From the beginning, for Turkey the war in Syria has been a “domestic” problem- albeit not entirely so.
For the West, it has been an opportunity to hurt a Russian ally, but it has failed, thus also making Syria become one of the areas for the strategic expansion of Shiite Iran. Giving ground to the enemy is a fundamental strategic mistake.
Incidentally it seems that the Global Strategy is lost memory for the West – more or less like political economy is completely forgotten, faced with market fluctuations and Stock Exchange algorithms.
On the one hand, however, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Erdogan aroused the pride of his nationalist voters while, on the other, he justified the increase in domestic prices and inflation with the vast Turkish operation in Syria.
Two propaganda solutions for the same problem, i.e. the Turkish hegemony in Central Asia.
Obviously, the primary goal of the Turkey led by the AKP – a party born of an old Muslim Brotherhood network – was to enter Syria to eliminate Assad’s Baathist power, with a view to replacing it with a clearly pro-Turkish regime.
To this end, Turkey accepted the presence of “terrorists” and the Turkish military support for the Syrian jihad, and even the hidden support for the so-called “Caliphate”, with a view to stopping the expansion of Syrian-Iraqi Kurds and their connection – also at territorial level – to the Anatolian Kurds.
That was the aim of the Operation “Olive Branch” that the Turkish Armed Forces carried out in early 2018.
In that case, it was a matter of blocking the Kurdish administration of Afrin to prevent the Kurdish YPG from creating its own strategic and territorial continuity in Northern Syria, up to coming into contact with the Anatolian Kurds.
The Turkish forces also moved many Turks to the area.
Currently Turkey has three goals: the agreement with Russia for the future of Syria; the maintenance of Iran’s neutrality in Syria and in the rest of the region and even the internal stability of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Erdogan would also like to have good relations with the United States, which is acting in Syria with ideas that are still very vague.
Unfortunately, this currently holds true for many strategic players in Syria.
After eight years of war, the World Bank has calculated that only material damage to houses and infrastructure is worth no less than 197 billion US dollars.
A quarter of all Syrian houses has been destroyed, but it is estimated that the cost for returning to the status quo ante ranges between 300-400 billion dollars. The most pessimistic ones estimate it at 450 billion US dollars.
We believe that currently the real cost is equal to 400 billion dollars. Assad’ Syrian forces and Syria’s inhabitants keep on discovering unknown disasters.
Considering the amount of money needed, however, the only two external supporters of Assad’s regime, namely Russia and Iran, are not in a position to contribute to the Syrian reconstruction.
Furthermore, the USA and the EU are not interested in funding Syria’s return to pre-conflict economic conditions, unless there is a “political transition”, i.e. unless Bashar al- Assad leaves power.
The problem is that he has won with the help of Russia and Iran, while the West – with its infinite coalition – has lost. Who can send away who?
Indeed, the US and European economic sanctions against Syria have become stricter in early 2019, and the country has a population of 13 million inhabitants, who urgently need support, aid, medicines and food.
Hence the greatest humanitarian crisis since the Second World War, but both the USA and Germany, in particular, are only interested in ousting the “tyrant” Assad – possibly for recreating the jihadist void that Syria has just overcome and that the West would not know how to manage, regardless its being for or against.
Currently the US sanctions impose a block on all exports to Syria or on any financial transactions involving Syrian entities.
80% of those who need serious hospital care cannot be treated. There is a lack of doctors, drugs and hospitals.
The sanctions also concern drugs and medical technologies, as well as all electrical, electronic, industrial and oil components.
Even the simplest electrical devices and their spare parts are affected by sanctions.
Given the new EU political configuration, however, Syria may receive some abstract political support, but certainly not tangible aid.
Here we can think of the Assembly of Hungarian nobles, to whom Marie Therese of Austria asked to support her war against Frederick II of Prussia who had invaded Silesia.
“We will give our lives for the Queen, but not the oats for horses”.
China could certainly be a solution.
To date, China has not shown particular interest in the matter, but it anyway participated in the meeting between 70 countries and international institutions, held in April 2017 for the reconstruction of Syria.
However, China has not provided direct support to the “tyrant” Assad, who anyway rescued his people and the West itself from the “sword jihad” which, from Syria, would spread everywhere in the Middle East and probably also to Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, between 2018 and 2019 China has already granted 2 billion to be invested in the Syrian industry.
