South Asia

India’s purblind opposition to Belt and Road Initiative

Published

4 years ago

April 21, 2019

China intends to host second global Belt-Road-Initiative (BRI) meet next month. China expects delegates from over 100 countries to attend the moot. The initiative has become the world’s largest platform for international cooperation. Some 123 countries and 29 international organisations have signed the BRI agreements with China. To extract `extra mélange’ from China, India and USA have expressed reservation about the imminent meet. The BRI includes US$ 60-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which India opposes as it traverses through Azad Kashmir (Freed Kashmir). India calls Freed Kashmir Pakistan-administered or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The so-called `constitution’ of the India-occupied Kashmir (valley, Jammu and Ladakh), provides seats for Azad Kashmir area. This gimmick is purported to convey the impression that Azad Kashmir is also part of India-0ccupied Kashmir. Practically India can’t trespass into Azad Kashmir as the Line of Control is heavily guarded by the two neighbours, at daggers drawn. Crossfire among bunkers is an everyday phenomenon.

The first BRI meeting was held in 2017. It was, among others, attended by 29 heads of state and government, the United Nations’ Secretary General and heads of World Bank. After dilly-dallying on various pretexts, India boycotted it. India and the USA have a mélange (sovereignty, debt trap, etc.) of objections against the BRI.

Geographic structure

The BRI initially included six corridors with landmass connectivity besides proposed Maritime Silk Road (MSR): (a) New Eurasian Land Bridge, running from Western China to Western Russia through Kazakhstan. (b) China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor, running from Northern China to Eastern Russia. (c) China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor, running from Western China to Turkey. (d) China–Indochina Peninsula Corridor, running from Southern China to Singapore. (e) China–Myanmar–Bangladesh–India Corridor, running from Southern China to Myanmar, and (f) China–Pakistan Corridor, running from South-Western China to Pakistan. When India decided not to participate in the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s inaugural Belt and Road Forum held in 2017, there emerged a dominant feeling among the supporters of BRI that New Delhi would be isolated. India never hesitated to share its concerns and always stood the ground.

No veto power to China

China despite being a stakeholder has no veto power. India is sanguine that Chinese initiative in Indian Ocean region (IOR) will not succeed unless and until India supports the BRI, even if in a piecemeal manner.

EU’s Perspective on BRI

China is an extremely important economic and trade partner for the European Union (EU). The EU is currently China’s largest trading partner, while China is the EU’s second largest trading. Italy supports BRI. According to informed estimates, China’s Navy, for instance, plans to build 400 warships and 100 submarines by 2030.

India’s qualms about BRI’s impact on Indian Ocean

India is fearful that BRI would exacerbate Sino-Indian tension in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region. India is worried about four specific corridors that constitute major components of the BRI and run across India’s South Asian neighborhood. BRI includes the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor (1990s), Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), a combination of bilateral infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean region, besides the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. India perceives these corridors and the associated infrastructure projects are detrimental to India’s strategic interests. They run close to India’s continental and maritime borders and may affect its security interests and strategic environment.

As an example of strategic implication, India quotes strategically located Sri Lankan port of Hambantota. The port was built using Chinese loans but, due to the high interest rates, Sri Lanka was unable to repay and incurred a burgeoning debt burden. Unable to pay debts, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the port to China for ninety-nine years in 2017 (lease rescinded under pressure prematurely).

Indian Ocean in a state of flux

Recent International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Chagos Islands has catapulted Indian Ocean into limelight. The `advisory’ is a blow to UK’s forcible occupation of Chagos Islands, including the strategic US airbase of Diego Garcia atoll. Many countries, including India are trying to dominate the Ocean

India’s interest

Forty seven countries have the Indian Ocean on their shores. The Indian Ocean is the third largest body of water in the world. It occupies 20 per cent of the world’s ocean surface – it is nearly 10,000 kilometers wide at the southern tips of Africa and Australia and its area is 68.556 million square kilometers, about 5.5 times the size of the United States

India’s motto is ‘whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia’. US Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan says that ‘this ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century; the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters’. This Ocean includes Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Flores Sea, Java Sea Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Savu Sea, Timor Sea, Strait of Malacca, Bay of Bengal, Mozambique Channel, and Persian Gulf.

Indian Ocean is rich with living and non-living resources, from marine life to oil and natural gas. Its beach sands are rich in heavy minerals and offshore placer deposits. India is actively exploiting them to its economic advantage. It is a major sea lane providing shipping to 90 per cent of world trade. It provides a waterway for heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia, and contains an estimated 40 per cent of the world’s offshore oil production.

Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914) of the United States Navy highlighted strategic importance of the Indian Ocean in these words: “whoever attains maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean would be a prominent player on the international scene. The Indian peninsula (i.e. the Deccan and below) juts 1,240 miles into the Indian Ocean. 50per cent of the Indian Ocean basin lies within a 1,000 mile radius of India, a reality that has strategic implications. India possesses the technology to extract minerals from the deep sea bed. Under the law of the sea, it has an exclusive economic zone of 772,000 square miles. Chennai is a mere 3,400 miles away from Perth in Australia, slightly more than the distance between New York and Los Angeles.

The Ocean is a major sea lane connecting Middle East, East Asia and Africa with Europe and the Americas. It has four crucial access waterways facilitating international maritime trade, that is the Suez Canal in Egypt, Bab-el-Mandeb (bordering Djibouti and Yemen), Straits of Hormuz (bordering Iran and Oman), and Straits of Malacca (bordering Indonesia and Malaysia). These ‘chokepoints’ are critical to world oil trade as huge amounts of oil pass through them.

Any disruption in traffic flow through these choke-points can have disastrous consequences. The disruption of energy flows in particular is a considerable security concern for littoral states, as a majority of their energy lifelines are sea-based. Since energy is critical in influencing the geo-political strategies of a nation, any turbulence in its supply has serious security consequences. Most of the ships approach the straits through the 10 degree channel between the Andaman and Nicobar islands. To dominate these straits, India established its Far Eastern Marine Command at Port Blair in the Andamans. It has developed Port Blair as a strategic international trade center and built an oil terminal and trans-shipment port in Campal Bay in the Nicobar islands.

