Since coming to power in 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed a more active foreign policy and advocated for China to play a larger role in global governance. Last year, China chaired the Hangzhou G20 Summit and ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change. This year, China held an international cooperation forum on the Belt and Road Initiative and in September will convene the ninth BRICS summit in Xiamen. Amid strong anti-globalization sentiments in Europe and the U.S., there is a debate over what Xi’s aims and intentions are in his effort to build new Chinese multilateral mechanisms for global governance, such as the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank, and reform existing institutions
Over the course of this year, the world has seen the United States step back from its role in global governance and walk away from deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Paris Climate Agreement. The retreat has raised questions about how the United States will respond to global crises escalating around the world. From violent extremism to displaced refugees, 2017 has seen far-reaching strife and calamity still to be addressed in 2018. Against this backdrop, China is making further inroads in expanding economically and asserting itself in global affairs. At the same time, China is hesitant to play a leadership role in areas where the United States is retreating and has to contend with ongoing disputes in its own backyard, including North Korea. What might the world look like in the year ahead in terms of hotspots of conflicts and how should governments and institutions tackle pressing crises?
With his inaugural visit to the Asia-Pacific region taking place just two weeks after President Xi Jinping’s elevation at the 19th Party Congress, President Donald Trump’s stop in China will be among the most consequential. The United States would like to partner more closely with China on pressing issues like addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. At the same time, the Trump administration has expressed concerns about China’s respect for the international rules-based order and discriminatory Chinese trade and economic policies. During Xi Jinping’s first state visit to the United States in 2015, much attention was placed on agreements made by the two leaders on cybersecurity and commitments on South China Sea policy. Less well known is that the two nations signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to designate funding toward cooperation on international development. The agreement serves as a guiding framework for curbing global poverty through cooperation on issues like food security, public health, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
The United States has begun modernizing its nuclear program even as the Trump administration continues to inject new uncertainties into the future of U.S. nuclear policy and the U.S.-China nuclear and strategic security relationship. Efforts to maintain strategic stability between Washington and Beijing are also facing challenges from U.S. allies in the region. Japan worries that a stable U.S.-China nuclear relationship would embolden China to take more aggressive military action against Japan and other regional actors. South Korea has also expressed concerns over how the U.S.-China relationship may impact U.S. deterrence and security guarantees for South Korea. The United States has long played a key role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but President Trump has called NATO “obsolete” and criticized other members for not paying their fair share in military spending. The future of NATO and U.S. alliances in the region could hang in the balance as the Trump administration shifts focus to the “America first” agenda. At the same time, elections in France, the Netherlands, and Germany are also putting a strain on the EU as populist candidates gain more ground among voters. While European heads of state have expressed hope that key players like U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis will help preserve the transatlantic alliance, China could benefit from a U.S. retreat. It is promoting its Belt and Road Initiative, and some European countries have thus far been receptive to the deals offered.
The Middle East has historically been a strong focus of U.S. foreign policy; China, as part of its rise as a global power, is increasingly looking to grow its economic engagement in the region. But questions remain regarding the ability of the two countries to cooperate in the Middle East. While the United States reviews its policy in the region, the Trump administration has vocalized strong positions on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal and even taken military actions on Syria. At the same time, China is focusing on promoting its Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East and continues to make technology investments in countries like Israel.
China and Russia have established closer ties under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, forging large-scale energy and economic ties, conducting joint naval exercises, and signing treaties to reaffirm their strategic partnership. While world leaders hoped the United States and Russia would focus on areas in which to cooperate in the post-Cold War era, more emphasis has been placed on competition. Rhetoric from U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, though, has renewed discussions about a possible improvement of U.S.-Russia relations that has the potential to shift the great power dynamics.
“Traditionally, China and Pakistan have cooperated closely at the strategic and political levels. Now the two nations are making efforts to expand their bilateral collaboration economically as well. The construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a milestone that signifies this shift.”Over the past few years, security tensions in the Asia-Pacific have increased, raising the question of how to ensure continued strategic stability between the world’s great powers. This region is home to five nuclear states—China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and the United States—in addition to nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.
U.S. government’s Asia policy is deeply uncertain. While North Korea continues to carry out more sophisticated nuclear tests and tensions escalate in the South China Sea, U.S.-China cooperation is more important than ever for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. However, a growing number of cyber disputes is challenging the relationship between the two major powers. How will these foreign policy issues in Asia be perceived and addressed by the Trump administration? The Western Pacific is experiencing a fundamental and potentially destabilizing military and economic power transition driven primarily by China’s economic and military rise and a corresponding relative decline in American power. Efforts by the United States or China to secure future predominance will prove futile and dangerous, given a host of security, economic, and diplomatic factors. Instead, creating a stable de facto balance of power is necessary and feasible for both countries. This shift could take the form of a more durable balance that would necessitate major regional changes that would be difficult to achieve, or a more feasible but less stable balance involving more modest adjustments. The incremental, conditional process this would entail involves developing domestic consensus, securing allied and friendly support, deepening U.S.-China dialogue, and achieving interlinked changes in several existing regional security policies.
