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A Few Words in Defence of Francis Fukuyama

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Thirty years ago, in the summer of 1989, the National Interest published the famous article “The End of History” that made the young American political scientist and philosopher Francis Fukuyama famous. Three years later, the article was expanded into a voluminous book that became a bestseller in the United States and was translated into dozens of foreign languages.

In Russia, or at least among Russian intellectuals, The End of History quickly became a symbol of the era, much like the crimson jackets of the first “New Russians,” liter bottles of the Dutch distilled spirit Royal and the electrifying Macarena. Fukuyama was cited, Fukuyama was quoted, but most often, Fukuyama was criticized. For the haughtiness of his liberalism. For his superficial and unprofessional view of history. For his free interpretations of Hegel. For being an apologist of the “unipolar world.” Hardly any other contemporary western scholar was such a popular punching bag for Russian social scientists. Echoes of this criticism are heard even today, 30 years later, although, over these decades, Fukuyama’s work has somewhat receded into the background, ceding its place to new equally stark and equally provocative works by other authors.

I have always found it hard to share the spirit of the many critics of The End of History, if only for the simple reason that I met the scholar long before he became the great Francis Fukuyama. Back then, he was Frank, a young RAND staffer studying the Soviet strategy in the “third world.” At the start of perestroika, I had the opportunity to be the leader, on the Soviet side, of a bilateral cooperation project involving young Soviet and American scholars, and Fukuyama was a collaborator on that project. He did not appear to me at that time to be either the most charismatic, or the most eloquent member of the American team. However, he also was not a stubborn dogmatist or a fanatical ideologue. In general, Frank preferred to listen, rather than to speak. It was difficult to reproach him for either intellectual arrogance or pointed disregard for other people’s opinions.

Of course, his sudden fame and his headlong breakthrough into the inner circle of the American intellectual elite could not but leave their mark on Fukuyama. Meeting him in Washington from time to time during the 1990s, I was saddened to see him becoming increasingly self-important. Sometimes, he sounded patronizing and bossy. Nonetheless, he was still interested in new ideas, always ready for a dialogue, capable of evolving and changing his views, of acknowledging his mistakes and errors: Fukuyama carried these features of his young self through the 1990s and into his older age.

When university academics attack Fukuyama, they do not always take into account the obvious point that every literary genre has its laws and specific features. The End of History of 1989 should be seen not as a fundamental academic work, but as an intellectual provocation, a political manifesto of sorts. The Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels should not be approached with the same yardstick as Marx’s Capital. When, 30 years later, we look back at Fukuyama article in the National Interest, it appears romantic, combative and naïve, but does Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” rhetoric of the same time look any less romantic and naïve? And which one of us was not a naïve romantic in 1989?

Viewing western-type liberal democracy as the final stage of humanity’s development and as the universally optimal socio-political form, Fukuyama arrives at the conclusion that for states with a “stable democracy,” history in its traditional interpretation – with its conflicts and wars, harsh rivalries and nationalism – had already ended by the last decade of the 20th century. And, together with history, traditional politics, philosophy, religion, and even the arts should also become things of the past. For instance, traditional domestic and foreign policies are increasingly replaced with politically neutral mechanisms for balancing the multidirectional interests of various social groups or states. Fukuyama sees fine-tuning state institutions and finding a balance of interests in “post-historical societies” as technical or even mathematical problems; in that respect, he is closer to Descartes’s rationalism than to Hegel’s dialectics.

For Fukuyama, the world where history continues is limited to the global periphery, to those countries and regions that still have to complete the process of their modernization. The periphery is still plunged into armed conflicts; this the place of bloody revolutions, clashes of irreconcilable ideologies and international coalitions that form and collapse. The “post-historical world” will for a long time run on a parallel course with the “historical world,” but since the former is much stronger, more efficient and more attractive than the latter, the global “core of liberalism” will inevitably continue to draw parts of the “traditionalist” periphery into it, thus bringing the end of history on global scale closer.

Let us not forget that “The End of History” was written when the global socialist system was collapsing before our eyes, when the global “East-West” split seemed to be disappearing into oblivion forever, when the “third wave of democratization” had peaked, when those tectonic social and economic shifts that would later be called “globalization” were being felt everywhere. Bards of the liberal triumph abounded in those times of trouble, but it was Francis Fukuyama who succeeded in giving this triumph a truly epic scale. His eschatological utopia directly challenged the Christian eschatology (the end of history as the Second Coming of Christ and the Kingdom of God on Earth) and the Communist eschatology (the end of history as the result of building a classless society and the atrophy of the state).

