The conflict between two South Caucasus countries – Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh became as one of the bloodiest and long-lasting conflicts contributing to instability in the region. After a ceasefire agreement signed in 1994 halting the armed skirmishes in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, Armenia and Azerbaijan pursued, albeit a fragile, diplomatic negotiations to reach a peaceful end to this bloody conflict.
However, peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries (namely the US, France and Russia) have been lasting for decades without any tangible results to achieve total peace. The current status-quo in the conflict zone was mainly favored by Armenian leadership until today in order to continue illegal activities in the occupied territories and seek for legitimacy for its occupation policy. However, four-day April 2016 fights demonstrated once again that status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone is very indeed dangerous.
All these developments clearly show that the status quo in the conflict zone should be changed as soon as possible, because such situation cannot be kept “frozen” any more. Any tangible result on the conflict resolution requires, first of all, Armenia to take finally result-oriented actions in order to achieve peace and prosperity in the region.
Following the government change in Armenia in 2018 with the fall of the government of Serzh Sargsyan composed of so-called “Karabakh clan” and take-over of ruling by Nikol Pashinyan (as a new Prime Minister) through mass protests against corruption and cronyism in Armenia, there was hope that the new government in Yerevan would change the situation and choose peace instead of sticking to the previous government’s policy of occupation.
The first high-level meeting (since the velvet revolution in Armenia) between Azerbaijan and Armenian foreign ministers took place on 11 July 2018 in Brussels with the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Actually, in the first meeting the Ministers discussed the certain parameters for re-engaging in substantive negotiations and vowed to take confidence-building measures. These meetings were conducted regularly until and after the first official meeting of head of states of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Vienna in 2019.
The first official meeting between Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was held on 29 March 2019 in Vienna. In an interview to the Russian TASS news agency President Ilham Aliyev noted “we have discussed the issues related to strengthening trust measures during contacts between people and the negotiating process should be supported by humanitarian measures”. President Aliyev also emphasized that “it is of huge importance that the format of talks remained unchanged and only Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss their problems as it was many years before”.
Prime Minister Pashinyan also regarded “the meeting as positive”, but he ruled out “that there has been a breakthrough in the negotiation process, or an evolution”.
Unfortunately, despite all aforementioned talks and positive thoughts, Pashinyan changed his position and started to support the previous Armenian policies on the conflict. Later, he even said that he will not engage in any discussions of “land for peace”. Pashinyan also demands that the format of negotiations should be expanded from the current bilateral format to include officials from the separatist regime (so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”) established in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. It is very obvious that Pashinyan’s that proposal aims to maneuver in the negotiations or to preserve the status-quo in the conflict zone. Whereas, it seems unacceptable for Azerbaijan when Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh region, which were forced to leave their homes and became refugees, are not considered in this regard.
The process clearly illustrates that new Armenian government is not ready for compromise to reach a peace with Azerbaijan. Instead of constructive engagement, they opted for sticking to hate speech. For instance, during the UEFA Europa League Final in Baku (29 May 2019) Arsenal’s player Henrikh Mkhitaryan (of Armenian origin) refused to visit Baku despite all high security guarantee promised by Azerbaijani government. His choice was regarded as being part of a “dirty” political game instead of playing football. Nikol Pashinyan even hailed his position in his twitter feed. Whereas, until now, many Armenian athletes participated at the Baku 2015 European Games, and many others at the international events hosted by Azerbaijan, and there were no threats and incidents for them.
In general, sportsmen may have a very positive role in conflict and hate situations. For instance, according to researchers from Stanford University, Liverpool’s Egyptian football striker Mo Salah effect is having an impact beyond the stadium walls, who found a drop in hate crimes around Liverpool since Salah signed with the club in June 2017. Mo Salah often celebrates goals by dropping to his knees and touching his forehead to the grass in the sujood (an Islamic prayer position), while Liverpool fans have a chant that goes: “If he scores another few, then I’ll be Muslim, too”. Henrikh Mkhitaryan with arrival to Baku could also use this opportunity to convey a peace message to other Armenians.
The short-term environment of peace was deteriorated by another provocation by Armenia against Azerbaijan. On 30 May 2019, during the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs’ visit to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani officer was killed by an Armenian sniper shot. On 9 June 2019 another Azerbaijani soldier was killed by the Armenian side, and Armenian Defense Minister awarded that who executed the Azerbaijani servicemen. These military incidents were followed by proportional casualties in Armenians’ side as well. Moreover, on June 12, 2019, Azerbaijan’s trainer plane has been detected and targeted by Armenian anti-aircraft missile system at the frontline (on Fizuli direction), but no incident was registered.
