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The origin of the Four Modernizations and President Xi Jinping’s current choices

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On September 13, 1971 Lin Biao tried to flee to the USSR with all his family, aboard a Trident plane of civil aviation, which had left with little fuel and no active radio contact.

The crash of the aircraft in Mongolia, where both Lin and his whole family died, was caused by the order given directly by Mao to shoot down the plane.

 What had happened, obviously in political and not in personal terms?

 The answer is simple: Lin Biao was very strongly opposed to the new agreement between China and the United States and hence had organized a military coup. For Lin Biao all the room for US geopolitics was to be found in what the Third International’s forces traditionally defined as “imperialism”.

 For Mao Zedong, imperialism was vital for both the USSR and the USA- and considering that he was far from the continent that was the prize for which of the two won the Cold War, namely Europe-he refused to make too many differences between the two.

 As a man of Tao and Zen, Mao treated an evil with another evil.

  Mao Zedong, however, also knew that a new economic relationship with the United States was needed, after the long economic crisis and the factional instability within the Chinese regime. The Soviet Union could certainly not give it economic stability and hence the “Great Helmsman” turned to the distant enemy rather than to the near quasi-friend.

 Nothing can be understood about China, including current China, if geopolitical choices are separated from economic, financial and industrial ones which, however, are subjected to the strategic “policy line” defined by the Party – a policy  line that is cultural and always based on a very long term.

 On September 29, 1972 the diplomatic relationship with Japan were resumed, along with those with the United States. An evident overlapping of different geopolitical lines which, however – in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers -were similar also from the symbolic viewpoint.

 In 1973 Deng Xiaoping reappeared in public, upon direct order by Mao Zedong.

 Those were also the years of the late definitive success of the “policy line” of Zhou Enlai, who had successfully gone through the Great Cultural and Proletarian Revolution, which had partly overwhelmed him, and led the 10thCPC Congress.

 That was the compromise which held the Party together, after Lin Biao’s elimination. An unstable agreement between the reformist “Right” (Zhou had spoken of “four modernizations” many years before, exactly in 1965) and the Left, silenced by Mao, that had crossed the red line of the Cultural Revolution and the failed communization of rural areas.

 In those years, also the Party’s Left lacked mass management of the people and the Party and had to agree with the other factions, while Mao mediated and also created “third wheels”.

  Create something from nothing – one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems of the Chinese Art of War.

 In 1973, just before the equilibrium between Zhou and the old CPC apparata broke again, Deng Xiaoping was fully rehabilitated and also became member of the Chinese regime’s deep axis, namely the Central Military Commission.

 In 1975 Deng was elected vice-President of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

 The connection between the reformists – if we can call them so – siding with Zhou Enlai, and the “centre” of the Party’s apparatus – that regained its roles and posts by ousting the Armed Forces -prevailed once again.

 Again in 1975, the National People’s Congress praised the “Four Modernizations” already proposed by Zhou and, in its final statement, hoped “that China would be turned into a modern and powerful Socialist country in the approximately twenty years before the end of the century”.

 Political transformation through the new economy, as well as preservation of the regime through political transformation itself.

 We could call it “the Tao of geoeconomics”. Acceleration of industrialization and modernization, but without creating the disaster of rural masses, who were objectively unable of providing the start-up capital for implementing any of the Four Modernizations. This was the real difference with the USSR of the 1930s.

 That capital had to be produced in innovative companies and be attracted from outside.

 At the time, however, the CPC was not yet firmly in the hands of any factions. In September 1975, the national Agriculture Conference saw the harsh clash between Deng Xiaoping and the old “Shanghai group” of the Cultural and Proletarian Revolution that, however, no longer controlled most of the Party.

 Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and shortly afterwards, in Tiananmen Square, there were severe incidents, albeit with the constant presence of many wreaths reminding of Zhou.

 Later there were also strikes and unrest, until the capture and trial of the “Gang of Four” in Shanghai. It had inspired the “Cultural Revolution” and was then directly accused by Hua Guofen – the man appointed by Mao to lead the transition- of having prepared a coup.

 China’s transformation, however, began again from rural areas: at the second Agriculture Conference in Dazhai, in December 1976 – where various cases of corruption and “social polarization” were described and stigmatized- the discussion focused on the First Modernization, namely that of rural areas.

 When you regulate too much, a parallel and illegal market is created. This always happens.

 Obviously this also happens when total communization is applied to the economic cycle of rural areas.

 Certainly those were residues of Sovietism in the CPC’s  doctrine, but also of the a-dialectical implementation of Marxism-Leninism in historical and social contexts in which the analysis of the founder of “scientific Communism” had never focused.

 In fact, when you read the works and correspondence that Marx dedicated to the Russian agricultural issue, you note that the author of “Capital” foresaw a direct Socialist social transformation stemming from the maintenance of the social and community networks in traditional villages. It may seem strange, but it is so.

 This system operates only with a non-industrialized State that is scarcely widespread in the territory. Otherwise, the problem is that of capitalism in rural areas to generate the surplus of urban and industrial investments.

 Even in the Second Volume of “Capital”, Marx’s model is essentially this one.

 It is precisely on the agricultural issue that the stability and success of many Communist regimes isdefined and, not surprisingly, the first of Zhou’s and later Deng’s Four Modernizations was precisely that of agriculture.

 The topic characterized all Party’s organizations, but it was in late December 1978 that the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee decided to decentralize the economy – another factor strongly different from the Leninist tradition – and even to liberalize it, in addition to a process of ideological revision, namely Gaige Kaifang that roughly means “reform and opening”.

 That was also related to the request for opening international trade based on the criterion of “mutual benefit” and equality between the various countries.

 Hence, also from the ideological viewpoint, Deng became the Supreme Leader of the Party – as well as of the State apparatus – and announced the Open Door policy.

 An extremely important fact was also the separation of the Bank of China from the People’s Bank of China, so as to serve as single State body for foreign exchanges.

