Connect with us

Eastern Europe

Armenia’s position blurred the progress for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and leads to an escalation

Published

on

The conflict between two South Caucasus countries – Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh became as one of the bloodiest and long-lasting conflicts contributing to instability in the region. After a ceasefire agreement signed in 1994 halting the armed skirmishes in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, Armenia and Azerbaijan pursued, albeit a fragile, diplomatic negotiations to reach a peaceful end to this bloody conflict.

However, peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries (namely the US, France and Russia) have been lasting for decades without any tangible results to achieve total peace. The current status-quo in the conflict zone was mainly favored by Armenian leadership until today in order to continue illegal activities in the occupied territories and seek for legitimacy for its occupation policy.  However, four-day April 2016 fights demonstrated once again that status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone is very indeed dangerous.

All these developments clearly show that the status quo in the conflict zone should be changed as soon as possible, because such situation cannot be kept “frozen” any more. Any tangible result on the conflict resolution requires, first of all, Armenia to take finally result-oriented actions in order to achieve peace and prosperity in the region.

Following the government change in Armenia in 2018 with the fall of the government of Serzh Sargsyan composed of so-called “Karabakh clan” and take-over of ruling by Nikol Pashinyan (as a new Prime Minister) through mass protests against corruption and cronyism in Armenia, there was hope that the new government in Yerevan would change the situation and choose peace instead of sticking to the previous government’s policy of occupation.

The first high-level meeting (since the velvet revolution in Armenia) between Azerbaijan and Armenian foreign ministers took place on 11 July 2018 in Brussels with the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Actually, in the first meeting the Ministers discussed the certain parameters for re-engaging in substantive negotiations and vowed to take confidence-building measures. These meetings were conducted regularly until and after the first official meeting of head of states of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Vienna in 2019.

The first official meeting between Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was held on 29 March 2019 in Vienna. In an interview to the Russian TASS news agency President Ilham Aliyev noted “we have discussed the issues related to strengthening trust measures during contacts between people and the negotiating process should be supported by humanitarian measures”. President Aliyev also emphasized that “it is of huge importance that the format of talks remained unchanged and only Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss their problems as it was many years before”.

Prime Minister Pashinyan also regarded “the meeting as positive”, but he ruled out “that there has been a breakthrough in the negotiation process, or an evolution”.

Unfortunately, despite all aforementioned talks and positive thoughts, Pashinyan changed his position and started to support the previous Armenian policies on the conflict. Later, he even said that he will not engage in any discussions of “land for peace”. Pashinyan also demands that the format of negotiations should be expanded from the current bilateral format to include officials from the separatist regime (so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”) established in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. It is very obvious that Pashinyan’s that proposal aims to maneuver in the negotiations or to preserve the status-quo in the conflict zone. Whereas, it seems unacceptable for Azerbaijan when Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh region, which were forced to leave their homes and became refugees, are not considered in this regard. 

The process clearly illustrates that new Armenian government is not ready for compromise to reach a peace with Azerbaijan. Instead of constructive engagement, they opted for sticking to hate speech. For instance, during the UEFA Europa League Final in Baku (29 May 2019) Arsenal’s player Henrikh Mkhitaryan (of Armenian origin) refused to visit Baku despite all high security guarantee promised by Azerbaijani government. His choice was regarded as being part of a “dirty” political game instead of playing football. Nikol Pashinyan even hailed his position in his twitter feed. Whereas, until now, many Armenian athletes participated at the Baku 2015 European Games, and many others at the international events hosted by Azerbaijan, and there were no threats and incidents for them.

In general, sportsmen may have a very positive role in conflict and hate situations. For instance, according to researchers from Stanford University, Liverpool’s Egyptian football striker Mo Salah effect is having an impact beyond the stadium walls, who found a drop in hate crimes around Liverpool since Salah signed with the club in June 2017. Mo Salah often celebrates goals by dropping to his knees and touching his forehead to the grass in the sujood (an Islamic prayer position), while Liverpool fans have a chant that goes: “If he scores another few, then I’ll be Muslim, too”. Henrikh Mkhitaryan with arrival to Baku could also use this opportunity to convey a peace message to other Armenians.

