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Orders Within Orders: A New Paradigm for Greater Eurasia

Zachary Paikin

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While Russia’s vision of a Greater Eurasia has proven useful in addressing certain foreign policy dilemmas, it is still in need of further conceptual development. The paradigm of “orders within orders” could expand and complement the idea of a Greater Eurasian partnership, while also advancing and securing Russia’s long-term interests by reformulating its relations with the EU and China in key ways.

Introduction

As Moscow’s relations with Western capitals gradually frayed over the course of the post-Cold War period, the Eurasian vector in Russian foreign policy has increased in importance, rising to the point where it now supplies one of the guiding paradigms of the country’s international vision — the Greater Eurasian partnership. Born in the post-Maidan environment, this concept has helped provide additional — albeit still limited — substance to Russia’s vision of a more pluralistic and polycentric world, transforming the world’s normative landscape and potentially reconfiguring the global geopolitical chessboard.

However, the idea of Greater Eurasia was born out of — and continues to be rooted in — contradictory impulses. These should encourage the Russian elite not to revisit the paradigm in its entirety, but rather to rethink its conceptual foundations so as to alter how it expresses itself in the real world, with the aim of strengthening the multi-vectored nature of Russia’s foreign policy.

Moscow’s dilemma

On the one hand, Moscow’s “Pivot to the East” was designed, in part, to buttress the foundations of Russia’s independent great power status and strengthen the Kremlin’s hand toward Europe by deepening ties with dynamic Asian markets. The launch of this “pivot” predates the onset of the Ukraine crisis and was thus built for a world in which Russia’s ties with the EU were troubled but not overwhelmingly hostile. On the other hand, Russia’s failure in 2013 to convince Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) not only resulted in a full-blown crisis of relations with the West, but also implied that Moscow would have to look beyond the post-Soviet space to secure a long-term place for itself in the global top tier.

Some analysts contend that EU-Russia relations will naturally improve over the long term. Nonetheless, in the meantime, Moscow finds itself situated between a European Union whose sanctions against Russia are one of the few signs of unity among member states, and a strategic partnership with China that rests on mixed foundations.

The Kremlin is keen to play up its agreement with Beijing on normative issues, such as their shared skepticism toward regime change and their commitment to the principle of non-interference in states’ internal affairs. However, this is often a case of Moscow using China instrumentally as a power multiplier in its normative dispute with the West, even though there does exist a genuine commitment to constructing a Eurasian order based on shared principles. But Russia’s Chinese dilemma runs deeper than this.

As long as relations with the West remain in the doldrums, Moscow has no choice but to make its strategic partnership with Beijing the lynchpin of its plans to maintain great power status. Russia is but a secondary actor in Asia’s regional order, which casts significant doubt on the ability of the EAEU minus Ukraine to become major pole at the global level on its own. But at the same time, failure to mend ties with the West will result in growing dependence on China, thus undermining the very aim that Russia seeks to achieve — preserving its status as an independent great power.

Reimagining great power status

Those adopting a critical view contend that the Kremlin’s great power discourse largely serves a psychological and political purpose, compensating for the loss of the Soviet Union and helping to legitimate the regime’s hold on power. This ignores the fact that it is also an eminently reasonable strategic aim: It makes sense for a declining power to attempt to secure a position at the table, where it will be able to play a role in writing the rules of the game. The question is how best to maximize Russia’s chances of earning a long-term spot at that table, and how to do so in a way that will enhance Moscow’s ability to shape the international order to reflect its interests. Great power status is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

In preparation for the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the Communist leadership in Beijing advanced the concept of “one country, two systems”. The aim was to solve two problems simultaneously, developing a workable model for Hong Kong while also suggesting a template for Taiwan’s eventual reunification with the mainland. Similarly, a conceptual innovation within the Greater Eurasia paradigm could help Russia to kill two birds with one stone as well, shifting the terms of its relationship with Europe while reframing the role of Central Asia in the context of the Sino-Russian partnership. We can call this concept “orders within orders.”

