaborator on that project. He did not appear to me at that time to be either the most charismatic, or the most eloquent member of the American team. However, he also was not a stubborn dogmatist or a fanatical ideologue. In general, Frank preferred to listen, rather than to speak. It was difficult to reproach him for either intellectual arrogance or pointed disregard for other people’s opinions.

Of course, his sudden fame and his headlong breakthrough into the inner circle of the American intellectual elite could not but leave their mark on Fukuyama. Meeting him in Washington from time to time during the 1990s, I was saddened to see him becoming increasingly self-important. Sometimes, he sounded patronizing and bossy. Nonetheless, he was still interested in new ideas, always ready for a dialogue, capable of evolving and changing his views, of acknowledging his mistakes and errors: Fukuyama carried these features of his young self through the 1990s and into his older age.

When university academics attack Fukuyama, they do not always take into account the obvious point that every literary genre has its laws and specific features. The End of History of 1989 should be seen not as a fundamental academic work, but as an intellectual provocation, a political manifesto of sorts. The Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels should not be approached with the same yardstick as Marx’s Capital. When, 30 years later, we look back at Fukuyama article in the National Interest, it appears romantic, combative and naïve, but does Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” rhetoric of the same time look any less romantic and naïve? And which one of us was not a naïve romantic in 1989?

Viewing western-type liberal democracy as the final stage of humanity’s development and as the universally optimal socio-political form, Fukuyama arrives at the conclusion that for states with a “stable democracy,” history in its traditional interpretation – with its conflicts and wars, harsh rivalries and nationalism – had already ended by the last decade of the 20th century. And, together with history, traditional politics, philosophy, religion, and even the arts should also become things of the past. For instance, traditional domestic and foreign policies are increasingly replaced with politically neutral mechanisms for balancing the multidirectional interests of various social groups or states. Fukuyama sees fine-tuning state institutions and finding a balance of interests in “post-historical societies” as technical or even mathematical problems; in that respect, he is closer to Descartes’s rationalism than to Hegel’s dialectics.

For Fukuyama, the world where history continues is limited to the global periphery, to those countries and regions that still have to complete the process of their modernization. The periphery is still plunged into armed conflicts; this the place of bloody revolutions, clashes of irreconcilable ideologies and international coalitions that form and collapse. The “post-historical world” will for a long time run on a parallel course with the “historical world,” but since the former is much stronger, more efficient and more attractive than the latter, the global “core of liberalism” will inevitably continue to draw parts of the “traditionalist” periphery into it, thus bringing the end of history on global scale closer.

Let us not forget that “The End of History” was written when the global socialist system was collapsing before our eyes, when the global “East-West” split seemed to be disappearing into oblivion forever, when the “third wave of democratization” had peaked, when those tectonic social and economic shifts that would later be called “globalization” were being felt everywhere. Bards of the liberal triumph abounded in those times of trouble, but it was Francis Fukuyama who succeeded in giving this triumph a truly epic scale. His eschatological utopia directly challenged the Christian eschatology (the end of history as the Second Coming of Christ and the Kingdom of God on Earth) and the Communist eschatology (the end of history as the result of building a classless society and the atrophy of the state).

Apparently, it was the large scale of Fukuyama’s concept and the ultimate rigidity of his logical construct that made his views so popular with the Clinton administration, and with the George W. Bush administration in particular. As always, practice far outstripped theory, taking Fukuyama’s ideas to their logical conclusion. While Fukuyama wrote about global democratization, for politicians in Washington at the turn of the century, democratization was reduced to global Americanization, and the ideal world order consisted not in searching for mathematically calibrated balance of interests of “stable democracies,” but in perpetuating the notorious “unipolar moment” that emerged in the world following the self-destruction of the Soviet Union.

Admittedly, Fukuyama himself paid tribute to the political situation of the day. Even though he wrote about the necessarily long parallel co-existence of the “post-historical” and “historical” worlds, it did not preclude him from long supporting the interference of the United States in the affairs of the global periphery and, in particular, from calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. However, it was the U.S. intervention in Iraq that caused Fukuyama to undertake a very serious revision of his political stance. By 2004, he had cut his ties with his old friends in the George W. Bush administration and even decided to stop cooperating with the conservative National Interest journal that had opened the door to global fame and intellectual influence for him.

