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Afghanistan’s Security Distribution in the region

Sajad Abedi

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Considering the weapons and skills of the Central Asian armies that have weapons and skills of the former Soviet Union, the forces of these countries are likely to face more severe insurgent resistance. It should be kept in mind that they cannot provoke all people. At no point in the past twelve years, Central Asian countries have not been willing to join a multi-national force and have not shown interest in it. Also, the strong combination of Central Asian armies in Afghanistan would be unpleasant. For example, speculation is that the Tajik army will be deployed to Tajikistan in Afghanistan. The same will be the case with the Uzbek and Turkmen forces. In this case, they will receive a brutal response from the Taliban. In fact, the Taliban will provoke Pashtun nationalism against forces from Central Asian countries to break up Afghanistan (from the Taliban’s perspective). Pashtuns do not turn their attention to this and will target Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens of Afghanistan. In such a scenario, Afghanistan easily falls into a full-blown civil war.

Other countries in the region that are likely to send troops to Afghanistan include Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt from the Middle East. Since people in these countries are involved with the Afghan insurgency, it is very unlikely that these countries will join the security force of several regional nationalities in Afghanistan. Middle East countries do not want to bet on deploying troops in Afghanistan. It can be very unpleasant to fight with insurgents that are being used by them in these countries, especially when these countries have not yet gone through the Arab Spring.

It is clear from the information that terrorist groups and their supporters have made a determination to horrify in Afghanistan in the coming year. The Taliban’s neglect of the Afghan government’s peace plan clearly shows that the Taliban have focused their attention on the war with the government in Afghanistan. The process of electing the National Assembly and the district councils is as important as the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan, the failure of this process is also important for the Taliban and terrorist groups in Afghanistan. In addition, developments in the region and international affairs, such as the withdrawal from the United States of America of the program of action with Iran and the defeat of ISIL in the Middle East, have had a significant impact on increasing insecurity in Afghanistan.

The ISIL group has carried out the most deadly attacks in Afghanistan this year, and has been able to focus more attention on analysts and news outlets. But what is most worrying is that this group has turned to the massacre of a particular social group in Afghanistan to flame up the fire of sectarian strife in Afghanistan, which, if not blocked by the government, has further concerns will create. The ISIS group launched this year in Afghanistan with a deadly explosion in the Shiite section of western Kabul, killing about 69 dead and 120 wounded. The incident took place at a polling station for the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Shiite neighborhood of Kabul, which was held by ISIL.

The ISIL suicide attacks against the religious and cultural sites of the Shiites of Afghanistan are now one of the major problems and challenges of the national unity government in the security sector of this people, which has so far failed to succeed and failed. Since its inception in Afghanistan, ISIL has been the most deadly attack on its Shiite population. Following the bloodiest suicide attacks in the demonstration on the Dehmzang square, Baqer al-olum and Al-Zahra Mosque, the most bloody suicide attack took place in the mosque during the winter of last year, resulting in the martyrdom of 40 worshipers and the wounding of 90 people. Following the bitter incident, another suicide bomber struck Imam Khomeini Mosque in Dasht-e-Baruchi, Kabul, killing more than 40 people and wounding 50. Following was a suicide bombing at the Tibian Social Cultural Center, where 52 cultural activists, journalists and Shiite students, martyrs and 90 others were wounded. At the beginning of spring this year, a bloody suicide attack was carried out on the pilgrimage of the Shah Shah, and a month later, a suicide attack took place at the Tazkara Distribution Center to register for the electoral campaign, which took all of these attacks to the ISIL group. In addition to the bloody attacks that took place in Kabul, ISIL was also carrying out deadly attacks on Shiite religious sites in other provinces of Afghanistan, an example of which was ISIL’s attack on the Javadiyah mosque in Herat city, which resulted in 30 martyrs and more than 60 others were wounded.

The initial analysis is that the ISIS group is seeking revenge against the Shiites of Afghanistan because of the large presence of Afghan Shiite youth through Iran’s recruiting of the Syrian war. This reprisal has caused the religious, cultural and religious communities of Afghanistan to always be threatened by ISIS. In addition, the ISIS group ideologically views all Shiites around the world with a hostile and reprehensible relationship that the countries supporting the radical and Takfiri ideology of the ISIS group also do not ignore any inhuman attitude towards the Shiites, As a result of this Takfiri view, the Shiites of Afghanistan are more threatened and vulnerable. It should be noted that in the recruitment process by the Iranian government of Afghan refugee children in Iran for deployment to Syria and in the area of providing security for Shiite citizens in Afghanistan, the central government of Afghanistan has a major responsibility that has been very weak in this area. Is. Meanwhile, Shiites and the Hazaras have shown a glorious civilization in democratic processes like the previous election, and have not, as the most civilized social group, conducted any illegal behavior for government institutions in the center and provinces. But again, they have been deprived of their most basic citizenship rights, whose neighborhoods in Kabul are an irrefutable certificate in this regard.