For 2019 and beyond, there are additional 23 billion granted by China through the Cooperation Forum between China and the Arab States.
Obviously China does not want to be involved in the Middle East chaos. It has no interest in it.
Syria, however, plays a significant role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Tripoli in the Lebanon has already been planned to be a BRI Special Economic Zone, considering that the Lebanese Tripoli port will be the basis for BRI transport to the whole East-Mediterranean region.
In order to revitalize this port, China plans to build the Tripoli-Homs railway, while in October 2018 China already donated as many as 800 electricity generators to the city of Latakia.
Another fundamental Syrian port.
Back in 2017, China hosted the “First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects”, with the two aforementioned billion for Syrian companies and, above all, the tangible aid for the reconstruction of over 150 Syrian companies.
China is interested in the local Syrian companies that deal with steel and energy. Moreover, the China National Petroleum Corporation is already present in the shareholding structure of two of the largest Syrian oil companies, namely the Syrian Petroleum Company and Al Furat Petroleum.
There is also a Chinese project for technological and training support to the Syrian Armed Forces.
Furthermore, there is the Chinese automotive sector – a market that China shares with Iran.
With a shrewd exchange between arable land and technology, Iran has already provided Syria with its mobile telephone network, as well as the management of some phosphate mines.
All Iranian economic operations are made by leaders of the Revolutionary Guard and probably the Iranian military will call upon Chinese companies at the right time.
One option for Assad could be the support – not yet politically mature, but certainly not impossible – of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
The two powers of the Arabian peninsula are above all interested in limiting the power projection of Turkey and Qatar – the two main supporters of the opposition (and the jihad) against Bashar al-Assad – while they consider Iran’s control over Syria scarcely relevant from the economic viewpoint. At least for the time being.
In late 2018, however, embassies were reopened in Syria, Bahrain and the Emirates.
Furthermore, as can be easily imagined, manpower is lacking throughout Syria.
Many people have migrated to the Lebanon, Jordan or Europe.
Nevertheless, there is still a shortage of capital, which also leads to manpower shortage.
From this viewpoint, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has developed a model of public-private partnership (PPP), which is almost the sole legal criterion for reconstruction.
Decree No. 19,issued by President Assad in May 2015, lays down that the various administrative units, including governorates and municipalities, can establish their autonomous investment companies.
In January 2016, Assad’s government enacted the Law on Public-Private Partnerships, which allows private companies to manage and develop all the public assets they hold or control.
For example, the Governor of Damascus is the President of the company that is investing in the real estate sector of Basateem al-Razi, a district of the Syrian capital city.
Obviously the recourse to private individuals is not enough. The PPP systems are based mainly on bank loans. Nevertheless, certainly also the banks have not all the capital available for reconstruction at their disposal.
According to the latest calculations, all Syrian banks have a reserve of 1.7 trillion Syrian pounds, equivalent to 3.5 billion US dollars. Hence the primary role will inevitably be played by donors, particularly the foreign ones.
Obviously Russia, China and Iran, but there are also North Korea, Brazil and India – and we will soon see them at work.
What about Iran, in particular? Iran has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of as many as 200,000 houses for civilian use in Damascus.
Considering the US and EU policies, many transactions will be made outside the SWIFT system.
The aforementioned system has two processors – one in the Netherlands and the other one in the USA – that work independently. Often the transactions will not take place in US dollars.
Iran also wants to build a power plant in Latakia, while the Ayatollah regime still supports Bashar al-Assad with as many as 6 billion US dollars a year.
If economic and military support are considered together, some analysts maintain that Iran’s transfers to Syria range between 15 to 20 billion US dollars a year.
Furthermore, if there are credible links between Iran’s investments and Syria’s political attitudes, Iranian money will continue to flow.
The Russian Federation has also carried out a strong lobbying activity for Syrian reconstruction, with a direct intervention by Chief of Staff Gerasimov vis-à-vis the United States.
The response has been almost immediate: the political “transition”, i.e. Assad’s quick leaving the scene, is the prerequisite for funding.
Assad, although having won against the jihad- often organized by Western allies – is now only guilty of having remained in power, instead of leaving Syria in the hands of Islamic terrorists, whom the West claimed it wanted to fight.
It is strange that some worshipers of democracy stoop to this type of blackmail.