A highly stable balance would necessitate substantial progress on several security hotspots, including the creation of a unified, largely nonaligned Korean Peninsula, a demilitarized Taiwan Strait, and militarily limited, jointly developed East and South China Seas. It would also encompass a more open economic environment characterized by an inclusive, region-wide trade and investment agreement. A more attainable though less stable balance instead would involve joint efforts to sustain a regional free trade and investment system short of a comprehensive regional trade agreement, as well as shared understandings regarding potential crisis contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. The magnitude and scope of relative military and economic strength between the major powers of the region are decisive in determining the pace, scale, and intensity of security competitions. Delaying or futilely pursuing either Chinese or American predominance will put the region at greater risk. The most stable and preferable outcome would involve major changes to volatile regional hotspots, whereas a more modest vision would be more feasible albeit less stable.
China will almost certainly manage to significantly increase its economic and military capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and its allies. Moreover, Washington and Beijing handle volatile regional issues very differently, and their respective offense-oriented escalatory military doctrines are likely to persist under existing conditions, increasing the likelihood of severe crises. Key U.S. allies will probably remain unwilling and unable to compensate for America’s relative decline. Last year, China and the EU celebrated forty years of diplomatic relations. The EU’s leading foreign policy official, Federica Mogherini, visited Beijing for the first time and advocated greater EU engagement in Asia. Chinese President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, traveled to the UK and later hosted state visits from Germany and France. Much of this diplomatic activity focused on upgrading cooperation between China and Europe on investment and trade as a way to deepen their strategic partnership.
China’s Belt and Road initiative aims to extend infrastructure and connectivity across Eurasia from the Asia-Pacific to Europe. It includes the overland Silk Road Economic Belt across Central Asia and the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road, which will span Southeast Asia. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping announced these initiatives in 2013, they have been actively discussed both within China and abroad. However, so far few infrastructure projects have been enacted and the proposal remains at an early stage. Civil and proxy wars have destabilized Syria, Libya, and Yemen, and Egypt is experiencing a domestic insurgency. Although instability in the Middle East remains widespread, China continues to deepen its ties in the region. In January 2016, Xi Jinping embarked on his first state visit to the Middle East as president of China, just days after Beijing released its first-ever policy paper on the region. President Xi Jinping appears to have ushered in a more assertive, proactive foreign policy approach than that of his predecessors—as high-profile initiatives like the Belt and Road make clear. Yet core principles of Chinese diplomacy have long been shaped by traditional Chinese cultural concepts that remain relevant today. As President Xi charts China’s foreign policy course in the years ahead, elements of continuity and change will continue to coexist.
The increasing aspirations of the economic giant China are likely to have lasting impact on the regional security and economic development of the South Asian states. Coupled with the Chinese approach of “non-intervention in internal matters” the idea of inclusive development under the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) has laid the foundation for infrastructural and human development in the region. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the flagship projects of the BRI, under which China is making large overseas investments in Pakistan. China and Pakistan have often repeated their stances that the CPEC is an economic corridor and a major stabilizing factor in the volatile and uncertain regional security paradigm of South Asia.
“Donald Trump elected as the US president and his America First foreign policy mantle, and Xi Jinping emerging from the newly-ended 19th National Congress of Communist Party of China even more powerful and vowing to rejuvenate his country, Sino-US relations had entered a period of turbulence and uncertainty…no-apology preachers of China Dream and America First, both Xi and Trump vowed to see their policies and agendas set in motion under their watch…How these two different visions with heavy dose of nationalist flavours can proceed smoothly against each other, especially at the backdrop of an emerging power transition, is an open question…However, for all the challenges and alarms, there’s still room for optimism of the future of China-US relations.
Russia-Ukraine Conflict and the Chinese Viewpoint
On the occasion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Uzbekistan, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and People’s Republic of China President Xi Jin Ping, who presented a different view of the Russian occupation of Ukraine than that of the Chinese government. During their last face-to-face encounter in February, Xi and Putin vowed to work together without boundaries, providing each other with unwavering political and diplomatic support. There are, however, evident boundaries to their “no limits” collaboration at the present moment, with China, as the more powerful partner, establishing such limits. China has maintained a neutral stance during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. A meeting between Xi Jin Ping and Vladimir Putin at the SCO Summit showed that Xi sent a clear message that China is not interested in a high-intensity, long-term war. Instead, Xi urged Putin to “assume the role of great powers” and play an anchoring role to bring solidity to the international system. China isn’t interested in a protracted conflict because of the damage it may do to the country’s economy, prestige, and international standing. China is the European Union’s (EU) largest trading partner and an excellent location for EU businesses to set up shops and expand operations.
During 2021, European firms spent over $5.1 billion in the country, making Europe the third biggest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, bilateral commerce between China and the EU reached $420.6 billion in the first six months of 2022. It’s impossible to deny the significance of China’s growing economic ties to the West, notably the United States and the European Union. China and the European Union are not on good terms, but EU Chamber of Commerce in China president Wuttke has stressed that they must “rely on each other” nevertheless. Commentators on European and Chinese politics and economies have mostly repeated one another’s arguments. China’s political and economic interest in Ukraine has reached new heights as the country has become a major investment ground for the Asian giant. One-tenth of Ukraine’s arable land has been purchased by the country, which is significant since Ukraine is China’s primary source of maize. Kyiv has been a very important ally to China’s Belt and Road plan. Therefore, China least anticipates a war-torn Ukraine and counter-China policies from Europe or the West.
