Earlier this week on 28th May, Pakistan marked more than two decades of technological prowess since successfully harnessing nuclear weapons capability. Termed as the’ Day of Greatness’ (Youm e Takbir), the occasion is meant to symbolize the country’s resolve and determination in indigenously developing advanced nuclear research and technology. Furthermore, it also commemorates the achievement of setting up the entire framework of strategic nuclear deterrence in South Asia, with respect to its arch-rival India. As a result this day symbolizes one of the defining hallmarks of the Pakistani state’s self-purported identity as a nuclear power. This in turn holds important implications for how this idea is projected inwardly to its own citizens as part of instilling a sense of patriotism and national identity, as well as being projected outwardly to its friends and foes within the wider international community.
In light of the recent escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan following the Pulwama attacks however, this year’s commemoration of Youm e Takbircarry added implications to Pakistan’ nuclear posture as direct result of the heightened geo-political tensions pervading throughout the region. While the immediate threat of war following history’s first aerial dogfight between two nuclear powers has largely subsided, there still remains a pervasive atmosphere of jingoistic sabre-rattling between India and Pakistan. These hostilities have been driven to a large extent by the BJP’s anti-Pakistan rhetoric, which has been on clear display throughout the party’s re-election bid in the recently completed Indian elections. While initially considered by Pakistan to be directed more towards a domestic audience of Indian voters, this rhetoric has been further reinforced by the Indian state’s own nuclear posture as evident in the previous week’s test launch of its Brahmos cruise missile.
The test which has been publicized by India as a successful air-to ground launch of the ‘world’s fastest cruise missile’ has been apparently carried out to showcase India’s enhanced airstrike capabilities. Highlighting the enhanced precision and greater penetration capabilities of this particular weapons system, this test can be seen as a continuation of India’s shift towards employing a ‘counterforce’ doctrine that is premised on creating greater space for a limited military engagement, particularly with a view towards Pakistan. Hence, taken within the context of the purported ‘surgical strikes’ that the Indian Air Force had attempted to carry out within Pakistan back in February, the latest Brahmos test indicates the same kind of nuclear posturing that has come to be expected from India’s strategic planners over the last decade.
As expected, Pakistan’s response under these circumstances has been to conduct a test of its own that was carried out just a day following the Indian test. The difference however was that, Pakistan, instead of showcasing a new or upgraded technology, chose instead to carry out a training launch of its already inducted Shaheen II ballistic missile system. Referring to how the missile adequately ‘maintained the desired deterrence stability in the region’ (in the military’s official statement accompanying the launch) Pakistan has chosen instead to simply reiterate its stance on what it considers as the key to maintaining the region’s strategic balance. Hence, Pakistan’s nuclear posturing can be consequently understood as still preferring a countervalue strategy, which is premised more along the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction and all out nuclear war. This has been done to deliberately differentiate its stance from India’s emphasis on counterforce which is in contrast premised on still creating space for a limited war, as outlined above.
These differences between both countries’ strategic posturing once again pose serious implications for regional peace and stability. As evident in their differing positions, Pakistan being the economically weaker country cannot expect to compete with India at every stage of its weapon’s development program. Hence, its repeated emphasis on the deterrence value of its largely indigenously developed, yet highly capable nuclear arsenal. India on the other hand, being one of the world’s largest arms importers can easily afford to outspend Pakistan enhancing both its conventional and strategic capabilities. This is evident in its ambitious plans to upgrade both its naval and air strike capabilities by prioritizing the sophistication and integration of its cruise and ballistic missile delivery systems.
It is worth noting however, that even though both countries’ strategic directions differ vastly in their ability to project power beyond their borders, history has repeatedly shown that Pakistan is highly unlikely to let India dominate based solely on its purported military strength. As was evident in Pakistan’s own retaliatory strikes and the ensuing aerial dogfight three months ago, India’s material advantages alone are no guarantee of combat effectiveness particularly considering the immense value placed on it by its political leaders. This glaring gap between India’s purported strategy and real-world effectiveness thus lays bare a dangerous disconnect between its military planners and political leaders.
On the other side of the border, as Pakistan commemorates21 years of maintaining strategic stability within the region, its own approach stands perhaps even more vindicated within the current scenario. While there is a definite consensus based on this stance between its political and military leadership at the internal level, it nevertheless remains to be seen how this is likely to be viewed by other major powers within the wider international community. Either way Pakistan’s own claims over the deterrence value of its nuclear arsenal stand only to have been reinforced rather than eroded in light of the above developments.