After being contacted by Vladimir Putin in August 2018, Chancellor Merkel said she wanted to avoid a “humanitarian disaster” that has already been in place for some time. She also said, however, she didn’t want to participate in a reconstruction process in Syria led – like it or not – by the Syrian winner, namely Bashar al-Assad.
The same was said by the French leaders. Good old days when, in a heavily-indebted Germany, Hjalmar Schacht, known as “Hitler’s banker” – a Jew and a Freemason, but anyway still free – created an investment bank in Munich to help the Middle East and Africa.
Again in August 2018, Russia also put new pressure on Saudi Arabia, although the latter has certainly never been friendly to the Alawite and pro-Iranian regime in Syria.
Certainly, even now Saudi Arabia does not want to bear the cost for Syria’s reconstruction.
Obviously, the Saudi regime may see investments in Syria as an antidote to the Iranian presence, although nothing has been decided yet.
Nevertheless, the forces within Mohammed bin Salman’s inner circle are not entirely opposed to a serious and heavy financial operation in Syria to definitively drive Iran away.
A balance of threats and signals could make – possibly with the military protection of Russia, which certainly does not want a Shiite hegemony over Syria – part of Saudi funds reach Syria – not exclusive, but also alien to the West, which sees nothing else that the naive escape of the “tyrant”.
The Libyan disaster was not enough for Westerners, who now want the escape of the Alawite and Baathist Syrian leader, although he has won.
What will happen later? Either the jihadist chaos, of which they believe they can take advantage to the detriment of Iran, or the Chinese penetration, which will certainly not be friendly to Western business.
As already seen, the other financial option for Syria is China.
China, however, will really take no action until the US troops move permanently from the Syrian region to the Far East.
In January 2018 Russia signed a contract enabling its companies in the sector to exclusively exploit oil and gas fields under the direct control of Assad’s forces.
The Syrian oil and gas reserves are, above all, in the North-Eastern regions, in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces in the hands of the YPG Kurds.
Other Russian projects are the following: electricity generation in the Homs district; a new railway line connecting Damascus International Airport to the city centre and a series of manufacturing industries.
The Russian entrepreneurial zeal has not even failed to upset Iran: Russia has “snatched” from Iran a fifty-year contract for the use of phosphates.
Hence, for the time being, the Russian Federation has won the struggle for Syrian reconstruction, but then there will inevitably be also China. Later, if the West remains deaf – and maybe even silly – there will be nothing left for Syria, which will recreate the conditions for a new regional war that the West will certainly lose again.
Beyond the friendship diplomacy between Morocco and Mauritania
Over the past decade or so, many politicians and diplomats have held that the most significant bilateral relationship has been between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. That remains true today, and it will be likely the case for long- term partnership to come, even as the sort of that relationship changes over time. Due to, diplomatic rapprochement between them and bilateral cooperation on several levels, Mauritania, tends formally to withdraw its full recognition of the Polisario Front “SADR” before the term of the current president, Mohamed Ould Al-Ghazwani, ends.
Yet, the truth is that Mauritania has unalterably shifted from the previous engagement with Morocco to the recent conflict with it on nearly all the key fronts: geopolitics, trade, borders security, finance, and even the view on domestic governance. To that extent, Mauritania was the most affected by the Polisario Front militia’s violation to close the Guerguerat border crossing and prevent food supplies from reaching their domestic markets. This crisis frustrated Mauritanian people and politicians who demanded to take firm stances towards the separatists.
In the context of the fascinating development in relations between Rabat and Nouakchott, the Mauritanian government stated that President Ould Ghazwani is heading to take a remarkable decision based on derecognized the so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and Polisario Front as its sole representative and follow up the recent UN peace process through the case of Western Sahara conflict under UN Security Council resolutions.
Similarly, the United States announced that “Moroccan (Western) Sahara is an integral part of The Kingdom–a traditional Ally, and it supports the Moroccan government’s constitutional procedures to maintain Moroccan Southern provinces strong and united.” It was rapidly followed by all major countries of African, and the Arab Middle East also extended their supports to the government in Rabat. What a determined move against the Polisario Front separatism in a sovereign state!
During the Western Sahara dispute, the Moroccan Sahrawi was humiliated to the end by Polisario Front: it not only lost their identity but also resulted in the several ethnics’ claim for “independence” in the border regions within. currently, Morocco is the only regional power in North Africa that has been challenged in terms of national unity and territorial integrity. The issues cover regional terrorism, political separatism, and fundamental radicalism from various radical ethnic groups. Although the population of the “Polisario groups” is irrelevant because of Morocco’s total population, the territorial space of the ethnic minorities across the country is broadly huge and prosperous in natural resources. besides, the regions are strategically important.
