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Impressions from South Africa’s election

Klaus Kotzé

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South Africa’s recent general election has bucked the international trend towards populism by consolidating its democracy at the political centre. The ruling African National Congress, led by the popular centrist, Cyril Ramaphosa, has maintained its outright majority by committing to the reform and cleaning up of the party and state.

South Africa went to the polls on May 8th to elect its sixth democratic government. Due to poor economic growth, extensive corruption and infighting in the governing African National Congress (ANC), this election had been billed to be the most consequential since the end of Apartheid, in 1994. Except for minor issues at polling stations and technical questions regarding the balloting system, South Africa’s peaceful and orderly ’s electoral process has ensured further democratic consolidation, proving itself as a bastion for free and fair elections on the continent.

With 57.5% of the national vote, the ANC has maintained its governing majority. The official opposition remains the liberal Democratic Alliance (DA), with 20.7%. Completing the Big Three is the leftwing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) who attained 10.8% of the vote. Eleven smaller parties captured enough votes to secure one or more seats in the sixth National Assembly. An assessment of the results illustrates several significant impressions.

The fringe fails to factor 

While democracies around the world have moved to the fringes, South Africa appears to be maturing towards the middle. Though the centre-left ANC and centre-right DA shed the same number of seats gained by the leftwing EFF and rightwing Freedom Front Plus (FF+), 19 and five respectively, the threat of further splintering to an array of radical fringe parties did not materialize. None of these parties, including Black First, Land First which rejects white membership and the National Front which advances a white secessionist state, achieved traction among the electorate. Neither received a singular seat in Parliament.

The FF+ and EFF may appear to be the election’s big winners, but this analysis is superficial. The FF+ has simply captured a quadrant of the persistently mobile white conservative vote. Unlike the DA which has failed to support this group, the FF+ has offered it an unabashed home. The EFF almost doubled the bounty of its first electoral outing in 2014. It did, however, fail to make the kind of inroads it hoped for and was expected to receive. The party which calls itself the government in waiting, whose leader is referred to as the commander in chief, which dominates local social media optics, and which attracts a significant sector of the young black vote, may fill a football stadium with jubilant supporters at a pre-election rally. It could however not perform on the day that mattered. The ambitious EFF was seeking to capture a greater chunk of the ANC’s vote, thereby taking South African politics and economics further toward the radical left. Its failure to secure more votes at a time that the ANC was particularly weak points to an electorate with little appetite for populist radicalism. The EFF, with its politically astute and ambitious leadership will now be compelled to tone down its agitation and provide practical policy alternatives. It will have to move towards the middle if its goal of power is to be realised.

The centre holds

The losses of both the ANC and DA will demand introspection and clear future strategies. The DA faces an inflection point. The party which has traditionally received the overwhelming support of minority groups has actively been seeking to break this threshold by courting the majority black support. Its poor performance suggests that not only did it fail to make inroads in this sector; its attempt to reach across the aisle resulted in its traditional support feeling alienated. Furthermore, it was unable to consolidate an approach to foil the popular Cyril Ramaphosa. The DA’s 6% growth in 2014, largely taken from the ANC, was received for its campaign to Stop Zuma! – a tactic to oppose disgraced and maligned presidential incumbent, Jacob Zuma. This time around there was no boogie man to blame, leaving the DA with more questions than answers as to its future political approach and ideology. As a traditional, Western liberal party, the DA appears out of touch with South Africa’s broader socio-economic reality. 2019 may very well be the last time that the DA emerges as the official opposition.

While the ANC achieved its worst electoral result since 1994, shedding 5% from its 2014 showing, it nevertheless maintained its outright majority. It also maintained all the provinces where it governed previously. The ANC’s powerful mandate is largely thanks to President Ramaphosa’s clean image and his commitment to reform. Ramaphosa, whose popularity exceeds that of his party, replaced Zuma in a narrow victory at the party’s elective conference in late 2017. Ramaphosa, a trade unionist cum billionaire businessman who was Nelson Mandela’s preferred successor, has been the face of the ANC’s electoral drive. Contrary to the traditional advance of a manifesto, the ANC’s campaign has been centred on Ramaphosa. His accession to power indicates the commencement of reform and cleaning up, from the top.