But another analysis in this regard is very different from that which was raised. Based on this view, ISIS is likely to be a fake intelligence and intelligence phenomenon Pakistan and other terrorist countries use to launch specific operations and sectarian wars in Afghanistan, Ideological, is trying to hit the central government of Afghanistan. According to this analysis, the relationship between the Taliban and ISIL is very close to each other. Because the Taliban group is also using it to use any means and behavior that undermined the Afghan government. The reality is the killing of innocent people by terrorists with the intent of punishing the central government for their demands. Concerns in these cases are doubling where the central government has been weak in securing the security of Afghan citizens, especially in the area of security of the religious and cultural centers of the Shiites, which has been very weak and unobtrusive. As a result, as mentioned above, only in the capital, the statistics of the dead and wounded Shiites are much more terrible than some of the statistics and information is available.

The steps that the Afghan government has taken to protect the Shi’i centers has been to ensure the security of Shiite mosques by the Shiite people themselves. Although they suffered from lack of equipment and facilities and did not receive any training from the beginning to the last month, they were still relatively effective. Since the recent Daesh’s bloody attack on the IDS center for voting registration in the Shiite neighborhood of western Kabul was faced with intense civilian reactions. This has led the Afghan president to consider an independent security domain for the security of Western Kabul’s citizens that the news of the opening of this area has been published in the media, but the residents of western Kabul have so far not been aware of the existence of this area and I personally could not really I get the point where the area actually opened in what part of West Kabul is open and where it is.

The second major security challenge of the Afghan government is the Taliban’s terrorist and terrifying activities. Last year, in addition to the center of Afghanistan, distant provinces of the country also witnessed widespread unrest that the recent Taliban attack on downtown Farah was at the top of its domestic news.

Taliban successive attacks in Farah city and the capture of the city at the beginning of last months by the Taliban showed that the Taliban group was more integrated and more enthusiastic from its donor countries than was expected. Find out Farah’s incident is beyond the existing analysis of what is important at the national level for Afghanistan, the Taliban’s message to the people and government of Afghanistan. By the end of 1396, the Afghan government, with the consent of all political parties in Afghanistan, declared unilateral and unconditional peace for the Taliban, and considered the great concessions for Taliban readiness for the peace process. But so far, there has been no indication from the Taliban that they are prepared to accept peace. In addition, the Taliban group, with the onset of its spring strike called Khandagh, virtually showed that the Taliban are still determined by their hostility to the Afghan people and started suicide bombing wars from remote areas of Afghanistan, where the Farah incident It’s an example.

ISIL and the Taliban now cover all terrorist groups as their subdivision and become more coherent, but the Afghan government has not responded to Afghan public opinion so far. It was expected that the government of Afghanistan would be more determined to mobilize public opinion after rejecting a peace plan without the preconditions of the Afghan government from the Taliban. But on the contrary, it was a Taliban group that proved its determination in Farah.

In the war of intelligence and guerrilla warfare, without the mobilization of public opinion and forcing the enemy to go through peace through a war, the Afghan government has never been able to succeed. But due to the coherence of the Taliban group, the failure of talks between the Taliban and the Meriya without the presence of the Government of Afghanistan, the high profile of the Mola-barader in these talks, the withdrawal of US troops from the Taliban group and the role of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process, the prolongation of partisan wars could finally cost Impose a lot on the government of Afghanistan.

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Defense

Why the “Coronavirus Ceasefire” Never Happened

Dr. Andrey KORTUNOV

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Six months ago, when COVID-19 had just moved beyond the borders of China and embarked upon its triumphant march across Europe and North America, politicians and foreign affairs experts started discussing what will happen after the virus is vanquished. The debate that ensued balanced the fears and concerns of pessimists with the hopes and expectations of optimists, with the latter believing that the pandemic and the global recession that followed would inevitably force humankind to put its differences aside and finally unite in the face of common challenges.

Six months later, we can say without any doubt that, unfortunately, the optimists were wrong. The pandemic did not bring about the changes in world politics they had been hoping for, even with the ensuing recession making things worse. And we are unlikely to see any such changes in the near future. Sadly, COVID-19 did not turn out to be a cure-all for regional conflicts, arms races, the geopolitical competition and the countless ailments of humankind today.