Is There a Way Out of the Russia-NATO Talks Impasse?
Few can have been surprised by the outcome of the recent talks between Russia and the West, in which the latter, represented by the United States and its European allies, rejected Russia’s demands to close NATO’s doors to new Eastern European members and restore its military infrastructure to where it was at the end of the twentieth century. A number of strategic, political, legal, ideological, and even psychological impediments prevent NATO from complying with Russia’s tough demands.
So what steps should Moscow take next, now that its ostentatious diplomatic blitzkrieg has come to nothing? Russian experts are full of proposals for how to retaliate against the intransigent West, including deploying new missile systems in close proximity to NATO member states, creating military threats to the United States in Cuba and Venezuela, increasing the presence of Russia-affiliated private military companies in unstable African regions, expanding military cooperation with China, and escalating propaganda and cyber attacks in the West.
There are also calls to punish the West on the diplomatic front. Russia could, for instance, withdraw from the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. It could denounce the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security signed by Russia and NATO in 1997; officially recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk separatist republics; halt U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction negotiations; or take any number of similar steps.
The implementation of some of these proposals would certainly generate serious new security threats for Russia’s Western adversaries, but it is unclear how they would enhance Russia’s security. On the contrary, stoking up confrontation in Europe and across the globe increases the risk of a head-on military collision that could result in a nuclear war. Global security cannot be compartmentalized in the modern world, and nor can its absence.
Russia, therefore, needs to establish its priorities. It can either try to inflict maximum damage on what it sees as an intractable and hypocritical West, taking revenge for the defeats and unilateral concessions of the 1990s, or it can try to strengthen its own security as far as possible amid the limitations of the current geopolitical situation.
To find a way out of the impasse of uncompromising stances being taken by both sides, it would first seem reasonable to disentangle the U.S.-Russian strategic weapons agenda from issues of European security. Negotiations between Moscow and Washington on nuclear issues follow their own logic and dynamics. They are too important to both sides and the international community to link them to any other problems, including security in Europe. Russia and the West separated the nuclear agenda from other aspects of their relations for many decades, and it makes no sense to revisit this principle now.
Besides, even though Russia and the West realize that their animosity runs deep and their positions on European security are poles apart, they can still take specific measures to make their confrontation more stable and predictable. Moreover, being resigned to the fact that their fundamental differences cannot be bridged should make the parties more amenable to steps that will bring the situation under greater control.
Any confidence-building measures, however modest—creating a buffer zone limiting military activity along the line of contact between Russia and NATO, resuming the work of the NATO-Russia Council and including a military component, possibly reviving the Open Skies Treaty in some form—would help to stabilize the volatile situation on the ground. That would be a great accomplishment for Russia, presuming that preserving strategic uncertainty and teetering on the brink of war are not, in fact, its real objectives.
If Moscow believes that the main security threat it faces is NATO military infrastructure moving closer to Russia’s western borders, it would make sense to focus on the infrastructure itself, rather than the theoretical possibility of NATO expansion. Let’s not forget that NATO institutional expansion eastward is not among Brussels’s short- or even medium-term goals. In any case, as France has shown, a country can be a NATO member for over forty years without participating in the organization’s military bodies.
Specific issues of NATO’s geographical expansion could be negotiated within the framework of a new Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 2), which could become legally binding for Moscow and Brussels. CFE was once a historic breakthrough that made it possible to dramatically reduce the degree of confrontation in the center of Europe. Of course, CFE 2 cannot be a copy of the thirty-year-old treaty, as both the geopolitical situation and military technology have changed dramatically over time. Preparing a new treaty will require serious efforts from all of its signatories, but it can be done, provided the parties have the political will to do so.
Russia should also be working with other neighbors that have been eyeing NATO membership. It is often said in Russia that Ukraine and Georgia are “being drawn into NATO,” creating the impression that the countries in question would like to resist but are being forced to slowly yield under pressure from Brussels. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. It’s the former Soviet republics that have been desperately trying to join NATO security bodies for years, while the West has to somehow respond to that pressure while knowing full well that the new members would likely weaken the organization. Hence, Moscow should focus on finding alternative security mechanisms for those countries to reduce their interest in coveted NATO membership.