As often happens with bestselling authors, the works of the “mature” Fukuyama were less popular than The End of History. They are not marked by his erstwhile radicalism and firm conviction of his own self-righteousness. The “mature” Fukuyama is more restrained in his assessments and more cautious in his conclusions than the “young” Fukuyama. And still, he makes worthwhile reading, at least in order to trace the tell-tale evolution of one of the most notable and consistent proponents of the political philosophy of liberalism.

For instance, while Fukuyama previously viewed the state as a hindrance to socioeconomic development than a means towards it, now he stresses the importance of strong and effective governmental institutions. While previously he defined the interaction between “post-historical” and “historical” worlds solely as a process of the former gradually subsuming the latter, now he insists on the need to analyze the internal development factors of “traditionalist” societies. While previously the outcome of the global confrontation between western democracy and eastern authoritarianism appeared obvious to him, today, given the growing rivalry between the United States and China, Fukuyama leaves the question of the model for the future human civilization open.

Let us, however, go back to The End of History. Re-reading various reviews of Francis Fukuyama’s first works (let us note in parentheses that, apparently, not all critics took the trouble of reading the source material), one involuntarily arrives at the conclusion that, in their desire to refute, score points against, or even pointedly “unmask” the famous American scholar, Fukuyama’s many opponents overlook the fundamental questions that you simply cannot help asking upon reading Fukuyama’s works. There were no convincing answers to those questions 30 years ago, nor are there any today.

Of course, like all utopian thinkers before him, Fukuyama makes a mistake when he talks about the impending “end of history.” History did not end in 1989, nor has it ended in 2019. It will continue for as long as humanity continues to exist with all its emotions, biases, ambitions, and bouts of madness. But what form will history take? Will we see it moving in circles, endlessly repeating the same cycles? And will the periods of antiquity, traditionalism, modernity, and post-modernity follow each like the seasons of the year? Or will history develop in a spiral? Are the many economic, sociocultural, and political shifts Fukuyama noted 30 years ago irreversible? And if history is a spiral and not a circle, what is the radical difference between the turns of that spiral that follow each other?

Fukuyama does, indeed, appear to have overestimated the expansionist potential of global liberal political systems. Yet, as far as one can see, in the 30 years that have passed since liberalism triumphed globally over communism, no comprehensive alternative to political liberalism that would be comparable to communism has appeared. The rising Islamic fundamentalism or the burgeoning national particularism can hardly be considered such alternatives. China is apparently not ready to propose an export-oriented model of its political authoritarianism. While Russia is drifting farther and farther away from the West politically, it continues to declare its adherence to the basic values of western democracy and market economy. How many decades more do we need to wait to see a full-fledged alternative to liberalism? Or was Fukuyama correct and such alternative cannot be invented as a matter of principle, just like we cannot invent the perpetual motion machine?

Indeed, Fukuyama’s notion of the world’s black-and-white split into “historical” and “post-historical” appears naïve and unconvincing today. The dividing line between “history” and “post-history” does not run between states, it runs between individual social, political, religious, and other groups within each country. Put very simply, it is the division between those who somehow benefit from globalization and those who become its victims. Hence the deep split in the US society today. Hence the unprecedented polarization of political life in Europe. Hence the drama of Brexit. This is the source of many political problems that Russia faces today and that China will face, too, sooner or later. Yet, the fact that dividing lines do not run where Fukuyama saw them and the way he saw them does not remove the problem of the split itself. Moreover, it is the close intertwining, interpenetration, and inseparability of the “historical” and “post-historical” worlds that makes the task of searching for the algorithms of their co-existence far more difficult. Fukuyama gave just a very general outline of this task.

Indeed, Fukuyama was a romantic and an idealist: he believed in the liberal idea, in the “grand meanings” of history, in the possibility of ordering international relations on a rational basis. This conviction was the source of the optimism that is evident in his early works. Today, little is left of his faith in the almighty political liberalism and in the ultimate triumph of liberalism. Fukuyama’s grand meanings have been refuted, trampled into dust and ridiculed many times over. Yet, what have the critics put forth as an alternative concept of a stable and efficient world order? An ambiguous and poorly detailed concept of an archaic “multipolar world”? Apocalyptic pictures of an impending free-for-all, chaos, wars, and conflicts? Predicting future misfortunes and upheavals does not take great insight; minimal imagination suffices. However, finding a way of restoring global governance that is more realistic than the “end of history” requires grand-scale thinking and intellectual audacity that are at least comparable to the scale and daring of the young Fukuyama.

