Energy
US strives to supply Europe with its own gas

American Congressmen continue to exert every effort to thwart the completion of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline, which is designed to secure a long-lasting supply of Europe with Russian gas. A parliamentary bill devised by the US Senate to toughen anti-Russian sanctions envisages measures against European companies and their production facilities involved in the construction of the pipeline. Simultaneously, the ongoing “trade war” between the United States and China “incorporates” the problem of Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe into the wider system of Washington’s foreign policy priorities, which “pushes stakes up” in this “game”.
According to the bill, which was drafted by Republican Senator Ted Cruz and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen, the new US sanctions will affect European ships that are involved in the construction of the Nord Stream – 2 gas pipeline. The restrictions will also spread to companies that are building deep-water pipelines for Russian energy projects, and, as stated by the American edition of The Foreign Policy, the document is directed directly against the Nord Stream-2 project, which “caused tensions between the US and Germany. ”
The authors of the bill point out that while laying pipelines the relevant vessels use the western know-how which Russia does not have.” “This is one of the few areas where Gazprom lacks technical knowledge and technology to implement pipeline projects,” – an expert on Eurasian energy issues in the Atlantic Council, Agnia Grigas, said as she commented on the new sanctions in an interview with The Foreign Policy. Earlier, the American newspaper The Wall Street Journal, citing its own sources, indicated that the United States plans to impose sanctions on investors and companies that are building the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, and, in order to facilitate this process, the Senators are planning to introduce the relevant measures as amendments to the current package of anti-Russian sanctions.
In the meantime, a high-ranking US official who wished not to be named indicated in his commentary that the provisions of the new bill were designed on the basis of the previous US sanctions which aimed at undermining the export of Iranian oil. According to The Foreign Policy, the new restrictive measures will affect individuals and legal entities that sell or rent vessels to be used in the construction of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline. In addition, the draft provides restrictions for those who provide financial and technical support for these vessels, as well as cover their insurance.
The company-operator of the project, Nord Stream 2 AG, has already commented on US restrictions regarding the project and the companies involved in its construction, saying that since the pipeline is being built in accordance with the law, the company does not see any need to introduce a special “plan B” in case of sanctions.
Representatives of the Donald Trump administration and the State Department, though talking about the possibility of new measures against the Russian project in general statements, confirm their readiness to apply sanctions against it. In particular, the US Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, has already warned that the Nord Stream 2 project runs a “high risk of facing sanctions”. In early May, in an interview with Focus, he made it clear that Washington could impose sanctions on German companies participating in the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project.
In Germany proper, plans by US officials and their like-minded counterparts in the European Commission cause ill-concealed irritation. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel has decided to intervene in the discussion in person. Speaking in the German city of Ravensburg, she made it clear that Washington and Brussels, despite the adoption of a new version of the EU Gas Directive, would not be able to block the Nord Stream 2 project, which she considers very profitable for Germany. According to Angela Merkel, the idea of a gas pipeline across the bottom of the Baltic Sea has already been approved in principle. Simultaneously, the Federal Chancellor acknowledged that the main disputes over this project are connected with Ukraine. In her opinion, “transit through this country should continue.” She indicated that she had mentioned this to Russian President Vladimir Putin and that she is planning to discuss this issue with the new Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky after he officially takes office.
Angela Merkel added that “Nord Stream 2” is not a purely German project – French, Austrian and Dutch companies are also involved in the construction of the gas pipeline. They include German Wintershall and Uniper, Austrian OMV, French Engie and British-Dutch Shell.
According to the German Chancellor, in the future Germany intends to diversify gas supplies and will build storage facilities for LNG. However, at present, the country needs the Nord Stream – 2 gas pipeline, particularly amid a reduction in gas imports from Norway and the Netherlands.