All aforementioned facts confirm that Armenian new government sticks to old mechanism, and all attempts to change the format of negotiations to present de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent party are just a maneuver to maintain the status-quo in the conflict. It is necessary to consider that, the conflict hitherto causes violence and human suffering for both nations, and without tangible results, further civil and military causalities will be from both sides. Both Armenian and Azerbaijan people suffered enough from this bloody conflict, and it is very time to achieve a peace in the region. As the Armenian journalist, social activist Susan Jaghinyan emphasized – “Sargsyan and Kocharyan destroy[ed] the people, if they continue[d] their rule, the Armenian people [would] not exist in the future”. After Velvet Revolution, Armenian people managed to change a regime, and now Armenian new government has all chances to prepare its population for peace and benefit from the regional economic cooperation. As soon as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolves, the Armenian people will be able to benefit from the opportunities of the current regional economic cooperation of Azerbaijan with other partners.
The new border geopolitics of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Azerbaijan
Borders are spatial-political phenomena that have a prominent importance and place in the global political sphere because they have divided the world arena into countries and put them together as actors. This importance and prominent position of borders has caused various fields of study such as political science, political geography, international law, etc. to study them from their point of view and continuously to follow and monitor their developments and changes. In the meantime, it seems that after the acceptance of the ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia along the northwestern borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, some developments have happened that need to examine. So, we examine these developments with a geopolitical perspective. The geopolitical attitude towards the border developments of Iran and Azerbaijan can analyze in the form of the following angles:
Border geopolitics in terms of location is the knowledge, acquisition, exploitation and preservation of geographical sources of power in border areas and related areas in transnational, national, regional and global relations. In other words, designing and reviewing the strategies of actors to achieve benefits and goals based on the geographical resources of power in the border areas called border geopolitics. The developments along the Iran-Azerbaijan border after the ceasefire show these developments cause the geographical sources of Iran's power: alliance with Armenia; severance of Iran's position as Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan communication bridge; reducing Azerbaijan's dependence on Iran for access to the high seas; reducing the possibility of transferring Iranian gas to Europe, etc. that along the borders should significantly reduce. On the other hand, the increase of geographical sources of power: increasing the size of the territory; establishing a connection with the Nakhchivan sector; forming a new opportunity to connect with the high seas through Turkey, etc. has brought about for the country of Azerbaijan. Based on this, it seems that in designing the forthcoming strategies of Iran and Azerbaijan, we will see changes in the geographical sources of power due to these changes.
Border geopolitics from a functional point of view is the knowledge, acquisition, exploitation and preservation of geographical sources of power in transnational, national, regional and global relations to achieve protection, control, management, security and other objectives in the length of borders and border areas. In other words, designing and reviewing the strategies of actors to achieve protection, control, management, security and other goals based on the geographical sources of power in the border areas called border geopolitics. If we examine the developments along the Iranian-Azerbaijani border after the ceasefire from this point of view, we will see that the importance and value of Azerbaijan's geographical resources along the border with Iran is increasing compared to Iran's geographical sources of power. It seems to put more effective and successful strategies in front of Azerbaijan to achieve goals such as control, security, etc. along the common borders. On the contrary, it will change the strategies facing Iran to some extent.
Border geopolitics from a player point is the knowledge, acquisition, exploitation and preservation of geographical resources of power in the border areas of the two countries, by Iran and Azerbaijan to achieve their goals and aspirations in transnational, national, regional and global. In other words, the use and exploitation of the geographical sources of power in the common border areas of Iran and Azerbaijan to achieve their goals and aspirations in transnational, national, regional and global relations called geopolitical borders.If we examine the developments along the Iranian-Azerbaijani border after ceasefire from this point of view, we will see that these changes have made Azerbaijan, as a geopolitical player compared to Iran, more powerful than geographical sources. On the other hand, variety of actors such as Turkey, Russia, etc. are present directly along the borders of the two countries.
In general, the changes that have taken place along the borders of Iran and Azerbaijan from a geopolitical point of view of the border seem to have been in favor of Azerbaijan and the geographical sources of power along the border between two countries in favor of this country. It has changed and thus increased the efficiency of the strategies facing Azerbaijan against the strategies of Iran based on the geographical sources of power in the border areas.