Incidentally, the full title of Francis Fukuyama’s book published in 1992 is The End of History and the Last Man. If the “end of history” can be interpreted as a direct reference to Hegel, then “the last man” is a term that Fukuyama clearly borrowed from Nietzsche. In his programmatic Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche depicts the antipode of his Übermensch as a being that has completely lost the will to power and willingness to take risks, a being that seeks only creature comforts, momentary pleasures, and security. Through Zarathustra, Nietzsche predicts a time when the society of “last men” will lose the differences between rulers and subjects, the strong and the weak, the outstanding and the mediocre. This is a society that has no flight or plight of spirit; it has no criminals, but it also has no heroes. The social fabric is growing progressively thinner, and society is rapidly fragmenting into individual human atoms. Conflicts are becoming a thing of the past, but creativity fades, too. Supra-personal goals fall into myths and legends, personal goals become the only important thing. The place of the human-creator is taken by the human-consumer.

Fukuyama turns to Nietzsche to outline one of the most fundamental problems of the “post-historical world.” He thinks that the coming of the “last man” may become a side effect of the “end of history,” and it will bring human civilization to decline and ruin. At the same time, however, Fukuyama makes multiple qualifications and reservations to the effect that the “post-historical society” can put various obstacles in the path of the “last man.”

But there is a paradox here. History has not ended, “post-historical” society has not triumphed in any country, but “the last man” has already appeared on our common horizon. He does not give a damn about whether history has ended or not: history has nothing whatsoever to do with him. He saunters along, as the “last man” should, without being in a hurry. He has nowhere to hurry, and no reason to: he has eternity in front of him. Yet, the slow, shuffling steps of the “last man” are heard ever more clearly in the West and in the East, in the North and in the South. He saunters around the planet as if he is its master, and as he walks, he surveys his new piece of real estate.

Friends, we need to do something with this insolent claimant of our rightful abode!

From our partner RIAC

Related Topics:Culture Geopolitics History International Law

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Diplomacy

Water Diplomacy – A Tool for Peace and Well Being

Published

15 hours ago

June 4, 2023

Kiran Bhatt

Authors: Kiran Bhatt, Prof Dr Sanjay Pattanshetty, Prof Dr Helmut Brand

On March 22^nd every year, World Water Day is celebrated. The theme for 2023 focused on accelerating changes to resolve the water and sanitation crisis as part of the Agenda 2030. Starting in 2015, Sustainable Development Goal 6 aims to achieve everyone’s access to water and sanitation by 2030, while Goals 14 and 15 focus on conserving water to ensure sustaining marine and freshwater ecosystems. In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly initiated the “International Decade for Action: Water for Sustainable Development – 2018-2028” to promote the management of water resources in an integrated manner. Further, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, as part of its Action Plan, stated that the demand for freshwater is estimated to grow more than 40 per cent by 2050. He added that the increased demand and the adverse impact of climate change would make water scarcity worrisome. Scholars and reports have highlighted that tackling the increasing stress on natural resources such as freshwater while battling climate change would be a primary challenge in the coming years. Thus, with the challenge evolving to affect worldwide, there is a spike in demand for international and regional cooperation despite trends of disregarding globally accepted agreements and geopolitical tensions.

Water as a Source of Conflict?

With the increasing water demand, managing transboundary water basins has become challenging for countries. Although wars or conflicts are not directly instigated by tension over water sharing, using water resources to intimidate the belligerents can potentially drive conflicts, both at the internal and international levels. In addition to the impact on security, scarcity and accessibility to water resources threaten individuals’ socio-economic conditions, including food insecurity. Therefore, water impacts regional and international relations through its ability to control tensions and conflicts. As per the United Nations, a territory is termed “water-stressed” if it withdraws 25 or more per cent of renewable freshwater. Statista, an online consumer and market data platform, recently published a report highlighting the regions facing the highest water stress by 2040. Going by the definition given by the UN, the regions of Central and Southern Asia experience high levels of water stress. At the same time, it is critical in the case of Northern Africa and West Asia.