Apparently, it was the large scale of Fukuyama’s concept and the ultimate rigidity of his logical construct that made his views so popular with the Clinton administration, and with the George W. Bush administration in particular. As always, practice far outstripped theory, taking Fukuyama’s ideas to their logical conclusion. While Fukuyama wrote about global democratization, for politicians in Washington at the turn of the century, democratization was reduced to global Americanization, and the ideal world order consisted not in searching for mathematically calibrated balance of interests of “stable democracies,” but in perpetuating the notorious “unipolar moment” that emerged in the world following the self-destruction of the Soviet Union.

Admittedly, Fukuyama himself paid tribute to the political situation of the day. Even though he wrote about the necessarily long parallel co-existence of the “post-historical” and “historical” worlds, it did not preclude him from long supporting the interference of the United States in the affairs of the global periphery and, in particular, from calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. However, it was the U.S. intervention in Iraq that caused Fukuyama to undertake a very serious revision of his political stance. By 2004, he had cut his ties with his old friends in the George W. Bush administration and even decided to stop cooperating with the conservative National Interest journal that had opened the door to global fame and intellectual influence for him.

As often happens with bestselling authors, the works of the “mature” Fukuyama were less popular than The End of History. They are not marked by his erstwhile radicalism and firm conviction of his own self-righteousness. The “mature” Fukuyama is more restrained in his assessments and more cautious in his conclusions than the “young” Fukuyama. And still, he makes worthwhile reading, at least in order to trace the tell-tale evolution of one of the most notable and consistent proponents of the political philosophy of liberalism.

For instance, while Fukuyama previously viewed the state as a hindrance to socioeconomic development than a means towards it, now he stresses the importance of strong and effective governmental institutions. While previously he defined the interaction between “post-historical” and “historical” worlds solely as a process of the former gradually subsuming the latter, now he insists on the need to analyze the internal development factors of “traditionalist” societies. While previously the outcome of the global confrontation between western democracy and eastern authoritarianism appeared obvious to him, today, given the growing rivalry between the United States and China, Fukuyama leaves the question of the model for the future human civilization open.

Let us, however, go back to The End of History. Re-reading various reviews of Francis Fukuyama’s first works (let us note in parentheses that, apparently, not all critics took the trouble of reading the source material), one involuntarily arrives at the conclusion that, in their desire to refute, score points against, or even pointedly “unmask” the famous American scholar, Fukuyama’s many opponents overlook the fundamental questions that you simply cannot help asking upon reading Fukuyama’s works. There were no convincing answers to those questions 30 years ago, nor are there any today.

Of course, like all utopian thinkers before him, Fukuyama makes a mistake when he talks about the impending “end of history.” History did not end in 1989, nor has it ended in 2019. It will continue for as long as humanity continues to exist with all its emotions, biases, ambitions, and bouts of madness. But what form will history take? Will we see it moving in circles, endlessly repeating the same cycles? And will the periods of antiquity, traditionalism, modernity, and post-modernity follow each like the seasons of the year? Or will history develop in a spiral? Are the many economic, sociocultural, and political shifts Fukuyama noted 30 years ago irreversible? And if history is a spiral and not a circle, what is the radical difference between the turns of that spiral that follow each other?

Fukuyama does, indeed, appear to have overestimated the expansionist potential of global liberal political systems. Yet, as far as one can see, in the 30 years that have passed since liberalism triumphed globally over communism, no comprehensive alternative to political liberalism that would be comparable to communism has appeared. The rising Islamic fundamentalism or the burgeoning national particularism can hardly be considered such alternatives. China is apparently not ready to propose an export-oriented model of its political authoritarianism. While Russia is drifting farther and farther away from the West politically, it continues to declare its adherence to the basic values of western democracy and market economy. How many decades more do we need to wait to see a full-fledged alternative to liberalism? Or was Fukuyama correct and such alternative cannot be invented as a matter of principle, just like we cannot invent the perpetual motion machine?

Indeed, Fukuyama’s notion of the world’s black-and-white split into “historical” and “post-historical” appears naïve and unconvincing today. The dividing line between “history” and “post-history” does not run between states, it runs between individual social, political, religious, and other groups within each country. Put very simply, it is the division between those who somehow benefit from globalization and those who become its victims. Hence the deep split in the US society today. Hence the unprecedented polarization of political life in Europe. Hence the drama of Brexit. This is the source of many political problems that Russia faces today and that China will face, too, sooner or later. Yet, the fact that dividing lines do not run where Fukuyama saw them and the way he saw them does not remove the problem of the split itself. Moreover, it is the close intertwining, interpenetration, and inseparability of the “historical” and “post-historical” worlds that makes the task of searching for the algorithms of their co-existence far more difficult. Fukuyama gave just a very general outline of this task.