Visions for a Greater Eurasian partnership were framed in response to frustrations resulting from the failure of the EU and Russia to construct a single Greater European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. As such, the tone it sets vis-à-vis Europe is largely defensive and rejectionist: Brussels cannot continue to treat Russia as a junior partner expected to conform to the EU acquis; rather, Russia must be viewed as an equal, and the EU is only welcome to join the Greater Eurasian community if it accepts its pluralistic principles. To a great extent, the result is a seeming binary rivalry between the Sino-Russian Heartland and the American-allied Rimland, limiting the benefits for many players that could flow from greater strategic promiscuity.

The paradigm of “orders within orders”, by contrast, would conceptualize EU-Russia relations as forming a regional international order within the broader Greater Eurasian order, operating according to its own principles and initiating its own separate bilateral dialogue on global ordering practices. This is very much consistent with Russia’s desire for a pluralistic Eurasia — indeed, it would even enhance Eurasia’s pluralism and deepen our understanding of its substance. What is more, it would also help to imbue ties between Brussels and Moscow with a more positive language and inclusive dynamic, while strengthening the place of the Eurasian supercontinent on the global chessboard.

Russia would thus be able to benefit from engaging in order-generating dialogue with both China and the EU without compromising on its strategic partnership with Beijing, in the process emphasizing its centrality in international affairs, enhancing the chances of it securing a long-term place at the great power table, and demonstrating that its contribution to shaping the future of international order goes beyond mere creative destruction, as critics often contend. Moscow’s current rivalry with the West and its deepening ties with China have placed it at the epicenter of several — now interconnected — flashpoints where great power interests clash, ranging from Ukraine to Syria to North Korea. Russia is therefore uniquely placed to transform the international climate and reap disproportionate benefits.

Transforming Russia’s key relationships

Some scholars have begun to suggest that the future of global politics will be determined by interactions not between powers but blocs, resulting in multiple overlapping international orders. The EU itself is a sub-regional order within Europe. Its decision-making processes, as well as the limits imposed by its institutional structure on its conduct of foreign policy, are becoming increasingly apparent. A key debate going forward will concern how it chooses to deploy its power as it consolidates its hegemonic position on the European Peninsula. Russia should seek to influence this process constructively, in order to guide it in a direction that reflects its long-term interests and entrench a logic of positive-sum cooperation in relations between Brussels and Moscow.

The current stalemate between the EU and Russia is partly the result of both sides refusing to revisit key principles underpinning the conduct of their foreign policies. Brussels will never acquiesce to a Yalta-style European order featuring spheres of influence, citing the Paris Charter’s provision that all European countries should have the right to choose their orientation. Moscow, for its part, believes that unilateral concessions on its part throughout the post-Cold War period were not reciprocated by the EU, which chose to embark on a project of constructing a Brussels-centric European order that relegated Russia to second-tier status.

To be successful, then, the paradigm of “orders within orders” needs to be billed not as a return to unilateral concessions, but rather as a reframing of the Greater Eurasian partnership designed to maximize the number of partners with which Russia can develop constructive relations. The EU could reciprocate by reinterpreting its signal concept of “resilience” that features so prominently in its 2016 Global Strategy, altering its focus from emphasizing the endurance of EU institutions and the broader liberal international order to stressing the elements of continued stability and cooperation across the wider European space (including Russia).

The paradigm could also help to delineate the contours of Moscow’s relationship with Beijing in Central Asia. Although the narrative that Russia fears losing its Central Asian sphere of influence to a rising China is often overblown, considering the region as representing a separate order within Greater Eurasia could help Moscow to entrench a certain set of principles and practices that ensure the preservation of cooperation and trust between all parties, even as geopolitical configurations and the balance of power evolve across the Eurasian supercontinent over the coming years and decades.