According to the German media, Berlin does not restrict itself to verbal statements in support of the Nord Stream 2 project but is trying its best to influence the American side in this issue. In particular, according to Bild, the German Ambassador to the United States, Emily Haber, has sent a letter to the US Congress urging them to stop threatening Russian companies PJSC NOVATEK and PJSC Gazprom, operating in Germany, with new sanctions. In her words, such actions jeopardize the energy security of Germany and of the entire European Union.
In her letter, Emily Haber points out that since countries of the European Union have adopted amendments to the Gas Directive, the issue of blocking the construction of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline is closed for Europe: “All countries that criticized the Nord Stream-2 approved this document “. Given the situation, the German diplomat described any further steps that Washington might take in order to hinder the development of the project as counterproductive and potentially threatening the energy security of the EU.
“What is also worrying is that the planned LNG terminal in Rostock may come under DASKA sanctions because of a minority stake owned by the Russian company NOVATEK,” – Bild says quoting Emily Haber. According to her, these sanctions can cause damage to LNG imports to Germany.
The Belgian gas company Fluxys and NOVATEK are planning to build a transit terminal for liquefied natural gas with a capacity of about 300 thousand tons per year in the port of Rostock. The facility is scheduled to be commissioned in 2022.
In response to a request from Bild to comment on the letter of the German ambassador to the US Congress, the German Foreign Ministry confirmed that the country’s government “is in constant and close contact with the US, including on the issue of sanctions.”
Russia deems Washington’s attempts to disrupt the implementation of the Nord Stream-2 project an instance of unfair competition which resorts to political pressure, ultimatum and sanctions to make Europeans buy American liquefied natural gas. According to Russian president’s secretary Dmitry Peskov, instead of “racketeering” and “raiding,” Washington should think about how to persuade Europeans to buy American LNG, which costs by “tens of percentage points” more compared to that produced in Russia.
The continuing trade war between Washington and Beijing is yet another factor demonstrating that the US has been stepping up efforts to assume control of the European energy market. In response to the decision of President Donald Trump to increase customs tariffs on the import of Chinese goods worth $ 200 billion from 10% to 25%, Beijing is increasing import tariffs on American LNG as of June 1 this year. According to the Chinese Customs Tariff Committee, the tariffs will go up from the current 10% to 25%.
The export of LNG from the US into China has dropped considerably since the Chinese tariffs came into effect in September 2018. According to Vygon Consulting, American LNG exports to China amounted to only 0.3 million tons in the first four months of this year compared to the same period in 2018, when China received 1.4 million tons of LNG. As a result, we have witnessed a forced redistribution of US liquefied natural gas flows to Europe, which, in turn, explains the toughening of Washington’s policy on the Nord Stream 2 project and reaffirms the existence of unfair competition from the United States.
The Russian gas pipeline project has been mentioned in US sanctions initiatives since the summer of 2018 as part of a policy aimed at increasing US LNG sales in Europe,” – said Maria Belova, research director at Vygon Consulting. She makes it clear that even though the trade war with China was unleashed later, the fact that LNG is becoming one of its victims creates an additional incentive for the US to try to secure a market for it in Europe.
Meanwhile, the excess volumes of American liquefied natural gas unclaimed by the Chinese market still end up on a market which, like the oil market, is global, – says Sergey Kapitonov, gas analyst at the Energy Center of the Moscow School of Management “Skolkovo”. Amid a favorable pricing environment, more and more LNG is being delivered to Europe, which creates a certain challenge for pipeline supplies from Russia.
Given the situation, future developments on the Nord Stream 2 project will largely depend on factors outside Europe, including the situation in Asian markets (where a possible increase in gas consumption could lead to an increase in demand and a rise in prices and consequently, reorientation of supplies), and also changes in world oil prices (which a number of Russian long-term gas contracts depend on). What is also of crucial importance is the military and political situation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, which account for the bulk of the world’s energy resources.
