As the experts of the sector say, all the advanced communication lines and networks are “non-deterministic”.
This means that, when built and completed, they are a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts and is not predictable in its results, given the functions of the parts taken separately.
The complication of the Web is related to the number of the parts composing it and to the number of relations, namely “nodes”, which are present in the elements that make it up.
This is not a phenomenon that can be corrected or controlled. It is a purely mathematical and inevitable effect of the Web and of the interaction between its nodes.
The Communication Assistance for the Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) is a US regulation obliging those who maintain the Networks to keep sound security mechanisms that are defined – together with those who produce them – in specific FBI directories.
Nevertheless, there is much talk about the relationship – which is, indeed, non-existent – between the Chinese intelligence services and Huawei.
According to CALEA, each information network must have a control system – hence a system to check the data passing through the network, so as to know – at any time – the data running on the specific Network to be controlled.
In other words – and with harsh clarity – it is a matter of allowing interceptions, according to the US law.
Therefore, from the privacy viewpoint, the US law does not impose different and better behaviours than those of which Huawei is accused.
Recently the UK-based Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has submitted its fifth annual report.
It has clarified that – as in any Networks – the source code is extremely complex and “long”, written in a language that is naturally “insecure and unsafe”, which can be manipulated by all those who can reach the source code since the aforementioned level of complexity is such that it does not allow any security check. Neither stable nor temporary.
Hence whoever could inspect the source code of any telephone network or world wide web producer could never determine whether it is devoid of bugs or original elements, or of malicious insertions by the producer or others, and could not even trace its origin.
Therefore, every time the source code is reconstructed, it produces something different compared to the previous version. It is a direct function of the complexity of the code itself.
This means that we are never sure that the code that has succeeded the initial check is exactly the one that “works” in the next network.
Hence data security risks are not and cannot be specific to Huawei alone, but are inherently common to all network builders and to their primary and standard software. Every manufacturer’s check inserts new data and new unpredictable effects.
Therefore the pure network technique does not matter much and, in any case, the security problem, which is always relative, applies to everyone.
Hence the questions we must ask ourselves are eminently political, i.d. how long can Huawei withstand pressure from the Chinese government or to what extent Huawei itself intends to support the efforts of Chinese security agencies.
It is unlikely that the Chinese intelligence services want to undermine or restrict the global reach of a global and Chinese company, which is essential for the economic development of the country, by trivially putting it in the service of its networks. It is certainly not worth it.
Moreover, Huawei has developed its 5G model for at least ten years and it has contributed to the definition of the 5G standard globally.
The Chinese research into the 5G started in 2009 and Huawei is second only to Samsung for number of standard essential patents (SEPs) and has the highest global level of 5G evolution in various areas of use. There are really no credible competitors for Huawei – hence the pseudo-arguments on security or Huawei’s relations with the Chinese intelligence services are used.
Too trivial and too dangerous. If anything, the true goal of the Chinese intelligence services is precisely to support Huawei’s image as an impartial and global operator, certainly not as a tool for its operations.
You cannot understand the Chinese intelligence services at all – which are not childish in their approach – if you assume they behave like this.
It is rather known to all global network and IT operators that five years ago the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted CISCO’s hardware and also infiltrated and paid RSA – the company processing numerical codes for the global market – to release manipulated cryptology standards, in addition to forcing some American companies, including Yahoo!, to collaborate in the global espionage organized by US agencies.
Precisely what of which Huawei is accused.
Who owns Huawei?
100% of it is owned by a holding company, 1% of which is directly owned by Ren Zhengfei, the founder of the company.
The remaining 99% of Huawei is owned by a “union committee” of all employees. The employees’ shares are, in effect, normal contractual rights for profit distribution.
Moreover, the purchase of the Huawei 5G network is particularly interesting from the price viewpoint, which could even offset the unlikely damage of a leak – possibly random – on a node of the Network.
A leak that obviously anyone can put in place – even using the Huawei network, without being part of the company.
Obviously you can also buy the 5G networks produced by Ericsson or Nokia.
These networks are definitely more expensive, less negatively affected by “external elements” (but is it true, considering that anyone can manipulate a network?) and created by less “dangerous” States – if we see them in a simplistic way – than China, which is currently the monstrum of the Western intelligence services that are now reduced to the minimum, including the US ones.