Whether the Russian elite chose to make this new paradigm explicit or merely use it as an implicit conceptual guide, it can complement the foreign policy community’s mental map in important ways. The community is often accused of being reactive, putting forward an abstract idea of an integrated Greater Eurasian space to stall for time in the face of a rising China, even as they claim that Russia had no choice but to react forcefully regarding Ukraine in response to Washington and Brussels’ continued refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of its interests. An attempt to infuse the Greater Eurasia vision with additional content will not only help Moscow to engage with other major powers more on its own terms, but also ensure that Russia can maximize its impact on the future shape of world order by consolidating existing normative frameworks and increasing the number of its dialogue partners.

Moreover, for a country charting a new strategy and identity at the northern tip of Eurasia following a quarter-century of frustrating attempts to find a place for itself in Europe, working to erect multiple complementary Eurasian orders would help integrate Russia’s various regions into their respective adjacent neighborhoods across the supercontinent. This would help to secure both the foundations of Russia’s multi-vectored foreign policy and its capacity to influence dynamics in multiple theatres, both of which are key to maintaining great power status over the long term.

First published in our partner RIAC

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Russian Foreign Policy Moving into 2020: Today’s Achievements and Tomorrow’s Challenges

Igor Ivanov

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It has become a trend in recent times for politicians, experts and journalists alike to sum up the outgoing year in international relations by noting the decrease in global governance and the growing instability of world politics. And 2019 is no exception. We have witnessed a number of surprises and unexpected events across the globe this year — from the landslide victory of Volodymyr Zelensky in the Ukrainian elections and the launch of impeachment proceedings against Donald Trump in the United States, to a series of political upheavals in Latin America and the never-ending political crisis in the United Kingdom, as well as numerous armed attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and wild oscillations in U.S.–China relations.

Russia’s foreign policy has been an utter success compared to the chronic instability and volatility that has become characteristic of the international situation. Even Moscow’s most ardent critics cannot deny that Russia has pursued a consistent foreign policy over the past calendar year. While many on the international stage may not see Russia as a convenient partner, it certainly cannot be accused of being unreliable or inconsistent in this capacity. This is an indisputable advantage that Russia enjoys over some of the other great powers and, as such, it is respected not only by the country’s friends and allies, but also by its enemies and opponents.

All things considered, we can expect the global system to become even more unstable in 2020. I would, of course, like to be wrong here, but the energy produced by the collapse of the old system of international relations has not yet entirely dissipated. The chain reaction of disintegration that it has caused is unlikely to be arrested any time soon. We are not talking about a year or two of diligent work here, but rather about a long-term historical undertaking — a challenge that needs to be met not by a single state or group of leading powers, but by the entire international community, which for various reasons is still poorly equipped to deal with the problem.

Under these conditions, the temptation may naturally arise for Russia to minimize its participation in international affairs, isolate itself from the unpredictable and dangerous outside world and focus on solving problems at home. The reluctance to “import this instability” and become involuntary hostages to those negative processes and trends in world politics that neither we nor anyone else can control is quite understandable. Also understandable is the public’s demand that the authorities focus on problems at home — and, sad as it may be, we have more than enough of these.

However, the strategy of self-isolation, even if only temporary and partial, is dangerous in at least two ways. First, consistent self-isolation is virtually impossible in the modern, interconnected world (North Korea is a very rare exception here). Russia is deeply integrated into global political, economic and social processes, and any attempts to isolate itself will inevitably mean abandoning many of the country’s most significant foreign political achievements over the past 30 years. Moreover, isolation would considerably slow down the process of solving those domestic problems that require the most attention.

Second, the strategy of self-isolation would effectively involve Russia withdrawing from active participation in the creation of a new system of international relations and the construction of the new world order. And a new world order will be created regardless. The only question is the price that humanity will have to pay for it. When the era of instability is over and a form of global governance has been restored, Russia will have to play by rules that have been developed by somebody else — rules that ignore Russia’s interests and serve those of other participants in global politics.