SDG 6 targets equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water. However, in many developing countries, contaminated water and poor sanitation facilities have resulted in the transmission of water-borne diseases like cholera, diarrhoea, and typhoid. Further, the absence of sanitation also enhances the breeding of vectors, which exposes threats of individuals to vector-borne diseases. Another impact of water scarcity and sanitation is its critical role in food security – from food production to ensuring adequate nutrition, which is possible through safe drinking water and improved hygiene practices. Water insecurity also has a far-stretching impact on the well-being of individuals. One of the aspects is social impact, where women are seen to encounter repercussions since they bear the responsibility of water acquisition for household tasks. Studies have further established that gender-based violence is closely related to the factors such as access, adequacy and reliability of water insecurity. Most research linked violence against women to gendered norms that justified aggression, made water and related household activities the primary responsibility of women, and limited women’s capacity to seek help.

Figure 1: Sustainable Development Goals Related to Water

Source: Authors’ own

Conflict and Crisis due to Scarcity – A Case of Sub-Saharan Africa

Fast-growing urban centres with a booming population dot the African continent on one side while it suffers from increased stress on the already overburdened water systems on the other. Multiple conflicts in the region trace their origin to increased competition for accessing depleting natural resources, among which water is placed high. The issues have risen at all levels of society; for example, the states of Sudan and Egypt have continuing disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with Ethiopia. While in 2021, a dispute between fishermen and herders in Cameroon turned violent, claiming the lives of 22 people while displacing close to 100,000 due to the continued clashes. The dispute was rooted in disagreements over the rights to water from Lake Chad. While water shortage triggers violent clashes, it also leads to food insecurity in the region due to the adverse impacts on agricultural output and wildlife. The impact of water scarcity has taken a severe turn on agriculture, thereby affecting agrarian economies. For example, South Africa, a relatively stable economy in the continent, depends on the agricultural sector for job creation, food supply and development through foreign exchange. However, the water shortage has negatively impacted commercial and subsistence farmers, affecting the latter more severely.

The nexus between climate change and conflict is a complex issue with context-specific factors playing an important role. However, water scarcity has proven to be a threat multiplier affecting lives and impelling migration. While the scarcity of water alone might not be able to explain tensions between conflicting parties, it can be used as a tool to enhance cooperation due to the mere necessity of water for survival.

Water – A tool for peace?

Water can trigger clashes between neighbours, especially in transboundary water basins, and lead to political tensions between upper and lower riparian states. Various factors, such as geography, influence these transboundary water interactions within a basin. For example, while considering the geographical setting of the course of a river, the states upstream are considered more advantageous merely because they can control the flow and volume of water. Actions such as building dams or diverting water to meet their demands are claimed to showcase power to other members. However, an upper riparian state is not always necessary to be the dominant player. This is evident in the case of the Nile basin, where Egypt has a more significant say.

It is in this context that one must view the importance of negotiations surrounding water sharing. Water negotiations provide an opportunity for the riparian states to discuss, debate and deliberate agreements on various critical factors, such as sharing technical information to agreeing upon commitments related to sustainable management of water resources. A further step in the process is water diplomacy, wherein water could be used to build diplomatic relations between states and international relations in general. While water may itself be a cause of conflicts, situations include groups competing for scarce resources. Disagreement may arise over water used for unilateral or mutually beneficial gains. Hence, the failure to address such disagreements could turn into potential conflicts. It is in these scenarios that water diplomacy becomes a tool for preventive tool. Such a diplomatic tool ensures regional cooperation by bringing stability and peace.

A good example of problems arising from water sharing can be analysed in the case of India. India and Bangladesh are known to share cordial relations, but water sharing has been an issue between the South Asian neighbours. The Ganges Water Treaty was signed in 1996, and the recent developments in signing an MoU regarding sharing water from the Kushiyara are some of the successes of water negotiations. However, an exception is the Teesta water sharing which has yet to be implemented due to remonstrance from West Bengal. On the other hand, a commonly sighted example of successful water diplomacy is the Indus Water Treaty, signed between India and Pakistan in 1960. The Treaty, which the World Bank mediated, aimed to ensure equitable access to water in the Indus River basin. Despite numerous flashpoints, the pact is viewed as a milestone not just in the political relations between the two countries but a model to negotiate, collaborate and address other outstanding concerns. The conflicts that had erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan also find water scarcity as one of the root causes of the dispute between the farmers and pastoralists communities. The international community has employed water to address the conflict that killed several and displaced thousands. Led by the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a project was initiated for sustainable recovery of peace in the Darfur region by enabling efficient water management, which helps build peace.