According to data compiled by the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) for August 2022, China bought products worth $42.9 million and exported goods worth $185 million to Ukraine. The value of exports has decreased from $1.11 billion in August 2021 to only $185 million in the current month. Over the course of this year, China has dominated the $13.3 million telephone export market in Ukraine. In addition, tobacco products, tyres, and automobiles are among the many items that are sent to Ukraine. However, the export of semiconductor devices and iron pipes from Ukraine and the import of soybean oil have been hit hard. This huge drop in trade value is undeniably a burden for China, especially at a time when the oil price has risen internationally and technological innovation is a requirement, but it can be simply attributed to the protracted dispute and China’s balanced political and diplomatic stance. As it turns out, ties between China and Russia are somewhat strange. Evidence in this regard is Xi’s “cool warning” to Putin.
The relationship between China and Russia is tense on the political and diplomatic fronts, largely as a result of Russia’s military action in Ukraine. Many in the American media and commentary have claimed that China was aware of the action in advance, a claim that China has categorically refuted. China has been very consistent in its criticism of NATO’s expansion into the territories that prompted Russia to take the dramatic measure of retaliating militarily. Furthermore, as a separate instrument for American expansionism, NATO is seen by China as a threat to its geostrategic goals. China worries that its ideological and historical ties to Russia would hurt its international standing and slow the country’s economic growth, which is heavily reliant on exports to the United States and the European Union. China has watched Russia’s aggressive moves against Ukraine intently from the beginning. The reaction of the international community, and the United States in particular, to Russian “expansionism,” was also carefully monitored. That’s because China plans to finally seize complete control of Taiwan, and this is the first, decisive step toward that goal. Taiwan, located among the “first island chain,” is surrounded by militarily important United States territory while being located a hundred miles away. Therefore, even a little move toward conquering Taiwan may immediately endanger American bases in areas like Hawaii and Guam.
China’s diplomats are playing it safe in the Russia-Ukraine conflict not only to avoid getting involved, but also to see how the United States and the West react to the crisis, which will give them valuable insight into how they should deploy their own diplomatic and power-political resources in the future. China is worried about the West’s reaction to a more assertive expansion of Chinese influence. Therefore, it is imperative that the country invest in its own electricity infrastructure, including its technology, human resources, and economy. China hopes to use the continuing turmoil between Russia and Ukraine to its advantage by playing the “partnership card” and demanding massive price reductions on imports, particularly energy. However, under these circumstances, China would strongly oppose any Western attempts to put economic penalties on the country. To protect its geopolitical aspirations, for which the Beijing-Moscow friendship is essential, China would not want to hinder the commercial ecosystem with the United States and the European Union (EU) nations, but it also would not cave to their will.
Impeachment Imminent for Yoon Suk-Yeol in 2023?
South Korea’s home affairs have been nothing short of a riveting drama series unfolding in real time. While the previous season starring Moon Jae-in was about a dragon slayer turned a dragon but with more heads, the current season follows the story of an ex-Prosecutor General who, having made it to the top political office, is trying to whip things into order while displaying next to no political skills and despite the need to toe the line of conservative rhetoric.
Who is Yoon Suk-yeol and what he has accomplished over his six months in power
Those who see Yoon as a typical member of the conservative camp need to check his earlier record, when he took part in student protests or famously led the investigation into the 2012 presidential elections scandal involving “political trolls”, national security agencies orchestrating an online smear campaign against the Democratic Party candidate. Although the investigation was eventually dropped, Yoon’s name surfaced yet again, when the government was looking for an investigator to probe corruption allegations against Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak—and it was Yoon who was credited with unearthing the necessary evidence to back Park’s indictment.
Following this success, Yoon was appointed Prosecutor General by Moon Jae-in, who apparently expected him to rubber stamp jail convictions as instructed. The new prosecutor, however, demonstrated integrity and homed in on corruption among the President’s entourage. Following a protracted bureaucratic tug-of-war between the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office (SPO) and an attempt to suspend him from office, Yoon ended up in politics and joined the conservative People Power Party (PPP) for lack of any third political force in South Korea.
Yoon’s political career with the PPP did not get off to a smooth start. He ran afoul of both classic right-wing and right-center conservatives, whose Lee Jun-seok was Chairman of the Party. During the election campaign, however, Yoon succeeded in building his own faction with his old buddies and former prosecution officers.
Nevertheless, Yoon won the presidential race by a meagre 0.73%, the tiniest margin in South Korea’s electoral history, whereas Lee Jae-myung, his principal contender and a former Mayor of Seongnam and Governor of Gyeonggi-do Province, fetched more votes than Moon Jae-in five years before.
Although this analysis does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of Yoon Suk-yeol’s first six months in power, it is worth noting that he got down to his presidential business with a good deal of zest that has met with no lesser resistance.
Yoon opened his presidency with a few major eye-catching moves to demonstrate his commitment to serious change. In his first most sweeping gesture, Yoon relocated his presidential office from the Blue House to the former Ministry of Defense building, emphasizing his resolve to end the “imperial presidency”. Then, the new president has avoided any overt acts of political vengeance and called for cooperation across ideological and party divides. A committee has been set up with a mandate to promote national unity in politics, economy, culture, and other areas.