For this reason, Russia’s foreign policy in the coming year should not be directed exclusively at resolving immediate tasks in various regions of the world, although these tasks certainly are important. Equally important is the development of new principles, models and mechanisms of international cooperation for the future. Figuratively speaking, while it may still be too early right now to start the construction of the building that will house the new world order, it is both possible and necessary to start picking out individual “bricks” and even entire building blocks of this future building today. This is a difficult task, but Russian foreign policy has already made some inroads in this respect.

For example, Russia has gained unparalleled experience in multilateral diplomacy in Syria that has enabled the country to align the positions of the most bitter of adversaries and reduce the intensity of armed hostilities. In Syria, Russia has managed to achieve what many people until recently believed was simply unachievable. It is clearly worth trying to expand this practice to the Middle East as a whole in the coming year. The region sorely needs a collective security system, and a concept developed and fleshed out by the Russian side could be just the ticket.

In Asia, Russia and its partners have taken serious steps towards the construction of a fundamentally new, democratic and transparent system of international institutions. Recent achievements include the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the promotion of the BRICS+ concept, the advancement of the RIC (Russia, India and China) format, and the progress made in work to combine the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. It is particularly relevant here to fill new institutional formats with real content. Russia will have the chance to solidify its leading role in expanding the “project portfolios” of BRICS and the SCO when it hosts their annual summits in 2020.

Russia–China relations are steadily becoming a driving force in the system of international relations. The further coordination of their actions on the international stage, including the security domain, will continue to strengthen their authority and influence in world affairs.

As for Moscow’s policies on the European front, while 2019 was not a breakthrough year in terms of improving relations with the EU, certain positives can be gleaned. Russia was welcomed back to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Russia and the West managed to agree on a common strategy to regulate the political crisis in Moldova. The Normandy contact group on the resolution of the situation in Donbass resumed its work after a long break. And trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union on energy issues started to move forward.

Europe has started to re-examine its model of regional integration fundamentally, and not only because of the United Kingdom’s impending withdrawal from the European Union. The continent also has deep-seated problems related to socioeconomic development, regionalization, security, etc. In this context, serious political dialogue on the future of relations between Russia and Europe is an absolute necessity. And this dialogue needs to be started now, without delay.

The 2020 election campaign in the United States is in full swing, so now is not the best time to try to start fixing relations. However, those who insist that Moscow should take a break in these relations until after the election, hoping that the United States will somehow emerge from the deep political crisis that split the nation three years ago, are simply wrong. History has taught us that we can spend our entire lives waiting for the “right moment,” and there will always be plenty of excuses to extend this break. Contacts with the Executive Branch of the United States are indeed objectively difficult at the moment, which means that Russia needs to step up its activities along other lines, including in terms of its Track II diplomacy.

A breakthrough was made in relations with Africa in 2019. The Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi demonstrated that there is interest on both sides in developing cooperation and that this cooperation holds great potential. The main thing now is to ensure that this momentum is not lost, which means that practical steps must be taken in 2020.

These are just some of the problems that Russian foreign policy will come up against in 2020. Russia has already demonstrated effective crisis management skills and has proven that it can cope with the most serious challenges of regional and global security today. Now it has the opportunity to show that it is also an experienced design engineer who is ready, alongside its partners, to develop individual components and entire nodes of the mechanism of the new world order that is still under construction.

Next year will mark the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. Looking back, it is essential to note that those who emerged victorious in 1945 were, despite their deep-seated dissent on the most fundamental issues of global development, nevertheless able to agree not only on the rules of the game on the world stage, but also on the creation of an entire system of international institutions to guarantee global and regional stability. And, despite its many shortcomings and imperfections, this system has served humanity for decades.

Today, the international community faces challenges that are comparable in scale to those it faced in the middle of the 20th century. I would like to hope that, like their great predecessors, the politicians of today will realize their historical responsibility and demonstrate political savvy to resolve the most pressing issues of our time.