These persisting ailments are more than evident in relations between Russia and the West. No positive steps have been made in the past six months in any of the areas where the positions of the two sides differ significantly, be it the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the unrest in Syria, the political instability in Venezuela or the war in Libya. The fate of the New START and the nuclear nonproliferation regime remains unclear. Moscow continues to be the target of new economic and political sanctions. Russia and the West are locked in an intense information war. There are no signs of a “coronavirus ceasefire,” let alone a full-fledged peace agreement, on the horizon.

Of course, Moscow has placed the blame for the lack of progress squarely on the shoulders of its western partners. While this may indeed be true in many respects, we must admit that the Kremlin has hardly been overflowing with ideas and proposals over the past six months. Even if Moscow did want to reverse the current negative trends in global politics, it has not taken any steps on its own to do so. Nor has it proposed any large-scale international projects, or even tried to temper its usual foreign policy rhetoric and propaganda.

On the contrary, the various troubles that have befallen Russia in the “coronavirus era” – from the public unrest in Belarus to the unfortunate poisoning of Alexei Navalny – are explained away as the malicious intrigues of Russia’s geopolitical opponents. For all intents and purposes, the Kremlin is in the same position now, in September 2020, that it was in back in March. The chances of another “reset” or at least a “timeout” in relations have disappeared completely, if they ever existed in the first place.

So, why did the “coronavirus ceasefire” never happen? Without absolving the West of its share of responsibility, let us try to outline the obstacles that Russia has put in the way of progress.

First, in an environment of unprecedented shocks and cataclysms, there is always the hope that your opponent will eventually suffer more as a result than you will. Many in Russia see the 2020 crisis as the final damning indictment of the West and even an inglorious end to the market economy and political liberalism in general.

The recent statement by Aide to the President of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin that Russia is poised to become one of the top five economies in the world this year is particularly noteworthy. Not because the country is experiencing rapid economic growth, but because the German economy is set to fall further than the Russian economy. If you are certain that time is on your side and that you will emerge from the crisis in better shape than your opponents, then the incentives to work towards some kind of agreement hic et nunc are, of course, reduced.

Second, the current Russian leadership is convinced that any unilateral steps on its part, any shifts in Moscow’s foreign policy, will be perceived in the West as a sign of weakness. And this will open the door for increased pressure on Moscow. Not that this logic is entirely unfounded, as history has shown. But it is precisely this logic that prevents Russian leaders from admitting their past foreign policy mistakes and miscalculations, no matter how obvious they may have been. This, in turn, makes it extremely difficult to change the current foreign policy and develop alternative routes for the future. In fact, what we are seeing is a game to preserve the status quo, in the hope that history will ultimately be on Moscow’s side, rather than that of its opponents (see the first point).

Third, six and a half years after the crisis in Ukraine broke out, we are essentially left with a frozen conflict. Turning the large and unwieldy state machine around, rewiring the somewhat heavy-handed state propaganda machine, and changing the policies that determine the everyday actions of the army of “deep state” officials is tantamount to changing the trajectory of a supertanker carrying a load of hundreds of thousands of tonnes. It is perhaps even more difficult, however, to change the opinion that has taken shape in Russian society in recent years about the modern world and Russia’s place in it. Just because the Russian people are tired of foreign politics, this does not mean that they will enthusiastically support an updated version of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” of the second half of the 1980s or the ideological principles of Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign policy of the early 1990s.

Fourth, the balance of power between the agencies involved in the development and practical implementation of Russia’s foreign policy has changed significantly in recent years. The role of the security forces has been growing in all its aspects since at least the beginning of 2014. Conversely, the role of diplomats, as well as that of the technocrats in the economic structures of the Russian government, has been dwindling with each passing year. It is the security forces that are the main “stakeholders” in Donbass, Syria, Libya and even Belarus today. It would be fair to say that they have had a controlling interest in Russia’s foreign policy. The oft-quoted words of Emperor Alexander III that Russia has only two allies, its army and its navy, perfectly reflect the shift that has taken place in the balance of powers between these agencies. We should add that this shift was largely welcomed and even supported by a significant part of Russian society (see the third point). Of course, the siloviki are, due to the specifics of their work, less inclined to compromise, concessions and basic human empathy than diplomats, economists and technocrats.