With specific reference to the relationship between 4G and 5G, it should be noted that, for 10 years, there is an average increase by 64 times in operational capacity for each system that arrives on the market.
The 4G is planned to run until 2023, but the 5G will increase the data processing power by as many as 5,000 times compared to the current 4G.
Nowadays, however, also the 4G has reached the “Shannon limit”, that is the maximum limit of theoretical data transfer on a network, given a predetermined “noise” level within the network itself.
However, the current 5G – namely Huawei’s – can always acquire new additional frequencies, which allow to use more channels, even simultaneously.
Nevertheless it is much more sensitive to the 4G rain.
The second advance of the 5G compared to the 4G network is the fact that the transmission cells have advanced antennas of different design compared to the current ones, capable of optimally managing different networks, even simultaneously.
Furthermore China is much more internationalized in the IT and Network sector than we may think.
Chengdu, the Chinese city with the highest density of “intel” companies, currently hosts 16,000 companies in the IT sector, including 820 ones fully owned by foreigners, in addition to Huawei’s primary competitors: Cisco, Ericsson, Microsoft, etc.
Nokia-Siemens has 14 joint-ventures and directly-owned factories in China. Alcatel-Lucent has its largest factory in China. Ericsson’s largest distribution centre in China is the point of reference for the whole network of the Swedish company in the world. Cisco has some Research & Development centres in China, but also 25% of all Cisco production is provided by Chinese factories.
The various quality controls, which in Huawei focus explicitly on the ban and detection of backdoors, i.e. hidden or secret ways to bypass normal authentication or encryption in computer operating system, which are controlled systematically, are managed – also financially – by companies known throughout the global market, such as Price Waterhouse Coopers for internal finance and accounting, IBM Consulting for IT technologies and many others. Hence how can we think that a company like Huawei, with this type of relations, controls and checks, is so “impenetrable”, as some Western media report?
Hence, apart from the rumors spread by mass media, what are the real reasons why, according to British intelligence documents, Huawei should not spread its far more cost-effective and functional 5G than the others in the West?
a) Huawei is the result of the Chinese “political ecosystem”. Well, what is the problem? How many Western companies work in China? A huge number and they all operate on the basis of local laws and China’s economic and political system. It is a hollow and generic argument.
b) According to its professional detractors, Huawei is the result of the Civilian-Military merger. However, the same principle applies also to the USA. Certainly there are CPC committees in 11 of the most technologically advanced companies in China. Nevertheless, as many studies show, including Western ones, this does not automatically transfer the expanding civilian technologies to the Chinese military system.
c) In 2010, only less than 1% of hi-tech civilian companies were connected to defence-related activities. Certainly, as happens everywhere, the connection between civilian and military activities is at the origin of Xi Jinping’s plans, namely the Made in China 2025 and the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan. President Xi has also created the Central Military Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development. However, these are specific projects and predetermined development lines – not for the immediate use of civilian companies’ technology state of the art in military ones.
d) The Chinese power, however, has always used – and will continue to do so – market forces to reform the old State-owned companies. In fact, this is the real current goal of Chinese power in the civilian-military relationship. This is also the reason why the big global Chinese companies are left free to float and fluctuate in the world market, instead of acting as retrievers for small and minor secrets, which the Chinese intelligence services can know anyway. Indeed, some analyses by the Chinese government itself tell us that, if the public business system does not change rapidly, most of the advanced private companies in China will de facto be cut out from the defence economy and its updating process.
e) How can we also think that a country like China manipulates one of its major companies, namely Huawei, to gather confidential information? The secrets, if any, are concepts, projects and sets of news, not the talk of some Presidents or some Ministers’ phone calls to their lovers. This is at most pink press, stuff for gossip magazines we can find by hairdressers. It is never intelligence. Obviously, for many Western countries, small personal data has become the substitute for sound strategic thinking, as if the defamation of a leader were the primary goal of an agency.
f) Again according to the detractors of its 5G leadership, Huawei is supposed to be subject to the 2017 Chinese Intelligence Law. This is a rule that allows, in principle, State control over foreign individuals and companies. What do Western intelligence services do differently instead? Not much, I think. Indeed, I am fairly certain about it.
g) The 2017 law also allows the operation of the Chinese intelligence services inside and outside China. Hence, what is wrong with it? What do we do differently? Obviously, in China’s legislation, it is also a matter of following and controlling the internal opposition. But, again, what do Western intelligence services do differently? Do they distribute snacks? Indeed, here is the connection between the various oppositions inside China and their use of, or even connection with, some Western intelligence agencies.