The Emerging Nakhchivan Corridor
As the details of the Karabakh deal are being fleshed out, the stipulation on the new corridor through Armenian territory has caused great debate. Beyond the signatories of the deal, Iran and Georgia are particularly worried as any meaningful change to the connectivity patterns in the South Caucasus could harm their transit capabilities.
The 2020 Karabakh war ended with major Russian diplomatic success on November 9 when a tripartite agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia was signed. The surrounding seven regions were to be returned to Baku, while Russian peacekeepers would guarantee the security of the truncated Nagorno-Karabakh. Though the exact role is yet to be confirmed, based on the rhetoric from Ankara and Baku, some sort of direct Turkish military involvement on Azeri soil is likely to materialize.
More importantly, however, Turkey gained a land corridor to Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan. The stipulation in the document reads: “Armenia guarantees the security of transport links … for unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and cargo in both directions” between mainland Azerbaijan and the exclave of Nakhchivan, which are separated by Armenian territory. Moreover, “Transport control is exercised by the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia. By agreement of the parties, the construction of new transport communications connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Azerbaijan’s western regions will be provided.”
The stipulation is a major breakthrough for Turkey as it would allow the country to anchor its influence on the Caspian Sea and perhaps, in the longer term, look even further towards its Central Asia kinsmen.
This would create a major dilemma for Iran and Russia, as Tehran and Moscow have historically perceived the Caspian Sea as a condominium between themselves (plus the littoral states since the end of the Soviet Union). Potential Turkish involvement could disrupt this equilibrium and especially Iran’s standing. However, this is highly hypothetical. After all, it would need years if not decades for this scenario to be realized and even then Turkish influence could not be as large as Chinese or Russian – two major forces in the region.
What bothers Iran is a potentially major shift in the region’s transportation routes. For decades Azerbaijan has been dependent on Iran for transiting energy and other supplies to Nakhchivan. The new Karabakh deal could change it. Armenia will now guarantee the opening up of a corridor through its territory to allow Azerbaijan to transport goods directly to Nakhichevan. Quite naturally, this limits Tehran’s leverage over Baku.
However, Javad Hedayati, who heads transit operations in the Iranian transportation ministry, announced that Iran is likely to stay a favorable route for trade despite the planned opening of the new corridor. “It is likely that this corridor will merely accommodate local traffic between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan,” said Hedayati.
Ankara has long been working on using the Nakhchivan corridor for geopolitical purposes. This is proved by the quickness with which the Turkish government announced the plans to build a railway to Nakhchivan following the November agreement. This comes on top of an earlier announcement of a gas pipeline construction to the exclave, and underlines the seriousness behind the Turkish intention, at least regarding the section from the Turkish territory to the exclave itself.
Much, however, remains unclear about the new corridor on the Armenia territory itself. First of all, will the road be used by the Turks and Azerbaijanis only? Considering the level of mistrust in Ankara and Baku towards Moscow, whose forces will be controlling this corridor, it is highly unlikely that Azerbaijan and Turkey will be willing to commit large financial resources to rebuild links on the Armenian land. After all, will the corridor be the Armenian territory, or will it fall under the tripartite administrative regime? These are arguably the defining questions which remain unanswered. One could also imagine constant incidents along the corridor as Armenia will remain unhappy with the stipulation. Transit fees could soften Yerevan’s position, but why should Russia be interested in the operation of the corridor? If the corridor is operational, these troublesome questions will have to be managed between the two sides sharing no trust in the other. These dilemmas were well summed up in the words of the Iranian official Hedayati. He stressed that Armenia could prevent Turkey’s access to the corridor for transfer of freight or passengers through Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan and further to countries to the east of the Caspian Sea.
Georgia is worried
One country which is particularly worried with the potential development of the new corridor is Georgia. Various pipelines, roads and a major railway transit the country from Azerbaijan on to Turkey. This has been a backbone of Georgia’s regional importance since the end of the Soviet Union and indeed served as a major attraction for larger players such as Europe and the US.
Quite naturally many in Tbilisi have begun to think whether this enviable position could be challenged. The consensus thought is that in the short and medium term no reshuffling in the region’s connectivity patterns is likely to take place. Even in the longer term, if the above mentioned uncertainties around the new corridor are resolved, many still believe that Baku and Ankara would not trade the already built and functioning railway and pipeline infrastructure, which runs through Georgia, for the Nakhchivan alternative. Perhaps the corridor will serve for ensuring local connections, perhaps limited trade (though highly unlikely).