While the ANC’s promise of renewal seems to have satisfied those deciding to cast their ballots, a significant sector of the 55 million population simply stayed away. More than nine million eligible voters did not register to vote. Another nine million registered voters did not make their cross, and more than a quarter of a million voters decided to spoil their vote. These numbers point to a frustrated populace that is tired of the cycle of politics wherein the ANC rules with impunity. Significantly, there was a clear division in voter turnout in urban and suburban districts compared to informal and rural dwellings. The former, the traditional terrain of the opposition, observed an enormous voter turnout (more than 90% of registered voters), the latter, the heartland of the ANC, experienced a considerable stay-away. While the failures of the state are collectively placed at the ANC’s door, so too are its successes. The millions of poor South Africans receiving state subsidies are clearly unwilling to trade what they have for the speculative promises of populism. Simply, 17 million subsidy beneficiaries see the ANC as the state and vice versa.

Going forward from the elections

The appearance that President Ramaphosa is now comfortably in power is, however, an illusion. Though he was able to mobilise the electorate and achieved a comfortable mandate, Ramaphosa’s greatest task was always going to commence once the elections are over. His challenges are internal to his party. He needs to effectively deal with a splintered party wherein a contingent of allies of the former president remain in senior positions. Ramaphosa will have to act swiftly to neutralise this powerful group and prove to the electorate and the markets that he can implement his promises. His first move will have to be to assemble a clean and competent cabinet that is able enact his reformist policies. Before the elections, Ramaphosa tactically delegated power to institutions that have laboured under poor and often corrupt leadership. He will have to lead from the front; he will have to act. He must capitalise on the positive sentiment across civil society and business to work together towards overcoming the perilous situation under Zuma.

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Africa

Why Young African Scholars Must Engage the Law and Politics of Africa through New Perspectives

Olalekan Moyosore Lalude

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The Year of Africa was a powerful phase, a transitional moment that saw Africa in liberated black and white images. In one, a woman wearing sunglasses and sitting astride a motorcycle scooter communicated freedom and a promise of a bold future.In another, a smiling, young woman in a polka dot dress wore Independence in a sash, followed by a happy crowd. In yet another, a grinning man borne on the shoulders of two other men in a throbbing crowd, carried a placard that read: COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE 1961. It was the year that saw seventeen African states begin a journey of black statehood. Those images were metaphors of liberty in a continent that had been kept away from deciding the course of its own destiny. 1960 was a beginning and the end of the African struggle.

It was the beginning of the African struggle because Africans in the independent states were transitioning from struggling against colonialism to contending against the political realities of their post-independent states. And it was the end, because those Africans didn’t have to contend against colonialism any more. In the true picture of things, it was a transition from the political control of people who sought the wealth of the continent to a struggle with murderous regimes, and the sad realization of the true damage that colonialism had wreaked in the political arrangement of the people.In Nigeria, it was the beginning of the weaponization of ethnicity and of resentful distrust in state politics.

Africa in the 1960s was a dramatic spectacle of violence, new beginnings and the creation of histories that has informed the present. Independence movements aspired towards liberated African states. The consciousness of colonial restraints inspired actions that marked the trajectory of the continent’s destiny. The political history of Africa’s becoming is a timeline of seesaw moments. Dictators have risen and have fallen in the hubris of forgetfulness thatthe powers that saw to their rise could see to their fall. The legal systems, processes, institutions and the politics of Africa were forged in the turbulence of African history.

Today it is easy to say that Africa has made progress in its strides towards social and political evolution, but the past is a mirror of solutions to present problems. This is why it has become imperative for newer approaches to emerge in the study of law and politics in the context of Africa. Founded in 2020 by me, the Carnelian Journal of Law and Politics is Africa’s response to the need for new insights on law and politics in the African context. This new journal gives young African researchers the opportunity to contribute top quality perspectives to the discourse on the law and politics of Africa. This is important as newer voices are needed to give an inter-generational balance to the debate on African law and politics. And this is why the journal has emerged to bridge the scholarly gap.

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A Tale of Two Sudans

Simon Wolfe

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For the first time in decades, Sudan is on a path to peace and democracy, turning the fall of a dictatorial regime into a reckoning with entrenched societal fissures and the overhaul of the institutions that reinforced them. On the other hand, South Sudan and its unity government, once a darling of western governments and NGOs as a model for religious freedom and democratic potential, continues to struggle to build peace and stability in the absence of any consolidated, legitimate institutions of authority.

It may be time to re-examine what we think we know about the war that split them apart.

Sudan: A Case for Cautious Optimism

Since the 2019 protests and coup that ended the repressive 30-year reign of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s transitional government is slowly working to undo decades of damage and emerge from isolation.