h) Furthermore, Western sources and media also state that the aforementioned Huawei’s structure is “opaque”. It may be so, but how is the structure of the other global hi-tech companies? Apple provides exactly the same internal data that is available to Huawei’s analysts. Considering the habit and style of granting substantial shareholdings to managers, the share ownership is equally opaque and often permits severe insider trading, often in favour of competitors. There is no reason to differentiate between Huawei’s corporate data and the one from other global IT and phone companies. Indeed, Huawei’s technical documentation is often much more detailed than the one of its global competitors. Certainly the public officials belonging to Huawei’s internal unions and control structures are accountable vis-à-vis the CPC and the State, but this holds true also for all the other Western companies that produce or sell in China. Do CISCO and Apple, who have been operating in China for many years, also in the R&D field, believe they are exempted from some security checks?
i) An apparently rational argument of Huawei’s Western competitors regards the willingness of Chinese banks to fund this company. Just think about the notorious and stupidly ill-reputed “State aid”.
j) Indeed, Chinese banks certainly fund Huawei-the last time to the tune of some billion yuan, but only and solely based on official budgets. Nowadays, Western financial companies have free access to as many as 44 trillion US dollars, which is exactly the current size of the Chinese financial market. They can also have the majority of shares. In 2030 Western financial companies plan to reach 10 billion US dollars of profits in China. The problem is that China is liquid, while Western countries are so to a lesser extent. Yet the credit institutions prefer not to invest in companies and prefer to do so in opaque financial instruments and government bonds.
k) Furthermore – and here we can see the solely political drift of the controversy against Huawei – it is supposed to have produced and updated the e-control networks operating in Xinjiang. Is it possible that the Uyghurs are wrong and China is right? What is the West’s positive bias vis-à-vis an Islamic population that is often refractory to the Chinese system, with decades of terrorism behind it, even after a great economic boom, while the Hui – another Islamic population – do not cause any problem to China? Hence if we do not accept the “authoritarian” values of the Chinese system, we should not massively invest in that economic system. This is exactly what the Western companies are increasingly doing. Conversely, if the Western companies appreciate China’s stability and efficiency, they should resign themselves to accepting also the sometimes necessary repression of vociferous or basically jihadist minorities. If the West wants the jihad liberation, possibly to counter the new “Silk Road”, it shall have the courage to openly say so.
Moreover, Google is planning to re-enter the Chinese market with a version of its search system that adapts to the new Chinese laws on censorship or on the control of dangerous news. Or even on “enemy” propaganda.
Reverting to Huawei, as already mentioned, the Chinese company has set up the Centre for Cybernetics Security in Great Britain, which is anyway in constant connection with the Government Communication Headquarters (GHCQ), the British intelligence and security organisation responsible for providing signals intelligence and information assurance, as well as for controlling networks, ciphers and the Internet.
It should also be recalled that the 5G is not only a much faster Internet downloading system than the previous ones, but it is a network that will transform companies and the information technology.
Remote Medicine, self-driving vehicles, Internet of Things (IoT), new automated production systems.
These are the fields in which the outcome of the struggle between Huawei and Western companies will be decided, in a phase in which – for the first time in recent history – the USA and European allies have significantly lower leading technology than the Chinese one. This is precisely the core of the issue – not the talk about Chinese intelligence services or the rhetoric about mass control systems in Xinjiang.
Ten Ways the C-Suite Can Protect their Company against Cyberattack
Cyberattacks are one of the top 10 global risks of highest concern in the next decade, with an estimated price tag of $90 trillion if cybersecurity efforts do not keep pace with technological change. While there is abundant guidance in the cybersecurity community, the application of prescribed action continues to fall short of what is required to ensure effective defence against cyberattacks. The challenges created by accelerating technological innovation have reached new levels of complexity and scale – today responsibility for cybersecurity in organizations is no longer one Chief Security Officer’s job, it involves everyone.
The Cybersecurity Guide for Leaders in Today’s Digital World was developed by the World Economic Forum Centre for Cybersecurity and several of its partners to assist the growing number of C-suite executives responsible for setting and implementing the strategy and governance of cybersecurity and resilience. The guide bridges the gap between leaders with and without technical backgrounds. Following almost one year of research, it outlines 10 tenets that describe how cyber resilience in the digital age can be formed through effective leadership and design.