First published in our partner International Affairs
Energy
The Maneuvering Of Gas Commodities As Securitization Of Russia’s Geopolitical Position

Authors: Luky Yusgiantoro and Tri Bagus Prabowo
In 2012, the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline project was redeveloped under The Power of Siberia (News Ykt, 2012). Putin legalized Gazprom (contractors: Gazprom Transgaz Tomsk). The idea named “Power of Siberia” represents the power of gas pipelines to shape and influence Russia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic situation. A new identity will be launched, conveying the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline and gaining international prominence. The Power of Siberia project is an integrated form of GTS (Gas Transmission System) that will bring the Irkutsk gas region in the fertile eastern part of Russia to the Far East and China. The pipeline location is located in the “Far East,” incredibly close to the border with China, and generally in the Asia-Pacific region. Initially, this gas pipeline was built to facilitate gas trade with China and reduce China’s dependence on coal (Pipeline Journal, 2022). What is the value of this project for both countries to become global concerns?
Furthermore, they have the ability or range to carry gas communications for approximately 4000 km. Due to its geographical proximity and shared economic interests, China is Russia’s most progressive partner in terms of a multifaceted regional and international strategy. Russia and China are known as close partners. The aftermath of Russia’s political alliance was to regain global power, status, and influence lost after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, which was the driving force behind the end of the Cold War (Oualaalou, 2021 ). Russia has articulated a vision of rebuilding its global reputation using energy, military might, intelligence, and diplomacy. Russia wants to play a crucial role in the global multipolar system because the West rejects Russia’s vision for a new geopolitical order. They saw many important events related to Russia’s moves in the international order, including its response to the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to try to dominate the nations of the world. The former Soviet Union (East), the failures in the Middle East, the annexation of Crimea, and one of Moscow’s recent invasions of Ukraine mark the military as a turning point in Russian geopolitical politics, especially during the Putin era. Russia has three strategic initiative points, including the ability to deploy and interconnect the means (intelligence, diplomacy, military, cyber, and energy) to gain influence and extend Russia’s global footprint. There is.
Moreover, the Fallacies and Western Ties strategy contradicts America First foreign policy tenets (unipolar) and impulsive decisions as a security threat. Russia wants to maintain its lack of regional interests in certain Baltic states (those still under Russian control) and the Balkans (Cooley, 2017). The Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Serbia) have been the cornerstones of great power rivalry for centuries. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the EU (European Union) used the momentum of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s to integrate the Balkans as geopolitical hotspots on the Western Front (European Policy). War analysts say the ongoing Ukraine conflict is a way for Russia to raise its stakes in the Balkans and reassert its regional influence (McBride, 2022).
In 2020, natural gas will still be the world’s third-largest primary energy requirement for the global community. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2019, demand for natural gas increased by 5.3% to 4 trillion cubic meters (TCM) in 2021 (BP, 2022). In 2021, Russia’s total natural gas production will be 701.7 billion cubic meters, the second largest globally, contributing to the strong demand in the global energy market. Russia is essential in the natural gas market (Sonnichsen, 2022). The climate crisis is the most obvious obstacle in the global gas market model. It originates from burning carbon with materials derived from fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. However, natural gas is acceptable during the energy transition as it burns the least carbon dioxide (CO2) and pollutants of these three substances (EIA, 2022). It is easier than supplying a gas infrastructure that does not provide infrastructure. Operationally, it is optimal. Talks about climate protection, the climate crisis, and the energy transition are being shaped by Western countries as a way of highlighting Europe’s dependence on gas from Russia, which is geographically accessible and still has gas in other gas reserves. The decision to stop sourcing natural gas from Russia continues to cause European controversy. The pipeline network actively built between Russia and Europe is an essential aspect of why this relationship is used as a tool for Russia to apply pressure—on territorial Europe. Europe uses a climate scenario, and Russia uses a gas-dependent scenario. Efficiency and effectiveness will not be achieved if Europe suddenly has to look for other reserves or switch entirely to this energy mix. Then, with Russia’s eloquence in exploiting the situation and the status quo, natural gas pipelines were used as a form of Russian energy diplomacy to dominate its (European) neighbors. Recognizing that the Western natural gas market is no longer preconditioned, moving target consumers to the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most effective energy plans for Russia’s fossil fuel expansion.