Indeed, Fukuyama was a romantic and an idealist: he believed in the liberal idea, in the “grand meanings” of history, in the possibility of ordering international relations on a rational basis. This conviction was the source of the optimism that is evident in his early works. Today, little is left of his faith in the almighty political liberalism and in the ultimate triumph of liberalism. Fukuyama’s grand meanings have been refuted, trampled into dust and ridiculed many times over. Yet, what have the critics put forth as an alternative concept of a stable and efficient world order? An ambiguous and poorly detailed concept of an archaic “multipolar world”? Apocalyptic pictures of an impending free-for-all, chaos, wars, and conflicts? Predicting future misfortunes and upheavals does not take great insight; minimal imagination suffices. However, finding a way of restoring global governance that is more realistic than the “end of history” requires grand-scale thinking and intellectual audacity that are at least comparable to the scale and daring of the young Fukuyama.

Incidentally, the full title of Francis Fukuyama’s book published in 1992 is The End of History and the Last Man. If the “end of history” can be interpreted as a direct reference to Hegel, then “the last man” is a term that Fukuyama clearly borrowed from Nietzsche. In his programmatic Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche depicts the antipode of his Übermensch as a being that has completely lost the will to power and willingness to take risks, a being that seeks only creature comforts, momentary pleasures, and security. Through Zarathustra, Nietzsche predicts a time when the society of “last men” will lose the differences between rulers and subjects, the strong and the weak, the outstanding and the mediocre. This is a society that has no flight or plight of spirit; it has no criminals, but it also has no heroes. The social fabric is growing progressively thinner, and society is rapidly fragmenting into individual human atoms. Conflicts are becoming a thing of the past, but creativity fades, too. Supra-personal goals fall into myths and legends, personal goals become the only important thing. The place of the human-creator is taken by the human-consumer.

Fukuyama turns to Nietzsche to outline one of the most fundamental problems of the “post-historical world.” He thinks that the coming of the “last man” may become a side effect of the “end of history,” and it will bring human civilization to decline and ruin. At the same time, however, Fukuyama makes multiple qualifications and reservations to the effect that the “post-historical society” can put various obstacles in the path of the “last man.”

But there is a paradox here. History has not ended, “post-historical” society has not triumphed in any country, but “the last man” has already appeared on our common horizon. He does not give a damn about whether history has ended or not: history has nothing whatsoever to do with him. He saunters along, as the “last man” should, without being in a hurry. He has nowhere to hurry, and no reason to: he has eternity in front of him. Yet, the slow, shuffling steps of the “last man” are heard ever more clearly in the West and in the East, in the North and in the South. He saunters around the planet as if he is its master, and as he walks, he surveys his new piece of real estate.

Friends, we need to do something with this insolent claimant of our rightful abode!

From our partner RIAC

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Diplomacy

Bye Diego … (Geopolitics of Sports)

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The news of Diego Maradona’s death plunged the football world into grief and deprived football fans of the existence of a unique star. If we want to express this issue with the language of a geopolitician, it will be a different perception and analysis by others.

The geopolitical orientation of sport is one of the geopolitical tendencies with an artificial nature. Because sport acts as a source of power in the relationship between actors and shapes their strategies, and because this source of power has no geographical basis, when we want to discuss it in the form of geopolitics, it means a tendency with an artificial nature. The geopolitics of sport is thus conceptualized as the knowledge, acquisition, productivity, and preservation of sport as a (geographical) source of power in local, national, regional, and global relations. In other words, the use of sport and related issues as a new (geographical) source of power to achieve goals in local, national, regional and global relations is called the geopolitics of sport.

By that definition, Maradona was a (geographical) source of power for Argentina. The geographical source of power that since the game between Argentina and England with the goal later known as “Hand of God, the goal of the century” was able to provide a new and different representation of relations between the two countries after the defeat in the Falkland War for Argentina and turn a nation sadness into happiness.

Since then, Maradona has acted as a (geographical) source of power for his country and has been able to influence power relations in designing and representing his country’s strategies. On the relations between Argentina and England; Traditional rival of Argentina-Brazil (Pele); In the internal relations of the country; Introducing his country by showing the Argentine flag and so on.

In general, it can be said that sometimes people with importance and position that they can gain in various fields of science, sports, art, etc. can become (geographical) sources of power and be effective in the relationship between actors and the design of strategies. Losing people like Maradona can deprive an actor from a valuable source of power.