As a bottom line, water diplomacy ultimately works towards preventing and mitigating issues arising due to disputes and disagreements related to water sharing. But its success depends on the parties’ willingness to cooperate. This willingness depends on the interests and motivations of the riparian states. A question arises if a powerful riparian might stall the entire process or the need for such engagements for a comparatively weaker riparian state even if there is no improvement in the prevailing imbalances. One angle to explain such unlikely cooperation is maintaining diplomatic relations and securing unexpected future circumstances that are dubious. The cooperation, if successful, could be extended beyond water management to include economic and security matters, ultimately bringing stability and peace to the region. While the success of such diplomacy centred around water depends on political will, linking the financial aspect to ensure further its implementation is also necessary. Political will is needed to establish relationships and networks for mobilising essential actors. It is also a requisite to bring all the crucial actors around a single table during disputes or crises. India’s G20 presidency, along with Lifestyle for the Environment (LiFE), has provided an opportunity to share its successful programs related to water conservation, such as Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM), Namami Gange Programme Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation and Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana. By explaining and sharing the sustainability of such programmes, India can lead the way for other countries in designing action plans which ultimately help achieve the SDG targets. This would also help address the over-stressing water resources in South Asia. On the other hand, there is also a need to involve other players like the Finance Ministry within the government, regional organisations, Multilateral Development Banks and International Financial Institutions, which ensures financial support. In addition, they also provide a third perspective and act as a binding force for the entire process. Water diplomacy can be used as a practical approach that will ensure a link between sustainability and security.

*Sanjay Pattanshetty is Professor and Head of the Department of Global Health Governance and Coordinator of Centre for Health Diplomacy at Prasanna School of Public Health, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal, Karnataka, India. He completed Doctor of Medicine in Community Medicine (MD) from Manipal Academy of Higher Education, and Double master’s in public policy and human Development with a specialization in Foreign Policy and Development from United Nations University and Maastricht University, The Netherlands. He has over a decade of experience in Public Health policy education program development, implementation, field research and practice. He has several scientific projects, and publications in reputed journals and has contributed to policy briefs in relevant areas.

*Helmut Brand is Jean Monnet, Professor of European Public Health and head of the Department of International Health at Maastricht University, The Netherlands. He studied Medicine in Düsseldorf and Zürich and holds a Master’s in Community Medicine from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the London School of Economics. Prof. Brand is a specialist in Public Health Medicine. He holds an honorable doctorate from Sofia Medical University. After working in several Health Authorities and Ministries of Health, he was director of the Public Health Institute of North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany. Since then European Integration in Health is the main topic of his work. He is past president of the Association of Schools of Public Health in the European Region (ASPHER) and the European Health Forum Gastein (EHFG) president.

As a policy advisor he serves on the European Advisory Committee on Health Research (EACHR) of WHO Europe and served on the Expert Panel on “Investing in Health” (EXPH) for the European Commission. At MAHE, India, he is the Founding Director of the Prasanna School of Public Health.

Diplomacy

The Role of Student Research in Shaping Diplomatic Discourse

Published

6 days ago

May 29, 2023

Newsroom

Diplomacy is a complicated field that is always changing. At its core are the fields of international relations and negotiations. To make good decisions in this fast-paced, global world, you need to know a lot about different themes and points of view. One of the key drivers of this understanding is student research, which plays a vital role in shaping diplomatic discourse. This article explores how important student research is and how it affects diplomacy efforts.

Understanding Diplomatic Discourse

Before we talk about the role of student research, let’s get a handle on the idea of diplomatic discourse. This is the exchange of ideas, opinions, and negotiations between nations. The goal is fostering cooperation, resolving conflicts, and addressing global challenges. It involves diplomats, policymakers, and experts who engage in dialogue and decision-making processes to shape international relations.

Conducting a thorough investigation requires careful planning, data collection, and critical analysis. It is important to gather reliable and credible sources to support your research. To master the art of academic writing, you need to know how to make a research paper that combines solid research with clear writing. You can make a good contribution to your area of study by carefully interpreting and presenting your findings. A well-written research paper not only shows that you know a lot about the subject, but also adds to the larger academic discussion.

The Value of Student Research

1. Fresh Perspectives

Student research brings a fresh and innovative perspective to diplomatic discourse. When young minds start to learn about many different things, they often approach problems with an open mind and a creative spirit. This can lead to the generation of new ideas, alternative viewpoints, and unconventional solutions. Even those which may not have been previously considered by established diplomatic circles. Diplomatic talks could be more open-minded and focused on the future if they took into account different points of view.