 That was the start of the “Long March” towards the Four Modernizations, with an unusually united Party, and currently towards “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” , as well as – at geopolitical level -President Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road.

 In January 1980, the “four freedoms” – of work, people, goods and capital – were abolished.

 The new planning needed to manage all aspects of productive forces.

  That was explained by a covert war of the Chinese economy against the penetration of foreign capital and joint ventures, which in fact were immediately regulated by specific legislation enacted the previous year.

 The great British operation of economic control over the South-Chinese coasts was resumed from Hong Kong, but the Chinese government eliminated the possibility of such an action by Great Britain (and by the USA, at least partly).

 Hence the Party’s unity had to be reflected in a new context and, to some extents, in the whole society, so as to prevent the liberalized Chinese economy from taking the Party and Socialism away. A new rationale for the CPC’s Leninist unity.

 The new Act on contract law was enacted in March 1981, and in 1982 also the new civil procedure law was enacted, which became effective on October 1, 1982.

 In September 1983, at the 12th CPC Congress, there were three groups within the Party: the nostalgic Maoists, a small and narrow majority for Deng Xiaoping; the Orthodox group that still wanted a nationally planned economy, as in USSR -hence probably the heirs to Lin Biao; finally the real reformists.

 Deng won with a clear, but not overwhelming majority.

 Hence, everyone was waiting for the Four Modernizations to fail, so as to go back to the old routine of the Plan.

 As also happened in the USSR, it was often fully imaginary compared to the actual reality of the things done and produced.

 It was in 1983, however, that the Third Front strategy was implemented, i.e. Mao’s directive – drawn up as early as 1962 – according to which the national strategic industries had to be moved from the coasts – militarily and politically difficult to defend – to the internal areas. Without said Mao’s directive, the New Silk Road could not be understood even currently.

Hence 14 open coastal cities that were declared so in 1984, but with a new law on profits that served as mainstay of Modernizations: companies were asked to pay a certain share of profits to the government, but they could withhold some profits if they matched and exceeded the requirements of the contract with the State.

 In 1985 a new regulation also involved government bonds. The seventh Five-Year Plan began, underlining a “scale” approach, in which the coastal areas – gradually freed from traditional strategic companies – were driving the economic development, which later spread like wildfire even in the internal areas.

 It was the Hong Kong model that Deng Xiaoping’s executives copied and adapted.

 For a short lapse of time, Chinese analysts and Party planners also looked to the Singapore model, with the (single) Party of Lee Kuan Yew.

 It isby no mere coincidence that Shenzen was close to the former British colony, and often the Chinese attracted and favoured the companies of the British area towards the new Chinese coastal areas also characterized by free-market economy.

 Advanced and high-tech services in coastal areas, and lower value-added, but still inevitable, productions in internal regions.

 A new dualism, where rural overpopulation had to be gradually absorbed by inland strategic companies.

 A double geopolitical status of inland areas which, in many cases, is repeated also in the current Belt and Road Initiative.

 In 1986, the “open-ended” contracts for the manpower working in State-owned companies came to an end.

 In October 1987,the 13th CPC Congress was held, in which – for the first time – there was talk about the “commodity economy”, i.e. a two-tier mechanism, in which the market is matched and also “corrected” by the old national planning.

 A sort of re-edition, for internal use, of the formula “one country, two systems” implemented by China with the agreements for Macao and Hong Kong.

 In 1988, however, the 7thNational People’s Congress officially legitimized the private initiative (not the mere ownership) and enabled private individuals to buy State-owned companies.

 The term “People’s ownership” was also deleted, while individuals and groups, even non-Chinese ones, could buy land with a system similar to that of the British real estate leasing.

 Profits, wherever made, had to be reinvested in the company that originated them, before requesting any financing from the People’s Bank.

 The Special Economic Zones, modelled again on the Hong Kong system, became five.

 Hence innovation on the coasts and strategic companies in the central regions – mainly public ones, which still remained almost completely public.

 In April 1989, Jiang Zemin rose to power.

 Student demonstrations also began in Tiananmen Square, where, year after year, the various anti-regime organizations gathered: Falun Gong, the networks of many illegal parties, unrecognized union organizations and many “spontaneous” groups.

 And some old “Red Guards”.

 Zhao Ziyang, the Party leader already defenestrated by Jiang Zemin, was in fact at the centre of “spontaneous” organizations.

 The various Autonomous Federations of Workers -spread by location and not by industry – were legally created.

 Gorbachev’s visit took place in May 1989.

  That was the key moment of a long series of doctrinal, practical, cultural and historical differences that – from the very beginning – divided the two great Eastern heirs to the Marxist-Leninist Third International.

 What really mattered to the Chinese leadership was that the Russian crisis did not overwhelm the Chinese Communists: that was the meaning of the declaration signed by Gorbachev, which regarded the “peaceful coexistence” of the two Communist regimes.

 The leader of the Soviet Party was made fun of – not even so elegantly – not because he had reformed the Soviet economic system – in a way, however, that the Chinese deemed wrong – but for one reason only: he had relinquished the Party’s role in the reformist process, which the CPSU had to lead and guide for China, from the very beginning.

An “economicist” mistake, as the CPC’s ideologues said – yet another proof of the Marxist roughness of the “Northern enemy”, as Deng Xiaoping called Russia.

 Sarcastic sniggers on the lips of Chinese leaders. Then Gorbachev explained again his perestrojka and glas’nost, but the Chinese leaders, whose power was based on Party’s bayonets, kept on not taking him seriously.

 Days before the arrival of the Soviet leader, at least one million people had gathered in Tiananmen Square.

 The problems that the Chinese leadership had to solve in a short lapse of time were radical: the “hard” wing that was previously a minority prevailed and managed to convince Jiang Zemin.

 The Party and its authority – the basis of any transformation, even the most radical one – were re-established without much talk. It was impossible to think about a heir to the “Long March” that dissolved the Party within “society”.