As for Ukraine, it is hard for Moscow to press Kyiv to fully comply with the Minsk agreements aimed at ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Without taking this issue off the table, it would be useful to concentrate on the first three points of the agreements, which call for stabilizing the situation along the line of contact in Donbas (complying with ceasefire agreements, withdrawing heavy weapons, and strengthening the OSCE mission). This would be an important factor in reducing tensions both in Donbas specifically and in Russian-Ukrainian relations as a whole. This approach would not exclude possible negotiations between Russia and the West on the scale and—most importantly—the specifics of Western military aid to Ukraine.
Some experts are of the opinion that Moscow’s hardline, radical, and inflexible demands of the United States and its NATO partners were a form of shock therapy. They believe the idea was to draw the West’s attention to legitimate Russian security interests that had been virtually ignored by the West for a long time. If that was Russia’s goal, it was accomplished: Moscow’s voice has been heard loud and clear.
But shock therapy alone won’t be enough to cure the numerous ailments plaguing relations between Moscow and the West. A long course of conservative treatment is in order here. In the medical field, conservative treatment primarily aims to stem the deterioration of a patient’s condition and anticipates full recovery or slowing the disease to a point where other intervention will no longer be necessary. The course of treatment generally calls for bed rest and minimal physical exertion.
Test of Babur Cruise Missile: Pakistan Strengthening its Strategic Deterrence
A month of December 2021 Pakistan successfully tested “indigenously developed” Babur cruise missile 1b. In this recent test, Pakistan enhanced the range off the Babur cruise missile 1b, although it was not revealed that how much the range was enhanced in official statement from the ISPR. But Associated Press Associated Press Pakistan has stated that now the range of the cruise missile is almost 900 kilometres which is twice the range of the previous versions of the same missile. The previous versions of the Barber cruise missile his only range of 450 kilometres. The DG Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan in his official statement states that the purpose of the test is to enhance “Pakistan’s strategic deterrence”.
Today Pakistan strategic deterrence is based on the concept of “full spectrum deterrence” which is only “India-centric”. The purpose of the Pakistan’s strategic deterrence is to bring “every Indian target” within the range of its nuclear missiles. According to the Lt. General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Pakistan deterrence capability must allow it to choose it from the variety of options against variety of targets. The purpose of the Pakistan’ nuclear missiles and its strategic capability are to deter threats emanating from its adversary from “sub-conventional to strategic levels”. Thus, missile development by Pakistan is based on the logic of averting conventional and strategic attacks, dynamism and cost-effectiveness vis-à-vis its nuclear adversary in the South Asia.
South Asia in last two decades witnessed the development of missile technology including cruise missiles, ICBMs and MIRVs along with simultaneous acquisition and development of missile defence systems by India. Missile defence system development and acquisition by India was based on the objective to deny the existing “mutual vulnerability” between both South Asian neighbours. Moreover, it was to achieve a “sense of security” from the threat of being attacked. Thus, to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis its adversary Pakistan invested in cruise missile technology. Today, Pakistan is capable of launching cruise missiles (nuclear tipped and conventional) from land, sea, submerged platforms and air. Development of cruise missile option for Pakistan was necessary response against India’s BMD development and acquisitions. In the latest saga of India’s BMD acquisition saga India is importing much hyped S-400 missile defence system, which is “considered as best available missile defence system in the market” and the first batteries of the said system is to be deployed in Indian Punjab. Although, it is said that S-400 missile defence system is effective against cruise missiles, aerial targets and UAVs other than ballistic missiles but in reality, due to the high manuverability and terrain hugging capability of cruise missiles they are highly difficult target to intercept. Ballistic missile defences despite given much hyped to are penetrable, through missiles, decoys, MIRVs and UAVs. With recent advancement in UAVs and Swarm drones technology, it is deemed favourable by many scholars that BMDs could be overwhelmed and destroyed through swarm technologies. However, though this swarm technology is highly effective but all states have not yet achieved the level of sophistication and advancement in IA to manage the swarms.
In this regard missile systems are attractive, cost-effective, advanced, précised and sophisticated enough technology against missile and air defence systems. Moreover, due to recent advancements in missile technology cruise missiles are capable of high precision striking while dodging the missile defence systems of the adversary. Thus, in this regard the Pakistan’s cruise missiles provide it the capability to hit target with precision strike without being intercepted by the adversary missile defence systems. As they fulfil the role of maintain the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence, nuclear tipped cruise missiles are of strategic importance to Pakistan. In current situation where India is working towards upsetting the deterrence equilibrium in the region by inducting more and more sophisticated military technology, cruise missile technology of Pakistan provide it with reliable mean to maintain the deterrence equilibrium in the region.