2. In-Depth Analysis

Students often have to do in-depth research on complex global issues. This study goes deeper than a simple understanding and looks at how political, economic, social, and cultural factors shape international relations. It shows that you know more than just the basics about the subject. By thoroughly examining these factors, students provide valuable insights that can enrich diplomatic discourse and inform policy decisions.

3. Cutting-Edge Research Areas

Students are the first to look into new technologies, world problems, and new trends. Their research often focuses on human rights, climate change, sustainable development, and hacking. Which are of great relevance to diplomatic agendas. When diplomats use the results of student research in their discussions, they can stay up to date on the latest developments and adapt their strategies accordingly.

4. Bridge between Academia and Practice

Student research acts as a bridge between academia and practical diplomacy. It allows academic institutions to contribute directly to real-world challenges by producing research that is applicable to diplomatic contexts. This helps to build a more complete plan to solve global problems by making it easier for people to share information and skills.

Promoting Student Research in Diplomacy

To maximize the impact of student research on diplomatic discourse, it is important to create an environment that encourages and makes it easy for students to start their own projects and activities. Here are some things that can be done to get students interested in studying diplomacy:

1. Establish Research Programs

Academic institutions and diplomatic organizations can collaborate to establish research programs focused on international relations and diplomatic studies. These programs can provide funding, mentorship, and resources to students, enabling them to undertake high-quality research projects with direct relevance to diplomatic discourse.

2. Foster Collaboration

Encouraging collaboration between students, diplomats, and policymakers can enrich the research process. By putting on events like workshops, conferences, and lectures that bring together different partners, you can make it easier for them to share useful ideas and build important relationships. This collaboration ensures that student research directly contributes to diplomatic discussions.

3. Recognize Excellence

By recognizing and rewarding students for their great research in diplomacy, they may be more likely to study things that will have a big impact on the world. Institutions can bring attention to the best research results by giving out awards, grants, and publication opportunities. This recognition helps to make student study even more important to the international conversation by making it more well-known and legitimate.

4. Engage in Policy Dialogues

It is important to give researchers chances to talk about policy and take part in diplomatic forums. They get the chance to talk about their results, take part in conversations, and add their points of view to the decision-making processes. Student research and political talk are tied together in a way that is good for both sides. Diplomats and people in charge of policy can learn important new things from these talks.

Conclusion

In conclusion, student research plays a crucial role in shaping diplomatic discourse. Students contribute to the richness and diversity of diplomatic discussions. They give new points of view, in-depth analyses, and insights into areas of research. Promoting student research in diplomacy can help students reach their full potential. This can help answer problems around the world and put the power of young brains to good use. It is important that the international community recognizes and accepts the importance of student research as a catalyst for positive change in the field of diplomacy.

Diplomacy

Modern Diplomacy and the New World Order

Published

4 weeks ago

May 8, 2023

Timofey Bordachev

There is no doubt that the international order is currently in a state of transition. The changes experienced seem to be the most significant in the past few hundred years. This assumption is predicated upon an objective fact — never before in the history of international politics has it included so many participants with different historical and cultural backgrounds. This means that we are not talking about another redistribution of power within a limited circle of states, but about a new distribution of power, capabilities and influence within a wider than ever circle of participants.

However, in practical terms, such large-scale changes result in a paradox: diplomacy is heavily influenced by tactical manoeuvring, rather than strategic considerations. This is especially noticeable in the example of the behaviour of Western countries; however, most of the rest are no exception. Even the actions of such powers as China or Russia, which by many indicators are truly examples of diplomatic conservatism, contain signs of not strategic, but contextual considerations. What can we say about small and medium-sized countries, some of which have even managed to become famous as skilful tacticians, making the most of the most ambiguous international situations?

Suffice it to say, the leading states will not determine the composition of the new world order alone; they have been joined by lesser-order predators, which are now in a state of constant manoeuvre. This, in turn, can lead us to one of two assumptions. Either this order is still very far from its ultimate form, or it is arising through a set of manoeuvres that seem insignificant from our aesthetic point of view, which are not the result of big decisions made by the wise and powers responsible for the fate of mankind.