China’s interest

In view of the spiraling demand for energy, China is sensitive to the security of the sea lines of communication and choke- points of the region. Sixty per cent of China’s oil supplies are shipped through the Straits of Malacca.

India and China: Eyeball to eyeball

Indian Ocean is fast emerging as the new hot-spot of Sino-Indian rivalry. Indian desire to expand its navy manifold to dominate the Indian Ocean has triggered shockwaves to China and other littoral states. Whether it is controlling piracy or use of sea resources, boats of the two countries face each other eyeball-to-eyeball. As is obvious from capital outlays in India’s defence budget, India wants to convert its navy into a blue-water navy as early as possible. The first item on Indian-Navy agenda is getting new aircraft carriers. In their media interviews, the chiefs of Indian Navy have lamented ‘dominance of smaller ships in the naval fleet imposes limitations of reach’. He asserted that ‘the Navy had to be built around three aircraft carriers, at least 30 destroyers and frigates, 20 submarines and replenishment ships’. The present Navy chief’s plans are no less grandiose.

One chief said, “We are looking at a fleet of 140 warships and 300 aircraft” (The News behind the News, April 6, 2009, pp.14-15). What the chiefs of Indian Navy said in the past, or the present chief says is no swagger. Dominating the Indian Ocean has been India’s long-cherished dream since its independence. George K Tanham, in his Indian Strategic Thought, a RAND research, observes that India wants to establish its hegemony over Indian Ocean by establishing Pax Indica, on the lines of Pax Britannica. He adds, India wants to ‘approach world-power status by developing nuclear and missile capabilities, a blue water navy, and a military-industrial complex, all obvious characteristics of the superpowers’ (page vii).

Commodore (Retd) Uday Bhaskar of the Society for Policy Studies says, `India needs to project itself as a credible and long term partner in a more persuasive manner, than what has been the experience in recent years’. He added, `Islands in the Indian Ocean Region have acquired distinctive strategic relevance and India will have to step up its appeal and comfort index, more so since it is pitted against China’s deep pockets.

Barry Desker, Director Institute of defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore says, `The emergence of new powers like China and India is expected to transform the regional strategic landscape in a fashion that could be as dramatic as the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century’.

To counter Indian hegemony, China is intends to have six aircraft carriers. When New Delhi deployed one ship in the Gulf of Aden in October last year with great fanfare, China deployed two warships to the same area. The presence of the Chinese and Indian warships underlines Beijing’s and New Delhi’s intense economic and strategic interests in the world’s third largest ocean.

India is acquiring several nuclear-powered submarines to augment its 155 military vessels in the ocean that it calls its property. India has transformed its Karnataka Bay into an advanced naval installation. To counter New Delhi Beijing is constructing naval stations and refueling ports around India, including in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

As is obvious from capital outlays in India’s defence budget, India wants to convert its navy into a blue-water navy as early as possible. India wants to ‘approach world-power status by developing nuclear and missile capabilities, a blue water navy, and a military-industrial complex, all obvious characteristics of the superpowers’.

India’s troubles in Maldives, Seychelles and Agalega Islands

India denies that its projects in Indian Ocean neighbourhood have never been acquisitive or “colonial”. However, it faced severe resistance, for instance, in Seychelles and Maldives and the Agalega Islands. After facing resistance over placing its helicopters in the Maldives’ Addu atoll and the virtual cancellation of its project to develop the Assumption Island in the Seychelles, New Delhi moved swiftly to ensure its US$87 million project in the Mauritius does not run into trouble. The project involved constructing a jetty, rebuilding and extending the runway, and building an airport terminal. Mauritian vice prime minister explained in the parliament that `the jetty is being improved to be able to receive ships and to extend the runway, which is in very poor condition, from the existent 1,300 metres to 3,000. At present, `only emergency medical evacuations are allowed due to the poor surface of the runway’. While the vice prime minister claimed ` she did not know “of India’s military plans, Indian Naval sources confirmed their involvement in the project. Mauritian opposition members point out lack of transparency in the project. Mauritian government is still to answer why it has exempted the project from any Environmental license process (EIA clearances).

Indian view is that `unlike the military bases run by other countries [like Diego Garcia], the Indian model is of a soft base’. India does not ` bar locals from moving through any Indian-made project’. So `these governments get more control over their domain, without diluting their sovereignty’. Even when AFCON and RITES engineers visited the islands `they are greeted by the locals, who took their boats up to the ship that brought them in and even accommodated and feed them during their stay’.

Mauritian prime minister faced tough questions in the National Assembly over Indian involvement in the project, its costs and military implications. Mauritian vice-prime minister had to declare, `Agalega is and will remain a Mauritian territory’. `This is an important project. We don’t want the jetty and the airstrip to remain in poor condition,” she added. Even local people protested when they saw Indian naval and coastguard’s setting up transponder systems and surveillance infrastructure. Several Islanders, including some from Agalega, which has a tiny population of 300, formed the “Koalision Zilwa Pou Lape” (Islanders Coalition for Peace), to lobby against the Agalega project.

A similar situation led to Maldivian President’s decision to cancel the loan of two Indian military helicopters and the visas of about 28 naval personnel. `The Agalega islands, with land of only about 25 square kilometres is now in the crosshairs of similar concerns, although most officials aware of developments believe India’s “softer” methods will ensure the success of the project.

Adversaries’ view of `debt trap’

Smaller countries who received China’s bounteous loans are incapable of paying them back. India thinks BRI may militate against India’s strategic interests. India mulls connectivity offers a set of tools to influence other countries’ foreign policy choices

China’s view of BRI benefits

Chines aid helped build East Africa first-ever expressway, and Maldives’ first-ever inter-island bridge. Belarus was enabled to produce sedans, Kazakhstan connected to the sea, and Southeast Asia provided a high-speed railway (being completed). Eurasian continent gifted the longest distance freight train service.