The recent hyped about cruise missile in today’s international system are hypersonic cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles. Global powers are competing to being able to deploy this technology. India is also taking part in this global race and has claimed that it has developed a “scramjet” technology. Question in this regard is that whether Pakistan would also invest in hypersonic cruise missiles or it could maintain the strategic deterrence without this.
Preventing Nuclear War in the Middle East: Science, System and “Vision”
“A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step.”-Karl R. Popper -The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959)
For the moment, informed global concerns about nuclear war avoidance center on superpower crises over Ukraine. Though such existential concerns are understandable and well-founded, there are coinciding nuclear threats in other parts of the world. More precisely, because world politics must always be evaluated as a system, whatever happens in Ukraine regarding nuclear warfare matters could sometime spill over into the Middle East.
Irremediably, the specific shape or form of any such “spillover” would be difficult to decipher.
Now, a very basic query must be raised: What are the essential parameters of relevant strategic planning? Whether or not analysts care to admit it, a nuclear war in the Middle East is conceivable and more-or-less plausible.Nothing can be said about tangible probabilities because a nuclear war – any nuclear war – would represent a unique event. By definition, any nuclear conflict would be sui generis. In science and mathematics, true probabilities must be based upon the isolable frequency of pertinent past events.
Quo Vadis? By definition, no other subject of national security concern could possibly justify comparably serious examinations. This means, inter alia, that Israel’s most capable strategic thinkers and scholars are immediately responsible for ensuring that virtually every imaginable nuclear war scenario will be suitably delineated and explored. It suggests further that Israel’s strategic analyses be consistently and expressly theoretical.
Recalling philosopher of science Karl Popper’s oft-quoted line (borrowed from the classic German poet, Novalis), “Theory is a net. Only those who cast, can catch.”
A core question needs to be raised at the outset: How might Israel find itself caught up in a nuclear war? Under what identifiable circumstances could Israel discover itself involved with actual nuclear weapons use?
Presently, as Israel remains the only regional nuclear power, such concerns could appear baseless. Nonetheless, always changing “order-of-battle” considerations could change suddenly and unexpectedly, most ominously in regard to Iran. Even in the continuing absence of a regional nuclear adversary, a beleaguered Israel could find itself having to rely upon nuclear deterrence against sub-nuclear (i.e., biological and/or massive conventional) threats. Acknowledging such a potentially existential reliance, the prospect of atomic weapons firing ought never be excluded or ruled out ipso facto.
What next? To answer its most basic nuclear security questions, Jerusalem’s strategic planners will need to adhere closely to variously well-established canons of systematic inquiry, logical analysis and dialectical reasoning. Accordingly, there are four intersecting narratives that best “cover the bases” of Israel’s obligatory nuclear preparedness: Nuclear Retaliation; Nuclear Counter Retaliation; Nuclear Preemption; and Nuclear War fighting. In sufficient detail, here is what these four comprehensive scenarios could reveal to that country’s capable leaders and scholars:
(1) Nuclear Retaliation
Should an enemy state or alliance of enemy states ever launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel, Jerusalem would respond, assuredly, and to whatever extent judged possible/cost-effective, with a nuclear retaliatory strike. If enemy first-strikes were to involve certain other forms of unconventional weapons, notably high-lethality biological weapons, Israel might still launch a nuclear reprisal. This particular response would likely depend, in significant measure, on Jerusalem’s calculated expectations of follow-on aggression and its associated assessments of comparative damage-limitation.
If Israel were to absorb “only” a massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could not automatically be ruled out, especially if: (a) the state aggressor(s) were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel’s leaders believed that exclusively non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent annihilation of the state. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out ipso facto only where enemy state aggressions were conventional, “typical” (that is, sub-existential or consistent with previous historic instances of enemy attack in degree and intent), and hard-target directed (that is, directed solely toward Israeli weapons and military infrastructures, not at “soft” civilian populations).
(2) Nuclear Counter retaliation
Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons, the target state(s)’ response would largely determine Jerusalem’s subsequent moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would expectedly turn to nuclear counter-retaliation. If this retaliation were to involve other weapons of mass destruction, Israel might then feel pressed to take an appropriate escalatory initiative. Any such initiative would necessarily reflect the presumed need for what is formally described in strategic parlance as “escalation dominance.”