All these factors preventing the conceptual renewal of Russia’s foreign policy can equally be applied to its geopolitical opponents. Politicians in the West are also hoping that time is on their side, that Moscow will emerge from the crisis weaker and more vulnerable, and thus more malleable than it was before. They also believe that any unilateral steps, any demonstration of flexibility in relations with the Kremlin, will be met with an even tougher and more aggressive policy. Negative ideas about Russia have also taken root in the minds of people in the West, and foreign policy is being “militarized” there just as much as it is in Russia.

Thus, neither the coronavirus nor the economic recession will automatically lead to a détente, let alone a reset in relations between Russia and the West. We are, in fact, moving in the opposite direction, once again running the risk of an uncontrolled confrontation. However, this unfortunate situation is no reason to give up on the possibility of signing new agreements, even if COVID-19 will no longer be in our corner moving forward.

From our partner RIAC

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India’s strategies short of war against a hostile China

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Since India’s independence several peace and border cooperation agreements were signed between the India and China. Prominent among them was the Panchsheel Agreement signed in 1954. A majority of the agreements were signed between 1993 and 2013. Recently genuine efforts were made by PM Narendra Modi by engaging Xi Jinping at the Wuhan and Chennai summits. But China is nowhere near to settling the border dispute despite various agreements and talks at the military and civilian levels.

After the 1962 war peace was largely maintained on the Indo China border. During the Mao and Deng era consensus building was the norm in the communist party. XiJinping appointed himself as chairman of the communist party for life. Today power is centralized with XiJinping and his cabal. Through Doklam and Galwan incidents Xi Jinpinghas disowned the peaceful principles laid down by his predecessors. China’s strategy is to keep India engaged in South Asia as it doesn’t want India to emerge as a super power. After solving a crisis on the border China will create another crisis. Beijing has declining interest in the niceties of diplomacy. Under Xi Jinping China has become more hostile.

China has been infringing on India’s sovereignty through salami tactics by changing the status quo and attempting to own the border territory. At Galwan on Xi Jinping’s birthday the PLA demonstrated hooliganism by assaulting Indian border positions. China violated the 1996 and 2005 bilateral agreements which states that both armies should not carry weapons within 1.24 miles on either side of the border. India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar mentioned that the standoff situation with China in Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh is “surely the most serious situation after 1962.”China is constructing infrastructure, increasing forces and deploying weapon systems on the border.

Options for India

India led by PM Narendra Modi has implemented a realist foreign policy and a muscular military policy.India ended the age of strategic restraint by launching special operations and air strikes in Pakistan. Since the Galwan incident India has increased the military, diplomatic and economic deterrence against China. India is constructing military infrastructure and deploying weapon systems like SU 30 MKI and T 90 tanks in Ladakh. India banned a total of 224 Chinese apps, barred Chinese companies from government contracts and is on the verge of banning Huawei. Other measures include excluding Chinese companies from private Indian telecommunications networks. Chinese mobile manufacturers can be banned from selling goods in India.

India should offer a grand strategy to China. India has a plethora of options short of war. Future talks should involve an integrated strategy to solve all the bilateral issues and not just an isolated resolution of a localized border incident. All instruments of military and economic power and coercive diplomacy should be on the table.

Foreign Policy

China expects other nations to follow bilateral agreements and international treaties while it conveniently violates them. India should abrogate the Panscheel agreement given China’s intransigence and hostility. China claims 35,000 square miles of territory in India’s northeast, including the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China occupies 15,000 square miles of India’s territory in the Aksai Chin Plateau in the Himalayas. India’s primary objective is to take back territories like Aksai Chin. While the secondary issue is the resolution of the border issue and China’s support to Pakistan. India can leverage the contemporary geopolitical climate to settle all issues. India can target China’s soft underbelly characterized by issues like Taiwan, Xinjiang and the economy. China raises the Kashmir issue at international organizations. As a countervailing measure India can raise Xinjiang at international organizations and conferences.

China has been militarily and diplomatically supporting Pakistan against India. Pakistan is a rentier and a broken state that sponsors terrorism. India can establish bilateral relations with Taiwan thus superseding China’s reunification sensitivities. China has territorial disputes with 18 countries including Taiwan and Japan. India can hedge against China by establishing strategic partnerships with US, Australia, Japanand Vietnam.

Military policy

An overwhelming military is a deterrence for China’s belligerent foreign and military policy. The 1990Gulf War demonstrated the capabilities of high technology weapon systems. As compared to China’s rudimentary weapons systems India has inducted 4th and 5th generation weapons like the SU 30 MKI, AH 64 Apache and T 90 tanks. The deterrence capacity of fighter aircrafts is reduced as they cannot target China’s coastlines due to their restricted range. Full deterrence can be achieved by ICBMs and nuclear powered submarines. With these weapons India can target centers of gravity like Shanghai and Shenzhen.

China is not a signatory to arms limitations treaties like Start I and Start II. China continues to expand its nuclear weapons stockpile and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like DF 21 and DF-26B which are banned by the INF Treaty. India is a law abiding stable democracy in an unstable region with two hostile nations on its flanks. US and Russia can relax the arms control mechanism considering India’s’ impeccable record on peace and non proliferation. This will allow India to buy Russian weapon systems like Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Topol and Bulava ICBMs and Yasen and Borey class SSBN submarines. While US can sell SSBN submarines and C4ISR gathering platforms like RC 135 and RQ 4 Global Hawk.

China remains a security threat for Asia. As China foments instability the APAC region from South Asia to South China Sea remains volatile. The Quad can be expanded to include Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia and multinational naval exercises can conducted in the South China Sea.

The enemy of my enemy is my friend. China fought small wars with India, Vietnam and Soviet Union. Vietnam defeated the PLA at Lang Son in 1979 with advanced weapon systems and guerilla warfare. India can increase militarily cooperation with Vietnam. China attacked the Soviet Union on the Ussuri river leading to heavy PLA casualties. Historically relations between Russia and India have been close. As a result of the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty China did not support Pakistan during the 1971 war. India can enhance its military and diplomatic ties with Russia to the next level.

Strategic partnership with US

Its time for a partnership between the world’s largest and the world’s biggest democracies. India and the US have a common objective to preserve peace, maintain stability and enhance security in Asia. India’s reiteration at leaders’ level and international forums that both countries see each other as allies for stability in the APAC region is not enough. India has to go beyond the clichés of the need for closer ties.

Due to the China threat the US is shifting its military from Europe and Middle East to the APAC region.US and India can establish an Asian equivalent of NATO as China’s destructive policy frameworks and threatening postures remain a strategic threat. India should enhance and deepen cooperation with the US intelligence community in the fields of MASINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, TECHINT and CYBINT. Both countries can form an alliance of democracies. If China militarily or economically targets one of the member country then the alliance can retaliate under a framework similar to Article 5 of NATO. Thus power will be distributed in the APAC region instead of being concentrated with China. A scorpion strategy will ensure that China does not harass its neighbors. The strategy involves a military pincer movement by India from the west and US from the East against a hostile China. India can conduct joint military exercises with the US in Ladakh. China cannot challenge Japan and Taiwan due to the US security agreements with these countries.

Conclusion

The world has entered the age of instability and uncertainty. The 21st century is characterized by hybrid warfare through military and coercive diplomacy. South Asia is not a friendly neighborhood where peaceful overtures lead to harmonious relations. China is a threat to India even in the context of a friendly relationship. Diplomatic niceties have no place in India’s relations with China. India can impose costs on China which can be more than the benefits offered by normalizing relations. The application of measures short of war without engaging the PLA will reap benefits. India can fulfill its national security requirements and global responsibilities through a grand strategy.

A policy of engagement and deterrence is crucial against an antagonistic China. While India attempts to develop cooperative ties with China it will need to continue to enhance and implement its military and coercive diplomatic strategies. China does not represent a direct military threat to India but at the same time one cannot deny that challenges remain.

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COVID-19 and Challenges to the Indian Defence Establishment

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The COVID-19 pandemic has created an uncertain situation all over the world. It is defined as the greatest challenge faced by the world since World War II. At a certain point, the pandemic had forced world governments to announce lockdowns in their respective countries that led to more than half of the human population being home quarantined. Since then, social distancing, travel bans, and cancellation of international summits have become a routine exercise. Most sectors such as agriculture, health, education, economy, manufacturing have been severely hit across the globe. One such sector which is vital to national security that has been impacted due to the pandemic is defence.

The effect of influenza and pneumonia during WWI on the US military was huge. The necessity to mobilise troops across the Atlantic made it even ideal for the diseases to spread rapidly among the defence personnel and civilians. Between mid-1917 and 1919, the fatalities were more so due to the disease than getting killed in action. Due to COVID-19, there have been many implications within the defence sector. Amid the ongoing transgressions in Ladakh, it becomes imperative to analyse the preparedness of the Indian defence establishment to tackle the challenges at hand.