From our partner RIAC

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The Intellectual Vector: Where Russian Interventionism Is Imperative

Dayan Jayatilleka

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In an interesting contribution to a valuable volume, Prof T.V. Bordachev of the HSE Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies makes a superbly insightful point: “Russia in Asia should play the role that France played in Europe at the dawn of European integration— the main intellectual engine of the new format of relations between the states [1] .”

In a period characterized by hysteria over alleged Russian intervention in everything from conflicts to elections, I would like to point out a deficit or indeed absence of such intervention in a vector it should, could and indeed must intervene: the intellectual vector. Just as the USA and France, Russia has been a seedbed of ideas and concepts during the period of Modernity, and still is, but with a difference. Unlike France and the USA, it has seemingly abandoned the vocation of the globalization of its ideas and concepts; of its very perspective.

In this brief note, I wish to spotlight a few thematic areas in which a Russian intellectual intervention is imperative and feasible. These are the Cold war and the clash of contending world orders in the 21st century, the phenomenon and problems of globalization and the Greater Eurasia concept/project.

The Battle of (Big) Ideas

While a vast number of books on the end and the history of the Cold War have been published in the West, with widely diverse perspectives; of the Cold War seen teleologically, from the standpoint of how it ended, there isn’t a single major, recognized Russian work, even an anthology, in English—which for better or worse, is a quasi-universal language—on the same theme and topic. Thus, teleological western perspectives of contemporary history dominate if not monopolize, by default.

The same is true of perspectives of the post-Cold war world. The ‘big ideas’ framing the future of the post-Cold war world came from the West, from Fukuyama and Huntington (and others with less impact, like Robert Kaplan). There is a dearth of ‘big ideas’ from Russia for and of the world, in the English language. Were there counters in Russia to Fukuyama and Huntington? Were there the counter-perspectives from Russia to neoliberalism and neoconservatism as paradigms or even as conceptual frameworks? Was there an ideology or doctrine from Russia that is a counter to both neoliberalism and neoconservatism? Did the Third Rome venture a Third Ideology, a Third Doctrine, not just for itself, but for and of the world—not only Russian versions/variants of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, of either Fukuyama or Huntington? There cannot be a third space in ideas globally without such a Russian intervention in ideology and political thought.

 (If I may strike a personal note, I have ventured an alternative narrative and explanatory framework from the global South. The Fall of Global Socialism—A Counter-Narrative from the South | D. Jayatilleka | Palgrave Macmillan).

Eurasia, Greater Eurasia

In the aftermath of the important recent conference “5 years of the ‘Greater Eurasia’ concept : issues and accomplishments” held at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and the question that was posed at the conference “What is to be done?”, I suggest that one of the intellectual tasks is to create a Eurasian/Greater Eurasian intelligentsia and a Greater Eurasian Idea, which I might add is not coterminous with the ‘The idea of Greater Eurasia’.

In developing a Greater Eurasian Idea, the future work requires both institutional and intellectual thrusts. The institutional work simply means that in a situation in which there seem to be no academic institutions, be they universities, think tanks, or centers of Advanced Studies, dedicated explicitly and specifically to Greater Eurasia or at least Eurasia itself, these should be created. A network of such institutions will be the material basis or substructure of the creation of a greater Eurasian intelligentsia.

But still more important is the Greater Eurasia Idea, which goes beyond the idea of Greater Eurasia, and develops an idea of a greater Eurasian perspective and world outlook. One of the most important means of a Greater Eurasian idea is that of excavation. By this I mean an exploration and auditing of the ideas of thinkers (including political leaders) past and present, of and from Greater Eurasia, about the existing world order and a more desirable world order. I refer not only to the ancient wisdom from this area, but much more importantly, the thinking from the period of Modernity, encompassing personalities such as Sun Yat-sen (China), Rabindranath Tagore, MN Roy (India), Renato Constantino (Philippines) and Soedjatmoko (Indonesia).

Such an audit can take the form of a multivolume anthology of writings and speeches, but would need to be extended to tracing the alternative models of a world order that was suggested by thinkers from Greater Eurasia, resulting in a conceptual reconstitution or ‘holographic projection’ of such an alternative world order.