The short-term environment of peace was deteriorated by another provocation by Armenia against Azerbaijan. On 30 May 2019, during the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs’ visit to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani officer was killed by an Armenian sniper shot. On 9 June 2019 another Azerbaijani soldier was killed by the Armenian side, and Armenian Defense Minister awarded that who executed the Azerbaijani servicemen. These military incidents were followed by proportional casualties in Armenians’ side as well. Moreover, on June 12, 2019, Azerbaijan’s trainer plane has been detected and targeted by Armenian anti-aircraft missile system at the frontline (on Fizuli direction), but no incident was registered.

All aforementioned facts confirm that Armenian new government sticks to old mechanism, and all attempts to change the format of negotiations to present de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent party are just a maneuver to maintain the status-quo in the conflict. It is necessary to consider that, the conflict hitherto causes violence and human suffering for both nations, and without tangible results, further civil and military causalities will be from both sides. Both Armenian and Azerbaijan people suffered enough from this bloody conflict, and it is very time to achieve a peace in the region. As the Armenian journalist, social activist Susan Jaghinyan emphasized – “Sargsyan and Kocharyan destroy[ed] the people, if they continue[d] their rule, the Armenian people [would] not exist in the future”.  After Velvet Revolution, Armenian people managed to change a regime, and now Armenian new government has all chances to prepare its population for peace and benefit from the regional economic cooperation. As soon as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolves, the Armenian people will be able to benefit from the opportunities of the current regional economic cooperation of Azerbaijan with other partners.

Continue Reading
Comments

Eastern Europe

Polonia: Poland’s diaspora policy

Published

on

In 2007, the Polish authorities for the first time adopted a government program to promote cooperation with the Polish diaspora (Polonia) and Poles abroad. In 2002, they introduced May 2 as Day of Polonia and Poles Abroad.

The strategic objectives of this program for 2015-2020 include support for the development of Polish language and culture among Poles abroad, strengthening Polish national identity among representatives of Polonia, contributing to the popularity of Polonian organizations abroad and the return of Poles living abroad to their homeland, establishing economic, scientific and cultural contacts between Poland and Polonia .

The Polish Foreign Ministry estimates the number of members of the Polish diaspora, including ethnic Poles and people of Polish descent, at 18-20 million, one third of them were born in Poland. Polonia and the Poles rank the sixth if we compare the proportion of members of the diaspora abroad with the population of the country of origin. 18% of tourists visiting Poland are members of Polish organizations abroad and ethnic Poles.

The largest Polish diasporas are in the USA (9.6 million according to 2012 reports), in Germany (1.5 million) and Canada (1 million). Poles are also living in France and the United Kingdom (0.8 million in each), the Netherlands (0.2 million), Ireland and Italy (0.15 million in each), the Czech Republic (0.12 million), Sweden and Norway ( 0.11 million in either), Belgium (0.1 million). In countries such as Austria, Spain, Denmark, and Iceland, members of the Polish diasporas number less than 100 thousand people.

According to the Polish Foreign Ministry, more than 1 million Poles and people of Polish descent live in post-Soviet countries. According to the ministry, these estimates are not accurate – for one,  in Belarus, the most “Polish” republic of the former USSR, the number of Poles and people of Polish origin could amount to up to 1 million (official reports estimate the number of Poles living in Belarus at 295 thousand).

Lithuania comes second by the number of Poles residing there – (250 thousand), the third is Ukraine (144 thousand), then Russia (47 thousand), Latvia (46 thousand) and Kazakhstan (34 thousand) – the fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively.

Polonia is conditionally divided by the Polish Foreign Ministry into ten functionality-based geographical groups: 1. Lithuania 2. Belarus 3. Ukraine 4. Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic 5. Western European countries (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, etc.). 6. USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 7. Other European countries 8. Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia 9. Brazil, Argentina 10.Other countries of the world.

This division was carried out on the functional, rather than numerical basis and there is no universal approach as to how to categorize Poles living abroad – each of the above mentioned countries sets its own requirements for working with Polonia. People who have Polish roots but do not speak Polish and who reside in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Brazil are regarded as Polish diaspora by Warsaw. In this case, there is a need to popularize Polish informational and ideological products for Polonia in these countries in the language of the country of residence with emphasis on the economic and cultural components and projects for the study of the Polish language.