China’s predecessors Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom, the United States have played role in development of Asia. They were the primary donors for development projects in Asia since World War II The Asian Development Bank estimates that between 2016 and 2030 developing countries in the region will need to spend $1.7 trillion per year to build the infrastructure required to “maintain its growth momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change.”

One Belt One Road was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinxing in 2013. It envisaged constructing a continental road (or the economic belt) connecting China to Europe through South and Central Asia. In addition, it envisioned creating a sea-corridor between China and Europe by way of the Indian Ocean. Regarding the continental route, India’s primary concern is the CPEC and increasing unease about Chinese connectivity inroads in Nepal. The MSR horrifies India as this project could dilute Indian influence in the Indian. China’s

connectivity and infrastructure involves four areas: transport infrastructure, port infrastructure, aviation infrastructure, and energy infrastructure. Besides, it includes Information Silk Road through the construction of “cross-border optical cables,” “transcontinental submarine optical cable projects,” and “spatial (satellite) information passageways.”

China answers suspicions

China says there is no hidden strategic agenda to use this initiative as a means to gain sphere of influence, or to violate other’s sovereignty. Aside from verbose statements, US, Japan or India has not offered any BRI-alternative. Some estimates project that China will invest up to $4 trillion to realize its vision for the BRI. Some of India’s neighbors were among the countries that thronged the forum (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Afghanistan).

The China-Pakistan Economic corridor

The US $62 billion CPEC begins at Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and ends at the port of Gwadar in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province. It would build a network of highways, roads, railways, pipelines, ports, and information technology parks along the route. It would facilitate movement of Chinese goods from China’s western provinces to the Arabian Sea across the Indian Ocean. Karakoram Highway between Pakistan’s Punjab Province and Gilgit-Baltistan will be modernised. The corridor aims to connect Gilgit in northern Pakistan to Gwadar in the south. Chinese entities have invested approximately in the CPEC.

India’s narcissist objection to Karakoram Highway

Earlier, India ineffectually objected to construction of the Karakoram Highway through Gilgit –Baltistan that India described as Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India’s then defence minister A. K. Antony noted in 2012, “Indian territory under occupation by China in Jammu & Kashmir since 1962 is approximately 38,000 [square kilometers]. In addition to this, under the so-called China-Pakistan ‘Boundary Agreement’ of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 [square kilometers] of Indian territory in [Pakistan-occupied Kashmir] to China.”

Speaking at the seventieth session of the UN General Assembly in 2015, the Indian representative noted, “India’s reservations about the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor stem from the fact that it passes through Indian territory illegally occupied by Pakistan for many years.” India alleges allowing the CPEC to continue would undermine India’s sovereignty and bolster Pakistan’s claim to the disputed territory.

So-called sovereignty over disputed territories?

India’s real bogeys are denial of Kashmir, and Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territories.

Mythical militarisation of Gilgit Baltistan and Gwadar

Without corroborative evidence, India claims that there are 30,000 Chinese army personnel to protect its economic interests in occupied Kashmir. Any further increase in Chinese troops along India’s borders would further jeopardise India’s security.

New Delhi expects Gwadar to emerge as an important naval base for China. If this turns out to be the case, Chinese access to Gwadar’s port would allow the Chinese navy to sustain a presence in the Indian Ocean, threatening pax indica. Similarly another

Corridor would connect the Chinese city of Kunming with the Indian city of Kolkata through Dhaka in Bangladesh and Mandalay in Myanmar, seeking to boost trade, build infrastructure, and foster connectivity among these nations.

Pulwama ploy

India’s prime minister Narendre Modi pounced upon Pulwama-suicide attack (February 14, 2019) to project it into international limelight. With general 2019 elections in his mind, he pandered to voter’s sentiments, blaming Pakistan. As a ploy to show India’s chagrin, it launched a `counter-terror’ air strike in Balakot on February26, 2019. The strike foundered as Pakistan Air Force downed a MiG-21 in an aerial combat and captured its pilot the very next day (handed back on 1 March, 2019).

India attributed Pulwama attack to Masood Azhar (Jaish-e-Mohammad). China blocked India-sponsored effort, spearheaded by the US, the UK and France, to get Azhar declared ` a global terrorist’.

India-China-Border (Doklam) standoff

In June 2017 Chinese troops were spotted extending a road through a strip of land disputed between China and Bhutan. India perceived this as an unacceptable change to the status quo and crossed its own border to block those works. The Doklam plateau slopes down to the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip of Indian territory dividing the Indian mainland from its north-eastern states. Were China able to block off the corridor it would isolate India’s north-eastern region from the rest of the country, a devastating scenario in the event of war. The Doklam standoff ended with disengagement on 28 August. Troops from both countries remain in the area, but are now separated by a few hundred metres.

Myth of India’s sovereignty over Kashmir

Kashmir is a simmering cauldron. For about seven decades, India denied Kashmiris’ their right of self-determination. It claims that the occupied Kashmir’s constituent assembly has voted for accession of disputed Kashmir to India. As such, it is no longer necessary for her to let the promised plebiscite be held in Kashmir. Is India’s argument tenable? Does history or documents corroborate India’s stand? Let us look a bit closely at India’s stance.

Kashmir’s accession to India

It is the Treaty of Amritsar (1846) which entitled Gulab Singh to rule Jammu and Kashmir State. This treaty stands lapsed under Article 7 of the Independence Act. The Act was passed by British Parliament on July 18, 1947 to assent to creation of independent states of India and Pakistan. The aforementioned Article 7 provides that, with lapse of His Majesty’s suzerainty over Indian states, all treaties, agreements, obligations, grants, usages and sufferance’s will lapse.