There is more. All pertinent decisions would depend upon Jerusalem’s early judgments of enemy state intent and on its accompanying calculations of essential damage-limitation. Should the enemy state response to Israel’s preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is unlikely that Israel would move on to any nuclear counter retaliations. If, however, the enemy conventional retaliation were “all-out” and plainly directed toward Israeli civilian populations – not just at Israeli military targets – an Israeli nuclear counter retaliation could not be excluded.
It would appear that such a unique counter-retaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy state’s conventional retaliation were entirely proportionate to Israel’s preemption, confined exclusively to Israeli military targets, circumscribed by the legal limits of “military necessity” (a limit routinely codified in the law of armed conflict) and accompanied by various explicit and verifiable assurances of non-escalatory intent.
(3) Nuclear Preemption
It is prima facie implausible (perhaps generally even inconceivable) that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would be perfectly rational, it is unlikely that Israel would ever allow itself to reach such “all or nothing” security circumstances. Unless the relevant nuclear weapons were employed in a fashion still consistent with the authoritative laws of war, this form of preemption would represent a flagrantly serious violation of binding (codified and customary) international rules.
Even if such consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the world community would be negative and far-reaching. In essence, this means that an Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only where (a) Israel’s state enemies had acquired nuclear and/or other weapons of mass destruction judged capable of annihilating the Jewish State; (b) these enemies had made it clear that their military intentions paralleled their capabilities; (c) these enemies were believed ready to begin an active “countdown to launch;” and (d) Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could not possibly achieve needed minimum levels of damage-limitation – that is, levels consistent with physical preservation of the state and nation.
It is arguable, at least in principle, that an Israeli non-nuclear preemption could sometime represent the best way to reduce the risks of a regional nuclear war. Such an argument would flow logically from the assumption that if Israel waits too long for Iran to strike first, that enemy (once it had crossed the nuclear weapons threshold) could launch its own nuclear attacks. Even if Iran should strike first with conventional weapons only, Israel might calculate no rational damage-limiting alternatives to launching a nuclear retaliation.
To the extent that this narrative is taken as a reasonable scenario, the cost-effectiveness/legality of certain Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could be enhanced. Arguably, in these actions, Jerusalem’s preemptive commitment to “anticipatory self-defense” would be entirely law-enforcing. No such defense could be mustered on behalf of any Israeli nuclear preemption, an unprecedented attack that would (in virtually all conceivable circumstances) be in stark violation of authoritative international law. A possible exception could obtain only if Israel’s resort to a nuclear preemption were compelled by plausible expectations of national disappearance (see, in this connection, the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice).
Should Israel feel compelled to resort to actual nuclear war-fighting at some point after (1) enemy reprisals for Israel’s conventional preemption cause the state to escalate to nuclear weapons, or (2) enemy chemical/biological/conventional first-strikes cause Israel to escalate to nuclear weapons, the country would confront substantial problems under international law. Should an enemy state launch nuclear first-strikes against Israel (not presently a possibility unless Pakistan is counted as an enemy state), Jerusalem’s retaliatory use of nuclear weapons would be less problematic jurisprudentially. At the same time, matters of law in such dire circumstances would become utterly moot.
(4) Nuclear War fighting
Should nuclear weapons be introduced into an actual conflict between Israel and its enemies, either by Israel or a particular foe, nuclear war fighting, at one level or another, would ensue. This would be true so long as: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Jerusalem’s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Jerusalem’s nuclear counter retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy adversarial second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not destroy enemy nuclear counter retaliatory capability.
It follows that in order to satisfy its essential survival requirements, Israel should take immediate, recognizable and reliable steps to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d).
In all cases, Israel’s nuclear strategy and forces must remain oriented toward deterrence, never to actual war fighting. With this in mind, in all likelihood, Jerusalem has already taken suitable steps to reject tactical or relatively low-yield “battlefield” nuclear weapons and any operational plans for counter-force targeting. For Israel, always and without exception, nuclear weapons can make sense only for deterrence ex ante; not revenge ex post.