After all, Georgia has been officially engaged in the trilateral partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan for nearly a decade. The endurance of the format has been tested by changes of governments and region-wide geopolitical transformations over the last decade. Each country of the three needs the others. Turkey wants a more stable Georgia with deeper economic and energy relations, while Azerbaijan needs Turkey’s backing. Georgia, under pressure from Russia and, given that it is located between its two fellow members of the cooperation, dependent on transit, in turn needs both Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Georgia also sees its position as straddling between two large regions – Europe and Central Asia. The 826-kilometre Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway unveiled in 2017 enables the delivery of cargo between China and Europe with a haulage duration of approximately two weeks. Up to eight million tons of cargo may be carried via the railway by 2025.
Abandoning this transit corridor would undermine the efficacy of the South Caucasus transportation and energy corridor. This makes the extent of the Nakhchevan corridor quite limited. Perhaps, what the region is likely to see is the growing interconnectedness of the exclave with the Turkish territory. The emergence of a major corridor through the Nakhchivan is likely to happen if, at minimum, a meaningful improvement of Turkey-Armenia relations takes place.
Author’s note: first published in caucasuswatch.de
«Crimean Platform»: Kiev set on opening a new diplomatic front
Even though the so-called “Crimean Platform”, as a new unrealistic project to retrieve Crimea, arouses no questions and the agenda of the Kiev initiators is clear, further developments require a close scrutiny, the more so since the political situation is versatile, given the impact of presidential elections in the USA and the activity of Turkey. Although the «Platform» will do nothing to translate the declared agenda into life, it will contribute to finding solutions to a number of issues on Kiev’s diplomatic agenda, or so they hope .
Kiev’s plans for the “platform” are extensive enough – it will operate on different levels. The first level is a high one with the participation of heads of state and government, the second level embraces foreign and defense ministers, the third- incorporates interparliamentary level, the fourth – brings together non-governmental experts.
Kiev is planning to re-set former initiatives and create a new instrument of pressure on Russia, this time against the Russian status of Kiev.
Among the most significant details is that the “platform” was launched by the Kiev Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (banned in Russia). For those lost in contemporary Mejlis policy the Crimean Platform is a new pillar and an upcoming political springboard which will make it possible for Kiev to boot its international activity.
A statement about the project was made by Ukraine’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Emine Djaparova, a de facto Mejlis representative, and possibly, a creation of the Turkish lobby. She is now presenting the “platform” in the media, having proclaimed the key agenda – “to return the issue to thehigher level of international attention”. What is behind such wording?
The Crimean Platform is yet another distractor from the Minsk Agreements, which Kiev has no intention of implementing. All these games – the change in the composition of the three-party contact group, injections of some ideas, even armistice – all these go into use but have nothing to do with promoting and fulfilling the agreements, since nothing has been put into practice of the agreements of the Normandy Four summit in December 2019. For this reason, there can be no meeting in the Normandy format, without which the Minsk process will be stuck and will not move towards implementing the agreements. According to Ukrainian political analyst, Ruslan Bortnik, the current situation has certain bonuses for Zelensky: «Yes, there is a steady armistice inside Ukraine, which the authorities are trying to sell as peace. I think that the authorities are quite content about this situation, that is, freezing of conflict for the Zelensky team marks huge success. On the one hand, this means absence of war, which draws a heavy burden on the public conscience, on the other hand – this is no-return of the disloyal electorate of Donbass in case of reintegration». In the opinion of the expert, this situation suits Europe as well. How interested Europe is in delaying the Minsk process will become clear by its activity within the Crimean Platform, which is why the project deserves attention.
But the most important thing why it all came into being is, to my mind, Kiev’s need for a new platform in order to see its old dream come true – to drag the USA into the participants in the proceed. Washington, if it is quick enough to return to international politics, which will be the case if Joe Biden wins, will likely be interested in taking a closer look at Russian interests, the more so in the Black Sea Region, possibly in cooperation with Turkey. It’s in this way that the project may allow Kiev to guarantee the inclusion of countries such as Turkey and the USA – something the Minsk format will never endorse.