Mountbatten deliberately kept mum about this reality for considerations of political expediency. The Independence Act required intention of accession to be absolute and crystal-clear. But, a stray glance at the ‘Instrument’ would make it clear that it is equivocal. The ‘Instrument’ expresses ‘intention to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities’ with maharajah’s prime minister. The last sentence in the ‘Instrument’ is ‘In haste and with kind regards’. Handwritten corrections on the text of the ‘Instrument’ speak volubly about the wavering state of the maharajah’s mind. The instrument, extracted under coercion and duress, is invalid under law.

Subsequent accession resolution, passed by the occupied Kashmir’s ‘constituent assembly’ is also void. This resolution violates the Security Council’s resolutions forbidding India from going ahead with the accession farce. Aware of India’s intention to get the ‘Instrument of Accession’ rubber-stamped by the puppet assembly, the Security Council passed two resolutions to forestall the `foreseeable accession’ by the puppet assembly. Security Council’s Resolution No 9 of March 30, 1951 and confirmatory Resolution No 122 of March 24, 1957 outlaws accession or any other action to change status of the Jammu and Kashmir state.

Renowned journalist Alastair Lamb also regards the Instrument of Accession, ‘signed’ by the maharajah of Kashmir on October 26, 1947, as fraudulent (Kashmir – A disputed legacy 1846-1990). He argues that the maharajah was travelling by road to Jammu (a distance of over 350 km). How could he sign the instrument while being on the run for safety of his life? There is no evidence of any contact between him and the Indian emissaries on October 26, 1947.

Actually, it was on October 27, 1947 that the maharajah was informed by MC Mahajan and VP Menon (who had flown into Srinagar) that an Instrument of Accession is being fabricated in New Delhi. Obviously, the maharajah could not have signed the instrument earlier than October 27, 1947. The instrument remains null and void, even if the maharajah had actually signed it. The reason, as pointed out by Alastair is that the `signatures’ were obtained under coercion. She points out Indian troops had already arrived at and secured Srinagar airfield during the middle of October 1947. On October 26, 1947, a further airlift of thousands of Indian troops to Kashmir took place. He questions: “Would the maharajah have signed the Instrument of Accession, had the Indian troops not been on Kashmiri soil?”

It is eerie to note that India has never shown the original `Instrument’ in any international forum. If India was truthful, it should have the temerity to present the document to Pakistan or to the UN. Isn’t it funny that, in the summer of 1995, the Indian authorities reported the original document as lost or stolen? This fact further beclouds authenticity of the document. India took the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948 under article 35 of Chapter VI which outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes. India avoided presenting the Kashmir case under the UN Chapter VII which relates to acts of aggression. Obviously, it did so because it knew that the Kashmir was a disputed state. And, issue of its integration with India or Pakistan remained to be resolved.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the Instrument of Accession does not exist. The `accession’ of the disputed state, through a resolution of the puppet assembly, is null and void. This `resolution’ violates the Security Council’s directive forbidding India to forge unilateral ‘accession’ of the state.

India’s connectivity alternative

Chinese initiative is backed up by her surplus capital. But rueful India has not been able to dangle an alternative to the BRI. Italy’s endorsement of the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hasn’t had much impact on Indian officials, who have long objected to the initiative, as media reports said the South Asian country signaled it might boycott the upcoming second Belt and Road Forum, to be held in Beijing.

In fact, the United States, has responded to BRI by launching similar blueprint by recruiting Japan and any other country who feel less comfortable dealing with China.

China, the new global hegemon

Historians, like Ibn-e-Khaldun, Toynbee, and Arrighi, have postulated a life cycle for fall of nations. For instance, Arrighi thinks wealthy hegemonic centres of civilisation last for about a century and then collapse. If USA collapses, China is likely to take her place. Much to India’s chagrin, Pakistan would remain her steadfast ally.

India’s myopic efforts to isolate Pakistan

India has now publicly stated its intention to isolate Pakistan in comity of nations. An isolated country is a weak target. India made holding the SAARC conference in Pakistan impossible.

India’s developmental assistance to six neighbouring countries in South Asia over the last four fiscal years amounted to over Rs 211 billion. The countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. India extended developmental assistance to six neighbouring countries. The total aid to Afghanistan from 2014-15 to 2017-18 was Rs 22.32 billion, to Bangladesh it was Rs 5.14 billion, and to Bhutan it was Rs 156.8 billion. The developmental assistance to Maldives during the same period was Rs 2.7 billion, to Nepal it was Rs 13.22 billion, and to Sri Lanka it was Rs 10.8 billion. India has built a dam in Afghanistan and making 11 more there. She has committed Rs 45 billion for Bhutan’s 11th Plan – about 68 per cent of the total external assistance received. Another Rs 5 billion came in from India as part of the economic stimulus plan.

Modi visited only such countries that benefited India internally or externally. Between 2014 and 2018, over Rs 2,021 crore was spent on chartered flights, maintenance of aircraft and hotline facilities during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to top 10 countries from where India has received the maximum FDI inflows. Foreign Direct Investments grew from USD 30,930.5 million in 2014, to USD 43478.27 million in 2017. A total of Rs 1,583.18 crore was spent on maintenance of Modi’s aircraft and Rs 429.25 crore on chartered flights during the period between June 15, 2014 and December 3, 2018. The total expenditure on hotline was Rs 9.11 crore. Modi visited over 55 countries in 48 foreign trips since taking over as prime minister in May 2014. Over Rs 1,346 crore was incurred on chartered flights, maintenance of aircraft and hotline facilities during Manmohan Singh’s foreign visits from 2009-10 till 2013-14 during UPA-II. The cumulative FDI inflows between 2014 and June 2018 stood at USD 136,077.75 million, compared to USD 81,843.71 million recorded cumulatively for the years between 2011 and 2014.