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Soft Power Policies of East Asian Titans

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Soft Power is a widely discussed and equally disputed concept as various scholars have their personal interpretation upon the power of attraction.

Joseph Nye has associated soft power with i) culture, ii) political values, and iii) foreign policies of a country.

China, Japan, and (Republic of) Korea rank the highest in the list of Intangible Heritages indicating their rich cultural identity.

The cultural identity like Confucian values gets interwoven with political ideas of respect and help build working morality that influences their foreign policies.

Japanese Anime such as Doraemon and Pokémon are extremely famous and Korean K-Pop such as Gangnam Style became the most liked video on YouTube. TikTok has brought China into the race of audio-visual diplomacy.

National identity and political views are promoted through audio-visual instruments such as movies, paintings, songs while some of them are despised as political propaganda.

The countries which have higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita are accepted to have a good political structure and other countries are likely to endorse a similar system. The three countries have become the symbol of success while many developing countries get inspired to adopt their style to improve their present condition.

Foreign policies depend upon the economic capability of countries and their ability to engage through trade and aid.

Trade is conducted to benefit one’s own country which may include importing unprocessed goods and exporting processed products like Japan import iron worth $7.18 billion and export cars and spare parts worth $139.3 billion.

Countries intend to import security instruments, basic goods like oil and gasoline while limiting luxury items by adding a large amount of taxes that shape foreign relations between countries.

The Asian Titans belong to the top ten product exporter as a result they get involved in nation branding and use corporate brands like Honda, Samsung, and Xiaomi to be perceived as a reliable household name. 

The aid includes humanitarian aid, military aid, economic assistance, technical and vocational training which help in establishing bilateral relations and all three countries have become active in this genre.

There is an additional component for socialization such as gastrodiplomacy which remains very strong in East Asian Titans which is proven with their many Michelin 3-star Restaurants. The culinary diplomacy is also conducted between government to government level as hosting country invites foreign heads of states in banquets or provide scholarship for elite foreign students.

The events conducted around elites such as tours, banquets, scholarships would transform their social paradigm which may cause policy change leading to norms that would transform the foreign policy of a recipient country in favor of a host country.

The public simply looks at the ranks, scores, and formulate opinions about a country without looking at the bigger picture. This could be efficiently be studied by looking at a single chart.

 ChinaJapanSouth Korea
A. Senses as Soft Resources   
i) Physical Diplomacy   
a) Sports/ActivityCuppings, Tai chiKarate, JudoTaekwondo
b) Olympics Medals608 Rank:8498 Rank:15337 Rank:19
ii) Audio-visual diplomacy   
a) Film Production     (2018)1082
Rank:2
613
Rank:3
454
Rank:5
b) Box Office Revenue
(2019)
$ 9.3 billion Rank:2$2.4 billion Rank:3$1.6 billion Rank:5
c) Additional ToolsTiktokAnime, MangaK-pop
iii) Gastrodiplomacy   
a) Popular FoodNoodles, DumplingsSushi, WasabiGimbap, Kimchi
b) Michelin 3-star Restaurants     (2017)5
Rank:5
28
Rank:1
2
Rank:10
B. Resources and Tourism   
a) World Heritage Sites
   (2020)
55
Rank:1
23 Rank:1214 Rank:21
b) Intangible Cultural Heritage
   (2020)
40 Rank:121 Rank:220 Rank:3
c) WEF, Travel & Tourism Competitive (2019)Score:4.9 Rank:13Score:5.4 Rank:4Score:4.8 Rank:16
d) Revenue by Tourism
   (2018)
$32.617 billion
Rank:10
$34.054 billion Rank:9$13.427 billion Rank:24
C. Nation Branding   
a) Corporate BrandsXiaomi, AlibabaToyota, HondaSamsung, Hyundai
b) Products Exports     (2018)$2.59 trillion Rank:1$713 billion Rank:4$617 billion Rank:5
c) GDP Per Capita
   (2018)
$9,771
Rank:78
$39,290
Rank:27
$31,363
Rank:34
D. Noble Prizes Laureates
     (2019)
6
Rank:24
28
Rank:7
1
Rank:51
E.The Soft Power 30     (2019)Score:51.25 Rank:27Score:75.71 Rank:8Score:63.00 Rank:19

The factors such as Noble Prize Laureates play a role in projecting Japan as a superior power but countries such as South Korea and China have risen to global prominence recently, this may have resulted in less money for research and development and caused fewer Noble Prize Laureates.