The crucial questions concerning Eurasia and Greater Eurasia are those of architecture and organization. At the heart of such questions is that of the all-important ‘Primakovian’ triangle the RIC, i.e. Russia, India, China, which Lenin in his last published writing of March 1923, said would determine the direction of the world’s destiny. What are the structural relations that are possible in the ensemble R-I-C? Should or should not other powers be included in it? Should the architecture of Eurasia and Greater Eurasia be one of concentric circles and what criteria would determine which circle which power is in—or would that change situationally?

The history of the Russian Revolution of 1917 demonstrated the crucial strategic importance of organization exemplified by the two models or types: Menshevik and Bolshevik. The organizational or architectural question—though the two terms may not be identical—can also be used in the international arena. Decades after the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, the pith and substance of the Bolshevik organizational philosophy was summed up by Lenin in his later writings, with the phrase “Better Fewer, but Better”—meaning quality over quantity.

In today’s global context it will mean grappling with the problem that the Chinese Communists raised in the early 1960s, namely “friendly and fraternal”, which they posed as a choice “do you support the friendly or the fraternal states?” Thankfully in today’s context, such a zero-sum game is not necessary, but the question remains of priority and hierarchy. Should the relations ship between those states which face a military strategic, and in some cases, existential, threat from a common source, have a relationship of a qualitatively higher level than those who do not, however powerful and friendly the latter may be? Should a new global architecture or a new global policy privilege such relationships, especially in a context of real or attempted global encirclement of Eurasia?

The complex problem is made slightly easier when one recalls that the tighter and looser, qualitative and quantitative, Bolshevik and Menshevik organizational models were in fact merged in the 1930s formula of the Anti-Fascist Popular Front, which had a national and broader international version. Does the thinking of Stalin, Dimitrov, Gramsci and Togliatti have an international relevance and applicability today in the face of a project of global encirclement, grand strategic offensive to preserve unipolarity and wage globalized hybrid war? What would a global united front or bloc against unipolarity, war and intervention look like in the current context?

State, the Nationalities Question and Terrorism

The theoretical, strategic and policy questions that await a perspective by Russian and Eurasian thinkers are at least three:

How to reconcile the contradiction between state sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity on the one hand and the right of self-determination of nations and nationalities on the other. What are the limits of state sovereignty and of the right of nations to self-determination, respectively? Where does one stop and the other start?

How to reconcile the contradiction between the need for strong sovereign states, and forms of autonomy or regions and peoples? What are the non-federal forms of autonomy that can be designed for states in which federalization is strongly felt, for historical reasons, to be fissiparous?

What are the universal criteria by which legitimate struggles of resistance and for liberation can be distinguished from terrorism? Is it not possible for a global consensus reflected in a universal charter to be signed which unconditionally rejects the intentional targeting of unarmed civilians as a legitimate tactic of struggle, and registers this as the defining criteria of terrorism , irrespective of the causes involved, however legitimate, and while remaining agnostic of the issue of armed resistance/armed liberation struggles as such?

Globalization

As Marx made clear in the Communist Manifesto, capitalism was a globalized and globalizing system (which Immanuel Wallerstein was to call a ‘world system’). What then is new about ‘globalization’? “Globalization” refers to the collapse of an alternative and parallel socialist system, and the incorporation of Russia and China in the world economy, which is essentially capitalist in character; a capitalist world economy. The problem, indeed the root of the crisis today is not globalization per se, it is the specific form of globalization which can be summed up as neoliberal globalization at the economic level and unipolar globalization at the geopolitical and geostrategic level. That is what I call asymmetric globalization.

The contradictions arising from these two specific forms of globalization has resulted in a hydra-headed reaction which threatens globalization itself. Therefore, globalization has to change if it is to survive and resume its pace. The dangerously false choice of “globalization or no globalization”, “globalization or de-globalization”, should be reframed. Thus, the question should be, what kind of globalization and who benefits from it? The search must be to define a model that is not an alternative TO globalization but an alternative model OF globalization. My own view is that the real choice must be framed as ‘neoliberal and unipolar globalization or Alt-globalization?’ as I call it, or ‘Asymmetric Globalization, Anti-Globalization or Alt-Globalization?’