The latter bears particular importance. In Brazil, for one, there are more than a dozen Polish language courses. People who go there are provided with social benefits and all the necessary documents – student ID passes for students, work certificates for teaching staff (teachers get discounts 33% to 49% on public and rail transport in Poland, etc.), certificates of Polish schools for distance learning, etc.

Given the presence of anti-Russian sentiment in Poland’s policy, it is not surprising that Russia, the republics of the Caucasus, and countries of Central Asia are among those that Warsaw accuses of breaching the rights of ethnic minorities, including Poles, which is not true. Working with Polonia in these regions carries a clear ideological touch, as historical grievances prevail over culture and economy. By intentionally inciting conflict, concocting accusations of violating the rights of ethnic minorities,Warsaw equips itself with ideological tools to justify its aggressive Eastern policy towards Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

In particular, there are noticeable attempts by Warsaw to force Polish organizations in Russia to participate in anti-Russian propaganda campaigns, especially regarding retrospective assessments of Russian-Polish and Soviet-Polish relations. Polish diplomacy cites the unsuccessful Polish uprisings of the 18th-19th centuries, exiled and repressed Poles of the tsarist and Stalinist times, return of Poland’s western lands to Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus following the Red Army’s Polish campaign in 1939, etc.

The Polish Institute of National Memory (PINP), being an exclusively ideological structure, is on the list of state institutions and ministries that are responsible for cooperating with Polonia. A projecttitled “The Next Stop is History” has been launched in order to promote the historical and ideological heritage of Poland. Implemented within the framework of the Polish diaspora program of the Department of National Education of PINP in several countries at once (conferences, exhibitions, symposia, film screenings, lectures, military sports games), the project has no geographical restrictions and is conducted with the participation of certified teachers.

Let us focus on some characteristic features of the Polish diaspora policy:

– the prevalence of economic aspects while establishing cooperation with ethnic Poles living in the USA, EU and South America;

– a powerful propagandistic and political emphasis and a minimal presence of  economy while dealing with Polonia in countries of the former USSR;

– abandoning tactics of interaction with Polonia which presuppose acting through Polonian organizations only and which have proved ineffective;

– coverage by social, cultural and other projects of the largest possible number of ethnic Poles, in the first place, those who are not members of diaspora organizations;

– absence of heavy vertical hierarchy in disapora organizations in favor of horizontal links and shuttle diplomacy;

– contribute to the formation of a protest and opposition-minded stratum amongst the young in countries of the former USSR (Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine) with further placement of its representatives in local government structures, the media and other socially important projects. 

Summing up, we can say that Warsaw’s diaspora politics abroad are focused on strengthening its positions in the Western community and pursuing unilateral and controversial goals in the eastern direction. From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

Eastern Europe

The US Naval Power & Georgia

Published

on

In many ways, Georgia’s sovereignty and slow but gradual integration into the western political and economic systems (NATO and EU) is contingent upon direct US support and power in the region. Therefore, tracking changes in American power and Washington’s vision of its military posture around the globe should be of importance for successive Georgian governments.

The starting point of course is the understanding that the US power in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea overall has always been of relatively limited character in comparison with other regions. This is largely caused by the fact the US is a sea power surrounded by large swathes of water and its reach into the depths of Eurasian continent through the deployment of troops is constrained.

Let us start with simple numbers. The Earth is a relatively modest-sized planet having 25,000 miles in circumference at the Equator, while its total surface area is 197 million square miles. This means that nearly three-quarters of the planet is water. The power controlling the world ocean thus commands numerous economic and military developments across the globe.

Americans know this well, seen in their efforts since the late 19th century to expand naval capabilities. The 20th century was an American century, but this is changing. China and India are building navies, Iranians grow assertive in the Persian Gulf, while the Russians do the same in the Black Sea.

Among them, the Chinese are crucial to watch. Their strategy is more to dilute American power than to engage them outright. This is a clever approach, more like hit and run, and creates uncomfortable conditions for a rival power. Chinese strategists of ancient times give some interesting insight into how the Chinese could be seeing their competition in the modern world.

Pure numbers and power overstretch too is blame. Consider the following fact. In the Cold War the US had to deploy fleets (overall up to 1000 ships) mostly in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as the Mediterranean Sea. In a striking contrast, nowadays, with up to less than 500 ships, the US need to cover the whole world as the number of competing sea powers has risen, as mentioned above.