 On May 19, the CPC decided to follow the hard line and the military forces reached the areas near the Square, from the outskirts of Beijing.

 Few hours later, the Square was completely cleared, but that was done the hard way.

 Shortly afterwards, at the 4th CPC Plenum, Jiang Zemin –  also following the experience of Tiananmen Square – returned to one of his old theories and developed the “Three Represents” model, i.e. the idea that the CPC’s power was based on its “vast representation” of the Chinese productive forces, of the cultural and technological avant-gardes and of the wide strata of population.

 In other words, the Chinese society – and its economy, in particular – was reformed by bringing the elites together, part of whom were in Tiananmen Square, but also the large crowds still organized by the Party.

 A Confucian middle way that was particularly successful.

 Hence, Zhao Ziyang definitively lost the game within the Party that, however, was also inside the Tiananmen Square insurgency.

 Once the crisis was over, Deng Xiaoping left also the last very strong power in Jiang’s hands: the leadership of the Central Military Commission.

 Shortly afterwards – and there was nothing more symbolic than that event – the Stock Exchange of Shanghai reopened. A reopening that had been expected since the 1930s.

 Later also the Shenzhen Securities Exchange opened. In both of them, any securities – including those issued by the State – were traded, but there was only one deep logic: to acquire productive capital to generate strong and self-sustained development of the coasts and of the high value-added industries that had to compete on the world free market, without granting protection and aid that would go to the detriment of the deep productive structures of the internal regions.

 In 1992, Deng’s journey to Southern borders had a clear route, although the CPC’s leadership had always had some doubts about the “free economic zones”. The core of the issue was that the GDP had to be increased in the lapse of time between the 1990s and the beginning of the Third Millennium.

  It had to be rapidly increased from 6% to 10%.

 Without that “quantitative” assessment – just to use the old Communist jargon – there could be no “qualitative” transformation of Chinese society.

 Everything had to be done soon – well, but soon. That was the characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s years – extraordinary years, in some respects.

 In a short lapse of time, the Party developed the concepts of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of “market Socialism”, which are so important also in President Xi Jinping’s current policy line.

 There were also other changes that, in a few years, led to the current Socialism with Chinese characteristics, as advocated by President Xi Jinping. However, everything could be done from a legal view point began in those years.

 The transformation process of the Chinese economy is long, powerful and complex, but – unlike what is often said in the West – it is never a mere market mechanism or a naive adaptation of the Party or the State to the absolute Western rules of globalization.

 As early as the 1990s, China has decided to govern market globalization and not just being a part of it. It wants to lead the process so as to be – now that the end of the century about which Deng thought has long been over – the axis of globalization and the centre of the new global hegemonies.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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How China Exacerbates Global Fragility and What Can be Done to Bolster Democratic Resilience to Confront It

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Authors: Caitlin Dearing Scott and Isabella Mekker

From its declared policy of noninterference and personnel contributions to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions to its purported role in mediating conflicts, China has long sought to portray itself as a responsible global leader, pushing narratives about building a “community of common destiny” and promoting its model of governance and economic and political development as a path to stability. This narrative belies the reality. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-style “stability,” whether to protect Belt and Road Investments (BRI) or regimes with favorable policies towards China, in practice facilitates authoritarianism and human rights violations, contributes to environmental degradation and corruption, and undermines democratic governance, all of which can fuel instability, intentionally or otherwise.

In pursuit of its true goal – “a world safe for the party” – China has leveraged its diplomatic and economic power to weaken  the international human rights system, bolstering support for illiberal regimes, contributing to democratic decline and exacerbating global fragility in the process. Nowhere is this more apparent than in conflict-affected contexts.

Conflict Resolution, CCP Style

Although China brands itself as a ‘promoter of stability, peace, and unity’, its very definition of stability is built on its authoritarian model of governance. This, plus its concerns about non-interference in its own domestic issues, informs its conflict resolution approach, which emphasizes host state consent and political settlement, two-ideas that can be laudable in theory, depending on the context. In practice, however, China’s conflict mediation efforts in some instances have provided support to incumbent regimes who are perpetuating violence and conflict, promoting a  ‘stability’ that disregards the voices of vulnerable populations and the need for inclusive governance. In the case of the Syrian civil war, China’s “political solution” meant maintaining China-friendly Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power, while blocking resolutions condemning the regime’s brutality against its citizens. 

“Stability” promoted by China can also come at the expense of human rights. China (and Russia) have previously pushed for cuts to human rights positions within peacekeeping missions, endangering the capacity of these missions to protect civilians in conflict.  In Myanmar, where the military is committing unprecedented human rights violations against its own citizens, China initially blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the military coup and other international efforts to restore stability at a time when a strong international response was much needed. This was in line with China’s previous engagement in the country, working closely with the military regime to “mediate” conflict near the Chinese border in a way that preserved China’s interests and influence, but did little to actually address conflict. After a growing humanitarian crisis began to threaten its investments on the Myanmar side of the border, however, China changed rhetorical course, showing where human rights violations stand in its hierarchy of stability.

Advancing China’s Interests, Undermining Governance

China’s policies in fragile states mirror its unstated preference for expanding its economic and political interests, even if securing them sidelines the stated imperative of addressing fragility. In some instances, China has lobbied for UN policies in conflict-affected contexts that appear to support its own agenda rather than – or sometimes at the expense of – peace. According to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2020 report to Congress, “China has shown an apparent willingness to leverage its influence in the UN peacekeeping operations system to advance its economic interests in African countries, raising the possibility that Beijing is subverting UN norms and procedures in the process.” Per the report, the most notable example of this was in 2014 when China lobbied to expand the UN Mission in South Sudan to protect oil installations of which the China National Petroleum Corporation held a 40 percent stake.

Moreover, China’s pursuit of its interests sets up countries on unstable trajectories. China’s economic investment policies and initiatives exacerbates governance deficits and increases fragility by encouraging corruption, facilitating authoritarianism and human rights violations, and contributing to environmental degradation, all key drivers of conflict. Two cases from Nigeria and Pakistan highlight the point.