The four above scenarios should remind Israeli planners and policy-makers of the overriding need for coherent nuclear theory and strategy. Among other things, this need postulates a counter-value targeted nuclear retaliatory force that is recognizably secure from enemy first-strikes and presumptively capable of penetrating any enemy state’s active defenses. To best meet this imperative security expectation, the IDF would be well-advised to continue with its sea-basing (submarines) of designated portions of its nuclear deterrent force. To satisfy the equally important requirements of “penetration-capability,” Tel-Aviv will have to stay conspicuously well ahead of all foreseeable enemy air defense refinements.
There is more. Sooner rather than later, Jerusalem will need to consider a partial and possibly sequenced end to its historic policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.” By selectively beginning to remove the “bomb” from Israel’s “basement,” national planners would be better positioned to enhance the credibility of their country’s nuclear deterrence posture. However counter-intuitive, the mere possession of nuclear forces could never automatically bestow credible nuclear deterrence upon Israel or on any other nation-state.
Always, something more would be necessary.
In Israel’s strategic nuclear planning, would-be aggressors, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, should be systematically encouraged to believe that Jerusalem has the required willto launch measured nuclear forces in retaliation and that these forces are sufficiently invulnerable to any-contemplated first-strike attacks. Additionally, these enemies must be made to expect that Israel’s designated nuclear forces could reliably penetrate all already-deployed ballistic-missile defenses and air defenses.
Israel, it follows from all this, could benefit substantially from releasing at least certain broad outlines of its strategic configurations, capacities and doctrines. Without a prior and well-fashioned strategic doctrine, no such release could make sufficiently persuasive deterrent sense.
Such intentionally released information could support the perceived utility and security of Israel’s nuclear retaliatory forces. Disclosed solely to enhance Israeli nuclear deterrence, it would center purposefully upon the targeting, hardening, dispersion, multiplication, basing, and yield of selected national ordnance. Under certain conditions, the credibility of Israeli nuclear deterrence could vary inversely with the perceived destructiveness of its pertinent weapons. These should never be treated as issues of “common sense.”
Among other fundamental concerns, Israel will need to prepare differently for an expectedly rational nuclear adversary than for an expectedly irrational one. In such variously nuanced and unprecedented circumstances, national decision-makers in Jerusalem would need to distinguish precisely and meaningfully between genuine enemy irrationality, pretended or feigned enemy irrationality and authentic enemy madness. In actual military practice, operationalizing such subtle distinctions could present staggeringly complex intellectual challenges and would need to take account of whether pertinent principal adversaries were (1) fully or partially sovereign states; (2) sub-national terrorist groups; or (3) “hybrid” enemies comprised of both state and sub-state foes.
Whatever nuances will be encountered in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the only rational way for Israel to effectively meet all these growing challenges will be to stay well ahead of its adversaries through the indispensable power of erudition and scholarship. Long ago, in classical Greece and Macedonia, the linked arts of war and deterrence were already described by military planners as challenges of “mind over mind,” not merely crude contests of “mind over matter.” For Israel, such ancient descriptions remain even more valid today.
Before Israel can successfully satisfy its most primary security and survival obligations, the country’s capable scholars must assume increasing intellectual responsibility for meeting the relevant challenges of “mind.” Most importantly, this means carrying on a coherent strategic “conversation” that goes significantly beyond usual day-to-day political commentaries or narrowly partisan observations. In the final analysis, Israel’s security situation must never be allowed to become a result of narrow political bickering between competing parties or interests. Instead, it should be allowed to emerge as the lifesaving outcome of optimally disciplined and dispassionate strategic scholarship.
There is one additional observation, a crucial one that brings the reader back to current superpower disagreements over Ukraine. Though present concern is that these disagreements could impact the prospect of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East (because world politics must always be assessed as a system), there are also variously urgent reciprocal concerns. To wit, a nuclear crisis or nuclear war in the Middle East could affect the likelihood of nuclear crisis or nuclear war between the United States and Russia over Ukraine.
Of necessity, the basis of this bold assertion is deductive argument rather than empirical generalization. Such a reasoned basis is by no means useless, deceptive or inferior. It represents the only logically acceptable basis for offering estimations of any such unique (sui generis) strategic circumstances.
Going forward, the prevention of a nuclear war in the Middle East should always be founded upon science-based scholarship and law, not on transient political factors. As a practical matter, observers are unlikely to see any propitious end to “Westphalian” international relations soon, but planners and policy-makers must still acknowledge that the “dreadful equality” of Thomas Hobbes’ “State of Nature” among individuals is also starting to characterize the relationship of certain states in world politics. More to the point, with the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons, some of the “weakest” states could become able to “kill the strongest.”