The rapid development of Asian countries has made it attractive and serves as the master of affective resources (culture richness, technology, competitive economy) while they suffer a bitter relationship with one another creating a space for western countries to enforce their normative resources (a third-party capability to arbitrate international dispute) to mitigate the crisis.

The Asian Titans have been growing their institutions to enhance their human resources to produce better publications that would further strengthen their strategic communication and media.

The soft power has helped generate a sense of national cohesion by protecting their ancient culture while promoting their vibrant economic growth. The countries intend to build a reliable economy and to be perceived as a trustworthy power.

Each Asian country has different objectives while promoting their culture. Japanese list of intangible heritage portrays its polytheistic tradition while China showcases itself as a culturally diverse country while it suffers accusation for human rights violations against minorities. Both China and Japan avoid its militaristic knowledge (the image coincide with hard power)even when they have a very interesting history with Martial Arts but South Korea seems to be enthusiastic to showcase its Ssireum(wrestling) and Taekkyeon (a traditional Korean Martial Arts) as intangible heritage.

Soft Power Policies of East Asian Titans maintain a variety within the unity. The region shares historic relations but still maintains its distinct identities creating an aesthetic composition for an external observer. The East Asian Titans are a unique case with tremendous soft power.

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Appeasement Diplomacy in inter war years (1918-1939)

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In International relations, policy of appeasement is a tactic of diplomacy and it means when a state accepts some demands of the other aggressive state that are not to be accepted otherwise, provide them with concessions to pacify and to avoid the conflict through negotiations. Appeasement diplomacy surely has pros but after the failure of Munich Agreement in 1938, the cons of appeasement diplomacy have been increased than its pros. Appeasement diplomacy has strength to prevent any war but history shows us that appeasement diplomacy rarely does. It can be used to pacify the aggression of the other state but on the other hand it can give confidence and courage to other state to increase that aggression. As there is an old saying: “Give them an inch and they’ll take a mile.” Moreover, states can use this as a tactic to buy time as it would allow a state to prepare itself for war that is likely to be conducted in near future. At present, appeasement is considered as a sign of weakness of a state and other states termed it as cowardice act. When an aggressive state doesn’t face any hurdle and restriction in its way, it continues to go in the same way and to maximize itself because it knows that there is no one out there who can challenge my actions. So, appeasement has both pros and cons and it depends on the angle we are observing an event with. For Example: Showing appeasement towards Germany and let it become so powerful was a big mistake by victorious power, according to some strategists. While on the other hand, some believes that it was a good tactic as it provided Britain a good amount of time to prepare itself completely for the war against Germany. Historically, appeasement is referred to the policy of Britain and France in 1930s when they allow Hitler to expand Germany’s power and territory and they didn’t keep check on Germany. Same thing they did to Japan and Italy.  At that time, this policy was popular and looked like a practical one but now it is seen as a weakness in policy. Now, why it was so popular back then; there are several reasons for that. British People and PM Neville Chamberlain wanted to void another destructive and vicious war.

Historical Background:

Following the World War 1, Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 in Paris. According to Treaty of Versailles, Germany was the responsible for initiating the World War 1. Some very harsh treatment was given to Germany in the form of loss of territory, demilitarization, and paying the cost of World War 1. Germans resented against this Treaty of Versailles and this resentment and economic sufferings give rise to the ultra-nationalistic sentiments which led towards the dawn of Adolf Hitler and ultimately World War 2. It is important to discuss the terms of Treaty of Versailles in order to understand the appeasement diplomacy in inter war periods. Peace Negotiations were held in Paris and big four leaders from the winning western nations were present in the talks. These leaders include Woodrow Wilson, USA; David George, Great Britain; Georges Clemenceau, France; and Vittorio Orland, Italy. The defeated powers, i.e. Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, were not representing themselves in the negotiations in Paris. Big Four had their objectives in the talks: Georges Clemenceau wanted to avoid France from going into another with Germany and also to protect it from any kind of attack from Germany. To refrain Germany from attacking again, he decided to minimize the strength of Germany and for this he demanded heavy repartitions from Germany as it would put Germany in economic crisis and Germany would only fight with the domestic problems. David George wished to see Germany as a trade partner of Britain. Vittorio Orland, on the other hand, wanted to increase the influence of Italy and to transform it into a big power. Woodrow Wilson of USA was against the territorial demands of Italy and he believed to make a new world order that would be in line with his Fourteen Points. But he seemed to be a very idealistic by other leaders as his points were not easy to convert them into policy. At last, under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced by European powers to leave 10% of the territory. Germany was allowed to keep limited nave and army only. German now could not keep an air force. More importantly, Germany, under Article 231 of Treaty of Versailles also known as war guilt clause, was forced to accept the responsibility for initiating World War 1. On Germany side, Hitler had aims to make Germany great again and he wanted to make it a great power. He decided to attain this by destroying the Versailles settlements. He dreamed to build a strong army. He also wanted to regain the territories Germany lost in World War 1 which includes Polish Corridor, the Saar, Alsace-Lorraine that was given to France, and Schleswig. Other than that, he also had aims to gain territories from Poland and Czechoslovakia and wanted to annex Austria.