Despite the fact that in popular literature, the ability to constantly manoeuvre is now, as a rule, one of the attributes of medium-sized states occupying an intermediate geopolitical position, it is precisely the large countries that have become true masters of this genre. Here we see that Europe, which despite its loyalty to transatlantic relations in the long term, certainly occupies first place. The main powers of the European Union, acting in an individual capacity or under the guise of European institutions obedient to them, are in a state of permanent manoeuvring, as the outer contour of the West. This is true in relations with China, Russia or other countries of the so-called world majority, and with their direct partners; they are constantly entering into bargaining relations with Europe’s powerful patron, the United States.

For the rest of the world, this creates the illusion that Europe can one day break away from America and embark on a relatively independent voyage. For the Americans themselves, it creates little additional opportunity or concern, but never leads to situations that threaten Washington’s monopoly on power.

For example, the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Beijing in the first half of April was certainly an example of such manoeuvring. The French head of state tried in every possible way to strengthen the idea among his Chinese counterparts that continental Europe can, at least tactically, act as something other than a territorial base for the realisation of American interests. In part, this was facilitated by objective economic opportunities that make cooperation with the Europeans beneficial for Beijing and the Chinese economy. The Chinese side remains somewhat confident that Germany and France are behaving desperately regarding Russia, precisely because they won’t consider a conflict with Moscow that could lead to dramatic consequences for them.

The Europeans are being gently pushed by the UK and the US towards a confrontation with China. For the European Union, going along with this would be economic suicide, especially given the current not-too-cheerful state of the socio-economic systems of most of “old Europe”. Moreover, the Europeans’ reluctance to refuse the benefits of cooperation with the PRC could even be seen during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing.

In addition, China quite rationally believes that the conflict between the West and Russia is more fundamental for Europe than the confrontation between the United States and China itself. Our Chinese friends are well aware of the history of relations between Russia and Western Europe, and understand that the hostility there emanates from the European states. Despite some positive experience of cooperation with Russia in the era when its behaviour was relatively convenient for the EU, the largest EU countries have always had their grievances with Moscow, perhaps even more serious than those of Japan, another American ally in the fight against the restoration of Russian influence and the destruction of American dominance in general. Russia objectively and historically is an adversary of Western Europe; this cannot be said about China, which simply due to its geopolitical position cannot cause serious concern. So the diplomatic manoeuvres of France and the EU as a whole will, of course, continue to be seen very positively by our Chinese friends.

Moreover, China itself manoeuvres in everything except for its strategic partnership with Russia, the true nature of which is hidden from outside observers by the exclusively trusting relations between our political leaders. Regarding all other issues, China is also advancing its long-term vision through decisions that may seem purely tactical. Moreover, as happened in the case of the historical rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, all the main features of international life are now contributing to the success of Chinese diplomacy. This will continue as long as Beijing can stay above the fight that the West and Russia are directly involved in over unfortunate Ukraine.

The United States is also conducting its own diplomatic manoeuvres, but, like Russia’s, they are more dangerous for global security simply because of the volumes of the deadliest weapons that the United States has at its disposal. Having proclaimed a decisive battle with Russia and an equally uncompromising confrontation with China, the US is also trying to play what enthusiastic observers call “subtle diplomacy.” However, if Europe relies here on its economic capabilities and certain charm of a sovereign player with a long history, then Washington manoeuvres in a deliberately brutal spirit, trying to play power games and pit everyone against everyone else. Of course, Washington succeeds less and less, but the resources accumulated over the past 50 years are still fantastically far from being exhausted.

Russia, in turn, is conducting its diplomatic manoeuvring by stubbornly refusing to “burn bridges” in relations with the West or damage the integrity of the world economic system. It has also demonstrates impressive tolerance towards those external partners that must take into account the wishes of the United States on the Russian issue, including even formally neutral countries that supply weapons to Kiev’s troops. In fact, only the diplomatic dialogue between Moscow and individual NATO countries has been completely stopped, and even there it was not done by Moscow, which emphasises that it is always open to resuming talks. Thus, almost no party involved is completely straightforward. In this regard, a relevant question that may confront experts of international politics is the following: are the general diplomatic manoeuvres simply part of the military activity that is growing on a global scale, or are they replacing the “big” negotiations about a new world order, about which theorists could dream of? It can be assumed that both are being done at the same time — to the particular chagrin of those of us who still believe that order in the world can be established through a single plan and rational, responsible calculations.

from our partner RIAC