Kiev has already announced the approximate date of the Crimean Platform big summit. Not accidentally, the event has been set for May 2021, Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba said, adding that involvement in the Platform of the USA is a key issue, but while elections in the USA are still under way, Washington’s vision of Ukraine is unclear. In case of Biden’s victory we can expect a renaissance of American attention to Ukraine, while Trump may remain pragmatically indifferent. The possible summit, its forma and participants will become the first indicator of the level of the Platform, though the prospects for this project, considering the position of Russia, are more than vague.
It is interesting to know what issues the participants in the Platform will raise. Even though the main points could be predicted right now, it is interesting to know how the participants in the Platform will formulate the water blockade of Crimea. Above-menioned Djaparova, speaking on October 21 at an international conference on “the issues of water supply and use of water resources of Crimea in the eonditions of Russian occupation”, coined an incredulous explanation to the water genocide: “Deputy Minister reported that Crimean ran into water shortages because of militarization of the peninsula following the occupation, and also, the artificial change of demographic composition. Due to the arrival of Russian troops and ordinary Russians, she said, the demand for freshwater increased dramatically. As a result, the existing resources were used up in 6 years».A unbelievably cynical statemenet!
Meanwhile, Ukrainian experts are already pointing to risks and the uselessness of the project.
«The first of the risks stipulates that this Platform may turn into Crimean “Minsk” – a useless and ineffective venue» (but who can stop Kiev from making it effective?)
«The second risk is a complete loss of Crimea in a third country, for example, in Turkey. Ukraine and Turkey share their interest in terms of liberating Crimea, but they may overdo it and Crimea may find itself a Turkish metropolis and part of Ukraine». Here comes the importance of Mejlis again. If Kiev takes the Turkish threat seriously, which will see Mejlis as an instrument of fictitious transformation of Crimea into a Turkish metropolis, we will witness one of the lines of struggle inside the Platform. Part of this struggle will be efforts to reduce the influence of Mejlis and the blockade of Turkey.
The Third risk is formulated in the following way: If Zelensky starts to aggressively advance in the direction of implementation of the project, there is a threat of new combat operations in Donbass. A strange assumption, but let it be on them.
The fourth risk – the Platform will become yet another venue maintained by the Ukrainian side the only outcome of its work being the creation of certain information. In my view, this is the most realistic scenario.
To expect that the Crimean Platform will help Ukraine retrieve Crimea is unrealistic, to say the least. But at the same time, it could serve as a political instrument, in case of support of the EU, Turkey and the USA, which could create extra tension on the border between Russian Federation and Crimea.
From our partner International Affairs
Netanyahu-Pompeo secret meeting with MBS: A clear message to Joe Biden and Iran
Israeli media reported on Monday, November 24, 2020, that Netanyahu had secretly traveled to Saudi Arabia on Sunday to meet...
The 2020 Myanmar Election and China: Push and Pull factor in ‘Paukphaw’ friendship
National Democratic League (NLD), the ruling party of Myanmar under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had a landslide victory in...
How to Ace a Research Paper in 7 Easy Steps
Writing as many words as you possibly can on the given topic might not be the best way to write...
New manual helps countries measure inflation by tracking prices of goods and services
On behalf of the Intersecretariat Working Group on Price Statistics, of which UNECE is a member, IMF has released the...
Iranian nuclear problem again: The storm clouds are gathering
The nuclear problem of Iran is once again becoming the focus of global media attention, and there are several reasons...
On the Universality of the “Logic of Strategy” and Beyond
Just like several other scholars, military strategist Edward Luttwak argues that “the universal logic of strategy applies in perfect equality...
Oil and Gas Industry commits to new framework to monitor, report and reduce methane emissions
In a move that will help tackle one of the biggest and most solvable contributors to the climate crisis, major...
Eastern Europe2 days ago
The Emerging Nakhchivan Corridor
Middle East3 days ago
Iraq Has the ‘Highest Negative Experiences Worldwide’ (Gallup)
South Asia2 days ago
As Sri Lanka struggles with Chinese debt-trap, Maldives moves closer to the Quad
Southeast Asia2 days ago
The Strait of Malacca: China between Singapore and the United States
Economy3 days ago
Democracy in decline and its fate after the crisis: Why will the big crisis kill liberalism with or without the demos
Eastern Europe2 days ago
The new border geopolitics of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Azerbaijan
Americas1 day ago
Why are some Muslims, from India to the U.S Voting against their Natural Allies
Defense2 days ago
The Future of QUAD grouping