“With effective cyber-risk management, business executives can achieve smarter, faster and more connected futures, driving business growth,” said Georges De Moura, Head of Industry Solutions, Centre for Cybersecurity, World Economic Forum. “From the steps necessary to think more like a business leader and develop better standards of cyber hygiene, through to the essential elements of crisis management, the report offers an excellent cybersecurity playbook for leaders in public and private sectors.”
“Practicing good cybersecurity is everyone’s responsibility, even if you don’t have the word “security” in your job title,” said Paige H. Adams, Global Chief Information Security Officer, Zurich Insurance Group. “This report provides a practical guide with ten basic tenets for business leaders to incorporate into their company’s day-to-day operations. Diligent application of these tenets and making them a part of your corporate culture will go a long way toward reducing risk and increasing cyber resilience.”
“The recommendation to foster internal and external partnerships is one of the most important, in my view,” said Sir Rob Wainwright, Senior Cyber Partner, Deloitte. “The dynamic nature of the threat, not least in terms of how it reflects the recent growth of an integrated criminal economy, calls on us to build a better global architecture of cyber cooperation. Such cooperation should include more effective platforms for information sharing within and across industries, releasing the benefits of data integration and analytics to build better levels of threat awareness and response capability for all.”
The Ten Tenets
1. Think Like a Business Leader – Cybersecurity leaders are business leaders first and foremost. They have to position themselves, teams and operations as business enablers. Transforming cybersecurity from a support function into a business-enabling function requires a broader view and a stronger communication skill set than was required previously.
2. Foster Internal and External Partnerships – Cybersecurity is a team sport. Today, information security teams need to partner with many internal groups and develop a shared vision, objectives and KPIs to ensure that timelines are met while delivering a highly secure and usable product to customers.
3. Build and Practice Strong Cyber Hygiene – Five core security principles are crucial: a clear understanding of the data supply chain, a strong patching strategy, organization-wide authentication, a secure active directory of contacts, and encrypted critical business processes.
4. Protect Access to Mission-Critical Assets – Not all user access is created equal. It is essential to have strong processes and automated systems in place to ensure appropriate access rights and approval mechanisms.
5. Protect Your Email Domain Against Phishing – Email is the most common point of entry for cyber attackers, with the median company receiving over 90% of their detected malware via this channel. The guide highlights six ways to protect employees’ emails.
6. Apply a Zero-Trust Approach to Securing Your Supply Chain – The high velocity of new applications developed alongside the adoption of open source and cloud platforms is unprecedented. Security-by-design practices must be embedded in the full lifecycle of the project.
7. Prevent, Monitor and Respond to Cyber Threats – The question is not if, but when a significant breach will occur. How well a company manages this inevitability is ultimately critical. Threat intelligence teams should perform proactive hunts throughout the organization’s infrastructure and keep the detection teams up to date on the latest trends.
8. Develop and Practice a Comprehensive Crisis Management Plan – Many organizations focus primarily on how to prevent and defend while not focusing enough on institutionalizing the playbook of crisis management. The guide outlines 12 vital components any company’s crisis plan should incorporate.
9. Build a Robust Disaster Recovery Plan for Cyberattacks – A disaster recovery and continuity plan must be tailored to security incident scenarios to protect an organization from cyberattacks and to instruct on how to react in case of a data breach. Furthermore, it can reduce the amount of time it takes to identify breaches and restore critical services for the business.
10. Create a Culture of Cybersecurity – Keeping an organization secure is every employee’s job. Tailoring trainings, incentivizing employees, building elementary security knowledge and enforcing sanctions on repeat offenders could aid thedevelopment of a culture of cybersecurity.
In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, all businesses are undergoing transformative digitalization of their industries that will open new markets. Cybersecurity leaders need to take a stronger and more strategic leadership role. Inherent to this new role is the imperative to move beyond the role of compliance monitors and enforcers.
Moving First on AI Has Competitive Advantages and Risks
Financial institutions that implement AI early have the most to gain from its use, but also face the largest risks. The often-opaque nature of AI decisions and related concerns of algorithmic bias, fiduciary duty, uncertainty, and more have left implementation of the most cutting-edge AI uses at a standstill. However, a newly released report from the World Economic Forum, Navigating Uncharted Waters, shows how financial services firms and regulators can overcome these risks.