Yoon has also continued the policy of commemorating the victims of the military dictatorship, seeking to hijack the Democrats’ agenda and taking part in such events as the commemoration ceremony for the victims of the Gwangju Uprising in 1980.
Yoon’s Cabinet and Administration are teaming with ex-Democrats, including the Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, though most public officers at the top have a history of serving under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, a fact that left its mark on their political views. And yet Yoon was the first to meet with the Russian ambassador ahead of his Democratic opponent.
Yoon has reorganized his Presidential Office, abolishing, rather radically, the office of the Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs previously regarded as the master lever for exercising informal influence over and forcing president’s will on security agencies and the civil society. Further plans envisage support in overhauling 350 government agencies to improve their productivity and efficiency. Then, there is a big focus on anti-corruption efforts which, as the South Korean tradition goes, pursue a dual purpose of fighting corruption and ousting political opponents from positions of power. On yet another line of resolute action, the government has launched a crackdown on drug trafficking.
Significant changes have been made to the economic policy. While the previous administration relied on rising personal incomes to drive economic growth, Yoon Suk-yeol and his government prioritize the private sector. Another notable change was the scrapping of the nuclear phase-out policy and reinstatement of the “nuclear ecosystem”.
To tackle the growing missile and nuclear threat from North Korea, the new Administration came up with an “extended deterrent” policy based on the alliance between Seoul and Washington as well as the cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan. But the “bold initiative”, which is in fact a repackaged version of proposals harking back to the times of Lee Myung-bak (denuclearization in exchange for economic aid), was rejected while the military cooperation with the U.S. renewed on the same historical scale was responsible for the long-drawn-out bout of escalation between the Koreas and “mounting threats”.
In spite of the declarations of strategic alliance with the United States, Seoul participates in economic formats avoiding any steps, or is reluctant to get involved in any projects, that could be damaging to its relations with China or Russia. Quite tellingly, Yoon cold-shouldered Nancy Pelosi refusing to get back from his vacation to meet the U.S. House Speaker in person during her tour of Asia and confining his welcome to a mere phone conversion.
The energetic efforts of the new President have encountered a whole raft of barriers. The first is a deeply divided society. The election defeat with the narrowest margin in South Korea’s electoral history was dismissed by the Democrats as purely accidental and even their fiasco at the local elections in June 2022 (where they secured only five out of seventeen provincial governor seats and mayor seats in directly-controlled cities) has not done much to wake them up to reality.
Moreover, since Moon Jae-in had left politics, the Democratic Party chair was taken by Lee Jae-myung, Yoon’s presidential rival with a controversial reputation of a populist who appears more left-wing in his pledges than Moon himself.
Adding to the contention is the Democrats’ overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. The opposition Democratic Party of Korea holds 169 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly, while the ruling People’s Power Party has 114. Thus, the Democrats are in good position to torpedo most of Yoon’s initiatives or reject his nominations to government offices (appointing someone without parliamentary consent is frowned upon as bad political manners). The legislating process can be simply paralyzed as the parties refuse to budge and compromise. This ongoing impasse is set to last till the next parliamentary elections in spring 2024.
The ruling party is struggling to stand united as Yoon’s supporters and conservatives teamed up against Lee Jun-seok entangled in a corruption scandal with bribes that he had received in kind as sexual services. The Ethics Committee suspended Lee’s party membership for eighteen months, but he refused to surrender his chairmanship of the party resorting to relentless litigation to overrule his opponents’ resolutions. After a long fight, Lee was finally dethroned—but he and his followers are still there to stay.
The second challenge lies in the current economic troubles, for which Yoon as President bears at least symbolic responsibility. South Korea’s economy is facing tough times with steeply rising inflation, the weak won versus the U.S. dollar, and steep interest rate hikes. Forecasts point to the growing risks of market volatility and a global recession driven by a dramatic rise in the U.S. Federal Reserve funds rate, Chinese economy slowdown and the fallout from the protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The growing external economic uncertainty increases the risks of domestic stagflation and fast-paced high inflation resulting from skyrocketing energy and commodity prices as well as from persistent disruptions in the global supply chains. Some economists believe that South Korea may find itself in a situation similar to the 2008 economic crisis, at the very least. But since most of the above comes as legacy problems inherited from the previous Administration, Yoon’s critics are pointing their accusatory fingers elsewhere.
Take, for example, his controversial government appointments. where Yoon has been criticized on three counts. The first line of attack had to do with the lack of inclusivity and gender equality as many of his nominees to top positions are those whom he has long known personally, mostly men in their fifties and fellow graduates of the Seoul National University. The second fault-finding narrative talks about a “Republic of Prosecutors”, since Yoon’s team includes, for obvious reasons, quite a few people with the SPO background, including the Minister of Justice, Minister of Unification and President’s Chief of Staff. The third is concerned with specific scandals ranging from real cases of corruption to questionable allegations way back in the past. Although most rows have been settled by self-withdrawals or resignations, they leave behind a sense of frustrated expectations laced with a foul aftertaste.
On top of it, the new Administration has ignored their pledge “not to do things the way Moon did” and started using some of the previous President’s methods such as forcing some of Moon-appointed officials from their posts and pressing them to resign for the sake of maintaining stability in the current government.