In recent weeks, Sudan has signed successive peace deals with rebel forces addressing grievances that have long inhibited a permanent resolution to the conflict. The agreements separate religion from the state and establish a commission for religious freedom mandated to protect the country’s Christian minority. They also grant autonomy to the contested regions of Blue Nile and South Kordofan and set Darfur on a path to reunification under its own governor. An August 31 agreement on Darfur also covers power sharing, security, transitional justice, land ownership and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

In addition to completing the peace processes mandated in Sudan’s interim constitution, Sudan has also taken steps to reset relations internationally. Though the transitional government has limited power in this area, indications are encouraging for the potential normalisation of Sudan’s relationship with Israel – which would, in turn, support Sudan’s case for removal from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Positive as the outlook appears to be, Sudan has a long, difficult road to recovery ahead. The transitional government has 26 months left to lay the groundwork for a civilian, democratically elected government to take over. In addition to the colossal challenge of rebuilding institutions nearly from scratch, the pandemic and the global commodity market collapse have generated urgent economic woes.

Moreover, anyone with experience on the ground in Sudan will warn against misplaced confidence at this early stage. Connection with the international community – and international markets – has long served as an incentive to end the conflict, but even the most promising of peace agreements has failed to produce sufficient stability for sustained development.

South Sudan: A Grim Reality

If Sudan calls for cautious optimism, South Sudan demands a reckoning with the failure of the international response.

When South Sudan seceded in 2011, observers were optimistic. Those in the international community – both in the omnipresent NGO sector as well as foreign governments (principally the United States) believed that the oppressed Christian South would finally be free from its Islamic subjugators in the North, and the resolution of this religious divide would finally bring peace to the region. Instead, two years after independence, a brutal civil war broke out between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and former First Vice President Riek Machar, displacing significant numbers of people and leaving large swathes of the country reliant on humanitarian aid. Best estimates of numbers killed are upwards of 400,000, which at times has rivaled the war in Syria that received far greater attention.’

So, what happened? How did the Cinderella story of South Sudan’s independence become a nightmare?

The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the rebels turned political party who governed the country at independence, were ill-prepared to fulfil the functions of a state, despite the heavy investment and optimism afforded them by their international supporters leading up to 2011. Well before South Sudan split from the north, NGOs and aid groups had provided the overwhelming majority of state services, often with incorrect or incomplete knowledge of where resources were going. Some organisations even unwittingly provided direct financial to support to militias or funded ‘dialogues’ that served primarily as brand rehabilitation for war lords looking to take advantage of a sprawling and largely unregulated aid industry.

Arguably the international humanitarian response formed the economic, social and political foundations for the South Sudanese state that emerged in 2011. The sad irony is that these foundations have been purged by years of corruption and mismanagement since.

This dynamic followed South Sudan beyond independence, creating a cycle of escalating violence enabled by a steady flow in billions of dollars of humanitarian aid. The assumption that the Southern forces represented a unified Christian bloc fighting for religious freedom and human rights was convenient for warlords seeking resources and legitimacy and appealing to the international NGO and donor community – especially to faith-based aid efforts – but it has proved to be devastating for the millions affected by the ongoing conflict.

Ultimately, because the 2005 peace process took the Southern rebel forces’ branding at face value – with the support of the aid industry – it failed to confront the fragmentation and factionalism that had destroyed South Sudan and anticipate that these fissures would continue and undermine state-building efforts today. Though a tragedy for the South Sudanese, lessons from the failure of peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan may prove valuable to its northern neighbour – and Sudan’s transitional government appears to be learning already.

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Russia Readies for Challenges and Opportunities in Africa

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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Within the framework of the joint declaration adopted at the historic Russia-Africa Summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has established a Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. The Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum has also moved to create an Association of Economic Cooperation with African States (AECAS).

The Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum primary task is to coordinate efforts for promoting cooperation between Russian and African integration associations, ensure political and diplomatic support for projects in Africa carried out with Russia’s leading state-run and private companies’ involvement, and for other aspects of preparations for Russia-Africa summits.   

The Association of Economic Cooperation with African States was established as a non-profit organization on 12 April 2020 in accordance with a directive of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin dated 21 March 2020 with the assistance of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  

On September 9, the Roscongress Foundation and the Association of Economic Cooperation with African States (AECAS) held a ceremony in Moscow to sign a cooperation agreement as part of a presentation of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. The agreement was signed by Roscongress Foundation CEO and Chairman of the Board, Head of the Russia—Africa Partnership Forum Coordinating Council Alexander Stuglev and the Head of AECAS Alexander Saltanov.