Multipolarity

There are two conceptual problems which have to be cleared up regarding multipolarity. The first is the increasing tendency to either conflate multipolarity and multilateralism and or to surrender the project of multipolarity and settle for multilateralism. The second problem is the question of how to arrive in a multipolar world. As for the first problem, it should be clear that a multipolar and multilateral world order is the desirable goal, but that these two aspects are separable and the multipolar aspect is more important than the multilateral one. In the post-Cold War period, the western liberals used multilateralism in service of the unipolar project, while the neoconservatives did so only exceptionally or hardly at all, but the essence was the same: a unipolar hegemonistic policy. Multilateralism is an institutional pathway which is preferable to unilateralism, but the central issue is not the institutional aspect of the world order, but the politico-military aspect of the world order; the aspect of power. The (Leninist) question is “which will prevail?” The unipolar project or the multipolar project will prevail?

The second problem area concerning multipolarity is that of the transition. How will we get from here to there? From the unipolar project to a multipolar world order? As in the old question of the transition from capitalism to socialism, there are the mechanistic and evolutionary interpretations; the ones that say that the transition will take place inevitably and inexorably, as a result of the working out of the process of historical change; indeed, as an evolution. A Realist interpretation would hold however, that the transition will involve a protracted struggle along all vectors, taking place over an entire historical period, and which will involve a tipping of the scales in favour of Greater Eurasia with Eurasia as its core.

The West

The conventional attitude to the West in the world as a whole is either that it remains the fount of all enlightened norms and values or that it is in irretrievable decline and decay, incapable of yielding anything of value. There is, however, a third possibility, namely that the West is in deep crisis and from within that crisis a surprising new development may arise which Eurasia and Greater Eurasia may do well to regard with objectivity and open-mindedness. The great surprise arising from the West is that in the USA, recent polls show that 50% of millennials regard ‘socialism’ as positive, and that the mainstream US Democratic party has shifted to the Left. Similarly, in the UK, the mainstream opposition Labour Party is led by a leftwing anti-interventionist personality. Is this potential or latent transformation in and of the West, an essential component in the transition to a truly multipolar world?

Russia’s intellectual intervention in these and other areas of contemporary concern is imperative and needs to be globalized, in order for Russia to fulfil the role of the ‘intellectual engine of the new format of relations between the states’ (Bordachev, 2019).

These are the purely personal views of the author.

From our partner RIAC

[1] ‘What Russia can give to Asia?’, Russia in the Forming Greater Eurasia, Problems of Geography, Volume 148, eds. VM Kotlyakov, VA Shuper, Moscow Kodeks Publishing House 2019, p. 71

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Russia’s return three vessels to Ukraine: A new gunboat diplomacy questioned?

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A new perspective turn in tough relations between two neighbors had a place on November 17, Russia declared returning of three “captured” gunboats to Ukraine and this news was soon confirmed by the Kiev authorities. There was another quite an uprising statement that was made by Putin himself that Russia is ready to resume the supply of natural gas to Ukraine. The news was immediately heard on the world’s political arena what truly made a belief that ‘that’ can surely be a beginning of the minimization of the conflict between Russian Federation and Ukraine as good neighbors as they seemed to be not that long ago. But shall we see that gesture as something well promising or we shall observe that in a quite skeptical way?