In foreign affairs doctrine, the certainty of countries interacting closely, neighboring states and Algeria, in particular, have always employed the issue of the Western Sahara dispute in the Southern Region of Morocco as the power to criticize and even undermine against Morocco in the name of discredit Sahrawi rights, ethnic discrimination, social injustice, and natural resources exploitation. therefore, local radical Sahrawi groups have occasionally resisted Morocco’s authority over them in a vicious or nonviolent way. Their resistance in jeopardy national security on strategic borders of the Kingdom, at many times, becoming an international issue.
A Mauritanian media stated, that “all the presidential governments that followed the former President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidala, a loyal and supporter to the Polisario Front, were not at all satisfied with the recognition of the SADR creation due to its fear that it would cause reactions from Algeria. however, Mauritania today is not the state of 1978, it has become a well-built country at the regional level, and the position of its military defense has been enhanced at the phase of the continent’s armies after it was categorized as a conventional military power.”
This is what Mauritania has expected the outcome. Although neighboring Mauritania has weeded out the pressures of the Algerian regime, which stood in the way of rapprochement with the Kingdom of Morocco, and the Mauritanian acknowledged that Nouakchott today is “ready to take the historic decision that seeks its geopolitical interests and maintain strategic stability and security of the entire region, away from the external interactions.” Hence, The Mauritanian decision, according to the national media, will adjust its neutral position through the Moroccan (Western) Sahara issue; Because previously was not clear in its political arrangement according to the international or even regional community.
Given the Moroccan domestic opinion, there is still optimistic hope about long-term collaboration on the transformation between Morocco and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, even considering some temporary difficulties between the two in the Western Sahara conflict. For example, prior Mauritania has recognized the Polisario since the 1980s, but this recognition did not turn into an embassy or permanent diplomatic sign of the separatist entity in Mauritania, the Kingdom has a long-standing relationship with Mauritania and the recent regional politics would not harm that, because it’s a political circumstance.
Despite the strain exerted by the Polisario Front and Algeria on Mauritania, and intending to set impediments that avoid strategic development of its relations with Rabat, the Mauritanian-Moroccan interactions have seen an increased economic development for nearly two years, which end up with a phone call asked King Mohammed VI to embark on an official visit to Mauritania as President Ould Ghazwani requested.
For decades, the kingdom of Morocco has deemed a united, stable, and prosperous Maghreb region beneficial to itself and Northern Africa since it is Kingdom’s consistent and open stance and strategic judgment. Accordingly, Morocco would continue supporting North Africa’s unity and development. On the one hand, Morocco and Mauritania are not only being impacted by the pandemic, but also facing perils and challenges such as unilateralism, and protectionism. On the other hand, Rabat opines that the two neighboring states and major forces of the world necessarily established their resolve to strengthen communication and cooperation with each other. To that end, both states would make efforts to set up long-term strategic consensus including mutual trust, reciprocal understandings, and respect to the United Nations and the current international system based on multilateralism.
In sum, both Morocco and Mauritania are sovereign states with a strong desire to be well-built and sophisticated powers. Previous successes and experiences in solving territorial disputes and other issues have given them confidence, which motivated both countries to join hands in the struggles for national independence, equality, and prosperity. In sense of the world politics, two states promise to advance the great cause of reorganization and renovation and learn from each other’s experience in state power and party administration.
Getting Away With Murder: The New U.S. Intelligence Report on the Khashoggi Affair
It was October 2, 2018 when a man walked into the Saudi Arabian consulate to collect some documents he needed for his impending marriage. He had been there earlier on September 28, and had been told to allow a few days for them to prepare the needed proof of divorce from an earlier marriage.
So there he was. His Turkish fiancée had accompanied him and he asked her to wait outside as it would only take a minute or two. She waited and waited and… waited. Jamal Khashoggi never came out.
What went on inside is a matter of dispute but US intelligence prepared a report which should have been released but was illegally blocked by the Trump administration. Mr. Trump is no doubt grateful for the help he has had over two decades from various Saudi royals in addition to the business thrown his way at his various properties. “I love the Saudis,” says Donald Trump and he had kept the report under wraps. It has now been released by the new Biden administration.