From the Conservatives’ perspective Yoon has let down his people because he failed to deliver on his pledge of introducing innovation and change in line with his vision of the future. In their opinion, he should have used this decisive period of his presidency to propose a plan and lay down the groundwork for effective government administration, but has made no progress on that front. The fact that some of his plans have been blocked by the Democrats does not count any more. In the eyes of the opposition, Yoon is building a dictatorship while showing a graphic example of total incompetence.
The third problem is Yoon’s media presence. On the one hand, Yoon is not a professional politician, on the other, he almost never leaves the spotlight and talks to the media every day. Given that the right-wing outlets are controlled by his political adversaries they criticize Yoon with equal regularity. His public gaffes and ambiguous statements are instantly made public and enhanced with fitting commentaries.
The last big media scandal flared up during Yoon’s visit to New York in September 2022 when Yoon was caught cursing on a live microphone after exiting from a disappointing meeting with Joe Biden. His outburst was recorded and aired later on the pro-democratic MBC network, this time complete with very specific subtitles in spite of not very distinct sound. To be sure, when Yoon banned MBC from joining the media pool for his next international visit this sparked accusations that he was trying to stifle the freedom of speech.
All of the above have been steadily eroding Yoon’s approval rating from 52% when he took office down to a little more than 30% on September 10th, 2022, which is extremely poor performance for a president in the early months of his term. And the numbers are still oscillating around this level with only 30.1% of those surveyed on November 10th responding that they are satisfied with Yoon Suk-yeol as their President and 64.9% disapproving of the way he handles the top job.
“War with the Democrats”
Under the circumstances, both parties use the word “war” to describe their current stand-off. There are several reasons for that. First, every party that has fought its way to power sweeps clean the conquered ground under the pretext of combatting corruption. Second, political vengeance and settling old scores are embedded in the political culture of South Korea. Most Conservatives, apparently in no mood to break the tradition of locking up the ex-President, are eager to have their reckoning for the jailing of Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak. Third, Yoon Suk-yeol is clearly resolved to see through the investigations which had eventually brought him to swap his Prosecutor’s Office for the President’s one.
For now, public prosecutors have their sights trained on the ex-President Moon Jae-in and the current Democratic Party Leader Lee Jae-myung. The political emergency helped Lee to rally the support of the party that was all the more unanimous since his foremost rivals either had left politics or cut less charismatic and recognizable figures. With all that, some openly said that Lee Jae-myung had been fighting not for the party chair or a parliament seat, but for his own safety and being able to recast the allegations against him as revenge for his political views.
The accusations against Moon Jae-in are related to two incidents. The first one was the repatriation of North Korean defectors in 2019, when two fishermen had murdered 16 of their comrades before they “chose freedom” and headed South, trying to escape the North Korean justice. The Moon’s government deported them, kicking and screaming, back home. The ethical reasons were good enough, but under the Constitution of South Korea all North Korean defectors are deemed to be citizens of South Korea and shall not be repatriated. Besides, there was no proper investigation, and the Conservatives might claim that the murder had not been proved and therefore Moon just sacrificed the innocent for the sake of strengthening ties with the North.
The second incident was the death of a fisheries official, Lee Dae-jun, who, according to official reports, was shot by North Korean troops in the waters of North Korea in 2020. However doubtful is the official account of the events. it has surfaced that in spite of insufficient evidence Lee was portrayed not as a victim but as someone who had tried to cross over to the North fleeing gambling debts and domestic troubles. Aggravating the picture, the President knew for a fact that a citizen of the Republic was in North Korean waters but failed to take any action to rescue him. This highlights Moon as a politician who prioritizes relations with the North over human lives as well as reminds everyone about Park Geun-hye who had allegedly done nothing to save the high school kids on the sinking Sewol ferry. Though indeed Park’s government had neither capability nor any chance to rescue them. While the ex-President refuses to cooperate with the investigators, the Conservative party members keep reminding him about his own criticism of Park Geun-hye for similar behavior.
The accusations against Lee Jae-myung are more mundane. They have been trailing him since his gubernatorial years in the city of Seongnam and boil down to astronomical profits pocketed by his crony developers in the construction business at a huge cost to the municipal budget. Lee also appears to have accepted bribes from businessmen disguised as contributions to a football club under his patronage in exchange for various preferences. Although the inquiry has led to some arrests already, there is no direct evidence against Lee Jae-myung because all the four key witnesses against him had died—in a strange coincidence of two proven suicides and two apparently natural deaths—one or two days before their testimonies were due in court. As for his past abuses, Lee has so far been charged only with violating the Elections Act as he had denied the acquaintance of certain individuals involved in the scandals, a claim which later was found to be false.
In 2022, however the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office discovered that all the developers’ ill-earned gains had been hoarded in a hush fund that was used to bankroll Lee Jae-myung’s presidential campaign. The SPO has already detained a number of people in his inner circle.
Lee’s wife too is under investigation on charges of using a corporate credit card of the Gyeonggi-do Province administration to pay her personal expenses for shopping and restaurants at the time when her husband was governing the province in 2018–2021. She is also suspected in making public servants run her personal errands.