Siberia’s first electricity will cost 770 billion rubles, and the investment in gas production will cost 430 billion rubles. The 1,400 mm natural gas pipeline capacity will increase to 61 billion cubic meters (2.2 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas annually. The pipeline lets the world see natural gas as one of the fossil fuels and does not pollute the air with the carbon and other substances of the climate crisis. , through the capital Beijing and down to Shanghai. According to state media, the intermediate phase will go online in December 2020, with the final southern section expected to start delivering gas in 2025 (Cheng, 2022). Through this agreement, Russia aims to extend its power beyond Mongolia into Siberia 2 in 2030 (IEA, 2022). Conditions for Europe to get 40% of natural gas from Russian pipelines. Germany, in particular, sources about half of its natural gas from Russia (Baldwin, 2022). Despite international media reports of embargoes and sanctions, the crisis has hit Europe hard. Europe must adapt its economic policies to politically justified policies and coordinate them with each other. However, this is a geopolitical struggle, and we must ensure that the country retains its absolute superiority. Russia chooses to invest in and plan for natural gas markets in regions that require or depend on natural gas in the energy sector, i.e., Asia-Pacific via China. China, influencing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan, is reshaping the geoeconomic position of Russia’s Siberia 1 and Siberia 2 power markets (Lukin, 2021). “Geopolitics is all about leverage” is one of Thomas Friedman’s influential geopolitical maxims. If a country cannot expand its influence, it remains a loser. Nevertheless, Russia is far from this analogy, as mentioned earlier. Russia continues to secure its geopolitical position. It is the embodiment of growing confidence in the reliability of natural gas. Russia still wants to become a major player in natural gas.
Energy
Remapping the EU’s Energy Partners to Ensure Energy Security and Diversification

Energy security has been a buzz word in Brussels for a few decades but since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by sanctions, Russian gas cut-off and physical destruction of North Stream pipelines, forecasts on strained EU energy production due to drought, the stakes have gotten much higher. This was confirmed on March 10th by a joint statement by the US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, reiterating both parties’ determination to “build clean energy economies and industrial bases”, including clean hydrogen and continue to work together “to advance energy security and sustainability in Europe by diversifying sources, lowering energy consumption, and reducing Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels”.
Last week, the EU energy chief Kadri Simson encouraged all Member States and all companies to “stop buying Russian LNG, and not to sign any new gas contracts with Russia. The EU has pledged to quit Russian fossil fuels by 2027 and replaced around two-thirds of Russian gas last year.
In this context, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), delivering Azerbaijani gas through (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) TANAP and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to the EU, plays a key role in current diversification efforts. The EU increased gas imports via pipelines from Azerbaijan from 8.1 bcm to 11.4 bcm last year. Only two years after its completion, the expansion of the Corridor seems to be likely as the EU and Azerbaijan stroke a deal in July 2021 to double the volume of gas delivery to 20 bcm by 2027 in addition to plans to tap into Azerbaijan’s renewables potential, such as offshore wind and green hydrogen. While encouraging Azerbaijan’s accession to the Global Methane Pledge, the deal aims at collecting natural gas that would otherwise be vented, flared, or released into the atmosphere.
With the opening of the interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB), at least 11.6 bcm of gas is expected to be delivered from Azerbaijan to the EU this year. The IGB has been dubbed as a game-changer for the EU’s energy security, especially as it enabled supplies to Bulgaria and Romania. A Memorandum of Understanding on gas supplies between Azerbaijan and Hungary was also signed this year, which shows that more interconnectors will be needed in the EU if TANAP would be expanded from 16 to 32 bcm and TAP from 10 to 20 bcm.