In Nigeria, China’s investment projects have exacerbated corruption and fueled distrust in local government – key drivers of conflict and intercommunal violence in the country. China has exploited poor regulatory environments and worked within illegal and corrupt frameworks, often tied to armed groups and criminal networks. In one illustrative example, China state-owned timber trading companies  offered bribes to local officials to illegally harvest endangered rosewood. Members of local communities have cited feelings of exploitation by officials accepting bribes from Chinese businessmen, further stressing fragile ties between local government and citizens. Such business practices also demonstrate a blatant disregard for the environmental consequences of illegally harvesting endangered flora and fauna. Moreover, the inherently opaque nature of these projects that are tied to CCP interests makes it difficult to demand accountability.

Similarly in Pakistan, a 62-billion-dollar project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) aimed at linking Xinjiang to the Arabian sea, has exacerbated tension in conflict-affected provinces. The project plans to build infrastructure and extract resources from several less developed regions, while overwhelmingly benefitting industrial and political hubs such as Punjab. Many provinces, including Balochistan and Sindh, have accused political elites of altering the route of the corridor in their own interests, thus further marginalizing their communities. Separatist groups have launched several attacks throughout the country, not only fueling conflict between Pakistani ethnic groups but also leading to attacks against Chinese expatriates. Recently, prominent voices from within China have called for a military intervention in Pakistan. CPEC has increased military presence throughout small villages, sparked an uptick in violent conflict along the route, and further eroded trust in local government institutions.

These cases may of course signal more opportunism and indifference by China to the impact of its engagement on stability in any given country, as opposed to an explicit attempt to undermine democratic governance (as it has done elsewhere in support of pro-China interests). Regardless of the intent, however, the impact is the same. China’s focus on political leverage and profits first and foremost undermines stability – and China likewise can benefit from instability in states with corrupt politicians interested in trading local resources for short-term political gains.

What Can be Done: Bolstering Democratic Resilience to Address Fragility and Foreign Influence

Foreign authoritarian influence has a compounding impact in conflict-affected contexts, further undermining governance structures, institutions, and processes that can mitigate or exacerbate fragility.  Good governance, on the contrary, can not only help countries prevent and manage conflict, but can also help countries address the myriad challenges associated with foreign authoritarian influence. Strong democratic institutions help societies respond positively and productively to threats both domestic and foreign.

Targeted investment in democracy in conflict-affected contexts vulnerable to foreign authoritarian influence offers an important opportunity for utilizing the Global Fragility Strategy in support of US foreign policy initiatives and advancing the Biden Administration’s policy priorities to tackle climate change, prevent authoritarian resurgence, confront corruption, and prevail in strategic competition with China.  An investment in support of democracy and good governance to address any one of these issues will reap dividends across each of these issues – engaging in conflict prevention and stabilization programming will both advance global democracy and advance US goals vis-à-vis China and other authoritarian rivals. Such investments, which must be long-term to account for the compounding impact of foreign authoritarian influence in already fragile environments, should include:

  • Supporting governments, civil society, and citizens to better understand, expose and counter foreign authoritarian influence, particularly in conflict-affected contexts where data and research efforts can be challenging. An understanding of China’s playbook is critical to countering CCP influence operations;
  • Helping independent media to investigate and expose foreign authoritarian influence and how it fuels conflict, whether through training, financial support, or other protections of the civic and information space, to raise public awareness of the impact of such engagement on conflict dynamics and promote transparency and accountability in dealings with foreign actors;  
  • Developing evidenced-based tools to prevent and mitigate foreign authoritarian influence in fragile contexts;
  • Strengthening electoral institutions, political parties, legislative bodies, and judiciaries to uproot elite capture and mitigate malign influence;
  • Leveraging diplomacy to build political will and incentives for government officials to resist foreign malign influences. Such diplomatic efforts can include increased outreach and contact with countries previously neglected by the US – but prioritized by China – and public diplomacy to both expose the CCP’s misleading narrative and advance narratives about what democracy can deliver;  and
  • Coordinating with similarly-minded donors such as the European Union, Japan, and Australia, to implement a unified approach to match the scale of Chinese investment and maximize the impact of any intervention.

Only democracy can help countries navigate the nexus of domestic and foreign threats to their stability. In the era of COVID-19, authoritarian resurgence, and climate crisis, supporting countries to develop these “resilience” fundamentals is a sound – and necessary – investment.

*Isabella Mekker is a Program Associate with IRI’s Center for Global Impact, working on countering foreign authoritarian influence and conflict prevention and stabilization programming.

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Politicizing the COVID-19 pandemic and Xi Jinping’s vision to reshape the new world order

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First: The internal and external strategic objectives of Comrade Chinese President “Xi Jinping“, in parallel with the international partnerships and relations of the Communist Party of China “CPC” around the world

Second: The recognition of Chinese Comrade President “Xi Jinping” before the leaders and youth of the Central School of the Communist Party “CPC” of the profound global changes post (Covid-19) world

Third: The relationship between the global achievements of the Communist Party of China, and the Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping” call for establishing an international multipolar world, and the politicization of the “Covid-19” pandemic in the USA and the West

Fourth: The relationship between the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic and the test the (new global governing systems and global governance) from the Chinese perspective

   The Egyptian researcher was invited as an expert in Chinese and Asian political affairs, by the “Friends of the International Chinese Belt and Road Initiative Forum” in the Pakistani capital “Islamabad”, on Friday, September 10, 2021, to talk about:

  “Politicizing the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic and linking it to China, and the reasons behind this matter“, in a meeting that was intensively covered by the international media, in several international, Chinese and Asian websites, newspapers and news agencies, in reference to the importance of this event for Beijing.