Kashmir’s current inferno is of India’s own making

While India blames Pakistan for her Kashmir troubles, it is pertinent to recall what India’s former defence minister George Fernandez (June 30, 1930 to January 29, 1930) said about Kashmir. I quote from Victoria Schofield on page 293 of her book Kashmir in the Crossfire (IB Taurus, London/New York, 1996.). `I do not believe that any foreign hand engineered the Kashmir problem’, stated George Fernandez in 1990. `The problem was created by us, and if others decided to take advantage of it, I do not believe that one should make that an issue; given the nature of the politics of our subcontinent, such a development was inevitable’. (Source: George Fernandez. 12 October 1990, India’s Policies in Kashmir: An Assessment and Discourse, in Thomas, ed. Perspectives of Kashmir.).

Pacifist Kashmiri

An adage about pacifist Kashmiris reflects how timid they were. A Kashmiri youth joined army but never fired a shot. Asked by a Punjabi sikh (assumed to be scion of a martial race), he replied tapsi tey thus karsi. That is, when my gun heats up it will automatically fire.

How the pacifist Kashmiri is turned into human missiles?

Humiliation

`Credit’ goes to reign of terror by 7,80,000 Indian forces in disputed state for punishing Kashmiri stone pelters with live bullets or pellets that blinded them (Washington Post July 12, 2016, New York Times dated August 29, 2016) . William Lukens, Bluemont (USA) clarified in Washington Post `To most Americans, a pellet gun is an air-powered pistol or rifle firing a single pellet. It is rarely able to kill or even wound a person hit with the pellet. As used by Indian police, “pellet gun” is a 12-gauge shotgun using shells that contain dozens of pellets propelled by gunpowder. There is a huge difference. When Americans read “pellet gun,” they think of “you’ll shoot your eye out.” Even girls and babies in laps are not spared. Most of the pellets, fired from a high-velocity pump-action guns (outlawed by Amnesty International) hit above chest, usually face. India’s ladla (pampered) army chief (a general’s son) has so far displayed a fight-or-flight response to insurgency rooted in Kashmiris ’multifaceted deprivation. Just recall Indian army chief awarded commendation certificate to Major Leetul Gogoi who drove his jeep with a Kashmiri protester, tied to his jeep front. Gogoi was later caught red handed with an 18-year-old girl in a Srinagar hotel. (The Hindu dated September 19, 2018). The ladla let the offender off the hook by charging with mild charge `fraternization with a woman’. The army chief is a misogynist who publicly rebuked women and declared them unfit for military service.

Humiliation of Kashmiris motivates them to become human missiles. The Pulwama Fedayeen, a schoolboy, was forced to rub his nose on ground by a `soldier’.

Roads were blocked to prevent mourners from attending funeral prayers of Pulwama bomber. Even dead bodies of stone-throwers are mutilated, paraded unzipped in body-packs, and photographed by way of memorabilia. Renowned writer Barkha Dutt reminisced (Outlook India dated February 20, 2019) a sensible local police officer’s directive `Bodies of those killed in encounters were to be properly zipped in covers and not paraded. At post-mortems of killed terrorists, no photographs were to be taken or distributed.’

A Kashmiri newspaper reported that army mercilessly beats even peaceful Kashmiri `for not hoisting Indian flag on their cars, bikes and even bicycles’, `even for selling or buying a pencil battery for a radio or wall clock’ .The presumption is that `these batteries will be used in the wireless sets or bombs’.

Persecution of Kashmiri students and traders in Indian states

Kashmir students and traders are being attacked or looted in schools and colleges, at bus stops and in railway apartments throughout India. About 700 students, including girls, fled to Valley. Even holders of PM Modi’s merit-based competitive scholarships had to rush back to Valley for safety.

Some retired generals and RAW’s former chief AS Daulat cautioned Modi against brutal use of force India stayed united while Pakistan broke apart for lack of resilience and political myopia. At the time of partition, India was embroiled in many virulent insurgencies: Dravidian South movement, seven angry sisters of North East, Khalistan movement. India overcame the insurgencies through talks with Laldenga, Master Tara Singh, Dr. Phizo and others. It accepted demand for creation of new states. Gradually the incendiary states merged into Indian Union. But, India stands alienated in Kashmir. Lest India breaks up into `a congeries of states’ (Sir John Winthrop Hackett, The Third World War), it should free Kashmiris before next war with Pakistan.

India buckles on issues

Taiwan

China considers self-ruled Taiwan as a breakaway province that it has vowed to reunite with the mainland even if it has to resort to force. China warned the US, India and other countries against transferring defence technology to Taiwan for producing submarines. Air India even removed logos showing Taiwan as an independent entity.

Boycott of Chinese goods

Following Pulwama incident, India’s Confederation of All India Traders, which represents 70 million traders, said it would burn Chinese goods on March 19 to “teach a lesson” to China. Swadeshi JagranManch, the economic wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a Hindu nationalist group with close ties to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), also called for a boycott of Chinese goods. Chinese products like mobile phones made by companies such as Xiaomi Inc and toys are ubiquitous in India.

Trade between the countries grew to nearly US$90 billion in the year ending March 2018. Aside from gung-ho, India’s trade ministry said in an email the country can’t take any unilateral punitive action against a fellow member of the World Trade Organisation.

India could not boycott import of China-made transistors that accounted for 81.9 percent of India’s transistor imports in 2017. The transistors are an input to almost all Indian electronic goods and machinery. India cannot afford to switch to home-made expensive alternative. These imports also contain embodied technologies, particularly semiconductors, fertilizer and pharmaceutical.

CPEC

India is yet to snatch back the Kashmir territory that China has occupied. No strike on Gwadar so far.

Inferences

Sagging US support

India can’t rely on Trump as bulwark against China. Trump values economic issues more than strategic issues. It may even slap tariffs on imports from India. Then there is the Afghan-exit nightmare.

No aid

There is no alternative to BRI for smaller countries. Gone are UNCTAD (UN conference on Trade and Development) or Lester Pearson’s trade, not aid, days. Countries are fighting for economic survival. Like it could not stop BRI in other countries, India can’t stop CPEC.