Moreover, investments will be needed to increase gas production in existing and new gas fields (Shah Deniz, Azeri Chiraq Guneshli, Absheron, Shafaq-Asiman, Umid-Babek, etc.), especially considering growing energy demand in Azerbaijan and its neighbours. Since the Russia-Ukraine war, 10 European countries turned to Azerbaijan to increase existing supplies or to secure new supplies. To meet such growing demands, Azerbaijan is poised to increase cooperation with neighbouring states, such as Turkmenistan, which is home to 50 trillion cubic metres of gas reserves – the world’s 4th largest reserves.
Following the Azerbaijani-Turkmen decision to jointly develop the formerly disputed Dostluq gas field, a trilateral swap deal between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and the 2018 Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea by all the littoral states; Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey stated that they were looking “to form a coordinated and multi-option system for delivering energy resources to global markets” on December 14th last year.
These developments could be harbingers of a new Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), a 180-mile under-sea pipeline that could be integrated into the SGC. Labelled as an EU Project of Common Interest, which could also be eligible for funding under the 2019 US European Energy Security and Diversification Act, this strategic under-sea pipeline project could bring an end to the EU’s energy crisis by securing a cheap source of natural gas, whose price is independent of LNG prices while counterbalancing Chinese, Russian and Iranian influence in Central Asia and beyond. On the other hand, Azerbaijan began the transit of oil from Kazakhstan this year in addition to Turkmenistan, which highlights the potential to use the Middle Corridor for hydrocarbons.
During the 9th Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council Ministerial Meeting and 1st Green Energy Advisory Council Ministerial Meeting in Baku in February, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson stated “Azerbaijan can potentially become the exporter of renewables and hydrogen to the EU”. At the end of last year Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary agreed to establish a green corridor to supply the EU with around four gigawatts of electricity generated by windfarms in Azerbaijan with the support of the European Commission.
Over the last several months, Azerbaijan signed documents that will provide investments to create 22 gigawatts of renewable sources of energy, both onshore and offshore. In April 2021, the World Bank started funding the offshore wind development in Azerbaijan, which has a potential of 157 GW. In addition to the Caspian Sea, which ranks second in world for its wind energy potential, Azerbaijan has an estimated 27GW in wind and solar power onshore.The current construction of wind and solar plants in Alat (230 MW), Khizi and Absheron (240 MW) and Jabrayil (240 MW) as well as new investment plans, including in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, are expected to further boost renewables production in the Caspian state all by living up to its vast green potential. While the country, with a population of 10 million, accounts for only 0.15% of total global greenhouse gas emissions, it defines green growth as a key priority for 2030. The EU supports the implementation of Baku’s Paris Agreement commitments through the EU4Climate initiative.
The Russia-Ukraine war may create a window opportunity for the EU to engage in concrete actions rather than high-flying buzzwords, pushing the bloc to do more strategic and visionary planning regarding future projects linked to its energy security, such as TCGP, and finally diversify away from Russian energy sources for good. Azerbaijan has proved to be a stable partner in these challenging times, which manifested the vulnerability of certain EU states against Russian economic and political pressure due to Gazprom’s immense infiltration of their gas markets for the past several decades. Now it’s the time to play fair game by a new playbook and to remap the European energy partners while investing in a stable, predictable, affordable, and sustainable energy future for the EU.
Energy
The Implications of the Russian-Ukrainian War on European Energy Security

Oil and gas prices have skyrocketed since Russia invaded Ukraine in late February 2022, which has already had an impact on the global economy. 30% of global wheat is grown in Russia and Ukraine. Sunflower seed oil accounts for 71%; corn and barley account for 26%; and vegetable oil accounts for 11%. Agricultural fertilizers and raw materials such as sulphur are among Russia’s most important exports. Wheat prices have surged to a record high since the invasion of the Black Sea ports, which has stifled economic activity.