The Democrats deny all accusations, Lee Jae-myung proudly ignores any court summons, and his party puts a lot of pressure on the government to stall the investigation. The evidence of Lee Jae-myung’s corrupt behavior appears to have more substance than the “facts” against Park Geun-hye if only because this time we know how the bribe-givers’ money was spent. It would be fair to remember that Moon Jae-in also attempted to put Lee Jae-myung behind bars because Lee was his foremost contender within the party.
What bear much importance here is that the Democratic camp would be utterly discredited, as well as the left without a strong leadership, should these charges turn to convictions. First, because other Democratic leaders either have taken a time-out from politics or have been compromised. Second, when a public idol and Democratic politician who has promised to fight corruption is caught red-handed himself, this inflicts irreparable damage on the party’s reputation. In this context, the Democrats would probably stoop to any kind of ruse to stop the prosecutors’ onslaught. Considering the zeal with which their opponents in power got cracking on those investigations, the Democrats’ best bet to forestall the disaster would be to bring about a change of power by impeaching Yoon Suk-yeol.
So, the political gasoline has been spilt and the question is what unfortunate event will strike the incendiary match. It could be a scandal associated with Yoon or his close allies (this is yet unlikely as both the President and his entourage has steered clear of corruption) or a national tragedy, for which the President would be held fully responsible. For Park Geun-hye, the debacle was triggered by the sinking of the Sewol ferry that killed 300 people. Although the failed rescue operation was the fault of the local authorities and it was not possible for the central government to make any difference, the opposition was swift and smart to pin the blame on Park and make it stick. However groundless the claims were that Moon Jae-in and his cohorts had faked the news, the media campaign run by the Democrats still helped to undermine Park’s approval rating and shape the public image of the ex-President that played its role in the events that followed.
Given the above, there are two questions that need to be answered. Could the Seoul Halloween tragedy (a crowd crush in the district of Itaewon on October 29th, 2022 that left 158 people killed and about as many wounded) become the equivalent of the Sewol sinking for Yoon Suk-yeol, and would the Democrats try and set Yoon Suk-yeol up for impeachment over the late 2022–2023?
The Halloween tragedy and potential impeachment
This may remind the Russian readers of a similar tragedy in Minsk (Republic of Belarus) in 1999 near the Nemiga metro station where several thousand people got crammed into a narrow sloping alley, so when those coming down first slipped and fell the crowd pushed forward over their heads and the ensuing panic only added to the casualty count. Could the Halloween disaster have been prevented? On the one hand, the festivities were not a municipality event where police should always be deployed to maintain order, but an informal celebration and the first big public event after years of Covid restrictions that drew large crowds of Halloween party-goers who were left without proper official oversight as there was no specific organizer. On the other hand, the authorities failed to take measures and disperse the crowd in good time in spite of some warning calls about the risk of a crowd surge. It seems that the local police were wary of having to interfere with the street party and spoil the fun for the revelers.
A special police department is conducting a probe to understand what went wrong, but the resentment is bitter and already widespread with surveys showing that about 70% of those asked are unhappy about the way their government has been dealing with the consequences of the tragedy. The common sentiment is that punishment ought to be served to some of the high-profile government figures that usually bear merely symbolic responsibility rather than the rank-and-file officials who were directly responsible and failed to prevent the crush or promptly pass information about the imminent danger.
The Democrats, in their turn, have been trying to exploit the tragedy as a symbol of government helplessness and incompetence, demanding a parliamentary inquiry and an independent special prosecutor, and calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, Minister of Public Administration and Security Lee Sang-min, and Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency Yoon Hee-keun. To some extent this explains why the two latter officials have no intent of resigning right away on their own and thus acknowledging their share of responsibility but might do so after they have closed the case and sorted out the consequences.
Anyway, Yoon immediately declared a period of national mourning, during which he more than once visited the memorial altar, met with religious leaders and was generally demonstrating the government’s commitment to properly investigate the tragedy and punish those responsible. This has taken the wind out of the Democrats’ sails making it hard to blame Yoon for ignoring the people’s bereavement as effortlessly as they did it with Park Geun-hye. On a different tack, the Democrats have been trying to spread the word that the tragedy happened because all the local police were busy guarding the President whose residence is not far from the scene of the stampede. To set things straight, this is not true because President’s security is provided by other troops, and as for police availability, part of the force did have to be deployed elsewhere at two political rallies held by the Democrats and the Conservatives at the same time as the Halloween festivities.
It is problematic to poke any other faults since Yoon has been running the country for a little over six months and has not had time to make any consequential decisions that could supply political ammunition against him. Blaming Yoon for the economic storm is risky as this could lead to questions about who had sowed the wind in the first place.
Technically, however, there is little to stop the Democrats from initiating the impeachment proceedings that could be announced if voted for by 200 out of 300 Members of Parliament and subsequently endorsed by the Constitutional Court. The Democrats already have 169 votes that could be beefed up to 200 by enlisting allies from other left-wing parties and Yoon’s enemies among the Conservatives like Lee Jun-seok’s faction. They have enough of their appointees in the Constitutional Court, and, as the Candlelight Vigil showed, public protests can be as effective as backdoor influence in terms of putting pressure on a public institution.