   In fact, it is not possible in any way to separate the attempts of the United States of America and the West to distract China towards achieving its primary goal of (building a multipolar, multilateral world and international poles), and the vision of Comrade Chinese President “Xi Jinping” on (reshaping the world order and makes it more compatible with Chinese interests and values).

   Where China’s leaders see that the liberal international system reflects the (global vision of the white colonial powers victorious in the Second World War), which it created to serve their interests at the headquarters of the United Nations “UN”.  Accordingly, Comrade “Xi Jinping” has formulated a strategy for China consisting of (two points), as follows:

  1. China is increasing its power, personnel, and financial influence within existing global governing institutions.
  • At a time when China’s leaders, on the other hand, must work on (building new institutions centered around China), such as:

(Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Road Fund) … besides, some other relevant Chinese international institutions.

– Hence, the Egyptian researcher sought to draw attention to the “real reasons behind the principle of politicization of the origin of the “COVID-19″ pandemic, and its relationship to China’s international achievements”, through the following division:

– First: The internal and external strategic objectives of Comrade Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, in parallel with the international partnerships and relationships of the Communist Party of China “CPC” around the world

  China has developed a comprehensive plan that the United States of America and the West tried to obstruct, in order to prevent China from internationally rising. The most important successes of China internationally are represented, by:

1) The ruling Communist Party of China has sought to establish international partnerships and party relations under the supervision of the senior and central leaders of the party, which is known as, the strategy of the (relationship between the Communist Party of China “CPC” and the other international parties), as an important part of the Chinese long-term strategy.

2) The Communist Party of China has internally developed a plan adopted by itself, represented in the (realization of the original goal of seeking the happiness of the Chinese people and the renaissance of the Chinese nation, as well as the unity of the world).

3) The Communist Party of China, in cooperation with the international parties with the same ideological thought and even intellectually opposite with it, seeking to the (commitment of achieving consensus and mobilizing the international forces to build a new China).

4) The Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping“, raised an important international Chinese slogan with many connotations, represented in:

“The world is common to all, and we are a nation with one common destination for humanity”

5) In order to achieve these Chinese priorities externally, the Communist Party “CPC” and its Committee on Foreign Communications and external Relations of the “CPC” worked in parallel and in line with the “Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, as an official institution together, through the (strategy of the Communist Party of China to deepen exchanges and cooperation with international political parties, and give full play to the for the advantages of contacts between the various political parties with the Communist Party in Beijing), in response to the call of the times to build a community of a shared future between China and the world, especially African, poor and developing countries.

6) Chinese President “Xi Jinping” was keen to (confronting international hegemony and unilateralism by Washington), and President “Xi Jinping” in his capacity as “General Secretary of the Communist Party of China”, stressed that “the fate of the world should be controlled by all countries on an equal footing, as international rules should jointly be formulated by all countries, and all countries of the world together manage the various affairs of the world”

7) Indeed, the senior communist leaders in Beijing have succeeded in transforming this global economic strategy into a (trustworthy support for the votes of the members of the Group of 77 in its favor in various forums, and at all known international parties).

8) To achieve the previous priorities, President Comrade “Xi Jinping” personally supervised the (transformation of the People’s Liberation Army from an institution based on the Continental Defense Army into a force to project power and influence beyond China’s borders), through the expansion of (navy, air, cyberspace capabilities and satellites). Here, Comrade Xi’s stated mission is to “build a world-class military institution to fight and win wars” in the post (Covid-19) world.

9) We also find the continuation of Chinese national efforts aimed at transforming China into a (technological superpower), imposing its global power and technical progress on (fifth generation networks of communications, semiconductors, supercomputing, and artificial intelligence).

10) The Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping“, and the leaders of the Communist Party of China, supported what is known as the “sovereignty of the Chinese people”, as the (first priority). The Communist Party “CPC” officials and Comrade “Xi”, in their political speeches, considered that:

“The position of the Chinese people is the basic political position of the Communist Party, making sincerely serving the Chinese people the basic objective of the Party, realizing the people’s aspirations for a better life, due to their constant pursuit and struggle, and promoting reform and development to achieve greater benefit and better well-off of living for all”

 Thus, the Communist Party “CPC” has always and along the way won the support and support of the masses of the Chinese people.

11) Many Western researchers, experts and academics themselves confirmed that the goals and endeavors of the Communist Party of China at every stage are very clear, and it adjusts its policies, according to the changing domestic and external situations in order to meet the needs of the Chinese people, and here, we can indicate out to a (research report issued by Kennedy College of Government at Harvard University) in 2020, which showed that:

“The Chinese government, led by the Communist Party of China, enjoys more than 93% of support and satisfaction among the Chinese people”, as another survey conducted by (York University in Canada), which is showed that:

“The Chinese people trust their government by up to 98%, and that trust has increased, especially after the emergence of Covid-19”

12) The Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping”, and the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party were also keen on deepening (belonging and unity) among the Chinese people, with Comrade “Xi’s affirmation” that:

“History’s journey has no end, but the future has already begun”

13) The “anti-corruption campaign” led by Comrade “Xi Jinping” in the Chinese interior, which was dubbed “Tigers and Flies“, included more than one million senior and junior officials of the Communist Party of China.

14) In order to achieve China’s goals internationally, the Chinese leader “Xi Jinping” presented his vision of the (future of China), which he called as the “Chinese Dream“, within the framework of a project entitled: “Rebirth of the Chinese Nation“, and succeeded in carrying out economic reforms that contributed to reducing the decline in economic growth, limiting state ownership of industry, combating pollution, and most importantly implementing the giant land transport project, known as the “Silk Road Initiative”

   Hence, China’s global achievements and its call for a multipolar international world made it as a primary target for attempts to obstruct it by the United States of America and its allies in the West.