All the same, grisly details of the killing including dismemberment soon emerged because in this tragic episode, with an element of farce, it was soon evident that the Turks had bugged the consulate. There is speculation as to how the perpetrators dispersed of the corpse but they themselves have been identified. Turkish officials also claim to know that they acted on orders from the highest levels of the Saudi government. They arrived on a private jet and left just as abruptly.
The egregious killing led to the UN appointing a Special Rapporteur, Agnes Callamard. She concluded it to be an “extra-judicial killing for which the state of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is responsible.” She added, there was “credible evidence” implicating Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other senior officials.
Now the US report. Intelligence agencies conclude Jamal Khashoggi was killed by a Saudi hit squad under the orders of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. They add that the latter has had unitary control over Saudi security and intelligence organizations and thus it was “highly unlikely” an operation of this nature would have been possible without Prince Mohammed’s authorization.
Mr. Biden’s reaction is plain. Although the Crown Prince is the de facto ruler with his father the King’s acquiescence, Mr. Biden has not talked to him. He called the king and emphasized the importance placed on human rights and the rule of law in the US.
President Biden is also re-evaluating US arms sales to the Kingdom with a view to limiting them to defensive weapons — a difficult task as many can be used for both, a fighter-bomber for example.
There are also calls for sanctions against the Crown Prince directly but Biden has ruled that out. Saudi Arabia is after all the strongest ally of the US in the region, and no president wants to jeopardize that relationship. Moreover, the US has done the same sort of thing often enough; the last prominent assassination being that of the senior Iranian general, Qassem Soleimani, by the Trump administration.
US intelligence report leaves Saudi Arabia with no good geopolitical choices
The Biden administration’s publication of a US intelligence report that holds Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman responsible for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi creates a fundamental challenge to the kingdom’s geopolitical ambitions.
The challenge lies in whether and how Saudi Arabia will seek to further diversify its alliances with other world powers in response to the report and US human rights pressure.
Saudi and United Arab Emirates options are limited by that fact that they cannot fully replace the United States as a mainstay of their defence as well as their quest for regional hegemony, even if the report revives perceptions of the US as unreliable and at odds with their policies.
As Saudi King Salman and Prince Mohammed contemplate their options, including strengthening relations with external players such as China and Russia, they may find that reliance on these forces could prove riskier than the pitfalls of the kingdom’s ties with the United States.
Core to Saudi as well as UAE considerations is likely to be the shaping of the ultimate balance of power between the kingdom and Iran in a swath of land stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to Central Asia’s border with China.
US officials privately suggest that regional jockeying in an environment in which world power is being rebalanced to create a new world order was the key driver of Saudi and UAE as well as Israeli opposition from day one to the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran that the United States together with Europe, China, and Russia negotiated. That remains the driver of criticism of US President Joe Biden’s efforts to revive the agreement.
“If forced to choose, Riyadh preferred an isolated Iran with a nuclear bomb to an internationally accepted Iran unarmed with the weapons of doom,” said Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and founder of the National Iranian American Council. Mr. Parsi was summing up Saudi and Emirati attitudes based on interviews with officials involved in the negotiations at a time that Mr. Biden was vice-president.
As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel appear to remain determined to either foil a return of the United States to the accord, from which Mr. Biden’s predecessor, Donald J. Trump, withdrew, or ensure that it imposes conditions on Iran that would severely undermine its claim to regional hegemony.
In the ultimate analysis, the Gulf states and Israel share US objectives that include not only restricting Iran’s nuclear capabilities but also limiting its ballistic missiles program and ending support for non-state actors like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthis. The Middle Eastern states differ with the Biden administration on how to achieve those objectives and the sequencing of their pursuit.
Even so, the Gulf states are likely to realize as Saudi Arabia contemplates its next steps what Israel already knows: China and Russia’s commitment to the defence of Saudi Arabia or Israel are unlikely to match that of the United States given that they view an Iran unfettered by sanctions and international isolation as strategic in ways that only Turkey rather than other Middle Eastern states can match.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE will also have to recognize that they can attempt to influence US policies with the help of Israel’s powerful Washington lobby and influential US lobbying and public relations companies in ways that they are not able to do in autocratic China or authoritarian Russia.
No doubt, China and Russia will seek to exploit opportunities created by the United States’ recalibration of its relations with Saudi Arabia with arms sales as well as increased trade and investment.