Among other things, this hitherto ignored outcome would mean that a particular state’s tangible “superiority” in nuclear weapons might not necessarily produce any proportionate increments of national security or safety.
“Realistically,” to sum up these matters concerning nuclear war avoidance in the Middle East, analysts ought to not soon expect any fundamental transformations of Realpolitik in the region. In the short term, at least, Israel’s planners and policy makers should continue to do whatever is needed and lawful to maintain the country’s critical deterrence and defense postures. At the same time, and preferably in some sorts of institutionalized cooperation with potentially nuclear adversary Iran, Jerusalem should begin to think beyond the “Westphalian” system of self-help power politics altogether. Though hard to take seriously regarding issues of international relations, the comprehensive wisdom of Federico Fellini does reasonably apply to variously complex matters of nuclear war avoidance: “The visionary,” warned the Italian film director succinctly but broadly, “is the only realist.”
 In this connection, recall the unchallengeable observation of Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in The Phenomenon of Man: “The existence of `system’ in the world is at once obvious to every observer of nature, no matter whom….”
 For early accounts of nuclear war effects by this author, see: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1984); and Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986). Most recently, by Professor Beres, see: Surviving amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018). https://paw.princeton.edu/new-books/surviving-amid-chaos-israel%E2%80%99s-nuclear-strategy
 Rabbi Eleazar quoted Rabbi Hanina, who said: “Scholars build the structure of peace in the world.” See: The Babylonian Talmud, Order Zera’im, Tractate Berakoth, and IX.
 See Karl Popper, epigraph to The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).
 On deterring a soon-to-be nuclear Iran, see Professor Louis René Beres and General John T. Chain, “Could Israel Safely deter a Nuclear Iran? The Atlantic, August 2012; Professor Louis René Beres and General John T. Chain, “Israel; and Iran at the Eleventh Hour,” Oxford University Press (OUP Blog), February 23, 2012; and Beres/Chain: Israel: https://besacenter.org/living-iran-israels-strategic-imperative-2/ General Jack Chain (USAF) was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), from 1986 to 1991.
 The law of armed conflict requires, inter alia, that every use of force by an army or an insurgent group meet the test of “proportionality.” Drawn from the core legal principle (St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868, etc.) that “the means that can be used to injure an enemy are not unlimited,” proportionality stipulates that every resort to armed force be limited to what is necessary for meeting appropriate military objectives. This element of codified and customary international law applies to all judgments of military advantage and planned reprisals. It does not mean that each side must either suffer or create symmetrical harms. The rule of proportionality does not stipulate that a defending state must necessarily limit its use of force to the same “amount” employed by the other side. Proper determinations of proportionality need never be calculated in a geopolitical vacuum. To a limited extent, for example, such legal decisions may take into correct consideration the extent to which a particular adversary has committed prior or still-ongoing violations of the law of armed conflict.
 According to the rules of international law, every use of force must be judged twice: once with regard to the right to wage war (jus ad bellum), and once with regard to the means used in conducting war (jus in Bello). Today, acknowledging the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the United Nations Charter of 1945, all right to aggressive war has been abolished. However, the long-standing customary right of self-defense remains, codified at Article 51 of the Charter. Similarly, subject to conformance, inter alia, with jus in Bello criteria, certain instances of humanitarian intervention and collective security operations may also be consistent with jus ad bellum. The laws of war, the rules of jus in Bello, comprise (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws on warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at The Hague and Geneva Conventions (and known thereby as the law of The Hague and the law of Geneva), these rules attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality and military necessity into belligerent calculations.
The question of preemption – any preemption – must also be confronted as alegal matter. For early writings by the present author on this matter with particular reference to Israel (a matter regarding “anticipatory self-defense” under international law), see: Louis René Beres, “Preserving the Third Temple: Israel’s Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law,” 26 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 111 (1993); Louis Rene Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” 13 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, “Striking `First’: Israel’s Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law,” 14 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL (1991); Louis Rene Beres, “Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” 8 ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 89 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, “After the Scud Attacks: Israel, `Palestine,’ and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” 6 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 71 (1992).
 On Israeli submarine basing measures, see: Louis René Beres and (Admiral/USN/ret.) Leon “Bud” Edney, “Israel’s Nuclear Strategy: A Larger Role for Submarine-Basing,” The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2014; also Professor Beres and Admiral Edney, “A Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent for Israel,” Washington Times, September 5, 2014. Admiral Edney was a NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT).