Second: The recognition of Chinese Comrade President “Xi Jinping” before the leaders and youth of the Central School of the Communist Party “CPC” of the profound global changes post (Covid-19) world

   President “Xi Jinping’s realization” of the importance of (political education for Chinese youth) in the post (Covid-19 world), came as Comrade “Xi” affirmed to the youth and leaders of the Communist Party, that the most important reason for China’s success and steadfastness now is to work together on the necessity of mobilizing leaders and the youth of the Communist Party of China and its president with the (Network of Friends around the World), because of those current profound international changes that the world is going through now, through the following affirmations:

1) President “Xi Jinping” believes that there is a “politicized war” against China, as a result of the changes that the world is currently witnessing, by saying:

“The world is currently undergoing profound changes that have not been seen in a century and is rapidly evolving after the Coronavirus pandemic”

2) Comrade “Xi Jinping’s affirmation” of the profound indications for the global changes came in his speech before the (Central Institute of the Communist Party), which is an educational institute of the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party, as a signal from him to keep pace with the Communist Party of China with current international events.

3) In the same context, the Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping”, confessed that:

“China is bothering with its international stances”

4) The most dangerous message of the Chinese President was what came from Comrade “Xi’s affirmation” before the leaders and youth of the Central School of the ruling Communist Party, about:

“China must not budge one iota on matters of principle, and adhere to China’s sovereignty, security and development interests with unprecedented firmness”

5) In the context of “Xi Jinping’s keenness” to pay attention to the Chinese youth to lead the Chinese nation, Comrade “Xi”, called:

“Young officials should uphold their ideals, adhere to the party’s loyalty, seek truthfulness from reality and facts, shoulder responsibilities, and strive to become the backbone of a society in which the Party and the people will trust together”

6) In the context of Chinese President “Xi Jinping’s assertion” that: “China strongly confronts any attempts against it”, emphasizing “China’s military and economic renaissance, as matters, according to Comrade “Xi Jinping” that are “irreversible”, and stressed out these points in his international speech, which was globally highlighted, on the occasion of the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China on July 9, 2021.

7) Believing in the role of the “Chinese people” in the struggle against Washington and the West and their attempts to distort China’s international image, President “Xi Jinping” addressed in front of crowds of Chinese audiences in the “Tiananmen” famous Square, location in the center of the Chinese capital, “Beijing”, with the affirmation led by “Xi” in his speech to the Chinese masses, by confirming that:

“China does not oppress other countries”

8) Chinese President “Xi” also warned that “no one should try to “persecute China”, saying:

“They beat their heads against a steel fence”

9) What stopped the Egyptian researcher most during Comrade “Xi Jinping’s discourse” to the Chinese masses on the occasion of the centenary of the Communist Party of China, while the Comrade “Xi’s affirmation” of his rejection of foreign attempts to distort the image of the Communist Party of China.

10) Today, Comrade “Xi Jinping” is keenly to internationally talk about the (role of the Communist Party in the modern history of China), by saying:

“The Communist Party of China has an essential part to the growth of the Chinese state, and attempts to separate it from the people will fail”

11) We find Comrade “Xi’s affirmation” of the necessity of (unification and the unity), as the only way that can (save China), and is capable of achieving the “development in China” in both of the internal and external side.

12) In the context of attempts to politicize the “Covid-19” pandemic, and stigmatize China with it, Comrade “Xi Jinping” confirmed that:

“We will never in China allow anyone to bully, oppress or subjugate China”

13) In a reference by “Xi Jinping” to the strength of the Chinese people in defending of their ruling Communist Party, his assertion came that:

“Anyone who dares to threaten China, its leaders and its ruling Communist Party, hits their head at the mighty steel wall represented by more than 1.4 billion Chinese citizens”

   Thus, we can understand the overall current international situation, that the increase in the intensity, strength and fierceness of the American-Western competition, in the face of China and the attempt to mobilize certain regional and international parties against each other, especially after the outbreak of “Covid-19“, which has contributed to the deepening of the global differences and the intensification of conflicts. So, China has repeatedly accused unfair forces of trying to curb its growth, and these statements were taken as an explicit and clear Chinese signal to Washington in the first place.

Third: The relationship between the global achievements of the Communist Party of China, and the Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping” call for establishing an international multipolar world, and the politicization of the “Covid-19” pandemic in the USA and the West

  Chinese President Comrade “Xi Jinping” has repeatedly warned against “politicizing the issue of the COVID-19 virus” or stigmatizing it as the Chinese virus. In his international political discourses, he has explicitly pointed out that:

1) Refusing to marginalize or exclude others or certain countries from working with the international community, by the call of Comrade “Xi” in his speeches on:

“We must reject the attempts to build blocs to exclude others and oppose the zero-sum approach. We must view each other as members of the same large family, continue to win-win cooperation, transcend those ideological differences and not fall into the trap of clash of civilizations”

2) Comrade “Xi Jinping” linked as well the relationship between the Coronavirus pandemic and the current international concepts, by emphasizing in his political discourses, about:

“The COVID-19 pandemic reminds the world that we are living in a global village that is interconnected and has a common interest, in which all countries are closely linked and share a common future”

3) In an important speech by President “Xi” at the (Annual Boao Forum for Asia) in April 2021, Comrade “Xi Jinping” criticized the efforts of countries that aimed at “building barriers” or “separating countries from others and dividing the world into warring or conflicting fronts”. Here, Comrade “Xi Jinping” has asserted on:

“Dividing the world into many competitors and building barriers between nations without working together or adopting the principle of common destiny of humanity will inevitably harm others and completely will not benefit anyone”

4) President “Xi Jinping’s long-standing call” for “reform of global governance” came to better reflect a broader and more diverse range of visions and values ​​from the international community, including their own, rather than those of a few major countries. This was as expected has rejected by Washington that has deeply warned of achieving the Chinese objectives, and the American officials have been claiming that:

“USA is a leader of the libral democratic values ​​in the world, and is globally leading the paths of defending human rights”

5) Comrade “Xi Jinping’s statements” at the “Boao Forum for Asia“, in April 2021, confirmed the purpose of his calls for a (new world order), because:

“The world wants justice, not hegemony”

6) Here, Comrade “Xi”, along with the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, are keen, in all international events, to emphasize that:

“The big country must appear with an international appearance worthy of it, with its ability to assume more international responsibilities”

   We can understand and conclude from this above understanding that the Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping” was keenly to referring to the concepts of “hegemony, unilateralism and isolationism”, besides the other related terms, but Comrade “Xi” didn’t mention or refer to a specific country in his statements or all of his political speeches, but the Chinese officials have recently explicitly referring to the American “hegemony”, in a public criticism of Washington’s imposition of its power and influence in trade and geopolitics in an unfair manner that harms the interests of other countries.