Phases of appeasement diplomacy:

This appeasement diplomacy can be divided into two phases. Firstly, from 1920s-1937, Britain and France wanted to avoid war at any cost. For this reason, they were accepting the breaches of Treaty of Versailles and they had sealed their lips against the aggressive acts of aggressive power. Examples are reoccupation of the Rhineland and rearmament of Manchuria, Germany and Abyssinia. Secondly, in 1937, when Chamberlain came in power, he actually gave much room to Hitler and he used the track negotiations instead of going towards war or using force.

In 1920s it all started and Britain tried to appease Hitler through Dawes and Young Plans. Locarno treaties were also signed to avoid conflicts; Locarno treaties were signed in 1925 and were actually seven agreements that were negotiated among Britain, Italy, Germany, France and Belgium. Then at Munich, appeasement was at its climax when France and Britain, to stay away from war, gave Germany a gift of Sudetenland and they also remained silent in Czechoslovakia case. Despite doing lot of efforts and giving concessions, this policy of appeasement appeared to be a failure.

Reasons for policy of appeasement:

Firstly, Britain and France had to face a lot of destruction during World War 1 and the next war was believed to be much destructive than before. Britain and France were facing economic crisis and they were not in a position to once again go into war and build their army. This opinion was basically build by the public opinion because people had not forgot the horror memories of World War 1 yet. So, Britain and France thought about accepting the demands of Hitler in order to avoid the Second World War. Secondly, Treaty of Versailles; it was a harsh treatment to Germany as Germany was declared as the reason of war and it had to bear the cost of world war and humiliations. For Britain, this treaty was some kind of injustice and ill treatment towards Germany. Britain showed sympathy towards Germany and Italy and that’s why it gave room to Germany and accepted Hitler’s demands so that it would improve their relations. Thirdly, failure of League of Nations; after WW1, League of Nations was established to maintain peace and stability in the world and to avoid another world war though League of Nations failed to do its job. So, Britain and France believed that we cannot solve disputed by use of force and negotiations are required there. They also wanted to enlighten Mussolini and Hitler so that they would respect and follow international law. For that they do direct negotiations with the leaders and let the Germans do what they wanted to do. Fourthly, fear of communism, communism ideology was started spreading in the world after WW1while western democratic countries were following the capitalism. At that time communism threat was much more dangerous than Hitler, according to some British Conservatives. Britain and France, being a capitalist country, wanted to use Germany and Italy to counter communism in the world. Germany and Italy could go in the camp of communism and to avoid that victorious powers tried their best to not to be strict towards Germany as it could become a buffer in front of communist expansion. Lastly, Britain wanted to let the economy of Germany grow so that it could use its huge market in future and that’s also one of the reasons Britain was ready to accept the demands of Hitler. They thought that growth of Germany’s economy would also decrease the internal violence of Germany.  Other than that, Britain didn’t want too harsh treatment with Germany as it France would be left alone on the continent. To put in another way, Britain was hesitant to see France dominating the European continent alone. So, Britain wanted to keep Germany capable and strong enough so that they could give challenge to France. Apart from that reasons, there was a feeling in the Britain military and politician’s camp that Britain cannot go into a full-scale war and we don’t have enough strength at that time to fight against 2 countries. Britain’s navy that was considered as the strongest threw down their morale that defending Britain Empire against the simultaneous attacks of Japan, Germany and Italy would become far more difficult. France was weak at that time and didn’t want to go in war and US was following the policy of Isolation. Britain PM Chamberlain believed that the longer the appeasement would last, the better it would be for Britain to stand up again.

The Dawes and Young Plan:

After World War I, the relations of Germany and Allies deteriorated due to issues of the reparations and refunding of debts. The victorious countries of the WWI demanded that Germany and its allies should repay the cost of the catastrophes of the conflict. In the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the European countries and German failed to reach to a conclusion of the amount of payments due to which a Reparation Commission formed to bring a plan acceptable to all. The commission finalized a bill of $31.5 billion but later in 1923 German defaulted and their currency collapsed which standoff the repayments. The U.S was not interested in collecting money from the Germans but more interested in repayment of the $10 billion which U.S had paid during the war time to the Allied powers during war. However, the U.S rejected the call to cancel the debt of the Allies afterward in 1922 London made a statement that the U.K would seek wartime debt repayment from all the European countries equivalent to its U.S debts. In the same year the U.S made a commission to negotiate the debts repayments provided to 17 countries during the wartime.