The speeches delivered at the meeting provided detailed information on the current and prospects of cooperation, and development of relations between the Russian Federation and African countries in the context of the results of the Sochi Summit. The discussions offered an insight into the main areas of activity of the Secretariat and the Association, their tasks to expand and strengthen Russian-African ties in within the framework of the dialogue mechanism of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. 

“The Russia-Africa agenda has taken on special relevance today: the first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum demonstrated the true potential of strategic relations between our countries. We are ready to make efforts and, jointly with the Association, help to create a favourable business climate, while serving as a bridge between Russian and African businesses and providing both sides with high-quality conditions for collaboration,” Stuglev said at the signing ceremony.

On his part, Saltanov said “Russia’s interest in economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation with African countries is long-term, sustainable and importantly, has historical roots. For their part, African countries are interested in Russian investments, technologies, and opportunities for training skilled personnel. The Association’s current goal is to actively search for new growth points and build a structure to expand the scope of common interests and further cooperation with the African continent.”

Mikhail Bogdanov, Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, attended the event. Delivering the opening speech, he said that “The first Russia-Africa Summit, a truly historic event that took place in Sochi in October last year was a response to these changing global challenges. It convincingly illustrated that Russia and its friends in Africa see each other as important and promising partners.

He further explained: “To provide efficient functionality for this new dialogue mechanism the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum has been created. This structure aims to coordinate the entire range of relations with the African countries. It will oversee the formation of interagency expert groups that will come up with tangible solutions to develop and enrich economic, research, and humanitarian cooperation with the preparation for new Summits in mind.”

Oleg Ozerov, Ambassador-at-Large and Head of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, stressed that “The first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum was a landmark event and achievement that made it possible to bring together all key politicians and business representatives from Russia and the African continent, establish contacts and agree on future cooperation areas. The second Russia-Africa event, in turn, will demonstrate the results of our efficient interaction, and, above all, economic results.” 

In May, Ozerov was appointed Ambassador-at-Large and Head of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. The secretariat will prepare the second Russia-Africa Summit due in 2022 as per the agreements reached at the first ever Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi. Biographical document made available says Ozerov is a diplomat with extensive experience at the Foreign Ministry, including with Arab and African countries.

As part of its preparation for the next Summit in 2022, the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum has created three new Councils. (i) The Coordinating Council will be led by CEO and Chairman of the Roscongress Foundation Alexander Stuglev, (ii) The Research Council will be chaired by Irina Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and (iii) The Public Council will be headed by Yevgeny Primakov, Head of Rossotrudnichestvo.

These three councils will closely cooperate and hold regular meetings, under the control and with the participation of the Russian-Africa Partnership Forum Secretariat. Besides coordination, the Councils will deal with developing substantive conceptual offers for the development of economic, science-technical, humanitarian and other types of cooperation between Russia and the African states.

Russia has been looking for ways to continue building relations based not only on the nostalgic memories of shared past, that of the liberation of African states, but on new values as well: protection and reinforcement of the African states’ sovereignty, the idea of maintaining and strengthening peace, good neighbourliness and cooperation with Russia.

Further, Russia is interested in the exploration and development of mineral resources and energy. It has not significantly invested in needed infrastructure in the continent, while agriculture remains only as a promising area for cooperation. That compared to the golden days, Soviet specialists built major infrastructure facilities, including hydroelectric power plants, roads and industrial enterprises across Africa.

Now, Russian companies are ready to work with their African partners to upgrade transport infrastructure, develop telecommunications and digital technologies, provide information security, and offer the most advanced technologies and engineering solutions.

In 2018, Russia’s trade with African states grew more than 17 percent and exceeded $20 billion. During the Sochi summit, President Vladimir Putin said he would like to bring the trade figure to, at least, $40 billion in the next years. Experts, however, argue that with more than two decades of missed opportunities, Russia could significantly increase trade by improving its own export products and that means competing with other foreign players in Africa.

The first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum was held in Sochi in October 2019 under the slogan – For Peace, Security, and Development. That event attracted over 6,000 participants, including representatives of all 54 African countries, 45 of which were represented by Heads of State and Governments.

The Summit culminated in the adoption of a final declaration that sets out the goals and objectives that have been endorsed for further development of Russia-Africa cooperation in different dimensions. It designated the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum as a new mechanism for dialogue in addition to summits in the Russia-Africa format once every three years. The second Russia-Africa Summit will be held in 2022.

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