 In modern philosophy, a more general highlighting of “will” is discoverable in Arthur Schopenhauer’s writings, especially The World as Will and Idea (1818). For his own inspiration (and by his own expressed acknowledgment), Schopenhauer drew freely upon Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Later, Nietzsche drew just as freely (and perhaps far more importantly) upon Schopenhauer. Goethe also served as a core intellectual source for Spanish existentialist Jose Ortega y’ Gasset, author of the prophetic work, The Revolt of the Masses (Le Rebelion de las Masas (1930). See, accordingly, Ortega’s very grand essay, “In Search of Goethe from Within” (1932), written for Die Neue Rundschau of Berlin on the occasion of the centenary of Goethe’s death. It is reprinted in Ortega’s anthology, The Dehumanization of Art (1948) and is available from Princeton University Press (1968).
 Expressions of such decisional irrationality in world politics could take variously different forms. These sometime overlapping forms, which would have no necessary correlations with authentic madness, include a disorderly or inconsistent value system; computational errors in calculation; an incapacity to communicate efficiently; random or haphazard influences in the making or transmittal of particular decisions; and the internal dissonance generated by any structure of collective decision-making (i.e., assemblies of pertinent individuals who lack identical value systems and/or whose organizational arrangements impact their willing capacity to act as a single or unitary national decision maker)
 Recall widely-cited observation of Sigmund Freud (in his book about
America’s Woodrow Wilson): “Fools, visionaries, sufferers from delusions, neurotics and lunatics have played great roles at all times in the history of mankind , and not merely when the accident of birth had bequeathed them sovereignty. Usually , they have wreaked havocS .”
 On such madness, see Seneca, 1st Century AD/CE: “We are mad, not only individuals, but nations also. We restrain manslaughter and isolated murders, but what of war, and the so-called glory of killing whole peoples? ….Man, the gentlest of animals, is not ashamed to glory in blood-shedding, and to wage war when even the beasts are living in peace together.” (Letters, 95).
In this regard, Israel’s nuclear strategy could have tangible effects upon the United States and meaningful implications for U.S. national security. On these generally ignored but still-significant effects, see Professor Louis René Beres and (General/USA/ret.) Barry McCaffrey, ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY, Tel-Aviv University and Israel Institute for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv, December 2016: https://sectech.tau.ac.il/sites/sectech.tau.ac.il/files/PalmBeachBook.pdf
 In this connection, consider Jose Ortega y’Gasset in Man and Crisis (1958): “Science, by which I mean the entire body of knowledge about things, whether corporeal or spiritual, is as much a work of imagination as it is of observation….”
William Blackstone, the jurist upon whose work the United States owes its own basic system of law, remarks at Book 4 of his Commentaries on the Law of England: “The law of nations (international law) is always binding upon all individuals and all states. Each state is expected, perpetually, to aid and enforce the law of nations as part of the common law, by inflicting an adequate punishment upon the offenses against that universal law.”
 See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1.Consol. T.S. 119, Together, these two treaties comprise the Peace of Westphalia. De facto, though co-existing with various patterns of collective security, “Westphalian” international law remains essentially a “vigilante” or self-help system of power management.
Though composed in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan still offers a still- illuminating vision of balance-of-power world politics. Says the English philosopher in Chapter XIII, “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery:” “During such chaos,” a condition which Hobbes identifies as a ‘time of War,’ it is a time “…where every man is Enemy to every man… and where the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Hobbes believed that the condition of “nature” in world politics was less chaotic than that same condition existing among individual human beings. This owes to what he called the “dreadful equality” of individual men in nature concerning ability to kill others, but this once-relevant differentiation has now effectively disappeared with the global spread of nuclear weapons. Today, certain “weaker” states that are nonetheless nuclear could still bring “unacceptable harms” to certain “stronger” states.
 For the authoritative sources of international law, see art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N., 1052.
 Even amid “Westphalian” geopolitics in international relations, a dominant jurisprudential assumption of solidarity obtains between all states. This fundamental assumption is already mentioned in Justinian, Corpus Juris Civilis (533 C.E.); Hugo Grotius, 2 De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, Ch. 20 (Francis W. Kesey, tr., Clarendon Press, 1925)(1690); and Emmerich De Vattel, 1 Le Droit Des Gens, Ch. 19 (1758).
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