Another reason for probable decline of the US naval capacity is globalization. The faster the pace of globalization, the bigger is the need to control every corner of the world as a minor military confrontation in Asia, Europe or the Middle East might transform into a global problem.

The sea power throughout history has proved to be far more long-lasting than any other land power and it actually is the best indicator of a nation’s power.

The US might hope to retain its global dominance also by enlisting allies of similar geopolitical aspirations as its own. But even there, it will rather mean that the US naval power admits its relatively weaker position. Many would call it an elegant decline. Another possibility will be spending more on navy and building new fleets, but their cost is at times as high as the accumulated GDP of tens of African and Asian states.

In many ways, this is what the British officials experienced before World War I. The country has been a primary naval force in the world for almost two centuries (especially in the 19th century), but a gradual rise of the US and German naval fleets was becoming more evident and potentially threatening to the British order at sea.

One of the reactions of the British elite was to negate the trend and claim that their power will be unmatched. It is difficult to admit your relatively declining power.

What does all this mean for Georgia? It relies on the US for its security and it borders on the Black Sea. However, in the long run when the focus of the US grand strategy will more focused on containing China at sea, Washington will be less able to properly address the Russian navy in the Black Sea. As said, there are simply not enough naval resources to hand. The scenario is unfortunate for Tbilisi, particularly at a time when the country is set to build the Anaklia Deep Sea Port.

Author’s note: first published in Georgia Today

Continue Reading

Eastern Europe

Why does Ukraine fret so much about Russia’s return to PACE?

Published

on

Ukrainian politicians and experts blame PACE’s decision to restore the Russian delegation’s voting rights on President Volodymyr Zelensky and his administration, and also on the leadership of the Council of Europe for allegedly wanting to ensure the resumption of Russia’s annual contribution of 30 million euros to the Council’s budget. They also foul France and Germany for striking a deal with Moscow, which they describe as “a shame not only for Ukraine, but primarily for European values.”

Kiev believes that there is only one right way to go, and that is an anti-Russian, nationalistic, dependent and provocative one, coupled with additional sanctions against Moscow. This stance was rejected by 118 PACE delegates from Azerbaijan, France, Spain, Italy, Norway, Austria, Slovakia, Portugal, Serbia and Turkey, with 62 delegates from Ukraine and Georgia, and the majority of delegates from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,  Britain and Sweden voting for it, and 10 delegates abstaining.

Simultaneously, Ukrainian politicians and media representatives tried to ignore a statement by their Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin, who said that the decision to return the Russian delegation to PACE was taken before (!) the presidential elections in Ukraine. He said that this had been brewing for some time, and would have been made regardless of the political situation in the country.

“It is not an issue of a distribution of responsibility, which, by the way, I don’t exempt myself from. It’s not about Poroshenko, Zelensky or somebody else either. This is a common problem, which we should be working together to address. In view of the ongoing election campaign, I fully understand the need for people to go on air and social networks, but it is really a matter of honesty and readiness to face the challenges as they are.”

Well, a surprise sign of political sobriety on Klimkin’s part, and a very inconvenient interpretation of the event for Kiev.

The prominent Ukrainian political analyst Vitaly Portnikov paints a rather gloomy picture of where things could go from now.

“What we are dealing with is a banal political special operation, primarily aimed at the resumption of full-fledged cooperation between the West and the Kremlin. It is by no means coincidental that this special operation was set in motion during the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, because its masterminds were eager to show just how sick and tired the Ukrainians were of the conflict, how much they wanted to “end all this shooting” and  reconcile with Russia. Therefore, the West would subsequently change its tack and help implement popular aspirations so clearly expressed during the Ukrainian elections by making its own compromises with Russia. In the next stage of this special operation, US President Donald Trump would meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Osaka to seal the fate of the post-Soviet countries, agree joint efforts to “deoligarchize” them and create effective institutions there. The next stage would be to discredit Ukraine as a country run by oligarchs using a weak and dependent president and a controlled parliament of rascals to accomplish their goals. This, in turn, would help bring about a regime change in Ukraine, force out the oligarchs and bring to power a Moldova-style coalition working under Moscow’s control and imitating mutual understanding with the West.”