Lurking as yet another potential factor in the fray are the United States that may choose to assist in toppling President Yoon to replace him with a classic right-winger, given that the Democrats are as pro-American as the Conservatives anyway. If the United States are gearing up for a global confrontation, Washington would be better off with an amenable rather than pragmatic head of South Korean state.
Nonetheless, Yoon still commands a fairly strong level of confidence and support, and, though there is no shortage of warts and all, his story is not that of someone who, having climbed to the top wishing to do justice and get rid of the usual politicking government types, degenerated into just another one of them as it had precipitously happened to Moon. The accusations against the Democrats themselves are quite grave and could also be leveraged to play on the people’s emotions. Especially, if their damaging power is boosted with the same rhetorical techniques that Moon and his supporters employed during the Candlelight Demonstrations. In addition, both sides competing for presidency “enjoy” fairly high disapproval ratings, and between the two unsavory reputations people tend to opt for the status quo.
Finally, the lasting effect of the previous presidential impeachment may, too, come to weigh in on the outcome because most of the allegations that had been bandied about by the media for five years and been driving angry protesters out into the streets were never proven in court. Furthermore, only the deleted messages in secret Telegram chats saved the Democrats from accusations that all those heart-rending rumors had been fake news fed in by Moon’s coterie via loyal top bloggers. While the realization that the masses had been already duped once might not necessarily hit the public domain, it may as well immunize the minds against future manipulation, and the Democrats would no longer be able to mechanically reuse their 2016 strategy.
Therefore, the Democrats are still quite likely to try and impeach the President, but an assessment of their chances of ultimate success would do better to look back for references well beyond 2016 and consider the events of 2004 when Roh Moo-hyun was impeached over his backing of a newly established political party consisting of his supporters, which was against the Constitution and put him on the wrong side of both the Conservatives and the “old-school” Democrats. The Assembly suspended his executive powers, but Roh Moo-hyun turned the tables so that in the eyes of the broader public his impeachment looked as if the old elite had been trying to stop the reforms. Then, Roh Moo-hyun’s party won the elections that were held in the interval between the impeachment vote and the pending ruling of the Constitutional Court and he was reinstated as President.
Be it as it may, the internal political turbulence in South Korea is clearly going to pack this drama season with a good deal of thrilling action and insightful lessons.
 His personal opinion is that there is no absolute certainty about whether the victim shot by North Korean troops and the missing official are one and the same person.
From our partner RIAC
A review of popular unrest in China in light of the ongoing anti-lockdown protests
Late 1970s saw the Chinese people standing up to exercise their right to dissent for the first time since the foundation of the People’s Republic, coinciding with the end of the Mao era. Here, I touch upon some of the iconic protests that China witnessed in the past five decades.
The ongoing popular protests in mainland China against the Xi Jinping-led party-state’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy, entailing strict lockdown measures, were triggered by a fire outbreak incident in an apartment building in northwestern China’s Urumqi that killed ten people and injured many. The tragedy happened on the night of 24 November 2022 as the residents were unable to escape the building, with the rescue efforts hampered due to the excessively strict lockdown policy. Tens of millions of people in mainland China are still under an extended lockdown of some kind or the other, while much of the rest of the world came back to normal.
Some Chinese workers were reportedly forced to sleep inside the factories itself, while undergoing quarantine. Previously, reports of people trying to come out of shops and factories due to fears that they could be locked inside surfaced in the media. In this backdrop, when the news of Urumqi fire incident came out, it soon struck a chord with the Chinese people, which soon acted as a catalyst for protests and demonstrations in several cities throughout the country, including in Beijing and Shanghai. Hundreds of people took to the streets, pouring out their frustration and anger against the state’s continued oppression of their freedoms under a maximalist approach to Covid response.
Contrary to expectations, the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that concluded in October 2022 never announced any relaxations to the “zero-Covid” policy, despite the damages it has done to the economy. For the first time in at least three decades, the CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, who also holds the ceremonial position of the President of China, has consolidated all powers in the recent party congress, in which he eliminated all the rival factions within the party from yielding power in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and the other higher ranks in the party. The “Xi faction” is now the only faction within the CCP’s higher echelons of power.
Déjà vu 1976
Democratic protests seem to be a far-fetched dream in a communist one-party authoritarian state like China. However, the country do have a history of protests, particularly following the dictatorial Mao era (1949-76), when people were given the freedom to express themselves during the “reform and opening-up period” that began in 1978 under the new paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who openly denounced Mao’s hardline policies, which curtailed civil rights of the people and pushed millions into starvation and poverty, resulting from disastrous movements such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). It is estimated that during this period, about 65 million Chinese people lost their lives by execution, imprisonment or human-made famines.
Thirteen years before the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre happened, there was another mass gathering of Chinese people in the same place, in April 1976, that was triggered by the death of the widely-popular Premier Zhou Enlai, who has also served as the foreign minister of China from 1949 to 1958. Back then, the Chinese people protested for their right to mourn their much-loved leader as the CCP placed limits on public mourning. People gathered at the Square, coinciding with the Chinese Tomb-Sweeping Day (Qingming Festival) and protested the actions of Mao’s team of protégés known as the “Gang of Four”, who ordered the place to be cleared. This was probably the first instance of mass protests in mainland China since 1949 as the Mao era drew closer to its end.