Using AI responsibly is about more than mitigating risks; its use in financial services presents an opportunity to raise the ethical bar for the financial system as a whole. It also offers financial services a competitive edge against their peers and new market entrants.
“AI offers financial services providers the opportunity to build on the trust their customers place in them to enhance access, improve customer outcomes and bolster market efficiency,” says Matthew Blake, Head of Financial Services, World Economic Forum. “This can offer competitive advantages to individual financial firms while also improving the broader financial system if implemented appropriately.”
Across several dimensions, AI introduces new complexities to age-old challenges in the financial services industry, and the governance frameworks of the past will not adequately address these new concerns.
Explaining AI decisions
Some forms of AI are not interpretable even by their creators, posing concerns for financial institutions and regulators who are unsure how to trust solutions they cannot understand or explain. This uncertainty has left the implementation of cutting-edge AI tools at a standstill. The Forum offers a solution: evolve past “one-size-fits-all” governance ideas to specific transparency requirements that consider the AI use case in question.
For example, it is important to clearly and simply explain why a customer was rejected for a loan, which can significantly impact their life. It is less important to explain a back-office function whose only objective is to convert scans of various documents to text. For the latter, accuracy is more important than transparency, as the ability of this AI application to create harm is limited.
Beyond “explainability”, the report explores new challenges surrounding bias and fairness, systemic risk, fiduciary duty, and collusion as they relate to the use of AI.
Bias and fairness
Algorithmic bias is another top concern for financial institutions, regulators and customers surrounding the use of AI in financial services. AI’s unique ability to rapidly process new and different types of data raise the concern that AI systems may develop unintended biases over time; combined with their opaque nature such biases could remain undetected. Despite these risks, AI also presents an opportunity to decrease unfair discrimination or exclusion, for example by analyzing alternative data that can be used to assess ‘thin file’ customers that traditional systems cannot understand due to a lack of information.
The widespread adoption of AI also has the potential to alter the dynamics of the interactions between human actors and machines in the financial system, creating new sources of systemic risk. As the volume and velocity of interactions grow through automated agents, emerging risks may become increasingly difficult to detect, spread across various financial institutions, Fintechs, large technology companies, and other market participants. These new dynamics will require supervisory authorities to reinvent themselves as hubs of system-wide intelligence, using AI themselves to supervise AI systems.
As AI systems take on an expanded set of tasks, they will increasingly interact with customers. As a result, fiduciary requirements to always act in the best interests of the customer may soon arise, raising the question if AI systems can be held “responsible” for their actions – and if not, who should be held accountable.
Given that AI systems can act autonomously, they may plausibly learn to engage in collusion without any instruction from their human creators, and perhaps even without any explicit, trackable communication. This challenges the traditional regulatory constructs for detecting and prosecuting collusion and may require a revisiting of the existing legal frameworks.
“Using AI in financial services will require an openness to new ways of safeguarding the ecosystem, different from the tools of the past,” says Rob Galaski, Global Leader, Banking & Capital Markets, Deloitte Consulting. “To accelerate the pace of AI adoption in the industry, institutions need to take the lead in developing and proposing new frameworks that address new challenges, working with regulators along the way.”
For each of the above described concerns, the report outlines the key underlying root causes of the issue and highlights the most pressing challenges, identifies how those challenges might be addressed through new tools and governance frameworks, and what opportunities might be unlocked by doing so.
The report was prepared in collaboration with Deloitte and follows five previous reports on financial innovation. The World Economic Forum will continue its work in Financial Services, with a particular focus on AI’s connections to other emerging technologies in its next phase of research through mid-2020.
US Blacklist of Chinese Surveillance Companies Creates Supply Chain Confusion
The United States Department of Commerce’s decision to blacklist 28 Chinese public safety organizations and commercial entities hit at some of China’s most dominant vendors within the security industry. Of the eight commercial entities added to the blacklist, six of them are some of China’s most successful digital forensics, facial recognition, and AI companies. However, the two surveillance manufacturers who made this blacklist could have a significant impact on the global market at large—Dahua and Hikvision.
Putting geopolitics aside, Dahua’s and Hikvision’s positions within the overall global digital surveillance market makes their blacklisting somewhat of a shock, with the immediate effects touching off significant questions among U.S. partners, end users, and supply chain partners.