What is interesting here is that Ukrainian experts started talking about such scenarios only after Russia’s return to PACE. It seems that this fact alone proved enough to spoil the mood of Ukrainian politicians and experts, who now paint a grim picture of their country’s future. They are aware of a problem, but they have no idea how to deal with it. Ukraine has no desire to change, even though it understands full well that in its present state it is increasingly losing its appeal to Europe. Given the hysterical state of mind of the country’s political elite, the situation there is very alarming and dangerously fraught with the darkest possible scenario.

With Russia now back in PACE, Ukraine is in a state of shock, dreading the possible lifting of anti-Russian sanctions. Ukrainian ex-President Petro Poroshenko described Russia’s return to PACE as the first step towards lifting the sanctions, “a powerful challenge to Ukraine,” “the first serious diplomatic blow that Ukraine received in the last five years,” and also “a blow to fundamental European values, when a price has been chosen between values and price.” He also vowed to fight the spread of “the virus of forgiveness of Russia for the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbass.” Poroshenko’s statements reflected his relief and hidden joy that Russia’s return to PACE did not happen on his watch, because otherwise a  political defeat at home would have been compounded by a foreign policy debacle.

Ukraine’s current president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is equally “disappointed” by the Russian delegation’s return to PACE, despite all his efforts to prevent that happening.

“Last week I personally discussed this issue with the President of France and the Federal Chancellor of Germany. I tried to convince Mr. Macron and Mrs. Merkel that the Russian delegation’s return to PACE is possible only after Moscow has met the fundamental requirements put forward by the Parliamentary Assembly. It is a pity that our European partners did not hear us and acted differently.”

The young Ukrainian president was thus taught a lesson in Realpolitik where state interests always come before declarations, ideology or the spirit of the times.

Ukraine may find itself in the “gray zone” of European politics. Kiev can blame this on a compliant Europe or the “cunning Putin.” Or it could adequately assess its own foreign and domestic policy, which threatens to push it back to the very “gray zone” of world and European politics, which Kiev believes it emerged from thanks to the “revolution of dignity.” Later, however, Ukraine took a step back unleashing a civil conflict in the south-east.

The Minsk process and the Normandy format were meant to pull Ukraine out of the “gray zone,” to create the impression of a certain normalcy amid an ongoing civil conflict and the emergence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. A sort of political schizophrenia grown on an anti-Russian soil…

What came as the first blow to Kiev, however, was not Russia’s return to PACE, but rather the fall from power of the Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plakhotnyuk. For Kiev this is something more than just a precedent, it is the specter of a “big deal,” which came about so unexpectedly and translated into an agreement struck by political rivals in Moldova. This is something Kiev fears most, a future where, with Russian gas flows diverted elsewhere, the Ukrainian gas transportation system will turn into a pile of scrap metal, where nationalistic rhetoric will be increasingly criticized in the world and international demands for the implementation of the Minsk accords will likewise increase. 

The situation for Ukraine is very serious indeed: Moscow and Washington can act as one in Moldova, and Europe, interested in joint energy projects and economic relations with Russia, and facing strong US pressure on energy issues (regarding the construction of Nord Stream-2) is looking for ways to normalize relations with Moscow. 

 From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

Latest

Science & Technology2 hours ago

‘Better Future’ lies in prosperity of startups

With the slogan of ‘Better Future’, the 25th edition of Iran International Exhibition of Electronics, Computer & E-commerce (ELECOMP 2019)...

Defense4 hours ago

Turkey: As S-400s arrive, passions burn on

On July 12, the first shipment of the Russian S-400 air defense missile systems arrived at Mürted Air Base near...

Environment6 hours ago

The growth we want is sustainable: Harnessing innovation for a circular economy for all

With rapidly growing competition for resources and increasing waste and pollution, the need to move towards an inclusive circular economic...

East Asia8 hours ago

Sanctions as a double-edged weapon: Chinese response to U.S arms supplies to Taiwan

The official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Geng Shuang, said that China, in response to American...

Economy11 hours ago

The Social-Strategic Revolution: Success for the Reluctant New Executive

The one stable thing written about in today’s job market more than any other subject is instability. For most people...

Hotels & Resorts21 hours ago

Protea Hotel Fire & Ice! by Marriott opens in Durban

Protea Hotel Fire & Ice! by Marriott Durban uMhlanga Ridge officially opened this month, making it the first Fire &...

Intelligence24 hours ago

Effective measures to control Afghan border

It is essential to point out before dwelling upon this issue that international terrorism in its current shape remains one...

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy