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The Deep Forces Preventing Reform in Malaysia

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The Pakatan Harapan coalition general election victory almost a year ago was supposed to herald a new reform era in a country spavined by corruption, cronyism and racism.

Very soon after Mahathir Mohamed was returned as prime minister after a 15 year absence and in a new role, he quickly made good on Pakatan’s promises to eliminate the GST, re-introd15-year absence fuel subsidies, seek the immediate release of Anwar Ibrahim from jail and charge former Prime Minister Najib Razak over the 1MDB scandal.

However, public disenchantment of the new Pakatan government very quickly developed as the pace of reform appeared to slow. The government flip-flopped over child marriage, then backflipped over its intention to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination due to protests organized by the ousted United Malays National Organization and ultra-nationalist Malay groups.

Shortly afterwards, it backed down from ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court due to criticism from the Johor Royal Family. The report completed by the Council of Eminent Persons (CEP) on reform was put under the Official Secrets Act, and has not been made public. More recently, Mahathir’s quick dismissal of the Suhakam Report finding that “state agents” where most probably responsible for the abduction and disappearance of religious leaders Amri Che mat and Pastor Anthony Koh disappointed many.

There is now a perception that the Pakatan government won’t deliver what it promised. The by-election result in the Semenyih constituency was an indication of this, confirming Medeka Centre polling that both the prime minister and Pakatan were rapidly losing popularity.

However those expecting the government to create a new Malaysia forgot about the complex nature of the Pakatan coalition itself, the electoral landscape and the institutional and attitudinal impediments to reform. 

The Nature of the Coalition

The leading party, in terms of influence but not numbers is Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, formed by Mahathir in the run up to the general election to give himself a political vehicle. Although the party manifesto talks in terms of maintaining fundamental rights and fighting corruption, Bersatu is really a nationalist-Malay organization, believing in Islam as the state religion, upholding the Malay monarchy, maintaining Malay privilege and that of natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and keeping Malay as the national language. 

Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) has twice Bersatu’s representation in the Federal Parliament and supports the abolishment of the New Economic Policy, the instrument that provides special privileges for Malays and other indigenous groups. In practice however, the party most often reflects its leader Anwar Ibrahim’s views. PKR’s structure is very similar to UMNO’s, and is currently strongly factionalized between the Rafizi Ramli and Azmin Ali groups. Recent party elections brought accusations of vote buying.

Under the Pakatan agreement Anwar is due to take the reins of Power from Mahathir sometime in 2020.

The third member is a breakaway group from PAS called Parti Amanah Negara, primarily a Malay based party standing for progressive Islam. It has 11 members of Parliament, where its leader Mohamed Sabu is Minister of Defense.

Next, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is primarily a Chinese based party, although it has sort to be multi-ethnic over the years. The DAP is based on social justice, democracy, and secularism. Its support comes from working class and professional urban voters, where the party played a major role in assisting Pakatan win the last general election.

The above coalition mix suggests that its orientation is going to be towards maintaining the current status quo, according to the various party manifestos and actions. Other than the fight against corruption and support of popular policies like the abolition of GST, the pressure for reform comes only comes from the DAP and some members of PKR.

Thus Pakatan is a paradoxical coalition where the push for reform comes from a minority. What’s more, Mahathir has dominated coalition, calling the major shots in terms of policy and administration.

If and when Anwar Ibrahim actually becomes the Prime Minister, it’s still very unclear as to whether he will follow the reform path or pursue his wishes to implement a more Islamic path in government administration and education.

Anwar’s Position a big unknown.

Analysts close to government say it is attempting to buy time on reform by blaming the previous government and economic situation. However, talking reform is one thing, achieving it another. If the Pakatan government is going to firmly commit to reform, it has to overcome many impediments, some rarely discussed.

The Electoral Landscape

Although 65 percent of Malaysia’s population could be considered urban, cities’ parliamentary representation is well under that. About 70percentofy seats are rural based, thus heavily over-representing rural voters. Thus DAP and to some extent PKR representation are below what they should be, while UMNO, PAS, Bersatu, and Amanah are overrepresented, a legacy of decades of gerrymandering by the previous ruling coalition.

Thus any party or coalition group that wants to win a general election must win over a rural Malay electorate, making the politics of race and Islam of paramount importance. Until there is real electoral reform, race-based politics are crucial. Any reforms perceived as threatening Malay privilege would cost at the next election.

Does Pakatan really want reform?

The current anomaly benefits Bersatu over PKR and the DAP. This is especially the case if more UMNO defections come and the party expands into Sabah, as Mahathir has vowed. It is vital electoral reform takes place to place to bring in the concept of “one vote one value” through rearranging constituency boundaries and/or implementing some form of proportional representation before Pakatan can undertake any serious reform in the area of ethnic-equality of opportunity.

This is a major barrier to reform and will allow Malay-nationalist groups to dominate the national narrative, and sabotage any new initiatives.

The Civil Service

The Malaysian civil service is probably the most difficult barrier to overcome. There is an unspoken mission among offices and staff to protect the Malay agenda. Any policy or program is likely to be sabotaged if it is perceived to threaten Malay interests. The system has been built over the past 20 years on political nepotism, with civil servants clearly and openly aligned with the last government.

It is also a bloated service, employing nearly 1.8 million people, with duplicative ministries and agencies, wasting massive resources, built on job generation to keep ethnic Malays happy.

Although these problems have to be dealt with, retrenching staff would be politically costly. Thus it could take more than a decade to eliminate excessive numbers of employees, nepotism, and the culture of the Malay agenda.

Steep Learning Curve for New Ministers

Senior civil servants have been used to dealing with ministers who didn’t know their portfolios and were only interested in issues of personal benefit, swinging the balance of power from elected government to the bureaucracy. It is a daunting task for inexperienced ministers who don’t understand procedures and have little in-depth knowledge of their portfolios to manage their ministries.

The Royal Families

There are nine quite diverse royal families in Malaysia, and an Agong (king) who is selected by the Conference of Rulers every five years as head of state. The respective sultans and raja primarily act as constitutional monarchs, and traditionally had a close relationship with the former government. A few members of UMNO and a former Prime Minister had royal blood, and it has long been rumored that backroom deals and concessions were given for favors done for the government of the day.

Governments traditionally kept the royalty happy through bargaining. There were only a few ripples during the 22 years of Mahathir’s previous reign, in which he passed constitutional amendments to cut royal immunity from the law and eliminate veto powers over parliamentary bills.

Royalty have on a few occasions asserted their power independently, as when the Raja of Perlis refused to accept the Barisan Nasional nomination for Chief Minister of Perlis Shahidan Kassim and appointed Md Isa Sabu after the 2008 election. Sultans have sometimes been partisan as was seen in the Perak Constitutional crisis in 2009.

Mahathir’s current spat with Johor’s crown prince over appointment of a new chief minister for the state, Malaysia’s second most populous, shows that royalty remains a potential barrier to reform, especially on matters of Malay position, religion and their own survival. Continuing to placate the royalty will be at the cost of reform.

Deep State?

Just recently Foreign Affairs Minister Daifuddin Abdullah and Federal Territories Minister Khalid Samad talked about a “deep state” within Malaysia. They are referring to a network of royal family members, senior military personnel, senior police officers, GLC office holders, high ranking civil servants, politicians, intellectuals and business people who have a common interest and deep commitment in protecting the Malay position.

They are said to hold regular informal meetings around the country to deal with threats to the perceived order. This could be a discussion with someone who ‘needs to be pulled into line, ”taking action within the law, or even through extrajudicial action through ex-police or ex-military people loyal to the cause.

To recapture the confidence of the electorate who voted Pakatan into power in the last general election, reform is needed on the New Economic Policy which grants financial advantages to bumiputeras. The government must again attempt to put through constitutional amendments to restore the original position of Sabah and Sarawak in the Federation if it is to count on the support of Sabah and Sarawak voters. The electoral system must be overhauled so a future government will not be shackled by the Malay heartland on reform.

It’s very difficult to see the Pakatan Government dominated by Bersatu being too interested in reforming the NEP, or even seriously tackling the inequality of the electoral system.

The state of the civil service is dismissal and the problems haven’t even been defined yet, let alone solutions found. Ministerial experience takes time, some patience is needed here. However criticisms are increasing when Pakatan ministers are seen to behave just like their predecessors. When the sedition Act is now been used like Lese Majeste in Thailand, debate on the role of Royalty in Malaysia will be supressed. Expect a period of testing between the government and Royal Houses to continue until new boundaries are renegotiated. Finally the real secrets of government are still being kept secret. Reform begins with transparency and Mahathir himself doesn’t appear ready to step into that environment.

Author’s note: first published in the Asia Sentinel

Innovator and entrepreneur. Notable author, thinker and prof. Hat Yai University, Thailand Contact: murrayhunter58(at)gmail.com

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Southeast Asia

The National Unity Government and the Rohingya Issue in Myanmar: A New Twist?

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In a Twitter message on 3 June 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG) in Myanmar announced a new policy position about the Rohingya issue. Entitled as ‘Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’ the NUG unequivocally spells out, “In honour of human rights and human dignity and also to eradicate the conflicts and root causes in the Union, the NUG aims to build up a prosperous and federal democratic union where all ethnic groups belonging to the Union can live together peacefully. This objective is clearly stated in the Federal Democracy Charter.’ The statement further says, ‘We invite Rohingyas to join hands with us and others to participate in the Spring Revolution against the military dictatorship in all possible ways.’

This marks a monumental policy change on the Rohingya issue by the NUG that did not include any Rohingya when it was formed on April 16, 2021. It may be mentioned that the NUG includes a president, state counsellor, vice president, prime minister and 11 ministers for 12 ministries. There are also 12 deputy ministers appointed by the CRPH.  Of the 26 total cabinet members, 13 belong to ethnic nationalities, and eight are women. International community particularly global civil society actors criticized the NUG for excluding the Rohingyas in the newly formed civilian government. It is, indeed, a question about the credibility of the government when it talks about federal democracy, but excludes a community who have been living in Myanmar for centuries.

The new statement from the NUG is a welcome development and an adjustment of their position with a genuine spirit of bringing all ethnic groups together and create a strong platform against the brutal and genocidal military regime in Myanmar. The February 2021 military coup in Myanmar is a watershed political development in the country that has dramatically changed the attitudes and perception oof the Myanmar people and the civilian political forces because of illegality, extreme form of brutality and betrayal to democratic change. The spontaneous social movements by the Myanmar people with a high risk of lives and livelihoods was perhaps unimaginable to the Junta government as well as global community. The civilian political forces possibly did not think such kind of sustained resistance in the form of Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar where people suffered direct military rule for more than five decades. Military rule was the order of the day in the country.

Against this backdrop, the statement of the NUG deserves a huge attention. Why has the NUG issue the statement? What is the significance of this statement for the status of the Rohingyas and the future of democracy in Myanmar? These questions are vital for establishing the rights of the Rohingyas who have been suffering as stateless people and living in different countries as the forcibly displaced people. Particularly, the presence of the 1.1 million Rohingyas in Bangladesh in the camps of Cox’s Bazar and Bhashan Char is a stark reality and a great casualty of humanity in the present world where a country called Myanmar can force more than a million of its residents overnight and continue to show the defiance not to accept them. The world is virtually silent!

In understanding the significance of the statement of the NUG we can identify several issues that deserve to be taken into consideration. First, the reason behind the change of position of the NUG on the question of Rohingyas is clearly spelled out at the bottom of the statement where they have urged the Rohingyas to join the movement to oust the military regime in Myanmar. It is not only addressed to the Rohingya people, but also to the forces and parties in the world who are supporting the cause of the Rohingyas. From this perspective it has a huge diplomatic purpose to bolster the movement of the NUG and CDM in their fight against the military regime. Particularly, the Western world, the United Nations and the Muslim countries who have expressed their solidarity and compassion for the Rohingyas and have devoted their resources for them. Second, the statement is not just a declaration of support of the NUG to the Rohingyas. It contains a roadmap about solving the Rohingya crisis for which some of the members of the NUG were liable. The leadership of the National League for Democracy (NLD) betrayed with the Rohingyas when their leader Aung San Suu Kyi joined hands with the Tatmadaw in 2011 and ruled the country jointly and ditched the cause of the Rohingyas.

The NLD leader also defended the crimes against humanity of the military leaders in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It was a true infidelity to the Rohingyas and also to her own long credentials as a fighter for democracy. Therefore, to establish a credibility of their declaration, the NUG shows a way-out to resolve the Rohingya crisis. They have promised to repeal and amend laws such as the 1982 Citizenship laws by the new constitution. This new Citizenship Act must base citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens. It is also mentioned that the NUG is in process of abolishing National Verification Cards to recognize Rohingyas as citizens. These two laws have discriminated for Rohingyas as the core ground. The NUG reaffirms to implement the aggrements signed with Rohingya repatriation and also agreed to Kofi Anan’s 88 points recommendations over Rohingya legal rights.

Third, the statement acknowledges the rights of Rohingya people and atrocity crimes they faced in Myanmar. The statement represents a shift from the persecution of the Rohingya by the military junta as well as previous governments, which routinely denied the existence of the Rohingya as well as evidence of mass atrocity crimes they suffered. The statement commits the NUG to ensuring justice and accountability for crimes against Rohingya in Myanmar. The NUG also affirmed its commitment to “voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation” of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State. The NUG makes a bold promise, “We will actively seek justice and accountability for all crimes committed by the military against the Rohingyas and all other people of Myanmar throughout our history.” They have gone to the extent of profound redressing of the past crimes and injustice as they say, “We intend if necessary to initiate processes to grant [the] International Criminal Court jurisdiction over crimes committed within Myanmar against the Rohingyas and other communities.”

Fourth, a critical issue is how would the supporters and sympathizers of the Tatmadaw at home and abroad respond to this major policy reversal of the NUG and its leadership who once viewed the Rohingyas in the same eyes as with the Tatmadaw? Understandably, China, Russia, ASEAN, India and several pro-military regime actors would not find it encouraging. They may rule it out at a tactic of the NUG to garner the global support particularly from the UN and West. Fifth, whatever the reactions of the global community, the Tatmadaw would find it a new avenue of diplomatic pressure on them. However, they will rule out this position as the military regime has already declared the NUG as a ‘terrorist’ outfit. Rather, the Tatmadaw would appeal to the Buddhist nationalists and Bamar people that the NUG has a sinister objective to legitimize the Rohingyas as citizens of the country.

Finally, the crux of the matter is that it is a great victory of the Rohingyas to show the world that the successive Myanmar regimes – military and pseudo military – have used false narratives, including branding them as terrorists, to undermine their rights and justice in the country where they have been living for centuries with their own identity. The NUG has made it loud and clear to the world that the military junta in the country is pursuing an apartheid policy and committed the crimes against humanity widely referred as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’.

In conclusion, to mean the business and establish a credibility of their intention expressed in the new policy position, the NUG of Myanmar should appoint an ethnic-Rohingya member to the cabinet who would help it implement and expand upon its new policy on the rights of Rohingya people. The NUG must continue to highlight meaningful consultation with Rohingya people globally, including Rohingya women. This new twist in the position of the civilian leadership in Myanmar who once reigned power and supported the military regime is critical for the future of the Rohingya issue and if it sustains, then the prospect of democracy in the post-Tatmadaw Myanmar will energize pro-democracy forces and boost global support for the NUG.

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Bargaining and Strengthening position of EEZ: Indonesia’s Diplomacy in South China Sea

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The South China Sea issue is getting more complex and has become an international issue that never ends until now. Because in addition the water areas are rich in natural resources both from energy sources, offshore and fisheries, on the other hand,  the waters of the South China Sea also become a strategic territory because the South China Sea is a trade route that delivers international goods and services with the amount of US$5 trillion. Therefore, automatically, these territories become a bone of contention for many countries especially China and four ASEAN member countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam in utilizing natural resources, where the involvement of many countries in claiming ownership of the South China Sea can trigger the occurrence of tension in an area such as the occurrence of conflicts such as there are showing of force between the armed forces, military intervention, and monitoring each other in the territorial waters of the South China Sea. These activities will disrupt the security stability of the South China Sea which triggers the threat of waters and disrupt the stability of neighbor countries that it close to the territorial. Coupled with the existence of China’s ownership claiming of the entire South China Sea through the Nine Dash Line rule, which is an ancient rule that emerged from Chinese history. This rule violates International law and is an illegal act, especially in violation of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) is an international treaty that was adopted and signed in 1982. In which the treaty emphasizes the existence of national sovereignty over the territorial sea as far as 12 miles from the coast and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as far as 200 miles.

The Importance of Bargaining and Strengthening position of EEZ Indonesia Diplomacy In South China Sea

Indonesia has no claim position and disputes in the waters of the South China Sea. Because Indonesia respects the International law of the sea agreement. However, there is Indonesia’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) which intersects with China’s Nine Dash Line. It is clear that this action violates UNCLOS and has become an illegal action. Because China still maintains the claims and rules of the Nine Dash Line which is a rule that come from Chinese history that is contrary to International Law. It can be proven by the presence of a Chinese Coast Guard ship entering the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone in the North Natuna Sea, it can automatically disrupt the stability of Indonesia’s territory and can become a problem and it is obvious that China violates the International norms. Therefore, Indonesia is important to strengthen Indonesia’s diplomatic position in its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) through negotiations with China through South China Sea diplomacy by maintaining its EEZ position to avoid inequality between the Nine Dash Line and Indonesia’s EEZ , especially in the Natuna Sea. Where this diplomatic activity can be used as a more effective strategy because it prioritizes peace or soft power strategy rather than through hard power diplomacies like military which can cause tension between the two countries, especially Indonesia and China. Indonesia and China have established diplomatic relations for 70 years in various aspects, both in terms of economy, education, military, religion, as well as public diplomacy activities that involving people to people strategy in each country as a strategy to maintain the relationship between two countries. As good partner country, Indonesia and China also need to carry out diplomacy activity, especially Indonesia in maintaining and showing a standing position and considering the overlapping Nine Dash Line in the Exclusive Economic Zone which if Indonesia does diplomacy through soft power, both countries will become good negotiating partners. Indonesia and China are coexistence with each other, therefore more comprehensive cooperation is important in discussing problems from various aspects, in particular, Indonesia must strengthen the position of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone to maintain the sovereign rights owned, especially the Natuna waters.

Therefore, Indonesia is important to negotiate and make a clear standing position in the EEZ by conducting diplomacy that is sustainable and encouraging China not to occupy Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. As Indonesia has sovereign rights in the waters of the South China Sea which consists of territorial integrity, regional stability, and economic interests. However, with the existence of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which has been intersectingwith China’s Nine Dash Line, this has led to a reduction in Indonesia’s sovereign rights which can be feared to disrupt the stability of the international security of Indonesia waters, especially the Natuna Islands which can disrupt many activities such as navigation activities, activities in exploring natural resources, and can threaten the national stability of the country. It because the Natuna Island is an asset that owned by Indonesia which greatly influences the life of civil society in the Natuna Archipelago region and depends on it for their lives by looking for natural resources in the Natuna island. Therefore in addition to economic cooperation, education and others. There is also a need for clear cooperation and certainty from each country, especially Indonesia and China, regarding their clarity in claiming waters without offending the boundaries of the neighboring waters, especially the Indonesian territory in the Natuna Islands through diplomatic activities, which with the existence of diplomatic activities, bilateral negotiations from the two countries. It can be a strategy to achieve peace and prevent conflicts. Because until now Indonesia is dependent on China from any aspect in completing the country’s needs especially through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), therefore the strategy in maintaining Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) position through bilateral diplomacy can be a great strategy to create peace, without undermined cooperation and diplomatic relations between two countries especially must implement the aim and the purposes of ASEAN  to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law.

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The thorny issue of the South China Sea between Japan, China and Vietnam

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Photo: Ibrahim Mushan/Unsplash

Japan is a long and narrow island country from North to South and narrower from East to West. Its land surface (377,975 square kilometres) is little larger than Italy’s. It borders the Pacific Ocean to the East and looks across the ocean to the United States of America to the East; to the West it faces China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), as well as the Russian Federation by sea but without strategic depth.

The rise of modern Japan during the Meiji Restoration elevated it at the time to the rank of “foundation of all Asian nations”. It opened up thousands of multiple political-military outlets and spread the country’s prestige in all directions. In so doing, it showed Japan’s intention to go beyond its Japanese archipelago and spread abroad.

This was confirmed, in fact, by the forms of continental policy, proposing a line of defence sovereignty and the theory of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or Greater East Asia Collective Prosperity Sphere, shown in the 1940s.

In response to the situation in the Far East after World War I, Japan implemented a strategy of moving from North to South and in World War II it set for itself the goal of moving its interests to the Republic of China. When the armed forces invaded an internally divided China, due to Japan’s lack of internal resources, the self-sufficiency economic situation was seriously challenged, with the results we all know.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is located in the Eastern part of the Indochina peninsula, bordering China to the North, Laos and Cambodia to the West and the South China Sea to the East and the South. It covers an area of 331,212 square kilometres (slightly more than Italy’s). Its coastline is 3,260 km long (excluding islands), and the country stretches 1,600 kilometres from North to South: its narrowest point is 50 kilometres.