Disrupting the Status Quo

Many personnel in the Indian armed forces have been tested positive for COVID-19. This puts the operational capabilities at risk. In one isolated incident, 26 personnel of the Navy had been placed in quarantine after being tested positive for COVID-19. The French and the Americans had a great challenge ahead of them as hundreds of soldiers were getting infected onboard their Naval vessels. Furthermore, the Army saw some cases being tested positive as well. In one such incident, the headquarters of the Indian Army had to be temporarily shut down because of a soldier contracting the virus. These uncalled disruptions are very dangerous for our armed forces. These disruptions challenge the recruitment process and training exercises.

Since the Indian Army has been involved in quarantining tasks, this exposes the personnel to the virus. As a result of this, the first soldier was tested positive on March 20 in Leh. Among them, those who work as medical personnel are even more exposed to the virus. In order to enforce damage control to the operational capabilities, the Army made sure that the non-essential training, travel, and attending conferences remained cancelled. They called off any foreign assignments and postings for the time being. The Army also made it a point to extend leaves for that personnel who were already on absence. This was a major preventive measure adopted to prevent further infection.

As a result of the lockdown that had been imposed nationwide, the defence services were forced to temporarily stall all the activities that relate to soldiering during peacetime. These activities include training, pursuing professional qualification, fitness tests and regimes, equipment maintenance such as unit assets and stores, up-gradation of the cadres among others. Since the Indian Army boasts of a force that has signed up voluntarily to guard the borders, most of the troops are away from their families, which makes it even more difficult during the times of crises. The mega biennial naval exercises scheduled to be held in Vizag were cancelled due to COVID-19. A total of 41 navies were planned to be a part of the joint exercises called MILAN. The Service Selection Board (SSB) training and the recruitment process have been put to a halt as well. This will severely impact the intake process for this year.

Handling Biohazards

The Army’s capable of operating in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) environment and has sufficient equipment like infantry vehicles, helicopters and tanks which can operate without any hassles. Since instances of chemical warfare have been witnessed in West Asia and other regions in the last two decades, the focus of the Army has been on that and not on biological warfare. Most Armies believe that bio-weaponry is still fictional and won’t come into play any time soon. Naturally, due to this mindset, most Armies are not capable of handling biohazards. This is a major setback in the time of COVID-19 and has to be addressed.

Riding Down the Slope

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the Indian economy has been nose-diving day by day. This is some bad news for the defence sector since the military spending will possibly be reduced as a result of the slowdown. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India’s GDP will grow at 1.9 per cent. This is one of the lowest in the history of post-independent India. Allocations and spendings will naturally take a hit and will take a long time to revive again. Defence manufacturing will also face a setback and discourage indigenous players who are looking at getting involved in the manufacturing and innovation sector. MoD has already received the Ministry of Finance’s circular that called for the defence spending to be limited to 15-20 per cent of the total amount allocated. This will ensure that the defence budget is not the priority for the finance ministry. A gap of Rs. 1,03,000 crore has been highlighted between the requirement and the allocated money. More than 60 per cent of this allocated amount anyway goes towards paying salaries and pensions. This means that the modernisation efforts will face a major slowdown in the next two years. Defence procurement is already difficult due to the bureaucratic hurdles, now the monetary crunch only adds more woes.

Moreover, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had announced earlier that more than 9,000 posts belonging to the Military Engineering Services (MES) will be abolished in the said industrial division. The reason cited was that this would bring about a balance to the expenditure. Due to the lockdown, the military development has taken a hit and has seen a decline in the production of freights. As of now, there is no manufacturing that is ongoing as far as fighter planes or aircraft, in general, is concerned. Some of the signed defence deals and contracts are said to be reviewed due to the financial crunch. India’s defence budget is expected to see some cuts due to the economy slowing down. The pandemic has worsened this even further. There is already an existing order to cap the spending for the first quarter of this fiscal year. Most of the payments that are being disbursed is largely that of paying for the existing contracts. This will diminish any scope for procurement of newer defence equipment that helps in modernising the armed forces in the long run. According to a report, it says that the Ministry of Defence is looking at a savings of anywhere between Rs. 400 and 800 billion in the 2020-21 financial year. To quote Yuval Noah Harari from his recent article in the Financial Times would seem relevant in this case, “Many short-term emergency measures will become a fixture of life. That is the nature of emergencies. They fast-forward historical processes. Decisions that in normal times could take years of deliberation are passed in a matter of hours.”  India has displayed the significant political will to make impactful decisions during the pandemic. The question is, how far and how soon can we push ourselves to be prepared on all fronts?

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