Fourth: The relationship between the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic and the test the (new global governing systems and global governance) from the Chinese perspective

   The Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping“, has called in all his current political discourses on the need to work to establish “international economic blocs” that work for the benefit of developing countries, a multipolar system and a multilateral international world, which is directly and reflected largely in the “increased American competition in the face of  China, and the attempt by Washington and its allies in the West to politicize the origin of the Coronavirus, by calling for its stigmatization and appending it to China“.

  Washington’s attempt to turn the world against China by causing the spread and outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic, which was documented by Chinese President “Xi Jinping” in his political speeches, through the following points:

1) President “Xi’s admission” that the world’s ruling systems are the main criterion for their success in combating the global epidemic, certainly came in an international speech to him, by stressing out:

“The spread and spill over of “Covid-19″ is a major test of the ability of countries’ governance systems to withstand or decline, and a test of the global system of governance”

2) Comrade “Xi” goes extremely beyond, by calling for a “global governance system”. China developed its philosophy and features, through “Xi’s emphasis”, on:

“The global governance system must adapt to evolving global political and economic dynamics, as an attempt to face the global challenges and adopt the fundamental direction of peace, development and win-win cooperation”

3) Comrade “Xi” was also keen to set clear moral standards that guide China’s relationship with the world, and the world’s relations with each other, by calling:

“Countries must not violate ethical standards and comply with international standards, provide the global public good, bear due responsibilities and be in the good faith of their citizens”

4) In the talk of Comrade “Xi Jinping” about the (relationship between the current global economic system and the Corona pandemic), Comrade “Xi Jinping”, indicated that:

“The spread of COVID-19 reminds the world that economic globalization is an indisputable fact and a historical trend”

5) In order to achieve the success of any governmental system or political system, President “Xi” has stressed the need to adhere to the following criteria, as:

“We must strike an appropriate balance between government and market, equity and efficiency, growth and income distribution, technology and unemployment, to ensure full and balanced development that benefits people of all countries, sectors and backgrounds in an equitable manner”

6) Here, we find that what was and still angers the United States of America and the West the most against Comrade “Xi Jinping” is his call that:

“We must continue open and inclusive development, commit to building an open world economy, and support the multilateral trading system with the “World Trade Organization” “WTO” as the cornerstone”

7) Here, we find that China’s attempt to create and strengthen regional and international ties, by strengthening its relations with countries within (collective frameworks), each of which is specialized in a specific region, such as: (ASEAN Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and others. In the sense that these institutions are working to create (parallel frameworks) for those on which the current international system is based, which is dominated by the United States of America with the help of its allies, which has provoked the United States of America with the continuation of Chinese calls and efforts to have a “central leadership role in a new pluralistic international system”, in order to globally extend its influence.

8) With the increasing calls of Comrade “Xi Jinping” for Chinese involvement in the international multilateral issues, from here, China found it in its interest to call for new global regimes, in order to enhance its international standing, thus China contributed to reaching a “climate agreement“, and increased its efforts in confronting the multiple international issues, such as: (confronting poverty, the spread of epidemics, all global and development efforts), and other related mechanisms, which aroused the ire of the United States of America by inviting China to lead the international efforts in the field of global governance systems and to develop a preliminary vision for the shape of new systems of governing institutions and Governance, which are mainly for (labor and management), additionally the peacekeeping efforts are under the direct supervision of the United Nations “UN”.

9) In an understanding from China of the reality of the current international situation in the post (Covid-19) world, the Chinese comrade “Xi Jinping”, has confirmed by saying:

“China’s situations may have been negatively affected by the global ordeal of the outbreak of “Covid-19″, but China is not in a hurry to transform itself into a great power, but rather announced that it has three decades to reach, and the future is still open for it to achieve this possibility”

10) China is currently working to deepen several other goals, through which it sees that:

“The best way to enhance China’s international standing is to safeguard the interests of the largest number of countries, strengthen the foundations of economic dependability, and stress out on achieving the mutual benefits of relationships among the different nations, not just their own interests”

11) For achieving the above-mentioned objectives, China, through the (International Belt and Road initiative “BRI”), has implemented infrastructure projects in multiple countries, established road and railway networks, and built electricity and water plants, which makes it easier for it to globally promote its call in “multi-polar world“.

   China has focused its efforts to be the “largest trading partner of many Asian and African countries”, facilitating its international efforts to establish a new administrative system, known as: (Global Governance and Managing Political Systems from a mainly Chinese perspective), which greatly angers Washington and its Western allies.

   Through the previous analysis of the Egyptian researcher, we note that “by comparing the American strategic goals with their Chinese counterparts and their development initiatives around the world”, the United States of America shows its achievements by being the (maker of peace through force and not peace), the call for a new Middle East, and a unilateral climate agreement, and others.

   Perhaps this is what was actually put forward by the speech of the former President of the United States of America “Trump” when he spoke about the “achievements of the United States of America internationally in confronting China“, during the (deliberations of the seventy-fifth session of the World General Assembly of the United Nations “UN”), and from here, it becomes clear to us the difference between the Chinese initiatives of development to serve (global development goals), and among those American goals that support the use of force, with their failure to use it effectively, as happened in (Afghanistan and Iraq), and others.