In 1923 European countries formed a committee headed by Charles G. Dawes to review the situation of German reparations. The Dawes Plan proposed that initially the reparation payment would be reduced and with economic stability the amount would be increased to collect the full amount. The foreign banks will provide a $200 loan to German government while France and Belgium would reorganize the economic policies and evacuate Ruhr to stabilize the economic situation of the country. The U.S banks would provide ample amounts of money to Germans to pay the debts of France and U.K but in return these countries would use money to repay the debts of the U.S.

In 1929 another committee formed to settle the German reparation headed by Owen D. Young which proposed a reduction in the amount to $29 billion and will be paid within 58 years. The loans would float which ultimately led to the end of foreign troop’s supervision in Germany however, the plan is also designed to smooth the way for the reparation payments. But after the great depression the loans to Germans dried up and their economy troubled. In 1931 all the countries paused the collection of debts due to economic depression. After the elections of the Roosevelt, U.K and France drew a link between the war debts and reparations and tried to cancel their debts of the U.S but the U.S did not accept and in 1933 European except Finland defaulted on loans of the U.S.  An important effort was made by the U.S in the shape of Dawes and Young Plan, moreover, after rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations by U.S, the Dawes and Young Plan played a pivotal role in reestablishing affairs with European countries.

Munich Agreement:

On September 30, 1938, the annexation of Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia by Germany was permitted by Great Britain, France, and Italy. This settlement was known by the Munich Agreement. However, the events that led to the agreement are worth mentioning.

Soon after taking of Austria by Germany in 1938, Hitler was eager of taking over Sudetenland, where more than 50 percent of population was of German origin. Hitler discussed with his army head command Wilhelm Keitel about the political and military aspects of “Case Green,” the code name for the predictable takeover of Sudetenland. As agreed, an out of the blue attack would have strong retaliation, hence the decision of diplomatic pressure along with the German political agitation going on in Czechoslovakia since 1933, will create ideal conditions for a military action.

Czechoslovakia was relying on French military assistance, with whom they had alliance along with Soviet Union. Soviet Union also offered their military assistance if the Great Britain and France come to Czechoslovakia’s defense, however, their offer was largely ignored. Meanwhile war mongering speeches were at peak in Germany by Hitler, making war seem inevitable. Both UK and France were reluctant towards defending Czechoslovakia, however, they were anxious to avoid any military confrontation. French announced they were not obliged to go to war for Czechoslovakia under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of alliance of 1924. Equally Britain announced they could not go to war in Czechoslovakia’s defense if the population of Sudetenland were themselves in favor of Hitler.

Seeing no other option, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain insisted to Prague of territorial concessions to Germany of the Sudeten German areas from Czechoslovakia in hopes of avoiding war. Chamberlain insisted Hitler not to go to war and that he will try convincing his cabinet and the French to handover Sudeten German areas of Czechoslovakia to Germany, something which Hitler agreed upon. Though rejected by Prague in the beginning, however, they were forced to accept the condition. However, by September 22, Hitler’s demand became harsher which was rejected by both French and the British, and war came closer than ever.

In hopes of avoiding war at the last hour, Chamberlain proposed a four-power conference, which was agreed by Hitler. Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in Munich, where it was decided that the Germans would occupied the Sudetenland by October 10, and international commission would be set up to decide about what would happen to other disputed areas. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia was informed either to submit to the proposal or resist it all alone, having no option, Czechoslovakia submitted to the proposal.

Chamberlain and Hitler also signed a mutual desire to resolve differences through consultation to assure peace before leaving Munich. Chamberlain was given a warm welcome by crowds for securing peace, however, Churchill was not happy about it, saying Chamberlain chose dishonor over war. The Munich Treaty became void after a year when Hitler annexed the remaining of Czechoslovakia and invaded Poland, which initiated the Second World War Even though the Munich Agreement gave some time for the Allies to increase their military preparedness; it did become a motto for its uselessness of appeasing expansionist totalitarian states.