Kashmir is not an intractable problem. Soon, India will have to revert to its foreign secretary Jagat S Mehta’s Kashmir proposals (soft borders). Trade across divided Kashmir, was agreed by India and Pakistan’s Musharraf within Mehta’s framework. It flourished until Modi recently stopped it to convert Kashmir into a veritable prison.. Mehta’s proposals are contained in his article, ‘Resolving Kashmir in the International Context of the 1990s’ (quoted in Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (1994, St Martin’s Press). India’s sovereignty mantra is a hoax to disguise its weak case on Kashmir and Arunachal Pradish.

WTO and BRIC

China’s role under World Trade Organisation and in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would force India to shun its spurious repugnance to BRI. In 1990, BRIC countries accounted for 11% of global gross domestic product (GDP), by 2014 nearly 30%. These countries are not a political alliance, like the European Union or a formal trading association. Yet they have power as an economic bloc.

By 2050 (with China as a sole hegemon), these economies, including India, would be wealthier than most of the current major economic powers. Columbia University established the BRICLab, where students examine foreign, domestic, and financial policies of BRIC members. China and India are destined to become the world’s dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services by 2050. Brazil and Russia will become dominant suppliers of raw materials. BRIC expanded to include South Africa as the fifth nation in 2010.

Writing on wall

Advice to India

India’s ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean does not augur well for the region. It should let Indian Ocean remain the zone of peace.Besides, India should mend its fence with Pakistan, sincerely support BRI and BRIC, or economically perish.

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Pakistan: A Terrorized Rather than Terrorist State

Amjed Jaaved

Mr. Amjed Jaaved has been contributing free-lance for over five decades. His contributions stand published in the leading dailies at home and abroad (Nepal. Bangladesh, et. al.). He is author of seven e-books including Terrorism, Jihad, Nukes and other Issues in Focus (ISBN: 9781301505944). He holds degrees in economics, business administration, and law.

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South Asia

The Reasons Behind Pakistan’s Reluctance to Establish Diplomatic Ties with Israel

Published

3 days ago

May 14, 2023

Nadir Ali

The expeditious pace at which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel pursued normalization left the people of Pakistan in a state of utter astonishment. The vast majority of Pakistanis firmly believe that the establishment of diplomatic ties between the UAE and Israel was made possible by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s implied approval of the Abraham Accords. Many people believe that the former prime minister of Pakistan was hand-picked for the position, and he has admitted that he has faced significant pressure to recognize Israel.

Similarly, Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan, advocated in July 2003 for a national discussion on the viability of establishing diplomatic ties with Israel, speculating that such a discussion might serve as a counterbalance to Pakistan’s antagonistic relationship with India. However, it should be noted that any attempt by Pakistan to normalize relations with Israel would inevitably require overcoming a number of formidable challenges, such as divisions within the military, opposition from political rivals, and hostile rhetoric from Islamic clerics.

Although, since its inception, Pakistan’s identity as a Muslim nation founded on Islamic principles has influenced its foreign policy. Islamist unity has been a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially in its relations with the Middle East. In international forums, Pakistan has consistently and unwaveringly supported Arab positions in the hopes of receiving similar support from Muslim and Arab nations in their ongoing disputes with India over Kashmir and other issues.

However, Pakistan has an opportunity to reevaluate its own policy toward the Jewish state as countries in the Gulf region begin to normalize their diplomatic relations with Israel. The acknowledgment from nations like Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco, as well as Saudi Arabia’s covert talks with Israel, may encourage Islamabad to present its case for recognition of Israel to a skeptical domestic audience. Any change in Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Israel, though, is certain to face vehement opposition from the country’s conservative and religious groups.

Manifestly, strategically, and diplomatically, there appears to be no tangible downside to the act of acknowledging Israel. The predicament lies primarily in the realm of ideology and politics. Israel, much like India, is an ideological blind spot for Pakistan. By instilling hatred in its people towards India and Israel and branding them as ‘Yahood-o-Hanood’ (Jewish and Hindu), arch-enemies who are constantly plotting against ‘Mumlikat-e-Khudadad’ (God-gifted state), Pakistan has, in fact, maneuvered itself into a deadlock.

In light of this, any type of reconsideration has turned into a political flashpoint, not just among politicians, but also within the military establishment. If the government even takes a small step toward recognizing Israel, the opposition will splinter it. A warpath has been threatened, and the clerics have also spoken out against recognizing Israel.

Pakistan’s steadfast refusal to recognize Israel until a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian conflict and the establishment of an independent state has yielded little progress for the Palestinian cause over the years. Despite Pakistan’s steadfast refusal to recognize Israel, which provides a moral impetus for the advancement of a Palestinian state, particularly as the only nuclear power in the Islamic world, this policy has not led to positive results for either Palestine or Pakistan. Although the idea of establishing diplomatic ties with Israel is no longer regarded as forbidden in Pakistan, attitudes toward Israel there are still largely unfavorable.

Meanwhile, some have argued that accepting Israel’s legitimacy would not be a problem if it resulted in a solution to the Palestine problem, which might help Islamabad win diplomatic support in international forums. India and sporadically the India-Israel alliance, are frequently blamed for terrorist attacks, security lapses, and intelligence gaffes in Pakistan.

Moreover, given that Israel will not approach its relations with Pakistan in a zero-sum manner relative to its relations with India, this argument is overly simplistic and disconnected from the realities on the ground. This idea is somewhat comparable to the claim that by diplomatically engaging with Russia, Pakistan will diversify its defense allies. Russia did not sever its long-standing security and diplomatic ties with Delhi to favor Pakistan, despite Islamabad developing cordial relations with Moscow over the years. In fact, Delhi is a much larger market for Tel Aviv than Islamabad in the context of shifting geopolitics in the Middle East and both have more in common.

Last but not least, Pakistan is firmly rooted in outdated ideals and ignores the fact that the Muslim world has lost interest in using its collective influence to address the Palestine issue, despite the volatile and rapidly changing political environment. In fact, it has turned out that the very idea that the Muslim world, propelled by a sense of Islamic solidarity, could force Washington and Tel Aviv to cede political ground regarding Palestine was simply a fantasy.