Mountains are high in the West and low in the East. Three quarters of the territory is mountainous. In the mid-19th century, Vietnam had no concept of marine economy or trade. However, with the occupation of some oil- and gas-rich areas and islands in the South China Sea, as well as through private development, Vietnam gained huge economic benefits, and has later formulated a series of marine policies since the 1960s.

In 2007, it approved a marine development project with 2020 as its goal. With strategic planning it tirelessly pursued the goals of a “sea power” and adopted a policy to strongly develop the marine economy, combining marine and maritime economy with national defence and security. Vietnam did not give up and fought for every square inch of island land, with the aim of obtaining a favourable strategic position and practical advantages.

As the awareness of maritime sovereignty grew, in the midst of fierce conflicts of national interests and drastic changes in international and regional geopolitical relations, Japan and Vietnam found themselves in the Senkaku (Chinese: Diaoyu), Paracel (Chinese: XishaQuan; Vietnamese: Hoàng Sa) and Spratly (Chinese: Nansha; Vietnamese: Truong Sa) islands.

There has been an open debate on the sovereignty issue. So far the disputes between China and Japan over the ownership of the South China Sea islands have not been properly resolved. The sovereignty of the South China Sea islands has become a serious issue that challenges bilateral relations between China and Japan, as well as the bilateral relations between China and Vietnam.

Indeed, one of the important goals in strengthening Japan’s and Vietnam’s maritime strategies is the use of oil and gas resources, but the dispute over the sovereignty of territorial waters and related exclusive economic zones is the most important issue.

With technological development, the earth’s resources will gradually shrink and be depleted. The ocean’s abundant resources will become the last piece of territory that can offer resources to the earth’s countries. Clearly the division of maritime borders and the island sovereignty between Japan and Vietnam involves the fundamental interests of national territorial sovereignties, and the various maritime measures and policies adopted by these two countries in the maritime sector will have a huge impact on the South China Sea. This impact is also the main reason for the stability of the South China Sea in the future.

As seen above, the issues regarding the South China Sea are complex and the other major player, namely the United States of America, must act cautiously and take precautions when dealing with the issue of these shores. Moreover, the effectiveness of its South China Sea policy should also be measured by whether it favours the achievement of the US strategic goals without coming into conflict with the People’s Republic of China, not least because of the presence of US military bases in the area.

Certainly, the United States will use the so-called South China Sea sovereignty issue in the Asia-Pacific region to incite China’s neighbours in the short term, but it must be said that in the long term the US influence will gradually decrease due to issues of greater remoteness. Dominance is waning, and the course of international relations is changing and cracking traditional hegemonies.

This is the iron law of historical development. China’s rise must therefore ensure the international security and fluidity of the South China Sea. Japan and Vietnam are the main reasons that will influence the stability of the South China Sea in the future.

As a result, China is stepping up the definition and implementation of the South China Sea military and maritime economic strategy. Having a strong ocean capability is the expression of a country’s comprehensive and global value in politics, economics and business, national defence, science and technology.

With the fast development of global industrial modernisation, China is an economically and demographically rich country. In the future, the South China Sea will be an important channel linking China to the rest of the world. The South China Sea and its coastal areas will be key strategic regions, and will cross the economic construction and national defence security of every country bordering it.

Fluidity and prosperity are also the ultimate goal of China’s rise. On the contrary, once wars and conflicts occur in these areas, they will affect and warn China’s economy and national defence security. Therefore, military strategy in the South China Sea outweighs economic value, if the latter is not adequately protected.

The confrontation over the South China Sea is not limited to a specific strategy in the field of maritime economy, but to a mutual development strategy that embodies the will of the coastal countries which, facing the ocean, are confronted with their own future.

At present, China itself is actively pursuing its maritime strategy, starting with maintaining and reclaiming sovereignty over territories traditionally belonging to the Motherland, by undertaking a more advanced military presence. It is also joining other countries in oil and gas exploration, as well as in mining, by strengthening research and sharing based on historical and legal principles.

Strengthening its presence, also through the construction of coastal, offshore and island areas, is a gradual march towards deep and distant seas, in line with the development interests for the South China Sea.

Provinces and cities in countries bordering the South China Sea are also considering the development of marine economy as an important goal, because the ocean is a strategic resource for the sustainable development of mankind and belongs to everyone.

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