Economic forecasters often foresee higher worldwide inflation and weaker global GDP growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipates inflation to rise to 5.7% in developed countries and 8.7% in emerging market and developing economies this year, respectively, representing increases of 1.8% and 2.8% above the predictions made in January. Down 0.8 percent from January, the global economy is forecast to grow at 3.6 percent. There has been a major shock to commodity markets, which will continue to keep prices at historically high levels through the end of 2024, according to the World Bank’s latest Commodity Markets Outlook research.
In 2022, the price of energy is expected to rise by 50% before falling again in the following two years. Price increases in agriculture and metals are predicted to begin in 2022, then fall. Commodity prices are expected to remain above their five-year average for the time being. Prices could rise and become more unpredictable in the event of a prolonged conflict or further sanctions against Russia.
By the end of this year, European leaders hope to reduce EU gas dependency by two-thirds. Initiatives like the IEA’s 10-point strategy are critical to ensuring global energy security. Energy efficiency, delaying the decommissioning of nuclear plants, and significantly expanding the use of renewable energy sources are all viable policy options. Supply and efficiency will rise, but so will the use of coal to replace natural gas and growing commodity prices for electric vehicle batteries and solar PV panels, which are counteracting these trends. The transition is hampered by the lack of energy security.
We don’t know how long the conflict will last, how far it will escalate, or whether or not new countermeasures can prevent Russian oil and gas from reaching the markets. The ease and means of gas replacement vary by industry. The most effective means of reducing the carbon footprint of European energy use is through increased production and increased use of renewable energy sources. In order to replace gas with coal, which is more expensive due to the conflict, they will not suffice. Coal is being phased out for the time being. Six percent of natural gas supply loss in 2024 will be due to coal. Several countries, with the exception of Germany, see a short-term benefit from delaying nuclear retirements and increasing the use of existing nuclear assets. Nuclear power generating accounts for one-third of the shortfall in natural gas.
Due to the war, the cost of bioenergy has not increased, and it is possible to grow bioenergy (primarily from sewage and waste) in the coming years. Bioenergy fills in the energy gap to the tune of 20%. Europe’s main energy independence program, a rapid expansion of renewable energy, has had little impact. Two years is needed to fill Russia’s 10% gas import shortfall. As time goes on, the impact grows more and larger. More than half of the world’s gas needs will be met by renewable energy sources like solar PV and wind power by 2030.
Battery costs will rise, postponing half of new car sales in Europe until 2028 as a result of rising material costs. Long-term decarbonization is hampered and oil decline is postponed as a result. EV subsidies may need to be increased in countries with high 2030 decarbonization goals. By contrast, in 2024, gas use is expected to be 9 percent lower than it was in pre-war time. The use of heat pumps will displace some of the gas currently used in construction by the year 2030, according to our estimates. Improved energy efficiency minimizes the amount of energy needed.
Europe will increase its gas production by 12 percent by 2030 as a result of recent industry responses to rising oil and gas prices and a commitment by the EU to distribute more gas. Global oil use will climb somewhat in the 2030s due to overinvestment that will lower oil and gas prices after 2025. The invasion in Ukraine will delay nuclear retirements, which are a global priority. Faster deployment of renewable energy sources, improved energy efficiency, and slower economic growth are critical over the medium term. Between 2022 and 2030, European emissions are reduced by 580 Mt, or 2.3%, as a result of the Ukraine conflict.
Food, gasoline, and gas costs have all increased as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine. There is a need for a new agricultural and political economic strategy due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and severe supply chain disruptions. To avoid a humanitarian crisis, Kyiv halted food shipments in March. The harvest for this year will be lessened if there is war. In the east, farming infrastructure and equipment have been devastated by the conflict. Ukrainian wheat supplies could be cut by a fifth in 2022, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Due to the fact that the next crop will not be cultivated in war, future harvests are in danger. The world’s leading wheat producer, Russia, has had its supply cut back due to sanctions. A productivist development model centred on extractive industries has resulted in environmental deterioration and natural resource exhaustion.
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