South Asia

The 4th round of the FM-level Pakistan-China Strategic Dialogue

Published

5 days ago

May 13, 2023

Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan

Image credit: Xinhua/Jiang Chao

At the invitation of Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang of the People’s Republic of China undertook his first official visit to Pakistan from 5 to 6 May 2023. On 6 May 2023, the two Foreign Ministers co-chaired the 4th round of the Foreign Minister-level Pakistan-China Strategic Dialogue in Islamabad.

The Strategic Dialogue is a structured mechanism that reviews bilateral cooperation in key areas. The two sides reaffirmed the abiding vitality of the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership; develop a roadmap for multidimensional cooperation between Pakistan and China; and discuss the evolving regional and global landscape.

During the dialogue, the entire range of bilateral relations and cooperation, including in political, strategic, economic, defense security, education, and cultural domains was reviewed. Regional and global issues of mutual interest were also discussed.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan congratulated the Chinese leadership on the successful holding of the ‘Two Sessions’. He wished China’s people and the new leadership greater success in building a strong, prosperous, and modern socialist country. He also expressed his resolve to work together with State Councilor Qin Gang to further fortify the Pakistan-China relationship.

Recalling the consensus reached between the leadership of the two countries during the visit of Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif to Beijing in November 2022, the two sides agreed to further strengthen Pakistan-China strategic relations amidst profound regional and international changes. The Foreign Ministers expressed satisfaction at the growing momentum in high-level exchanges between Pakistan and China while reaffirming the need for convening important bilateral sectoral engagements.

The two Foreign Ministers underlined that Pakistan-China friendship was a historic reality and a conscious choice of the two nations. As ‘All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partners’, Pakistan and China enjoy complete mutual trust, and their iron-clad friendship enjoys complete consensus in both countries.

Both sides agreed on continuing their enduring support on issues concerning each other’s core national interests. Reaffirming Pakistan’s special place in China’s neighborhood diplomacy, the Chinese side reiterated its firm support for Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as its unity, stability, and economic prosperity. The Pakistani side reiterated its commitment to the “One China” policy as well as its firm support to China on all core issues of its national interest, including Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea.

Welcoming the completion of a decade of CPEC in 2023, the two sides hailed CPEC as a shining example of Belt and Road cooperation which has accelerated socio-economic development, job creation, and improvement of people’s livelihoods in Pakistan. Reaffirming their commitment to the high-quality development of CPEC, both sides noted with satisfaction the steady progress of CPEC projects. The two sides reiterated the key significance of the ML-1 project under the CPEC framework and agreed to advance its earliest implementation. They also agreed to actively advance the Karachi Circular Railway alongside key areas of cooperation including, inter alia, agriculture, science and technology, IT, and renewable energy.

The two sides reviewed the progress of various projects at Gwadar, including the Friendship Hospital and New Gwadar International Airport (NGIA). Both sides reiterated their resolve to develop Gwadar as a high-quality port and a hub for regional trade and connectivity.

Acknowledging industrialization as highly conducive to long-term sustainable economic growth and development, they also agreed to work together in the guidance of the Framework Agreement on Industrial Cooperation to actively advance industrial cooperation. Both sides reiterated that CPEC is an open and inclusive platform for win-win cooperation and invited third parties to maximize benefits from CPEC.

The Pakistani side expressed gratitude to the Chinese side for its economic and financial support and its generous assistance package for post-flood reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The two sides reiterated their firm resolve to counter-terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Acknowledging the endeavors and sacrifices made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism and extremism, the Chinese side appreciated the measures taken by Pakistan to ensure enhanced security of Chinese projects, personnel, and institutions in Pakistan, as well as the steps are taken to apprehend and bring to justice the perpetrators targeting Chinese nationals in Dasu, Karachi and other attacks. The two sides agreed to further build on the cooperation in security and counter-terrorism domains.

Reviewing their cooperation on regional and international issues at multilateral forums such as the United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the two sides agreed to further deepen their coordination and cooperation to safeguard mutual interests. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and support for multilateralism, free trade, and win-win cooperation.

The Pakistani side supports the Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative put forward by the Chinese side. The two sides are ready to advance cooperation on the GDI and GSI bilaterally and in multilateral fora. The Pakistani side welcomed the Global Civilization Initiative proposed by the Chinese side.

Both sides underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability in South Asia and the need for the resolution of all outstanding disputes. The Pakistani side briefed the Chinese side on the latest developments of the situation in Jammu & Kashmir. The Chinese side reiterated that the Kashmir dispute was left over from history and should be properly and peacefully resolved in accordance with the UN Charter, relevant Security Council resolutions, and bilateral agreements. Both sides opposed any unilateral actions that further complicate the already volatile situation.

Stressing that peace and stability in Afghanistan is vital for socio-economic development, connectivity, and prosperity in the region, both sides called on all stakeholders to work together for a peaceful, stable, prosperous, and united Afghanistan, which would firmly combat terrorism and live in harmony with its neighbors. The two sides underscored the need for the international community to provide continued assistance and support to Afghanistan including through unfreezing of Afghanistan’s overseas financial assets. The two sides agreed to continue their humanitarian and economic assistance for the Afghan people and enhance development cooperation in Afghanistan, including through the extension of CPEC to Afghanistan.

Qin said his country will “continue to do our best to support Pakistan’s foreign exchange and financial stability.” It was the Chinese decision to roll over even commercial loans to Pakistan that has helped keep Pakistan financially afloat. So, China’s help has been extremely vital to help Pakistan, at least keep its foreign exchange reserves.

Both foreign ministers rejected the perception that Pakistan is a victim of “debt-trap diplomacy” and the assertions that China targets struggling economies through unsustainable loans to pursue its geo-strategic goals. There is no basis whatsoever in the so-called debt sustainability, debt trap … concerns that are propagated. Chinese investment and financial support … is in keeping with the traditions of our unique, time-tested friendship.