Frost & Sullivan’s research finds that, currently, Hikvision and Dahua rank second and third in total global sales among the $20.48 billion global surveillance market but are fast-tracking to become the top two vendors among IP surveillance camera manufacturers. Their insurgent rise among IP surveillance camera providers came about due to both companies’ aggressive growth pipelines, significant product libraries of high-quality surveillance cameras and new imaging technologies, and low-cost pricing models that provide customers with higher levels of affordability.
This is also not the first time that these two vendors have found themselves in the crosshairs of the U.S. government. In 2018, the U.S. initiated a ban on the sale and use of Hikvision and Dahua camera equipment within government-owned facilities, including the Department of Defense, military bases, and government-owned buildings. However, the vague language of the ban made it difficult for end users to determine whether they were just banned from new purchases of Dahua or Hikvision cameras or if they needed to completely rip-and-replace existing equipment with another brand. Systems integrators, distributors, and even technology partners themselves remained unsure of how they should handle the ban’s implications, only serving to sow confusion among U.S. customers.
In addition to confusion over how end users in the government space were to proceed regarding their Hikvision and Dahua equipment came the realization that both companies held significant customer share among commercial companies throughout the U.S. market—so where was the ban’s line being drawn for these entities? Were they to comply or not? If so, how? Again, these questions have remained unanswered since 2018.
Hikvision and Dahua each have built a strong presence within the U.S. market, despite the 2018 ban. Both companies are seen as regular participants in industry tradeshows and events, and remain active among industry partners throughout the surveillance ecosystem. Both companies have also attempted to work with the U.S. government to alleviate security concerns and draw clearer guidelines for their sales and distribution partners throughout the country. They even established regional operations centers and headquarters in the country.
While blacklisting does send a clearer message to end users, integrators, and distributors—for sales and usage of these companies’ technologies—remedies for future actions still remain unclear. When it comes to legacy Hikvision and Dahua cameras, the onus appears to be on end users and integrators to decide whether rip-and-replace strategies are the best way to comply with government rulings or to just leave the solutions in place and hope for the best.
As far as broader global impacts of this action, these will remain to be seen. While the 2018 ban did bring about talks of similar bans in other regions, none of these bans ever materialized. Dahua and Hikvision maintained their strong market positioning, even achieving higher-than-average growth rates in the past year. Blacklisting does send a stronger message to global regulators though, so market participants outside the U.S. will just have to adopt a wait-and-see posture to see how, if at all, they may need to prepare their own surveillance equipment supply chains for changes to come.
A lesson in Naomi Wolf’s promiscuities and an open space where poetry matters
Shut the door. Shut out the quiet light. Tell yourself to swim away from the tigers with arms pillars of...
Overcoming today’s challenges for tomorrow’s security
In a world where technology such as artificial intelligence and robotics is evolving rapidly, defence organisations that are steeped in...
Afghanistan: EU reinforces humanitarian support with €40 million as crisis worsens
The European Commission has allocated an additional €40 million in emergency assistance for those affected by the worsening humanitarian situation...
Regional Conference on Air Quality Management in the Western Balkans
Government representatives from North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia met today in Skopje for a regional conference...
A New Currency Offers New Hope for Zimbabwe
For many Zimbabweans queuing up outside banks last week, it must have felt like the beginning of a new era....
It’s Hard to Find a Black Cat in a Dark Room, Especially If It Isn’t There: RAND on the Search for Cyber Coercion
What is cyber coercion and how have states used cyber operations to coerce others? These are the questions addressed in...
Post-Brexit UK will continue to offer significant opportunities
PwC’s new report, Brexit and beyond: Assessing the impact on Europe’s asset and wealth managers, outlines the chief findings from...
Africa2 days ago
The Geopolitics of natural resources of Western Sahara
Europe2 days ago
U.S. President Trump to meet Bulgaria’s Prime Minister at the White House: What to expect?
Defense3 days ago
Is this the end of NATO-era?
South Asia2 days ago
The era emerged from “RuwanWeliSaya”: Aftermath of Presidential Election in Sri Lanka
South Asia1 day ago
Sri Lanka’s election results and their implications
Americas2 days ago
Poll Shows Trump’s Israel Policy Is Opposed Even by Republicans
Urban Development2 days ago
Banking on nature: a Mexican city adapts to climate change
Newsdesk3 days ago
ADB Program to Help Improve Education and Health in Armenia