But that will not alter the two countries’ long-term view of Iran as a country, albeit problematic, with attributes that the Gulf states cannot match even if it is momentarily in economic and political disrepair.
Those attributes include Iran’s geography as a gateway at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe; ethnic, cultural, and religious ties with Central Asia and the Middle East as a result of history and empire; a deep-seated identity rooted in empire; some of the world’s foremost oil and gas reserves; a large, highly educated population of 83 million that constitutes a huge domestic market; a fundamentally diversified economy; and a battle-hardened military.
Iran also shares Chinese and Russian ambitions to contain US influence even if its aspirations at times clash with those of China and Russia.
“China’s BRI will on paper finance additional transit options for the transfer of goods from ports in southern to northern Iran and beyond to Turkey, Russia, or Europe. China has a number of transit options available to it, but Iranian territory is difficult to avoid for any south-north or east-west links,” said Iran scholar Alex Vatanka referring to Beijing’s infrastructure, transportation and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative.
Compared to an unfettered Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE primarily offer geography related to some of the most strategic waterways through which much of the world’s oil and gas flows as well their positioning opposite the Horn of Africa and their energy reserves.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s position as a religious leader in the Muslim world built on its custodianship of Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, potentially could be challenged as the kingdom competes for leadership with other Middle Eastern and Asian Muslim-majority states.
On the principle of better the enemy that you know than the devil that you don’t, Saudi leaders may find that they are, in the best of scenarios, in response to changing US policies able to rattle cages by reaching out to China and Russia in ways that they have not until now, but that at the end of the day they are deprived of good choices.
That conclusion may be reinforced by the realization that the United States has signalled by not sanctioning Prince Mohammed that it does not wish to cut its umbilical cord with the kingdom. That message was also contained in the Biden administration’s earlier decision to halt the sale of weapons that Saudi Arabia could you for offensive operations in Yemen but not arms that it needs to defend its territory from external attack.
At the bottom line, Saudi Arabia’s best option to counter an Iran that poses a threat to the kingdom’s ambitions irrespective of whatever regime is in power would be to work with its allies to develop the kind of economic and social policies as well as governance that would enable it to capitalize on its assets to effectively compete. Containment of Iran is a short-term tactic that eventually will run its course.
Warned former British diplomat and Royal Dutch Shell executive Ian McCredie: “When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled in 1922, it created a vacuum which a series of powers have attempted to fill ever since. None has succeeded, and the result has been a century of wars, coups, and instability. Iran ruled all these lands before the Arab and Ottoman conquests. It could do so again.”
Why states undermined their sovereignty by signing NPT?
Nuclear weapons are known as brawny and cataclysmic weapons. The source of the energy of such weapons is fission and...
Duck conservation takes flight in Jamaica
On January 20, 2021, the day of the inauguration of American president Joe Biden, two ducks named “Joe” and “Kamala”...
Estonia provides good support to jobseekers, but does not reach everybody
The Estonian labour market has outperformed most EU countries after the global financial crisis. The employment rate of people in...
New EU energy labels applicable from 1 March 2021
To help EU consumers cut their energy bills and carbon footprint, a brand new version of the widely-recognised EU energy...
E-Boda-Bodas: a promising day for electric transportation in East Africa
Forty-nine motorcycles made little noise but raised much interest in Nairobi’s Karura Forest this morning, as the UN Environment Programme...
Biden’s Syria strikes don’t make him a centrist Democrat – they make him a neocon
Biden’s Syria strikes last week left many of his supporters, including me, surprised. The Syria strikes don’t make Biden the...
65% of Adults Think Race, Ethnicity or National Origin Affects Job Opportunities
A recent Ipsos-World Economic Forum survey has found that 65% of all adults believe that, in their country, someone’s race,...
Europe3 days ago
Russia-EU break possible but unwanted
Middle East3 days ago
US intelligence report leaves Saudi Arabia with no good geopolitical choices
Defense2 days ago
Europe2 days ago
The Present Battle over Greece’s Past is Seeding New Battles in its Future
Eastern Europe3 days ago
Crisis in Armenia Provides Fertile Ground for Russian Meddling
Intelligence2 days ago
Hybrid Warfare Against Pakistan: Challenges and Response
Southeast Asia2 days ago
Biden administration’s policy towards Vietnam, and the South China Sea
International Law3 days ago
Why Did States Sign NPT Treaty As Non-Nuclear Weapon States