Qin’s visit to Pakistan comes on the heels of the Pakistani army chief’s visit to Beijing just over a week ago and a bilateral political consultation there in March. The two heads of state met in China last November.

During a visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister to Pakistan, some potential expected outcomes could include:

Strengthening Bilateral Relations: The visit may aim to reaffirm the strong friendship and deepen bilateral ties between China and Pakistan. The discussions could focus on enhancing cooperation in areas such as trade, investment, energy, infrastructure projects, and people-to-people exchanges.

Economic Collaboration: Both countries may discuss furthering economic cooperation, including implementing projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This ambitious initiative aims to connect Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province with China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang through a network of infrastructure projects.

Security and Defense Cooperation: Given the strategic nature of their relationship, security, and defense collaboration may be a significant part of the discussions. This could involve discussions on joint military exercises, arms deals, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism efforts.

Regional and International Issues: China and Pakistan often coordinate their positions on regional and international matters. The visit may involve discussions on issues like Afghanistan, regional stability, cooperation within multilateral forums like the United Nations, and common interests in South Asia and the broader region.

People-to-People Exchanges: Cultural, educational, and tourism exchanges may be highlighted during the visit. Efforts to enhance people-to-people contacts, student exchanges, and cultural cooperation could be discussed as means to deepen the understanding and friendship between the two nations.

South Asia

The Hour of Reckoning for Pakistan

Published

1 week ago

May 9, 2023

Fizza Ali

The current standoff between major political parties in Pakistan has also deepened the county’s constitutional crisis. With politicians unwilling to set aside their differences, Pakistan’s democracy and governing institutions are in serious trouble. We often hear that in an ideal democracy the essential aim is to maintain a balance between democratic freedoms and social order. However, what we are witnessing today is quite the opposite. Instead of engaging in healthy democratic political competition, political actors are bending backwards to literally terminate each other. A recurring question that is often asked and answered is the extent to which polarisation has increased in the country. And the common answer is yes it has, indeed, increased and in unprecedented ways.

No other country within the proximate region has seen so much political violence for so long, and with as many entangled dimensions as Pakistan has. Not a day goes by without the forces of polarization manifesting across the nation, further worsening our state of uncertainty. From filing several cases, to using regulatory authorities to block coverage and speeches of opposition leaders, to conducting searches and arrests on mostly fabricated and easily dismissed charges. The government is currently engaged in politics of reprisal, making a mockery of democracy and the rule of law. In all past instances, the results of such periods of intense polarization have only resulted in destabilization while harming the institutions which are essential to democracy. Not to mention that political attitudes, such as these, have generated an atmosphere of hostility among political leaders that go far beyond the normal boundaries of peaceful political contestation. All scholars of democracy collectively agree on this notion, that the greatest reward of democratic systems is not just limited to rapid economic growth or progressive social policies, but also the certainty that the transfer of power from one government to another will be peaceful and predictable. A system of governance in which elections are not held on time and are marred by irregularities is less of the democracy it is intended to be and more of an exploitative authoritarian regime. The government’s recent line of strategy seems like a desperation to retain power. Giving rise to potential new threats when it comes to the viability of democratic rule in Pakistan. Such events have strengthened the growing public perception that it is all part of a greater political game to block the democratic process of change that is conducted through elections. After all, a truncated National Assembly cannot claim to represent the entire electorate, as they must seek fresh mandate from the public to govern. They must realize that there are no “choices” in the constitutional prescription when it comes to election timelines. If elections could be held back in 2008, there is no reason why they cannot be held now. Politicians who are hiding behind the judiciary’s internal turmoil to reject the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s latest ruling in the elections delay case should, perhaps, not throw both sense and restraint out of the window.

In this atmosphere of heightened political polarisation, where the stakes are so high, and the divisions are so deep; the fate of Pakistan’s difficult democratic transition depends on its political leadership. The power to navigate the ship back to calmer seas has, since the beginning, rested on their shoulders. Should cooler heads prevail, as one certainly hopes, the two sides can reach some form of negotiated settlement. Political reconciliation is the need of time, given the multitudes of external and internal challenges presently confronting the economic and political landscape of Pakistan. Instead of trying to use extra-legal means to maintain its rule, the government should seek to defuse the deepening political polarization that currently exists. They must realize that it cannot force any exception to the Constitution without setting a precedent that will shatter the very foundations of Pakistani democracy. One must remember that such tactics did not work previously, and they will certainly not work for now. At this crucial stage, the nation needs all hands-on deck. Putting citizens first, respecting their right to vote in a timely manner and recognizing their ownership of the country are crucial. Running away from the elections is not the solution to the problems that we are confronted with. This current wave of revenge politics has created an extremely dangerous situation that threatens to derail the entire democratic political process. Even more worrying is the fact that the unfolding political power game has exacerbated the clash of institutions, leading towards a systemic collapse.

As for the friendly countries to whom we go far too often, hat in hand, the message from them is quite clear: put your house in order first, they tell us, and with good reason. Except we refuse to do anything like that. In the coming months, with food price inflation at an all-time high, should tempers instead continue to increase, more violence and unrest can be expected, further destabilizing the polity and undermining a fragile economy at the expense of the Pakistani citizens lives and livelihoods. The window for finding an amicable way out of the present crisis is closing fast. It is incumbent upon both parties to find a democratic solution to this impasse as there is no point in putting up defiance at the peril of public peace. At present, the only way forward is free and fair elections and restoration of constitutional order. Although the coalition government has stated that only the parliament has the mandate to legislate and decide on elections, it should be borne in mind that no decision by the legislature should violate the Constitution of Pakistan. The 90-day constitutional limit of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab caretaker governments has already passed, and it would not be incorrect to say that the two caretaker administrations are presently operating in a legal vacuum. Now is the time for power circles in Pakistan to rise above the politics of tactical manoeuvring for short-term political and economic gains. Now is the time for better sense to prevail and for there to be constructive engagement rather than destruction.