Signs of Appeasement during Interwar periods:

Firstly, Britain did not take any action to have eyes on the German rearmament. Secondly, proper measures and action were not taken when Italy invaded Abyssinia. Apart from that, a naval agreement was also signed between Germany and Britain which was sign of acceptance for German naval rearmament. They signed this agreement and didn’t include Italy and France in consultation. Thirdly, France remained reluctant to mobilize its troops even when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936. Hitler played very cleverly and he had offered peace of 25 years to Britain which then became the reason that Britain didn’t back France in most of the situations. Britain was hesitant to see France dominating the European continent alone. So, Britain wanted to keep Germany capable and strong enough so that it could give a challenge to France in the region. Moreover, in Spanish Civil War, Britain and France decided to stay away while Italy and Germany were helping Francisco Franco. Britain officially recognized the Italy’s control of Abyssinia and in return they demanded Italy to bring back its troops that were assisting Francisco Franco in Spanish Civil War. Britain kept and fulfilled its promise while Mussolini failed to complete his side of work. Other than that, observing no strict action against Germany, Hitler went on to demand for Czechoslovakia. It was actually ineffective handling the events from Britain which gave Hitler a confidence to make such wishes. It was a greatest victory of Hitler when Chamberlain followed the appeasement on that issue. If we talk about Czechoslovakia then it was clear that Hitler was going to destroy Czechoslovakia because strategically it was an important location. By controlling the area of Czechoslovakia, Germany would dominate in the central Europe militarily and economically. Secondly, Czechoslovakia was made under the Treaty of Versailles and Hitler had many reservations to it which was also the reason for Hitler going towards Czechoslovakia. Nazi conducted huge protests in the Sudetenland giving the excuse of discrimination towards Sudeten Germans. Clashed started emerging between Germans and Czechs and French and Britain were afraid that it could lead us towards World War 2. To avoid this any length, they persuade Czech and put huge pressure on them to give concessions to Germany and Hitler. At last, it was agreed that Germany can take over Sudeten Germans. After this, Chamberlain had a talk with Hitler to give this offer and Hitler at first accepted it but then in the next meeting which was held at Godesberg he made more demands of taking more territories of Czechoslovakia and instant entrance of troops of Germany into the Sudetenland. Edvard Benes, the then president of Czechoslovakia, didn’t agree to this demand and ordered for the mobilization of his army. Czechs were quite hopeful that they would defend the boundaries of Czechoslovakia with the help of USSR and France against the attacks of Germany and Austria and Hungary. Despite of all the negotiations and agreements, World War 2 broke out in 1939.

Did Appeasement diplomacy become the cause of World War 2?

The answer to this question varies for different historians. Some believed that it was appeasement diplomacy which deteriorated the situation and led us into World War 2. Appeasement policy also became one of the main reasons for the collapse of League of Nations because western democracies couldn’t provide a solid and firm leadership to League of Nations. It also brought Germany, Japan and Italy close to each other and they form Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. The concept of balance of power in Europe got disturbed with the emergence of this new alliance. Britain intentions were also not very clear which gave Hitler a trust to attack Poland and with this attack, World War 2 began. To many historians, France and Britain should have stood like a wall in front of Hitler so that Germany could not become so strong. Appeasement diplomacy was encouraging Hitler to do more and go beyond the limits and it was actually appeasement which rose Hitler’s prestige in the eyes of public. When Hitler saw no challenge and no restriction in front of him then he reached out to take huge risks. It could be possible that Hitler was not thinking of waging World War 2, it was the victory at Munich which pushed him to stake on war with Poland. Britain and France, at Munich, had given Hitler a clear idea that they would not go in war with Germany despite Germany is going for more and more. Many historians criticized Chamberlain for not supporting the Czechs at Munich because Poland was even much weaker than Czechoslovakia and Britain and France were not in a position to defend Poland. On the other hand, many defend Chamberlain by saying that what he did at Munich was just to buy time so that Britain would rearm itself for a fight against Hitler. If we see wisely, that actually happened and Britain got a year to rebuild its army for eventual fighting with Germany. John Charmley, a British Historian, wrote in his book about Chamberlain that realistically Chamberlain got stuck and he had no other option but to fulfill the demands of Hitler because there were no alternatives available at that time. Many even think that Chamberlain should be given credit for trying his best to prevent war.

Conclusion:

To conclude the whole discussion, it can be said that Britain adopted this appeasement diplomacy to prevent another full scale war against Germany but it proved to be a disaster for Britain. Hitler found a vacuum and he used it as an advantage and he continued to expand Germany more. We can say that Britain used this tactic to gain more time but had Britain stopped Germany at first place, there would have not been another disastrous and destructive war. Appeasement diplomacy, in the present times, is seemed to be a weaker point of any country and it should be used wisely after doing considerable amount of homework on it repercussions and consequences.

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