With the great beginning from obtaining sovereignty in 1990 Ukraine got extremely prominent blessings such as geopolitically pleasant territory, great natural and human resources , advanced industrial power and very strong educational background. Those factors had to play a key role in formation of a new great power and Ukraine could definitely possess that claim. However after more than a quarter of century outpoured we can observe those dreams in ruins. Governmental incompetence multiplied by corruption did a destructive job and Ukraine’s European-leaning made Russia see that as a tumor what brought to Crimea’s cut and Donbas’s bleeding burnt. When Kyiv wasn’t asked about such a ‘surgery’ Moscow was that doer who anticipated where Ukraine’s European incline could bring to and NATO as a terminal station of that incline was and is the biggest threat to the Kremlin. Ukraine had and apparently still has a great desire to be European directed country and that comes with no doubt, even geographical center of Europe is located in Ukraine but it hasn’t had a place in history for Ukraine to fully enjoy European life and   we can admit that open boarders to Europe for Ukrainians has made a blurry vision that the seat around EU’s round table is prepared and waiting for Ukraine to sit on. Logically speaking there are dozens of obstacles and barriers that not only stop but also pull Ukraine back and unfortunately EU’s high requirements are not the most severe problems, America’s help turns to remain a promise that more likely will never come to be present at the epicenter of the crisis as well as Europe’s observers may only confirm the horror of the flames that continue to sting Ukraine. And now when promised aid from the West can’t help we see how ‘Russian new gunboat diplomacy’ gets its place on.

“Gunboat diplomacy” is conventionally termed as a part of imperial diplomacy which aims to subjugate a weaker or a smaller country by the threat of using force. For example  ‘Operation  Vantage’ or  ‘Gaza  Flotilla  Raid’ where  we  can  observe  the implementation  of  “Gunboat  diplomacy”  ,  however  in  this  particular  situation Russia’s message contains dual meaning: a good-will gesture and a hidden warning to Ukraine. As the leader of Russia, which has been a great power of Europe for almost 350 years, Putin is sure to understand the implication of diplomacy supported by force. The concept of “New gunboat diplomacy” indicates that vessels get its way home with a further conversation that meets a “Big Stick” holder’s expectations presenting a choice to Ukraine to rethink “Western directions” or observe where “New gunboat diplomacy” has its “old scratches”.

Yet, many claim that this type of diplomatic tactic is nothing new but statement from court that made Russians return the boats, others contradict that with sanctions’ flying colors court couldn’t bring any pressure to aggravate already heavily inflamed situation. “Some not well trained cats don’t know what to do with the mice when they catch them”- How much is that applicable to the situation that happened when Russia returned warships back to Ukraine, was that a goodwill and will that bring any goods? Our history brings rotation all around and that truly reminds the helix. The US has faced an adversity that brought to a dramatic failure in Vietnam War when domestic situation brought a severe movement that made politicians radically change their minds and Washington had to step back. This rough comparison displays the situation that we do observe nowadays on Russian territories where people who were afflicted by sanctions get reductions of daily life quality what was caused by recent economical destabilization. There is an anticipation that this wave will turn into tsunami due to indignation that circulates among Russian citizens who find explanations of this unpleasant situation in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

Upcoming summit which is approaching to be on December 3-4 absolutely requires to have a positive face on and unpleasant domestic situation made Moscow act a good neighbor and it is always pleasure to kill a bunch of birds with just one stone. And as there are people who oppose Russia’s aggression there are also those who support and definitely agree with current foreign policy – boats were returned, but they were hollowed out by Russians as Kyiv says. Apparently that’s the sign to redesign them from gun boats into trade ones; what brings us to another inhibitor that characterizes changes of Russia’s behavior is loss of Ukraine’s trade leadership to China in 2019. Even still trade between Russia and Ukraine is remarkably high and even got a rise what definitely meets Kremlin’s interest what underlines that the conflict escalation should get its conclusion.

This actually brings a hope that the situation will be relieved but Kyiv will not have pink glasses on after such a dose of humiliations that fell on Ukraine from Russian side. Even the Kremlin possesses an idea of the minimization of the conflict that indisputably strikes the borders that will undoubtedly take quite a long time for both sides to get disputes docked and current stage is a beginning of a conversation that will apparently display to us new possibilities in crisis resolution. For now the dance of Cossack and Ballerina reminds that homo homini lupus est.

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