With the heralding of the Deng Xiaoping-era, shortly following a power struggle with Mao’s designated successor Hua Guofeng at the third plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in December 1978, some amount of toleration of political dissent and political expression were allowed, in what came to be known as the “Democracy Wall Movement” or the “Beijing Spring”. But, it lasted only for a year. This was also the time of rapprochement with the United States, which saw the opening of formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic for the first time. Washington recognized Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China, at the cost of Taipei. Shortly after this, Deng Xiaoping became the first paramount leader of mainland China to visit the U.S. in January 1979.
Despite these happenings in the diplomatic stage, the CCP continued to remain autocratic at home. The 1980s witnessed the beginning of China’s transformation into a modern industrial powerhouse as private corporations and foreign investments flooded into the country. With the socioeconomic transformation underway and the higher exposure to new ideas of living, the Chinese people started demanding more political freedoms. Hu Yaobang, one of the most trusted lieutenants of Deng, had overseen much of the changes that happened in China in the 1980s in his capacity as CCP General Secretary. He passed away in 1989, two years after he was stripped of power by the party hardliners.
Tiananmen turns bloody
Like Zhou Enlai, Hu was also a widely respected and loved leader in China. Tens of thousands of people gathered at his funeral venue in April 1989 and called for greater political freedoms, mostly youngsters and students. In the weeks that followed, protesters reached Tiananmen Square again. The CCP officials initially had differing views on how to deal with the escalating protests, but only a few maintained a liberal outlook. The hardliners ultimately prevailed over the others in party deliberations. It was also the time the Soviet Union was beginning to disintegrate and China was patching up its ties with the crumbling superpower.
The last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Beijing, in May 1989, while the student protests were still underway. This was the first engagement between the two countries since the onset of the “Sino-Soviet split” in the 1950s. Martial law was declared in Beijing later that month. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was ordered to clear off the protesters. The first of week of June 1989 saw the PLA tanks and troops marching on the roads of Beijing, finally reaching Tiananmen Square, where they opened fire on peaceful, unarmed protesters and brutally crushed the protests.
Hundreds of Chinese civilians, mostly university students, were killed in the military action, inviting international condemnation of the CCP regime, which continues to erase this dark episode from the public memory. Commemorations of this incident is not allowed in the mainland, while Hong Kong used to do so until 2020-21, when Beijing hijacked the city’s security apparatus by opening a national security office there, which made sure that Tiananmen vigils remained banned in Hong Kong as well.
The purge of Falun Gong
The 1990s saw the rise of a new spiritual movement in China called the Falun Gong, rooted in the traditional practice of Qigong that combines meditation, slow physical movements, and regulated breathing exercises. Having endorsed atheism as state ideology, the CCP under Jiang Zemin perceived the rise of this movement as a threat as it never aligned itself with the official party line. By the end of the decade, China has about seventy million Falun Gong practitioners. Famous China scholar David Ownby mentions in his 2008 book “Falun Gong and the Future of China” that the group has been engaged in about 300 protests and demonstrations between 1996 and 1999.
In April, protests escalated initially in Tianjin and later spread to Beijing’s central administrative area where the CCP and the Chinese State Council were headquartered. This is often cited as the beginning of the end of the movement in China as the CCP started a series of propaganda campaign, chiefly led by the Ministry of Public Security, against its practitioners, which in some cases entailed the use of excessive force including arbitrary arrests, forced labor and physical torture, and at times resulting in deaths, according to a 2000 report by Amnesty International. However, Falun Gong continues to survive among the Chinese diaspora in North America, Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.
The killing of Hong Kong’s democracy
Hong Kong is one of the two special administrative regions (SAR) of China, along with Macau, with a history of living under a democratic system. In 2014, Hong Kongers protested an attempt by Beijing to dilute the democratic procedure to elect the city’s Chief Executive by introducing a new mandatory pre-screening of candidates. This was aimed at jeopardizing the “one country, two systems” principle and to install a pro-CCP regime in the city, where polls were scheduled to take place three years later. The protesters occupied the city for 79 days, bringing it to a standstill. This came to be known as the “Umbrella Movement” as they used umbrellas to protect themselves from the pepper spray and tear gas used by the police.
Five years later, in 2019, Hong Kongers took to the streets again when the pro-Beijing government of Hong Kong tried to introduce an extradition bill that would have allowed the handover of crime suspects in Hong Kong to mainland China, which could end up in arbitrary detention and unfair trials. This led to series of demonstrations with several instances of violence. Even though the bill was eventually suspended, the protesters numbering in tens of thousands, continued to raise a new set of demands for democracy, thereby spiraling into a broader movement that led to Beijing upping the ante on its crackdown on dissent in the city. Beijing termed the protesters as ‘separatists’ and introduced a new national security law in 2020 that effectively jeopardized the city’s autonomy, in what was dubbed as the Hong Kong’s worst crisis since 1997, the year in which the city’s sovereignty was transferred back to China from the UK.
Oher than the aforementioned instances, China has also witnessed various other protests in the past, but most of them were sporadic in nature, relating to corruption, forced evictions of people for development projects, labour strikes, environmental degradation and so on. With the current leader of China, Xi Jinping, having the firmest grip on power since Mao Zedong, Chinese democratic aspirations appear to be doomed in the foreseeable future.
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