   Hence, the attempts of the United States of America to stigmatize the “pandemic of the Coronavirus” and attach it to China, by confusing the “scientific reasons for the causes of the global outbreak of the pandemic, and those real underlying political, economic and strategic reasons behind the principle of American and Western politicization of Covid-19”, mainly aims to:

“Distracting Chinese attention away from those American international problems and crises by raising the world against China and paying attention to it for causing the spread of the Corona virus, so that the United States of America is unique in leadership on the international scene within the framework of international hegemony and unilateralism”.

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East Asia

The war and the treaty that proclaimed Japan’s emergence as a world power

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September 5 marks 116 years since the end of the Russo-Japanese War, with the signing of the U.S.-mediated Treaty of Portsmouth. Fought in the beginning of the 20th century, it has a unique place in history, as the warring sides fought over the territory of two neutral states China and Korea and it also saw a European power being defeated by an Asian power for the first time in the modern era.

The Background

1904-05 was a tense period in the history of Asia. The story begins a few decades back when the island nation of Japan emerged from over two-and-a-half century of isolation, following the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In the next three to four decades, the country would undergo a rapid modernisation of its society, army, navy, and industry, with the adoption of Western methods and standards. The Russian Empire which already had control over Siberia was looking to expand further into East Asia, particularly towards the east of River Amur which would give them outlets of warm-water ports in the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea, and thereby in the Pacific Ocean. Since the 1850s, Russian urban settlements appeared along the left bank of River Amur, despite protests from a weakening Qing China.

Owing to the domestic turmoil in the backdrop of the struggle against British and French aggression and the Taiping Rebellion, imperial China was not in a position to resist Russian power. Finally, China was forced to cede to Russia all the territory from the mouth of the Amur till the frontiers of the Korean peninsula, including the region where the port of Vladivostok would emerge soon. Russian expansionist policy went unchallenged for the next three decades. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, Russia’s interest in Siberia, Russian Far East and East Asia saw a revival, but this time there it had to confront a newly emerging Asian power – Japan.

The decisive victory of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which was fought over the control of Korea, demonstrated Japanese power and the weakness of the Qing Empire. Before the war, Korea had long been a key client state of the Chinese empire, but its strategic location opposite the Japanese archipelago, with all its natural resources like coal and iron, attracted Japanese interest in the peninsula. The war ended in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in 1905. After the war, Korea was removed from the suzerainty of China and was placed under the Japanese sphere of influence. Taiwan and parts of Manchuria also came under Japanese control.

Japanese power emerges from the shadows

In the next ten years, Japan, a collection of islands in the Pacific with a largely rugged terrain, would go into war with a European great power and a bi-continental giant – Russia. With the 1894-95 war with China, Japan now has control over the Korean Peninsula. This signalled Russia that an upcoming face-off with Japan was inevitable due to its own conflicting interest in the region. A slew of diplomatic efforts by Russia followed as a run-up to the war. Tsar Nicholas II of Russia led the efforts along with his cousin, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II, and France, a part of the so-called ‘Triple Intervention’, trying to persuade Japan to give up its territorial demands in Northeast Asia in return for an increased indemnity.

In 1896, Russia even forged an alliance with the Qing Empire to protect the latter’s territorial integrity from foreign aggressions in the future. But, in fact what followed was the scramble for China’s coastal territories among the Russians, Germans, French and the British in the remaining part of the 1890s, which culminated in the rise of resistance movements against the Qing dynasty, including the Boxer Rebellion. In the meantime, Japan was building up its own armed forces by the way of increased conscription that gathered momentum in the late 1890s.

The breakout of war

The Japanese strategy was such that it never intended of attacking Russia directly, but the focus was put on winning an early and decisive victory that would secure their hegemony in Northeast Asia without any rivals. Russian leadership was also ineffective to counter a well-prepared and well-equipped land and naval forces like Japan’s. Realising Japanese strength in the region, Russia’s minister of war, Aleksey Kuropatkin, in fact, recommended the Tsar to abandon his imperial ambitions in Manchuria and the Amur River region.

Even though the Tsar accepted his minster’s proposal, the extremists at the imperial court and other influential commercial interest groups behind the Russia’s expansionist project in East Asia acted as a hindrance for its execution. Meanwhile, the Russian military was left in the lurch to fight the Japanese, who were well-determined to win any battle. In short, Russia heavily underestimated Japan’s military edge. Thus, in February 1904, the Russo-Japanese War broke out with the Battle of Port Arthur, then a naval base and currently in the Liaodong Province of north-eastern China, which was then leased to Russia by the Qing dynasty of China from 1897 onwards. It was a surprise night attack by the Japanese naval forces on the Russian fleet stationed in the port.

The war escalated and went on for the next one-and-a-half years. Russia suffered a number of defeats in the battles that followed, both in land and sea, with some being indecisive. Tsar Nicholas II thought that Russia could win if it continued to fight, and he chose to remain engaged in the war and wait for the outcomes of key naval battles. By May 1905, Russia’s final glimmer of hope for victory faded in sight with its defeat in the Battle of Tsushima, a strait located halfway between the Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula.

Negotiations begin in Portsmouth, the peace treaty is signed

By August 1905, negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese War began when the then American President Theodore Roosevelt invited both nations to conduct direct negotiations at a neutral site of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the north-eastern coast of the United States. The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was specifically selected as the site for the negotiations by President Roosevelt. The final treaty was signed on 5 September 1905, affirming Japanese presence in south Manchuria and Korea. It also ceded the southern half of the island of Sakhalin to Japan. It was the first international treaty to be signed in the U.S. and also with American mediation.

The Treaty of Portsmouth would set the balance of power in East Asia and the Pacific for the next four decades. It effectively ended Russia’s expansionist policies in Northeast Asia. The war and the subsequent treaty announced the emergence of Japan to the status of a world power. American diplomacy, thus, began its journey, which would reach it zenith following the two world wars. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt was awarded the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the Russo-Japanese War. The following four decades would witness Japan going on a rampage across Asia in pursuit of its militaristic ambitions, particularly in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, before it would savour defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1945.

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